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ART. I.—THE EARLY IRISH CHURCH.

Essays on the Origin, Doctrines, and Discipline of the Early Irish Church.
By the Rev. Dr. MORAN, Vice-Rector of the Irish College, Rome. Duffy,
1864.

THE British Parliament is not always a safe school of history. A statement in Hume apt for present debate is used without inquiry; whether since confirmed or confuted, it passes current in the House, and though its inaccuracy be afterwards proved, the misstatement has meanwhile travelled far and wide on the wings of the daily press to the newspaper readers of the kingdom, and truth in a pamphlet labours in vain to overtake it. The error floats in the superficial recollection of the many, whilst the authentic correction is stored but in the libraries and the memory of the few.

More than twenty years ago Lord John Manners, in a debate on "the Irish Arms Bill," stated "that the Roman Catholic Church was not the Church of the Irish people originally; that Church was for hundreds of years independent of Rome, and it was not till an English king conquered Ireland that the supremacy of the Pope was acknowledged by it."

Lord John Manners added, "This is no curious opinion, tortured out of obscure records, but is a received fact, stated in strong terms, among other historians, by Mr. O'Driscoll, a Roman Catholic himself." Dr. Rock, in his then letter to Lord John Manners, acknowledged that he did not know what might be the religious belief of Mr. O'Driscoll. It is a pity that Dr. Rock did not refer to Mr. O'Driscoll's "Views of Ireland," because he would at once have ascertained that Mr. O'Driscoll was an avowed and strong Protestant!

Yet Lord John Manners, upon the strength of Mr. O'Driscoll's Irish name (for nothing else in him or his book savours of Catholicity), quoted him as a Catholic authority, adequate to transmute a "curious opinion" into a "received fact." And such is the

parentage of many received facts in the British Parliament and in English society !

Last year this curious opinion was re-announced by the Archbishop of Armagh in his charge, and by the Bishop of Oxford in the House of Lords ; its echo was heard on many hustings at the last election, and it has doubtless been received as a fact by most of the clergy and half the people of England.

Even if true it would be useless as an argument, since the length of ecclesiastical possession by Catholics in Ireland previous to the Reformation is admitted to have been at least equal to that of Protestants since ; and whether, therefore, the Catholic Church had existed in Ireland for four hundred or for fourteen hundred years before the Reformation, its right by possession was then, even according to the Protestant view, more venerable than that of the Irish Established Church is now.

But the statement, though argumentatively useless if true, is positively untrue, nay, the very opposite to the fact ; for, as Dr. Rock had proved before, Dr. Moran proves again, and more completely from the further evidence which has during the last twenty years come to light, and chiefly from Protestant sources, that S. Patrick was a Catholic, and a Roman Catholic, and that the Irish, his spiritual children, were and ever continued to be Catholics, in communion with the See of Rome, professing the distinctive doctrines and habituated to the distinctive practices of the Catholic Church, and that not a single Protestant doctrine or Protestant practice prevailed amongst them.

The Bishop of Oxford at the same time mentioned that S. Patrick himself informs us that his father and grandfather were, the one a priest, and the other a deacon ; this and the extract from an old Irish canon, to which we shall next refer, form the most plausible grounds of inference on the Protestant side we have yet seen, though these relate to *discipline* only—and even these grounds disappear when they come to be examined. S. Patrick does mention the fact alluded to, but that it was the custom of priests and deacons then to marry by no means follows, any more than it would follow that, because the late Cardinal Weld had a daughter well known in English society, therefore it is the present custom for cardinals to marry. It is no very unfrequent circumstance for a layman left a widower with a child to become a priest ; the only thing extraordinary is if it happened to have occurred with both father and son, and perhaps it was just because it was extraordinary that his father and grandfather should have been, the one a priest and the other a deacon, that S. Patrick mentioned it.

Dr. Todd writes thus :—"The following canon, the sixth of this synod, seems to have been enacted before the celibacy of the clergy was enforced in Ireland : 'What cleric soever . . . or if his

wife does not walk with her head veiled, let them (*i. e.*, the clerk and his wife) be despised by the laity, and also separated from the Church.”

That Dr. Todd has been misled by an erroneous copy of the language of the canon would appear from the following remarks of Dr. Moran:—

Dr. Todd supposes that the second part of the sixth canon above cited has relation to the *clerk's wife*; the original words, as quoted by him, of the text seem, indeed, to leave no doubt on this head: since, after speaking of *quicumque clericus*, it adds *et uxor ejus*. However, to say the least of it, Dr. Todd does not display his usual candour in this argument. When citing the original Latin text he refers to Martene's edition, and yet he forgets to mention that the word *ejus* (on which his own argument entirely rests) is omitted in Martene's text. If this word were supposed to form part of the original text it would supply an additional argument for the antiquity of these canons, as we should suppose these canons to have been enacted at a time when very many were assumed from the marriage state to the sacerdotal dignity, and when, consequently, a special enactment was required regarding the wives from whom the clergy should separate themselves, according to the disciplinary law of celibacy rigorously observed in our early Church. However this formula, *uxor ejus*, occurs only in the text of Spelman, from whose edition it was copied by Ware and some others. The MS. from which Spelman took this text seems to have been of the eleventh century; and he himself assures us that it was corrupt in many places, *pluries malesanum*, and standing in absolute need of critical correction, *et in locis quibusdam criticorum implorsus sagacitatem*. On the other hand, we have an accurate text of this ancient decree, viz., as it is recorded in the “*Collectio Hibernensis Canonum*,” one of the most authentic of our ecclesiastical monuments, and dating from the year 700. Now, in this valuable record the canon of our apostle is thus quoted:—

“*Patricius: quicumque clericus ab ostiario usque ad sacerdotem, si non tunica usus fuerit, quæ turpitudinem ventris tegat et nuditatem, et si non more Romano capilli ejus tonsi sint: et uxor si non velato capite ambulerit, pariter a laicis contemnentur et ab ecclesia separentur.*”

“Patrick decreed: Whatsoever cleric, from an ostiarius to a priest, who shall not wear a tunic to cover his nakedness, and whose hair is not shorn according to the custom of Rome; and a wife appearing in public with an unveiled head, shall be alike despised by the laity, and separated from the Church.”

Thus, then, there is nothing in the ancient canon of S. Patrick about the “clerk and his wife,” but whilst the first part of the canon presents an enactment regarding the clergy, the second part prescribes that married women, too, should adopt the law of Rome, and that only when veiled should they appear in public. In the Roman Church, as we learn from S. Jerome, the veil was worn by virgins consecrated to God, as a sign of their being espoused to Christ, and by married females, in *signum obedi-*

tie viro suo. Thus our apostle, whilst sanctioning the Roman usage, in regard to the ordinary dress of the clergy, wished, too, to introduce the veil as worn by the married females in Rome.

Dr. Moran's work displays much learning, industry, and critical power ; he corrects many previous errors by access to later sources of information. His treatment of the subject is both exhaustive and conclusive ; it is moderate in compass, good in style, close in argument, and contains much matter which cannot in so convenient a form, and perhaps not at all, be met with elsewhere, and we would strongly recommend its perusal to any of our readers who wish without very much trouble to obtain an accurate acquaintance with the subject.

We will endeavour, as far as space will admit, to show the outline and general purport of our author's remarks on the question whether S. Patrick and the early Irish were in communion with, and acknowledged the authority of the See of Rome, that being the most distinguishing test of their Catholicity, though the identity of the ancient Irish and of the present Catholic belief in other special doctrines is also satisfactorily established by Dr. Moran. And if we arrive at the conclusion that the Faith, then as now, of the Catholic Church was preached by S. Patrick, and adopted by his Irish disciples, and transmitted by them to their successors, and diffused by many of them throughout Europe, one other corroborative and consentient testimony would be furnished of that which stands secure upon other and independent grounds, and another illustration of what so frequently transpires in the pursuit of various branches of knowledge, that the facts of science and of history, and of all human knowledge, though sometimes at first, and when only partially known, they may seem to our limited faculties to conflict with Catholic Truth, yet when further investigated, and more carefully and fully comprehended, they are found singularly and uniformly to confirm it, and the more complete and accurate the knowledge the more exact and striking the confirmation.

S. Patrick, in his "Confessions," records that his family had a house near Bonavem Tabernæ, where we may presume he was born in 387. Ussher and others consider this place to have been Dumbarton, in Scotland, but it is now more generally believed to have been in Armorica, and near the present Boulogne.

During an invasion of that country by the Irish in 403, he was taken prisoner at the age of 16, and remained in servitude for six years in Ireland, until he escaped and returned to Gaul. He then determined to devote himself to the service of the Church, and to missionary labours in Ireland.

If we may venture from his actions to guess his character,

we should say that he was by nature strong both in body and mind, of a warm and enthusiastic temperament, which made him feel keenly for others, and inclined him to high and difficult enterprise; but with that peculiar instinct or genius which both leads and wins human nature, the shrewd good sense which grasps the practicable, and distinguishes it from the chimerical, and the firm and sustained determination which, combined with the previous qualities, enabled him to accomplish with apparent ease what few have ever accomplished in a manner equally complete, and with a result equally enduring. His early slavery (for such it was) for six years in Ireland made him sympathize with the sufferings, and acquainted with the language of the people; both inclined and enabled him to help them; he brooded over their condition, and how he might most effectually help them. He wished to serve both God and those who had been his fellows in suffering, and in order to this on his return home he devoted himself to the sacred ministry, and even then heard in a vision "the voice of the Hibernians" calling him to that great work which he afterwards undertook and accomplished, which would to many good men have been only a dream, or at most an abortive endeavour, but which his peculiar combination of the qualities of heart and mind, with the grace of God, enabled him to realize.

He studied four years in the celebrated monastery and college of St. Martin, near Tours, and afterwards placed himself under the direction of S. German of Auxerre. S. German and S. Lupus were in 429 sent by the Pope to Britain to eradicate from that country the errors of Pelagianism, and S. Patrick accompanied them as one of their disciples.

At the same time the attention of the Pope was called to the state of Christianity in Ireland, and he resolved to send a bishop there. S. Patrick was for this purpose sent by S. German with recommendations to the Holy Father, but before he arrived Palladius had departed for Ireland. Prosper, a contemporary writer, speaking of Palladius, says, "he was ordained by Pope Celestin, and sent the first bishop to the Scots (i.e. the Irish) believing in Christ," from which it is evident that there were previously Christians in Ireland, though without any bishop amongst them.

Palladius reached Ireland, remained there a few months, and founded three churches; but his success was not great, or equal to his hopes, and he retired dispirited to Britain, where he died.

Palladius, thus selected by the Pope to be bishop to the Irish, had been deacon of the Church of Rome, and left a distinguished position of honour and comfort to undertake an arduous duty. There is no reason to doubt that he was a good man, and he must have possessed many qualifications for the work for which he was

selected. His failure, therefore, only indicates the difficulties of the undertaking to a man of more than average aptitude, but who had not the extraordinary endowments, natural, such as those already mentioned, and acquired, such as the knowledge of the language, which were possessed by S. Patrick.

It would seem that news of the failure of Palladius had reached Rome, and that S. Patrick had been appointed his successor, or more probably, S. German, on hearing of the mission of Palladius to Ireland, had recommended to the Pope S. Patrick, from his knowledge of the Irish language and other qualifications, as coadjutor to Palladius; for when two or three of the disciples of Palladius set out to announce his appointment to his successor, they met S. Patrick in Gaul, on his way from Rome to Ireland. He then, after being consecrated bishop in Gaul, proceeded on his course, and arrived in Ireland in 432. His baptismal name was Succath: at the time of his ordination it was changed to Magonius, but Pope Celestin, to add dignity to his mission, had conferred upon him the Patrician order, which had been instituted by Constantine, the first Christian emperor, and he became afterwards generally known by the name of Patricius, which was originally a rank and not a name. The events in the life of S. Patrick thus briefly stated are one by one elaborately proved by Dr. Moran from contemporary or very early documents, the authenticity of which is admitted by Protestant authors.

There is not the slightest symptom apparent of any variance between the doctrines which he, fresh from Gaul, from Britain, and from Rome, taught, and those which the earlier Irish Christians had learned from their previous teachers, whoever they may have been. The doctrines of the Catholic faith, from whatever quarter derived, seem to have been uniformly identical; the very variances in discipline or practice, in the tonsure or in the time of observing Easter, and the importance which was attached to these and the pertinacity with which they were for a long time adhered to, serve only to prove that there could not have been any variances of doctrine or they would undoubtedly have appeared and have been made the most of, have been discussed with equal warmth and pertinacity, and have been either retained with obstinacy or abandoned with reluctance. Nothing of the sort appears, and the inference therefore is very strong, that nothing of the sort existed.

It is no part of our undertaking to give a detailed account of the piety, zeal, and wisdom of this Apostle of the Irish. He completed the great work of the conversion of Ireland, and he made it a solid and enduring work. The grace and blessing of God did this through him; but, as God usually effects His will by obvious human means, He in this instance also employed means peculiarly adapted to the end. The personal influence of S. Patrick must have been

very great, for he converted multitudes, the rich as well as the poor, and even induced kings whom he did not convert to appreciate his character and to tolerate his labours for the conversion of others; and he penetrated to the most distant parts of the island. Indeed, the voice which he had heard in sleep had sounded to him from the woods fringing the western sea of Ireland, and the mountain which still bears his name—Croagh Patrick—and whither in later years he retired for the fast and prayer of Lent, towers in isolated grandeur over the far north-western coast of Clew Bay with its hundred islands. He was mild yet fearless, and with his strong discriminating sense and knowledge of mankind adapted himself to every rank and class of society. The poor, of course, were his readiest and most numerous hearers, but he made many converts among the sons and daughters of the chieftains. They admired and respected the man, though, like many persons in advanced life, they did not adopt the truth that was new to them; and probably he was often a useful counsellor to them and a frequent mediator between them.

During the latter part of his life he wrote his "Confession," for the purpose of informing foreigners of the redeeming change which God had through his ministry worked in the minds of the Irish. He died on 17th March, 465, being then seventy-eight years of age, though accounts vary as to his age and the period of his death.

What then was the faith taught by S. Patrick and his immediate successors?

We confine ourselves to the acknowledgment of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, as without that all other agreement would be incomplete; but our readers who refer to Dr. Moran's *Essays* will find them equally conclusive as to the real presence and sacrifice of the altar, prayers for the dead, confession to and absolution by the priest, prayers to the Blessed Virgin and other saints for their intercession with God, and respect paid to relics, &c.

The doctrines taught by S. Patrick would naturally be, not only in conformity with those of the Pope who sent him, but also with those of the Church in Gaul where he had studied, and with those of S. Germanus of Auxerre, and S. Lupus of Troyes, with whom he had been intimate, the former of whom had recommended him to the Pope, and the disciple of both of whom he had been when they were sent by the Pope to oppose the Pelagian heresy in Britain. And it is not questioned that the doctrines then taught in Gaul and by S. Germanus and S. Lupus were identical with those of the Church of Rome.

The Protestant antiquary Petrie (*Essay on Tara*, p. 92) and Ussher (*Discourse*, &c. : Dub. 1815, p. 84) both admit the mission of S. Patrick from Rome. In the ancient tract preserved in the Book of Armagh, the first leaf, in which we would expect to

find the relations between S. Patrick and Pope Celestine mentioned, has disappeared within the last two hundred years. In Ussher's time the tract was complete, and Ussher records that the mission of S. Patrick from Rome was attested without a dissentient voice by the historians of his time.

S. Prosper, in his work against Cassian, written between the years 433 and 440, says, "Whilst that Pope (Celestine) laboured to keep the Roman island (Britain) Catholic, he caused also the barbarian island to be gathered to the fold of Christ, by ordaining a bishop for the Irish."

We may just mention here that the Protestant Dean of Ardagh, Dr. Murray, in his "Ireland and her Church," published in London 1845, and which is often now referred to by Protestants, suggests that "while the papal (*i. e.* foreign) writers make Palladius the first apostle, and take no notice of Patrick, the Irish make Patrick first, and take no notice of Palladius." (Moran, 43.)

The fact, however, is not as he states; S. Tirechan, the Scoliaist of S. Fiace, Miurchu-Maccu-Macthenus, the Leabhar Breac, the Annals of Ulster, and the various Irish lives of S. Patrick, expressly mention S. Palladius as well as S. Patrick; and Bede, in his "Martyrology," Alcuin, Eric of Auxerre, Sigebert of Gemblours, Giraldus Cambrensis, and Ricemarch also, all mention both Palladius and Patrick. Dr. Murray seems to have been misled by the silence of Prosper, and of Bede in his Chronicle; but Prosper, writing in 434, may not have had full information of the success of S. Patrick; and Bede, who omits to refer to S. Patrick in his Chronicle relating to the affairs of Britain, expressly mentions him in his "Martyrology."

Probus, in his "Life of S. Patrick," written in the eighth century, says that, on being nominated to the Irish mission, "S. Patrick poured forth to God the following prayer: 'O Lord Jesus Christ, lead me, I beseech thee, to the seat of the holy Roman Church, that receiving authority there to preach with confidence thy sacred truths, the Irish nation may, through my ministry, be gathered to the fold of Christ.' And soon after, being about to proceed to Ireland, this man of God, Patrick, went, as he had wished, to Rome, the head of all Churches, and having asked and received the apostolic blessing, he returned, pursuing the same road by which he had journeyed thither."

The "Via Quarta" of S. Patrick, supposed to have been written by S. Eileran, and which bears internal evidence of having been written previous to the year 774, says, "S. Germanus sent Patrick to Rome for the apostolic licence, for this was required by the ecclesiastical law; and Patrick having come to Rome was most honourably received by the holy Pope Celestine, and relics of saints being given to him, he was sent to Ireland by that Pontiff."

The "*Vita Tripartita*," of which a copy was found in the British Museum in 1849, and which was referred both by Colgan and Curry to the sixth century, is to the same effect.

These and other ancient lives of S. Patrick, all of which were written at a time when it is now asserted that Ireland was Protestant, vary in minor details, but they all concur in relating that he was sent upon his mission by the supreme authority of the Vicar of Christ.

One of those beautiful proverbs called *Dicta Sancti Patritii*, preserved in the Book of Armagh, which was transcribed in the year 807, is to the following effect: "Thanks be to God: you have passed from the kingdom of Satan to the city of God; the Church of the Irish is a Church of Romans; as you are children of Christ, so be you children of Rome." (*Liber Armacan*, fol. 9.)

S. Columbanus, who had conversed with the disciples of S. Patrick, dying in old age in 615, and who had acquired learning and piety in the great monastery of Bangor, in Ireland, declares that "the Irish are the scholars and disciples of Rome;" and addressing Pope Boniface IV. he wrote, "The Catholic faith is held unshaken by us as it was delivered to us by you, the successors of the holy Apostles."

We are indebted to the eminent German antiquarian Mone for two very ancient hymns of the Irish Church to S. Peter, which he discovered amongst the papers of the old Irish monastery of Reichenau, and which he published from Irish manuscripts of the eighth and ninth centuries in his work entitled "*Hymni Latini Medii Ævi*." Fribourg, 1855.

We regret that want of space does not allow us to copy from Dr. Moran's work these beautiful hymns and their equally beautiful translation. The 4th and 5th verses of one are as follows in original and translation:—

Dudum elegit dominus
Petrum ut optimum oleum,
Ut obitaret Dominum
Essetque pastor ovium.

In years long past, in bygone time,
As highest prince, to post sublime,
Was Peter chosen to succeed,
And Christ's ne'er-failing flock to feed.

Elaboravit ubique,
Curæ datus historiæ,
Fundamentum dominicæ
Ecclesiæ Catholicæ.

Nor clime, nor space, might bound
his zeal,
And pages writ his deeds reveal;
On him, the rock so strong, so sure,
Christ's Church shall ever firm endure.

And the following are the 4th and 5th verses of the other hymn:—

Sancto Petro pro merito,
Christus regni caelestium,
Claves simul cum gratiâ,
Tradidit in perpetuum.

Animarum pontificem,
Apostolorum principem,
Petrum rogamus omnium,
Christi pastorem ovium.

The keys which ope the portals blest,
That lead the way to endless rest,
To him Christ gives, with grace to
tend

And guide his flock safe to the end.

Great Pontiff of Christ's chosen band,
Apostles round thee humbly stand !
O'er Christ's true flock strict watch
still keep,
Still guard his lambs, still guard his
sheep.

These hymns were written by an Irishman not later than the eighth or ninth century, possibly earlier, since they may have been composed some time before the manuscripts found were written. Was he a Catholic or a Protestant? They seem to us just such hymns as a devout and educated Catholic of the present day would delight to compose, whilst they could not have been written by a Protestant.

S. Cummian Fota (i.e. the tall) was born about 590, and died in 661. He was Bishop of Clonfert. A short hymn on the Apostles by this father of the early Irish Church has been preserved to us. One strophe relates to each Apostle, that respecting S. Peter being as follows:—"Rejoice, O New Jerusalem! solemnize the glad-some festivals of Christ, and exult in the commemoration of the Apostles—of Peter the keybearer—the first pastor—the mystic fisherman, who with the Gospel net draws in the spiritual fish of Christ." (Moran, 88.)

Ussher relies upon the hymn of S. Sechnall or Secundinus, a disciple and relative of S. Patrick, as asserting the Protestant tenet regarding S. Peter and the see of Rome. The passage in his hymn upon which Ussher relies he translates as follows:—"Patrick is constant in the fear of God and immovable in the faith; upon whom the church is built as upon S. Peter, whose apostleship also he has obtained from God, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against him." Even if this translation were correct it would only mean that S. Patrick was chosen to hold that post of honour and jurisdiction and privilege in the Irish Church which belonged to S. Peter in regard to the Universal Church. We are indebted to the Irish Archaeological Society for an edition of this hymn. The passage on which Ussher relies forms the third strophe, and runs thus in the original text:—

Constans in Dei timore et fide immobilis
Super quem edificatur, ut Petrus, ecclesia:
Cujusque apostolatium a Deo sortitus est
In ejus porta adversus inferni non prevalent.

Of which the literal translation is—"He is constant in the service of God and immovable in the faith as Peter, upon whom the church is built, and whose apostolate he received from God; against whose bulwark the assaults of hell cannot prevail." Ussher's translation would require Petrum in the accusative, which indeed was the reading adopted by Ussher, but is no longer tenable, since the Leabhar Breac and the Dublin MS. of the book of hymns, and also the Roman MS., all read "ut Petrus." So far therefore from depreciating, according to the Protestant view, the prerogatives of S. Peter, it serves to illustrate them.

S. Mochta, of Louth, was a disciple of S. Patrick. He went to Rome about the year 460, and, on account of the previous heresy of Celestius, who was of the Irish nation, he was required to present to Pope Leo the Great his profession of faith, of which a copy, written about 700, was discovered by Muratori in the famous Irish monastery of Bobbio. In this he writes, "If for the fault of one individual the inhabitants of the whole country are to be deemed accursed, let that most blessed disciple, too, be condemned; I mean Rome itself, from which hitherto not only one, but two or three, or even more heresies have gone forth; and nevertheless, none of them could get hold of or contaminate the Chair of Peter, that is to say, the see of faith."

The monastery of Bobbio furnishes a further proof, for thence to the Ambrosian Library at Milan was brought by Cardinal Frederick Borromeo the missal of S. Columbanus. Mabillon, who published it in 1724, says it was then more than a thousand years old. Different opinions have been maintained amongst the learned whether this missal was a specimen of the Gallic or of the Irish liturgy, but it seems to us to be proved by Dr. Moran that it is the latter, and was most probably the very Irish liturgy which a writer of the seventh century records was bequeathed by S. Columbanus to the monastery of Bobbio. Among its masses there is one specially assigned for the feast of the "*Cathedra Sancti Petri*," and that apostle is said to have received *omne jus gentium Judæorumque*, and his are declared to be "the keys of heaven, the dignity of the pontifical chair; so great a power, that what he binds none can loosen, and what he loosens shall be loosed also in heaven; a throne of exalted dignity, where he will sit in judgment on all the nations of the earth." The first collect of the same Mass thus begins:—"O God! who on this day didst give to S. Peter, after Thyself, the headship of the whole Church, we humbly pray Thee, that as Thou didst constitute him pastor for the safety of Thy flock, and that Thy sheep might be preserved from error, so now Thou mayest save us through his intercession." In the Mass for Sundays it is said that the Divine Redeemer, stretching forth His hand to S. Peter when sinking in the waves, was an emblem of how

"the wavering faith of that apostle was consolidated and he himself confirmed as Head of the Church." And again, on the feast-day of the apostles SS. Peter and Paul, it is declared that "from the whole body of the apostles the Redeemer chose S. Peter as the foundation of the Church, and confirmed his faith, to the great joy of all the disciples." (Moran, 96.) Indeed, this missal corresponds in all essentials with the present Catholic missal, and in itself offers conclusive proof that the Holy Sacrifice of the body and blood of our Saviour was offered then as now. It contains two masses in honour of the Blessed Virgin, one for her general feasts and the other for the Assumption, masses for other Saint-days and masses for the dead; and is in itself a written testimony that the Catholic faith of Ireland, France, and Italy in the sixth century was identical with the Catholic faith of the present day.

The letter of Columbanus to Pope Boniface was written soon after the saint had settled in Italy, and deserves to be specially noticed, because some expressions from it have been quoted as implying a want of due respect to the Pope. It is addressed, "To the most beautiful Head of all the Churches of the whole of Europe, to the beloved Pope, the exalted prelate, the most reverend overseer, the pastor of pastors," &c. Subsequently the popes are styled, "the masters, the steersmen, the mystic pilots of the ship spiritual, i.e. the Church." Whilst of his countrymen he says, "We are the scholars of S. Peter and S. Paul and of all disciples subscribing by the Holy Ghost to the divine canon; all are Irish inhabitants of the remotest part of the whole world, receiving nothing save what is evangelic and apostolic doctrine. None of us has been a heretic, none a Jew, none a schismatic; but the faith just as it was at first delivered by you, the successors of the holy Apostles, is held unshaken." And at the close of his letter he adds, "We are, as I said before, bound to the Church of S. Peter. For although Rome is great and illustrious, yet it is only through this Chair that she is great and renowned amongst us."

As this letter of S. Columbanus is thought by some Protestants to favour their views, let us see how they endeavour to use it. Dean Murray may be considered as comprising their views.

1. In the first place, then, they appeal to the general language of the letter, which they say is "too strong to allow us to suppose that the Irish monk who used it considered Pope Boniface, whom he was addressing, to be the head of the Church."

The language of S. Columbanus is often strong. Indeed the whole letter is written with frankness and liberty, and with all that energetic earnestness which we might expect in one who had grown old not only in the practice of virtue, but also in the apostolate of Gaul and Italy. He, however, reminds the Pontiff that he writes "not as a stranger but a friend—a disciple—a servant," and

he adds, as if anticipating the difficulty which Dean Murray would one day seek to deduce from the freedom of his words, "therefore, freely will I speak, for I address our spiritual masters, the steersmen and pilots of the mystic ship."

2. The next difficulty they find is in the doctrine of S. Columbanus, by which they say he asserts that "it was possible for the See of Rome to forfeit apostolic honour by not preserving the apostolic faith." This is a corruption of the original text, which is, "*Ut ergo honore Apostolico non careas, conserva fidem Apostolicam, confirma testimonio,*" &c., and is an exhortation to the Pope to preserve and confirm the apostolic faith by such means as became the Pastor of Pastors. What did S. Columbanus mean when he exhorted the Pontiff to preserve the faith? Did he look upon Pope Boniface as a simple bishop, whom he exhorted not to be dilatory in defending the cause of truth? No, he addresses him as the common father and pastor of the whole universe. He says, "The Catholics of the whole world, the sheep, are affrighted by the approach of wolves; wherefore use, O Pope, the whistlings and the well-known voice of the true shepherd, and stand betwixt the sheep and the wolves, so that, casting away their fear, the sheep may in everything find thee to be the first pastor." And again, he exhorts the holy Pontiff, "Set, in a manner, higher than all mortals, and exalted near unto the celestial beings, lift up thy voice as a trumpet, that thou mayest show their wicked doings to the people of thy Lord entrusted to thee by Him." Nor is even this sufficient; he adds, "I strive to stir up thee as the prince of the leaders; for unto thee belongeth the peril of the whole of the Lord's army." And then he again addresses him, "Thou hast the power of setting all things to order—of beginning the war—of arousing the leaders—of commanding arms to be taken up—of drawing forth the ranks into battle array, &c." "fearing, do I moan unto thee alone, who from among the princes art the only hope, having authority through the privileges of the apostle Peter." Surely nothing can be more unprotestant than this! S. Columbanus reminds the Pope that he is bound to be at his post, and he declares that that post is the office of the first pastor, who holds the care of the fold of Christ—the guardianship of the people of God. Surely few writers have more clearly than this asserted the privilege of S. Peter's See; and, reading these passages, the mind recognizes instinctively the same spirit that dictated the words of the alarmed apostles when the storm raged around them, and they cried out to the Redeemer, "*Domine, non est tibi curæ quod perimus.*" It is with such sentiments, and with such sentiments only, that S. Columbanus appeals to the Roman Pontiff to watch and preserve the flock of Christ from impending danger.

3. S. Columbanus, however, according to Dean Murray, asserts "that the sword of Peter signifies not temporal power or spiritual jurisdiction, but a true confession of faith in a synod." From this passage it results (1) That the Roman Pontiff wields "the sword of Peter." (2) That it belongs to him to cut off schism from the Church with that spiritual sword. (3) That the opportune means of cutting off the schism of which S. Columbanus speaks was to synodically proclaim the faith of Peter, and then anathematize all who would not receive that faith. For which reason he had already lamented that the Pope, who was endowed with full authority, had not, on the first appearance of the schism, solemnly proclaimed his faith, and then condemned and excommunicated whosoever should even dare to slander the presiding see of the orthodox faith.

4. But at all events, says Dean Murray, S. Columbanus explicitly lays down "that the chair of Peter is capable of being defiled by doctrinal error, and that it is possible for the Catholic faith not to be held in the Apostolic See."

There is no such statement made by S. Columbanus. - He speaks indeed of the mist of suspicion having gathered round the See of Peter, and of the Pope's being ranked among the patrons of heretics, but he takes good care to let the Holy Father and the readers of his letter know that such were not his own sentiments, but merely the sentiments of the schismatics who, like many nowadays, were maligners of Rome, and against whom S. Columbanus exhorts Pope Boniface to unsheath his spiritual sword. Hence, in one place he says that he had written this letter in order to arouse the Pontiff "against those men who blaspheme such as are thine, and clamour against them as the receivers of heretics." Subsequently he adds, "See that the mist of suspicion be drawn aside from the chair of S. Peter, for the reception of heretics is, I hear, imputed to you; but God forbid that I should believe it; it never has occurred, and never will occur to the end of time." And in concluding his letter he again exhorts the Pope to use courageously the spiritual sword, "that my glorying for you may not be in vain, and that your assailants may be confounded and not we; for, as befits disciples in regard to their Master, I declared in your name that the Roman Church admits to its communion none who impugn the Catholic faith." And the whole letter is evidently that of a zealous and plain-speaking man, anxious to exhort him with whom the spiritual authority lay to use it promptly and decisively in defence of the Faith. We are glad that this letter of S. Columbanus has been referred to by Dean Murray and others, since it serves to bring out in bolder relief the teaching of the early Irish Church regarding Rome, and to present that great Irish Saint as an illustrious champion of the prerogatives of the Holy See.

Claudius Clemens, an Irishman who was appointed to the See of Auxerre, and was famed especially for his Gospel Commentaries, is referred to by Archbishop Ussher as insinuating something not unlike Protestant tenets, and it may therefore be well to refer especially to him.

Ussher thus writes :—"The famous passage in Scripture (Matt. xvi. 18) where the Romanists lay the main foundation of the Papacy, Claudius explains in this manner—Upon this rock I will build my Church ; that is to say upon the Lord and Saviour, who granted to His faithful friend, lover, and confessor the participation of His own name, that from Petra (the rock) he should be called Peter."

We shall not readily pardon the Protestant Primate for implying that these words of Claudius are in opposition to the teaching and doctrine of the Catholic Church, for Catholics concur with Protestants that Christ is the true rock on which the Church of God is built ; Catholics, however, also maintain that S. Peter was divinely made a sharer and participator in our Blessed Redeemer's privilege, and this is precisely what Claudius here asserts when he declares that our Saviour granted to Peter "the participation of His own name."

There is another passage in Claudius's "Commentary" which is carefully passed over in silence by Ussher, but which serves to render clearer the words under consideration. He is commenting on the list of the Apostles, and he says—"The first was Simon, who is called Peter ; the name, therefore, which in Latin is Petrus and in Syriac Cepha, is derived from the rock—without doubt from that rock of which S. Paul speaks, 'and the rock was Christ'; for as Christ, the true light, granted to the Apostles that they might be called the light of the world, so, too, to Simon, who believed in the rock Christ, was the name of Peter given ; to the meaning of which name Christ alludes in another place saying, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.'," Thus does Claudius again repeat the Catholic doctrine, and employ moreover the very illustration of it used by Catholic theologians at the present day. Christ grants to Peter a participation of His own Headship of the Church ; precisely as He who was the true light of the universe granted to all the Apostles a participation of this prerogative, so that they, too, are styled "the light of the world."

2. Ussher continues : "Yet does this same Claudius * acknowledge that S. Peter received a kind of primacy for founding the Church, in reference to which he terms him the Prince of the Church, and the prince or chief of the Apostles, but he adds

* It is doubtful whether the Claudius here referred to was the Irish Claudius.

S. Paul also was chosen in the same manner to have the primacy in founding the Churches of the Gentiles." Claudius referring to S. Paul says, "He only names Peter, and compares him with himself because on Peter was conferred the primacy for the foundation of the Church: and in like manner he himself was chosen to hold the primacy in founding the Churches of the Gentiles." The natural conclusion from which is that to S. Peter was granted the universal primacy, comprising the whole Christian world, whilst to S. Paul a primacy, too, was granted, which, however, was limited to the Churches of the Gentiles. Could we wish for a clearer statement of Catholic doctrine?

3. Ussher writes: "It is also observed by Claudius that, as when our Saviour propounded the question generally to all the apostles, Peter answered as one for all; and therefore, however the power of loosing and binding might seem to be given by the Lord to Peter, yet, without doubt, it is to be known that it was given to the rest of the apostles also, as Himself witnesses, who, appearing to them after the triumph of His passion and resurrection, breathed on them and said to them all, 'Receive the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye remit,' &c." We may well understand that it was but little to Ussher's purpose to add the words which immediately follow those just cited by him, and in which Claudius declares that by the Redeemer's words was granted, not only to Peter and the other apostles, but to all bishops and priests to the end of time, the power of remitting sins. But what excuse could the archbishop plead for omitting two other passages—one of which immediately precedes, the other follows in the same page, the text now cited, and which alone afford a key to understand the commentary given by Claudius in regard to the dignity of S. Peter? The first passage, then, which Ussher omits is as follows: "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The word key, then, does not here refer to anything material formed by the hand of man, but it indicates the judiciary power. He who with a zeal greater than the rest acknowledged Christ, was deservedly in a special manner endowed with the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Thus, according to Claudius, all the apostles indeed received the judicatory power from Christ; but in a special manner, and *præ cæteris*, the power of the keys was granted to Peter.

The second passage which is omitted by Ussher is still more important; for, after stating that to all the apostles—nay, and to all bishops and priests—was given the power of binding and loosing, Claudius adds: "But blessed Peter, who had acknowledged Christ in the fulness of faith, and loved Him with a true love, received in a special manner the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the principality of judiciary authority, that thus all the faithful throughout the universe might understand that whosoever in any manner sepa-

rates himself from the unity of his faith and communion, such a one can neither be absolved from the bonds of sin nor enter the portals of the kingdom of heaven." Why did Ussher omit this passage? If he was desirous of illustrating the opinion of Claudius, surely this in the clearest manner presents his opinion to us; but probably the Protestant primate feared to let his readers see how explicitly our Irish commentator, as far back as the year 800, asserted the dignity and prerogatives of S. Peter, and how he expressly declared that the power and privileges granted to the Church by the Divine Redeemer, were all centred in that chosen apostle; and perhaps, too, he feared that some of his readers might meditate on the concluding words of Claudius, that whosoever, throughout the whole world, is not united with Peter in the bonds of communion and faith, can neither obtain the remission of his sins nor enter into the enjoyment of the heavenly kingdom. Claudius was, indeed, a curious witness to bring forward in favour of early Irish Protestantism. As the prophet of old, when brought to curse, pronounced blessings on the people of Israel, so do all early Irish writers who are cited by Protestants, invariably, when their full text is examined, proclaim the Catholic teaching of the early Irish Church.

Among the letters of early Irish writers published by Ussher in his "*Sylloges Epistolarum*," is one written in 634 on the Paschal question by another S. Cumman, who led the penitential life of a hermit, and at one period of his life ruled the famous monastery of Durrow, and who, by the way, enriched his monastery with relics of S. Peter and S. Paul. In this letter he speaks with all reverence of S. Columbkille and other saints who had followed the Irish computation as to the time of observing Easter, but he declares himself compelled, by the practice of the Universal Church, to abandon that ancient system and conform to the new computation. He states the time and study he had himself devoted to the subject, refers to various authorities, but adopts that of S. Jerome. "An old authority," says Jerome, "rises up against me. In the meanwhile I cry out, Whosoever is joined to the chair of S. Peter, with him I shall be." A chief point of S. Cumman's argument is the necessity of maintaining inviolable the unity of the Church. "I turn me," he says, "to the words of the Bishop of Rome, Pope Gregory, whose authority is acknowledged in common by us, and who is gifted with the appellation of the golden-mouth, and who, though writing last of all the Fathers, is deservedly preferred to all; and I find him, writing on the passage of Job, Gold hath a place wherein it is melted, that the gold is the great body of the saints, the place of melting is the unity of the Church, the fire is the suffering of martyrdom, and he who is tried by fire out of the unity of the Church may be melted, indeed, but cannot be cleansed."

After studying for a year the various matters connected with the Paschal controversy, he resolved "to interrogate his fathers that they might declare to him, and his elders that they might narrate to him." Those whom he interrogated were the neighbouring Bishops of Emly, Clonmacnois, Mungret, and Clonfertmolva; and these bishops "having met together in Maghlene, some being personally present, others sending their legates to represent them, they decreed and said, 'Our predecessors, as we know from meet witnesses, of whom some are still living, others now sleep in peace, enacted that we should humbly and without scruple receive whatever things were better and more to be esteemed, when they were sanctioned by the source of our baptism and faith, and brought to us from the successors of the Lord's Apostles.' Afterwards they in common set forth to us, as the custom is, a mandate upon this matter, to keep Easter the coming year along with the whole Church."

After this, in accordance with the commandment, "If a difference arise between cause and cause, and if judgment shall vary between leprosy and leprosy, they shall go up to the place where the Lord hath chosen (Deut. xvii. 8), and with the synodical decree that when causes were of great moment, they should be referred to the head of cities" (which we see was the maxim or decision of S. Patrick himself), "our seniors judged it proper to send wise and humble men, as children to their mother; and by God's will some of them, having had a prosperous journey, reached Rome in safety, and returned to us the third year, and saw that all things were done precisely as had been told to us, and they were the more convinced of these things, seeing them, than if they merely heard of them; for, abiding together with Greek and Oriental and Scythian and Egyptian, they found all celebrating together in S. Peter's Church at Easter; and before the Holy of Holies they attested to us, saying, throughout the whole earth, Easter is, as we know, thus kept. And in the relics and the Scriptures which they brought with them, we found that there was the blessing of God; for with our own eyes we saw a young girl who was blind restored to her sight at these relics, and we saw a paralytic walk, and many spirits cast out."

This testimony gives us a clear insight into the theological teaching of Ireland at this early period. The unity of the Church was the great central point of the whole theological system: this unity was preserved by clinging to Rome and remaining inseparably attached to her doctrines and practices, and if controversy arose, the last appeal was to the successors of S. Peter at Rome.

The well-known discussion at Whitby between the supporters of the Irish and Roman Paschal computation, may also be noticed, because a detailed account of it has reached us. Summoned by Oswin, king of Northumberland, in 664, on the one side appeared S.

Colman, who had been a monk of the Irish monastery of Hy or Iona, abbot of the other Irish monastery of Lindisfarne, and bishop of the province of York; on the other, S. Wilfrid, who had been educated at Lindisfarne, but had subsequently learned the correct Paschal computation at Rome, and who was at this time abbot of Ripon; and his associate was Agilbert, a native of France, who had been educated in Ireland, and was at this time bishop of the West Saxons.

S. Colman's argument was simple; he found no fault with others; he wished merely to be allowed to follow the customary computation of those who had taught him. His opponents replied almost in the very words of S. Cummian's letter: "The Easter computation which we follow we have seen adopted by every one at Rome, where the blessed apostles Peter and Paul lived, taught, suffered, and were buried. We have seen it also in every part of Italy and France that we have traversed. It is observed at one and the same time in Africa, Asia, Egypt, and Greece, and, in short, throughout the whole Christian world, except by the Irish monks and their associates, the Picts and Britons." To Colman's argument from the sanctity of S. Columba and other saints who had followed the Irish computation, Wilfrid well replied that they were indeed holy men; and "I believe, had they been rightly informed on the subject, they, too, would have conformed to the universal usage." And, addressing Colman, he added, that the defenders of the Irish usage could plead that ignorance no longer. "You and your associates certainly commit sin if, after hearing the decrees of the Apostolic See—nay, of the Universal Church—and these confirmed by the Holy Scriptures, you disdain to follow them. For although your fathers were saints, yet in their small number in the very extremity of the world, they must not be preferred to the whole Church; and however holy and illustrious performer of miracles your Columba was, is he to be preferred to the most blessed prince of the apostles, to whom the Lord has said, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it; and I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven'?" This argument made a great impression on the English king, and turning to S. Colman, Oswin said, "Is it true that the Lord has thus spoken to Peter?" S. Colman replied in the affirmative. The king then asked, "Can you show that so great power was granted to your Colman?" The saint answered, "That he could not." Whereupon Oswin continued: "Do you, on both sides, agree in this, that the cited words of the Divine Redeemer were specially addressed to S. Peter, and that to him the keys of heaven were given by our Lord?" The disputants replied, "We are all agreed in this." "Well, then," concluded the king, "I will not oppose the heavenly gatekeeper," and decided in favour of Wilfrid's opinion.

This narrative is valuable in two respects:—1st. It is impossible that the disputants could have addressed each other merely in the terms in which they did if the Irish party had held religious doctrines similar to those of Protestants at present, or indeed if the religious opinions of both parties had not been identical; and, secondly, because, in the midst of their dispute, both parties were of one accord as to the prerogatives and supreme authority of S. Peter. The Protestant Dean of Armagh thus comments on the Whitby Conference:—"Colman, when he found his opinions rejected, resigned his See of Lindisfarne rather than submit to this decision of the king, thus furnishing us with a remarkable proof that the Irish bishops in the seventh century rejected the authority of the Pope." Singular reasoning this, for in truth there was no attempt to exercise the Pope's authority, but there was an exercise of the king's authority, which S. Colman, unlike the Anglican Church at present, did not admit to be decisive in a matter of ecclesiastical discipline.

A very ancient tract in the Irish language, "*On Injury and Assaults to Ecclesiastics*," is preserved in the *Leabhar Breac*,* forms part of the Brehon laws, and has been recently translated by Eugene Curry. In this curious tract occurs the following:—"Which is the highest dignity on earth?—The dignity of the Church. Which is the highest dignity in the Church?—The dignity of a bishop, and the highest of bishops is the bishop of S. Peter's Church, to whom the Roman kings are subject." After assigning the respective eric or fine for inflicting injury on the various grades of the ecclesiastical order, the tract thus continues:—"Where is this doctrine found?—It is found in the treatise which Augustine wrote upon the decrees of the Church, and upon the *dires* (that is, the fine paid for injury in person or property to each degree) and the reparation to be made; and it is thus, according to the rule of the Church of Peter, the empress of the whole world."

The ancient writer of the *Life of S. Furseus* introduces the following words as addressed by that great saint to the central See of the Catholic world:—"O Rome! exalted above all cities by the triumphs of the Apostles, decked with the roses of martyrdom, decorated with the lilies of confessors, adorned with the palms of virgins, strengthened by all their merits, enriched with the remains of so many and so renowned saints, we hail thee! May thy sacred authority never, never cease, which has been illustrated by the dignity and wisdom of the holy fathers: that authority by which

* Which Petrie calls, "The oldest and best MS. relating to Church history now preserved (in Ireland), or which perhaps the Irish ever possessed."

the body of Christ, that is to say our blessed Mother the Church, maintains its undying consistency and vigour."

Gillibert was appointed to the See of Lunneneach (now Limerick) about the year 1090, as Ussher thinks, and therefore towards seventy years before the English landed on the Irish shores. He, at the request of the clergy, drew up a letter on ecclesiastical orders, in which occurs the following:—

The picture I have drawn sheweth that all the Church's members are to be brought under one chief bishop, to wit, Christ and His Vicar, blessed Peter the Apostle, and the Pope presiding in his see to be governed by them. . . . As Noah was placed to rule the Ark amidst the waves of the flood, just so does the Roman Pontiff rule the Church amid the billows of the world. . . . The position held in the Eastern Church by the patriarchs is that which belongs to archbishops in the West; and both patriarchs and archbishops are subject in the first degree to the Roman Pontiff. As the patriarchs, however, govern the Apostolic Sees, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, it is their privilege to ordain archbishops, and in a manner are likened to the Bishop of Rome. To Peter alone, however, was it said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church." Therefore the Pope alone is exalted in dignity above the whole Church, and he alone has the privilege of ordaining and judging all.

S. Malachy, Bishop of Down, repaired to Rome in 1139, and obtained from Pope Innocent II., by whom he was most honourably received, a conditional promise of the pallium for the four Archbishops of Armagh, Cashel, Dublin, and Tuam, and in 1152 was held the Synod of Kells, at which Cardinal Paparo, the legate of the Pope, distributed the palliums brought by him from Rome to those four archbishops.

We will proceed now to a few extracts from the canons of the Irish Church in regard to Rome. In the part of the ancient Book of Armagh, which is copied from that written by S. Patrick's own hand, occurs the following, which we give in the translation of Ussher:—

Whenever any cause that is very difficult and unknown unto all the judges of the Scottish nations shall arise, it is rightly to be referred to the See of the Archbishop of the Irish (that is to say, S. Patrick) and to the examination of the prelate thereof. But if there, by him and his wise men, a cause of this nature cannot easily be made up, we have decreed it shall be sent to the See Apostolic, that is to say, to the Chair of the Apostle Peter, who hath the authority of the city of Rome.

On which Ussher remarks:—

It is most likely that S. Patrick had a special regard for the Church of Rome, from whence he was sent for the conversion of the island; so as, if I myself had lived in his days, for the resolution of a doubtful question, I

would as willingly have listened to the judgment of the Church of Rome, as to the determination of any church in the whole world, so reverend an estimation have I of the integrity of that Church as it stood in those days.

But this was not an inclination of feeling or a recommendation, it was a decree, by which S. Patrick commanded all doubtful controversies to be referred to the See of Rome, and not to be referred there for advice, to enable the archbishop in Ireland to decide, with the aid of such advice as Ussher suggests, but to be sent there as to one who hath authority to decide. The genuineness of this canon is clear. Its being found in the Book of Armagh brings us back well nigh to the time of S. Patrick himself, that ancient MS. having been transcribed in the year 807, and then the original of this canon was believed to have been written by S. Patrick himself. It was acted upon by the bishops of Leinster and Munster at the Synod of Magh-lene, in 630, to which we have before referred, on the testimony of S. Cumman, who was present at it, and is thus referred to in a collection of canons for the use of the Irish Church, made about the year 700 :—"S. Patrick defines, should any grave controversies arise in this island, they shall be referred to the Apostolic See."

And this is therein confirmed by reference to the decrees of Rome :—"The Roman canons decree that when the more difficult questions arise, they are to be referred to the head city." And again :—"The Roman Synod enacts, if in any province controversies arise which cannot be arranged amongst the contending parties, let the matter be referred to the chief See."

On these canons Dr. Murray, being unable to impugn their authority, remarks :—"Now, supposing for one moment that this canon and decree were genuine, were they ever acted upon before the twelfth century? The ancient Irish Church on no occasion ever appealed to the Bishop of Rome."

If this had been so it would only prove that they had not any occasion to appeal, since it is clear that their canons laid down the mode and order of appeal to the Court of Rome in case occasion should arise. But the fact is not as asserted by Dr. Murray. It does indeed happen that in the domestic annals of the Irish Church we meet with few matters of controversy which they were unable to determine in their own synods, or which required the intervention of the Roman See. Human nature was probably as lively and erratic then as since, but there would seem to have been a strong reverence for their own bishops, earned, we may believe, by the purity and earnest labours of their lives, and the feeling due to the Irish bishops themselves was probably intensified by regard for the memory of S. Patrick, which was extended to his successors.

The deputies sent from the synod of Magh-lene, in 630, as

before mentioned, returned from Rome with the tidings that the Irish usage as to the time of celebrating Easter was not in accordance with what they found practised at Rome, and thus was set at rest for ever in the southern division of Ireland the question of the Paschal solemnity. (Moran, 156.)

A few years after the Easter question had been thus happily settled in the south of Ireland, the bishops of the north endeavoured to establish a like harmony in Ulster. They also met, and they also decided to ask for the decision of Rome on the subject, and a letter to that effect was addressed to Pope Severinus in 640. Unfortunately the Pope had died ere that letter reached its destination. The Roman clergy indeed replied, but they misconceived the usage which prevailed in Ireland, and directed their reply against that which did not exist there. This epistle to the Pope proceeded, as we learn from the names of those to whom the reply was addressed, from Thomian, Archbishop of Armagh; Columban, Bishop of Clonard; Cronan, Bishop and Abbot of Nendrum; Dimma, Bishop of Connor; Baithan, Bishop of Tegg-Baithan; Cronan, Abbot of Maghbile in Down; Ernian, Abbot of Torey Island; Laistran, Abbot of Ard-mac-Nasca, on the banks of the present Belfast Lough; Scallan, Abbot of Bangor; and Segienus, Abbot of Hy; and S. Saran O'Critain, a Doctor of the ancient Church of Ireland.

These names are of great importance, as proving that the petition to Rome for some decision regarding the Paschal computation was addressed to the Vicar of Christ by all the great monasteries as well as the chief bishops who adhered to the northern or Columban tradition. As a matter of discipline they clung to the practice of their fathers, and when that peculiar discipline gave scandal to their brethren, and was looked upon with suspicion by neighbouring Churches, they turned their eyes to the Common Father of all, to seek from him instruction and guidance.

The perfect communion between Ireland and Rome is also proved by the fact that Irish bishops assisted at councils of the Roman Church. Thus in 721, when Pope Gregory II. convened a council in Rome to anathematize the Iconoclast Emperor Leo, the Isaurian, amongst the names attached to the synodical decrees we find that of "Sedulius, an Irishman, Bishop in Britain." A few centuries later the third council of Lateran was held in Rome, when the Albigensian heretics were condemned, and many disciplinary laws were enacted for the Church. Several Irish bishops took part in this council.

Another fact which proves how strong was the attachment of the old Irish to Rome, is the number of pilgrimages to Rome which were then undertaken, not only by ecclesiastics, but by noblemen and even kings. This is a fact which it would be too tedious to

illustrate by particular instances, but the subject is dwelt upon in some detail in the 3rd and 4th chapters of Dr. Moran's Essays, from which we have throughout borrowed largely. And the records of their visits convince us that it was not mere curiosity which took them there, but the feeling of devotion and of filial attachment for the See and successor of S. Peter. Occasionally they went there to be consecrated; and usually visited Rome for the sanction and blessing of the Pope, before undertaking any mission. And even the expression became proverbial with reference to a person intending to set out on a pilgrimage to Rome, "*sicut mos est gentis illius*," as is the custom of that (the Irish) nation.

Believe that the ancient Irish regarded the Pope and the See of Rome as their descendants at the present day do, and this custom is the natural and spontaneous expression of devotional feeling, but attribute to the ancient Irish Protestant doctrines, or any doctrines in the slightest degree differing from those of Rome, and then this custom becomes incomprehensible.

Another corresponding fact tending to the same conclusion is the great number of persons who at that period resorted from all parts of Europe to Ireland; and this fact is irreconcilable with any other state of things than a perfect identity of religious belief in Ireland and on the Continent. In the life of S. Senanus, who was born in 488, and who had visited Rome, and on his return founded a church at Inniscarra, on the banks of the Lee, five miles from Cork, it is mentioned that "soon after the foundation of this church a vessel arrived there with many religious pilgrims; amongst these were fifty religious Romans, whom the desire of a penitential life, and of the study of the Scriptures, then flourishing amongst us, had attracted to our island. They desired to be placed under the guidance of the holy men who were famed for their sanctity of life, and their observance of religious discipline." Thus were reciprocally bound together the Churches of Ireland and Rome. Rome was famed in Ireland as being the Apostolic See; and hence the Irish went on pilgrimage to venerate the Vicar of Christ, and pay their vows at the shrine of the Apostles. Ireland, too, was famed in Rome; her religious perfection, sanctity, and skill in sacred science won the admiration of the faithful of the Holy City; and when their own monasteries were laid waste, and their sanctuaries pillaged by ruthless invaders, we find them seeking a sacred asylum in Ireland, in whose hallowed retreat they might pursue undisturbed the highest paths of spiritual perfection. The Protestant Dr. Petrie, when speaking of the Round Towers, makes mention of "the crowds of foreign ecclesiastics—Egyptian, Roman, Italian, French, British, and Saxon—who flocked to Ireland as a place of refuge in the 5th and 6th centuries. Of such immigra-

tion," he adds, "there cannot possibly be a doubt; for, not to speak of the great number of foreigners who were disciples of S. Patrick, and of whom the names are preserved in the most ancient lives of that saint, nor of the evidences of the same nature so abundantly supplied in the lives of many other saints of the primitive Irish Church, it will be sufficient to refer to that most curious ancient document, written in the year 799, the Litany of S. Aengus the Culdee, in which are invoked such a vast number of foreign saints buried in Ireland. Copies of this ancient litany are found in the 'Book of Leinster,' a MS. undoubtedly of the 12th century, preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; and in the 'Leabhar Breac,' preserved in the Royal Irish Academy."

It is clear that if the pious pilgrims who then flocked to Ireland from all parts of the Continent and from Rome itself had found any variance whatever between the religious doctrines of Ireland and those of Rome, they would have returned home from the heretical or schismatic island, and the influx of foreign Catholics would soon have ceased. There is not the slightest indication of any such difference having been observed by those who visited Ireland, or by those who in Ireland received these visitors; and therefore the inference that there was perfect identity of doctrine becomes irresistible.

There is one other special circumstance which deserves to be noticed converging to the same conclusion, and that is, the great number of missionaries and other pious men who during those ages went from Ireland either to preach the Gospel to the wild and unbelieving barbarians in some part of Europe, or to become schoolmasters, or monks, or zealous priests amongst the believing but more troubled people of the Continent. Few who have not minutely examined into the subject can be aware to what an extent the continent of Europe was then indebted to Ireland for missionaries and teachers and clergy. The Irish missionaries usually visited Rome for the sanction and blessing of the Pope before they proceeded on their perilous journey; and it is a surprising fact, that there are few towns in France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, or Italy where, even to the present day, some Irish saint and benefactor is not held in peculiar veneration, as evinced by the popular feeling on the recurrence of his feast-day.

So great was the efflux of Irishmen in that direction that hospitalia were established by pious Irishmen in various towns in France, &c., for the hospitable reception of their countrymen.

S. Boniface, the martyr and apostle of Germany, in the early part of the eighth century, was a native of Ireland, and became Archbishop of Mentz and founder of the great monastery of Fulda. He received from Pope Gregory II. his commission to preach the Gospel

amongst the pagans, and the Holy Father in giving him that commission spoke "in the name of the indivisible Trinity, by the authority of the blessed Peter, the prince of the Apostles, whose office of teaching he held and whose holy see he administered." He more than once visited Rome, first to receive episcopal consecration and afterwards to consult the Holy See on the spiritual interests of his flock. In 742, towards the close of his missionary toils, S. Boniface solicited from Rome the appointment of another Irishman named Albuin (known in Germany by the name of Witta) to the see of Buraburg near Fritzlar in Hesse. The reply of Pope Zachary is happily preserved and is as follows:—"To our beloved Witta of the church of Buraburg—Pope Zachary. We have lately heard that our most holy and most reverend brother Boniface, God having been pleased by His blessing and power to propagate the Christian law and the teaching of the orthodox faith, and the doctrine as preached in this holy Roman Church, in which, through God's will, we preside, decreed and directed that the territory in which you preach amongst the Germans should be divided into three dioceses. Having heard this, we raised our hands to God with ineffable joy, returning thanks to the Author and Giver of all good gifts, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who gathers all to His saving fold. The aforesaid most holy man solicited by his letters that, by our apostolic authority, we should confirm your sees. Wherefore, with sincere solicitude and with the divine aid, by the authority of the blessed Peter, prince of the Apostles, to whom was given by our Saviour Jesus Christ the power of loosing and binding in heaven and on earth the sins of men, we confirm and decree that your episcopal sees shall remain unchanged," &c.

Willibrod, born in Britain, was educated by the Irish monks at Ripon, and afterwards spent twelve years in theological studies in Ireland before he "hastened to Rome, the apostolical chair of which was then filled by Sergius (687 to 701), that by his sanction and blessing he might begin the wished-for work of announcing the Gospel to the heathen." This blessing was accorded to him, and being enriched with relics of the holy martyrs, he fearlessly announced the doctrines of the faith to the inhabitants of Friesland. After a few years we find him again journeying to Rome, where, at the request of Pepin, he was consecrated by the same Pope bishop of that territory.

Another Irishman, named Dichnill, a disciple and companion of S. Columbanus, founded a monastery in the diocese of Besançon. He set out to Rome, and thus addressed the Pontiff:—"I am a native of the island of Erin, and a pilgrim for Christ's sake. The oratories which I erected bear the names of the noble apostles Peter and Paul, to whom belongs this Roman citadel. They have been enriched with many gifts and possessions by the surrounding princes,

and I have now come to the chief Bishop to commit them to thy apostolic care." The charter of his monastery was confirmed by the seal of apostolical authority.

The record of S. Kilian and his companions, about the year 686, is thus written, with the beautiful simplicity of the ninth century :— "There was in Ireland a holy man of princely birth, by name Kilian. Assembling some of his disciples, he exhorted them to despise the transitory goods of the world, and in the spirit of the Gospel to forsake country and kindred and to follow Christ. They yielded to his persuasions, . . . and having landed in Germany, their holy leader Kilian thus addressed them :—'Brethren, how beautiful is this country, how cheerful are its people; and still they are in the darkness of error. If it seem good to you, let us do as we said when we were in our own country; let us go to Rome to visit the threshold of the prince of the Apostles, and present ourselves before the blessed Pope John; and if it be the will of God, when we shall have received the sanction of the Apostolic See, we shall, under its guidance, return again to this people, and preach to them the name of our Lord Jesus.' Without delay, their deeds corresponded with these words, and they set out for the threshold of S. Peter, the prince of the Apostles. On arriving there the holy Pope John had already passed to his eternal rest; but they were lovingly and honourably welcomed by his successor, Pope Conon. And this holy pontiff, having heard whence and for what motive they had come, and to what country they were desirous to devote themselves with such zealous ardour, received their profession of our holy faith and then commissioned them in the name of God and S. Peter to teach and preach the Gospel of Christ."

S. Canice, whose life has lately been edited by the Marquis of Ormond, visited the Holy See, spending some time in various towns in Italy, which long cherished a remembrance of his virtues and miracles, and in one of them built a monastery on land given to him for the purpose by the prince of the country.

S. Foillan or Foelan is venerated as one of the chief patrons of Brabant. Lucca numbers among its patron saints two Irishmen, S. Frigidian and S. Sylas. S. Caidoc was the apostle from Ireland of the Morini in Gaul in the seventh century.

Another Irishman, Muiredhac Mac Robartaigh, known in Germany as S. Maridnus, set out with two companions on a pilgrimage to Rome in 1067. Arriving in Ratisbon, they met with an Irish recluse, who made known to them the will of Heaven that that city should be their permanent abode. They remained, and founded there the monastery of Weich-S.-Peter, which soon acquired a widespread fame and filled Germany with filiate foundations for Irish monks.

When the Abbey of Nivelles was founded in favour of S. Gertrude,

daughter of the illustrious Pepin, in the seventh century, her mother, whilst she sent to Rome for relics and copies of the Lives of the Saints, sent at the same time to Ireland for lettered men to instruct her community and for musicians and chanters to teach them psalm-singing. (2 O'Halloran, p. 196.)

A native of Ireland, of the genuine Irish name of Shiel, Latinized into Sedulius, wrote in Italy, about 490, poems in Latin (*Carmen Paschale*), of acknowledged merit, which Pope Gelasius commended to the use of the faithful.

S. Columba, an Irishman, founded in 563 the celebrated monastery in Ireland of Iona, and spread the knowledge amongst all the western islands and great part of the mainland of Scotland. His name holds a distinguished place in the Roman and other martyrologies, and he was held in peculiar veneration throughout the northern part of Britain.

S. Aidan, the great apostle of the Northumbrians, was an Irishman from the monastery of Iona. The Anglo-Saxon king Oswald had, whilst an exile in Ireland during the reign of his uncle Edwin, there been instructed in the doctrines of Christianity; and being afterwards desirous of extending that blessing to his subjects, he applied to the Irish for a bishop to be sent over to him, and on the arrival of S. Aidan, who was imperfectly acquainted with the English language, it is related by Bede, that the king himself often acted as his interpreter.

Amongst the numerous Irishmen who carried the learning and piety of their native island to various parts of the Continent may be named Caidoc, who founded the monastery of Centula, in Pontthieu; S. Fursa, who established a monastery at Lagny, near the river Marne; his brothers Ultan and Foillan, who founded what was long called the monastery of the Irish in Brabant; S. Bavo, at Ghent; S. Livin, who earned the crown of martyrdom in Flanders and Brabant; S. Fridolin, who was held in grateful recollection in Lorraine, Alsace, Germany, and Switzerland; S. Arbogast and S. Florentius, also in Alsace, and who each in succession became Bishop of Strasburg; Erard and Albert at Ratisbon; S. Wiro at Heristal; Cataldus, patron saint of Tarentum; S. Virgilius, whose real name was Feargal, Bishop of Saltzburg; Clement and Albinus, of whose services as teachers Charlemagne availed himself, the one in France and the other at Pavia; Dungal, consulted by Charlemagne as to solar eclipses, and placed by Lothaire I. at the head of a great public school he established at Pavia; another, Sedulius, the author of "*Commentaries on the Epistles of S. Paul*," was sent by the Pope with the dignity of Bishop of Oreto on a special mission to Spain; Donatus, another Irishman, of great repute both as theologian and poet, became Bishop of Fiesole.

It would be tedious, though easy, to enumerate more names. The Protestant Mosheim, in his "*Ecclesiastical History*" (p. 279), remarking on the eighth century, says, "Irishmen, who in that age were called Scots, cultivated and amassed learning beyond the other nations of Europe in those dark times; they travelled over various countries of Europe for the purpose of learning, but still more for that of teaching; and in this century and the following Irishmen or Scots were to be met with everywhere in France, Germany, and Italy discharging the functions of teachers with applause."

We have thus referred to the resort of students from all parts of Europe to the schools and monasteries of Ireland, to the pilgrimages of Irishmen to Rome, and to the labours of Irishmen as missionaries and schoolmasters in various parts of Europe, because these facts appear to us conclusively to demonstrate that the Irish were in religious communion with the See of Rome, and that the religious doctrines of Ireland, of Rome, and of Catholic Europe were identical. It is admitted that in France, Spain, Germany, and Italy the spiritual authority of the Pope was acknowledged, and is it possible that any difference between Ireland and the rest of Europe as to the authority of the Pope, or on any other doctrine, could have existed without some trace of it appearing? The errors of Pelagius and his disciple Cælestius, the former of British and the latter of Irish origin, caused for some time the religious opinions of Irish visitors to the Continent to be scrutinized narrowly, and some of them were even required on their arrival at Rome to address to the Pope a written statement of their creed. If there had been any variance whatever in religious belief, would Irish missionaries have been accepted, blessed, and sent by the Popes to preach the Gospel to the Pagans? would Irishmen have been not only admitted as monks in the monasteries, but enabled by the liberality of continental princes and nobles to found monasteries? would they have been received with joy as priests and bishops in the cities of the Continent, and as teachers in the great schools? or would the continentals have frequented Ireland for religious instruction or retirement if the religion of Ireland and of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy had not been found to be the same, and if they had not all found themselves united in one common faith by a common submission to the spiritual authority of the See of Rome? We cannot see how it is possible to resist this necessary conclusion that the faith taught previous to and by S. Patrick and his successors in Ireland was the same faith which was professed in every other part of the world by those who were in communion with the See of Rome.

A rapid summary of what we have mentioned leads to one

inevitable conclusion. When we see that bishops,—first Palladius and then S. Patrick,—were sent by the Pope to exercise episcopal functions amongst the Catholics in Ireland and to convert the other inhabitants who were not Catholics; when we find that they, the former partially and the latter completely, performed the mission on which they were thus sent without any known denial of or dispute respecting the authority of him who sent them; when we find that S. Patrick, after he had effected the conversion of Ireland, left the following injunction or canon for the guidance of his clergy and people in after times: “If any grave controversies arise in this island, they shall be referred to the Apostolic See”; when we find no trace of any dispute or question as to this being the solemn canonical rule of the Irish Church, but on the contrary express confirmation of it in Irish canons of the year 700, by reference to Roman canons to the same effect; when we find, upon the authority of S. Cummian, that Irish bishops in the seventh century acted upon this rule; when we find that Ireland, having become Catholic and having had not only churches and schools but also monasteries and convents established in the country, and being by insular and distant position further removed from the barbarian incursions which had overwhelmed the Roman empire, its clergy, its monks, its nuns, its schoolmasters and its saints, became renowned throughout Christendom, and Catholics, both young and old, both men and women, came from distant countries to learn or to practise religion with more security or with more fervour in Ireland, and that there is not the slightest indication that any of these found the doctrines or the practices of religion in Ireland different from what they were accustomed to in any other part of Christendom; when we find that Irish priests went out from Ireland as missionaries to every country in Europe, and that before proceeding on their mission they almost invariably went and knelt at the feet of the Pope and asked his apostolic blessing and sanction on their labours, that many of them were raised to the dignity of bishops by the Pope, that they built churches and founded religious houses throughout the Continent, and that there is scarcely a city on the Continent in which some Irishman who there lived as an apostle or died as a saint is not to this day held in grateful memory, and that neither Pope nor people ever discovered that they preached any other than the one Catholic faith, alike in Ireland, at Rome, and in every place where they lived or died, but that Popes and people alike regarded many of them as saints in heaven, and sought their intercession as such with God; when we find no trace that any one of these Irish missionaries took a wife with him, but on the contrary, that they went, as the Apostles before them had gone, and as Catholic missionaries have ever since gone, in the only mode in which any large conversion of the heathen has, with the blessing of God, ever been effected; when we find that continental sovereigns,

who wished to obtain the best masters for schools which they were establishing, sent to Ireland for them, that Irish schoolmasters therefore taught in many of the most celebrated schools of the Continent, delivered lectures and put forth books of instruction, but that no sovereign, or bishop, or priest, or rival schoolmaster, or any other human being ever made the discovery that they taught anything but the one true Catholic faith; when we find that these Irish, from the time of S. Patrick down to that of King Henry II., whenever they wrote or published anything in which they referred to the Pope, always spoke of him just as Catholics do at the present day, and as Catholics then did throughout Christendom, Ireland included,—we cannot escape, nor do we see how any one can escape, the necessary conclusion, that the Irish before and from the time of S. Patrick, to and through the time of Henry II., and to and through the time of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and down to the present day, have acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Pope just as all Catholics have ever done and now do. Either this must be so, or if the Irish were Protestants, then must all the peoples of the various countries of Christendom with whom the ancient Irish were in constant religious communication, including the Popes themselves, have also been Protestants. And to those who reject this latter absurdity and adopt the rational conclusion which the historical evidence establishes, it involves and suggests the important reflection, that the religion of S. Patrick and of the ancient Irish and of all the peoples of Christendom with whom they were in religious communication, and of all Catholics, down to the present day, must be the religion taught by Christ our Saviour.

We have confined ourselves to the one test of Catholicity, the being in communion with the See of Rome. We might have shown, for the evidences are superabundant, that the ancient Irish believed the doctrines and followed the practices of the Catholic Church, but it appeared to us that there was no way in which we could so readily prove that the ancient Irish were Catholic as by proving that they were in communion with the See of Rome. We could easily have proved that they believed in the real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Holy Sacrament of the altar, but so do some members of the Church of England; we could easily have proved that they honoured the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, and asked them, and especially her, to pray to God for them, but so do some members of the Church of England; that they went to confession, but so do some members of the Church of England; and we might thus have identified the leading doctrines and the prominent practices of the ancient Irish and of the whole Catholic Church then, ever since, and at the present day, but many of such doctrines and practices might also have appeared very similar to, if not identical with,

those of *some* members of the Church of England ; and therefore we thought that the most ready and simple and certain way of determining whether the ancient Irish were Catholics or Protestants was to apply the test of their being in communion or not in communion with the See of Rome. That is the crucial test, alike with ancient Irish and modern Anglican, and to that test therefore we have confined ourselves in the present article.

When, indeed, it is said that the ancient Irish were Protestants, what is really meant ? Is it meant that they were Church of England Protestants, or Calvinists, or Congregationalists, or Methodists, or Baptists, or Quakers, or any other of the various, nay multitudinous, forms of Protestantism ? Is it meant that they believed in the Thirty-nine Articles, or in the Catechism of the assembly of divines, or in that which has been taught by Calvin, or by Wesley, or by Fox, for all these and many others come under the generic name of Protestants, though differing widely from each other ? Is it meant that the ancient Irish believed that there is or that there is not regeneration in baptism, for both these opposite beliefs are tolerated in the Church of England ? Is it meant that the ancient Irish believed or did not believe in the Real Presence, for this belief and its negative co-exist in the Established Church ? Is it meant that they believed, or did not believe, in holy orders and apostolical succession, for both these beliefs, and both their negatives, also exist in the Established Church ; and the difficulty is to know what is *the* belief of the Established Church of England, unless it be comprised in the very compendious and lawyer-like statement recently made by a learned Queen's counsel on the hustings, that "the Church must do whatever the State tells it to do," which obviously means that the creed of the Church of England is contained in the statute book, and may be altered by Act of Parliament next session.

It is an old saying that much dispute might be avoided by definition of terms, and when any one asserts that the ancient Irish were Protestants he would certainly lessen, and perhaps altogether avoid, the trouble of inquiry if he would first define the word "Protestants," and state the exact doctrines which they hold. We hope and believe that it is consistent with the respect and esteem and affection which we have for many Protestants, if we say that the religious doctrines of Protestants are so various and so indefinite, that we should not be far from the mark if we suggested that a Protestant may believe or disbelieve almost anything he likes, if only he refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Church of Rome ; and if this be so, we have taken the most effectual way of proving that the ancient Irish were *not* Protestants, by showing that they *did* acknowledge the authority of the Church of Rome.

ART. II.—AUTHORITY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

La Filosofia antica esposta e difesa del P. GIUSEPPE KLEUTGEN, D.C., D.G.
Versione dal Tedesco. Roma.

De l'Unité dans l'Enseignement de la Philosophie au sein des Ecoles Catholiques. Par le P. H. RAMIÈRE. Paris.

Essay on first Principles. By the Very Rev. JOHN CANON WALKER.
London: Longman.

THE foundation by Descartes of what is called "the modern philosophy," may fairly be accounted the severest *intellectual* calamity which ever befell the Church. However much she suffered in other ways from the various heresies of successive centuries, *intellectually* she gained by them. For she was led in each case to investigate more profoundly, to analyze more carefully, to express more precisely the dogma assailed; while its assailants were expelled from her territory, and had no power therefore to taint her atmosphere. But Descartes was no heretic: and the result of his career is, that for a very considerable period there has been mutual internecine war among Catholics, as to the very fundamentals of philosophy.* From the fact of living in the midst of this phenomenon, there is a tendency in contemporary Catholics greatly to underrate its disastrousness; and it may be worth while therefore, before going further, to point out one or two particulars under which it is especially deplorable.

Dogmatic Theology more properly so called—the exposition and analysis of dogmata in themselves and in their mutual relation—has its very life in the combination of

* "This great undeniable fact must never be lost sight of, that *up to the beginning of the last century* the scholastic philosophy kept itself in possession throughout the whole extent of the Catholic Church (Kleutgen, vol. i. p. 100). F. Kleutgen then would give some 150 years, as the period during which the calamity mentioned in the text has oppressed the Church. "Our domestic contentions . . . turn on the *most fundamental questions*; those on which depends the *certainly of all our rational convictions*; on the principles which should be opposed to sceptics and pantheists; on the legitimacy of the idea of God and of all absolute ideas; on the very value of reason; in one word on the *whole of philosophy*" (Ramière, pp. 4, 5).

truths known by revelation with truths known by reason. If the latter data therefore be wrongly supplied, the whole science is vitiated and worthless.* The disciples then of an unsound philosophy are ipso facto excluded from all full or trustworthy scientific knowledge of dogma. Since therefore nowadays all speculatively given Catholics regard a large number of their fellow Catholics as being in this very category—as being disciples of an unsound philosophy—the natural result is, that dogmatic theology goes very much to the wall. And indeed one very curious indication of this result may be observed; viz., that the very meaning of the phrase “dogmatic theology” has imperceptibly changed. Catholics do not like to admit that they neglect dogmatic theology; and so they give that name to other studies, which, however valuable in themselves, are of quite a different character: such as dogmatic *history*, and anti-Protestant *controversy*. Both these studies, it need not be said, have very great value; and the latter indeed has been for the last three centuries absolutely indispensable: but surely it is quite a misnomer to speak of either as “dogmatic theology.”

Now we should have to occupy a long article with the subject, if we attempted to set forth the deplorable disadvantage under which all Catholic speculation labours, from the comparative neglect into which dogmatical science has lately fallen in many parts of Christendom. Here we will but express briefly our own strong opinion, (1) that this is the one central science, which gives unity and due proportionate significance to all other sacred studies; (2) that where this is neglected, even those which are zealously cultivated produce far less good fruit than would otherwise be the case; and (3) that the one predominant cause of its neglect—the cause which has had much more influence than all the rest put together—has been the mutual divergence of Catholics in the field of philosophy. Canon Walker has spoken excellently on this; though in language studiously moderate:—

* “What is theology? The philosophy of revelation: in other words it is the result of applying to revealed dogmata the methods and principles of philosophy. Evidently therefore all hope of theological union must be abandoned, so long as disputes continue on philosophical principles and on the intrinsic trustworthiness of reason. . . . If one of our students opens S. Thomas, Suarez, or some other of those great doctors whom the Church has proclaimed the luminaries of theology,—instead of light he finds therein but obscurity: their terms, their axioms, their formulæ, which used to be perfectly clear to those who had been philosophically educated, have now become even to teachers mere hieroglyphics” (Ramière, pp. 21, 22).

In this point of view the Church has suffered loss, when her writers and teachers turned more to the historic and authoritative foundations of truth, than to its intrinsic reasons, analogies, and aims; although she has undoubtedly gained in other and important respects. At first the younger methods, as with Petavius, inherited a rich stock of principles and dogmatic truth to support and vivify their elaborate and critical illustrations; but by degrees the substance began to subside, and the most meagre groundwork of reason served the purposes of varied erudition; nay, what has been very prejudicial to truth, a dangerous eclecticism of different principles of philosophy has been adopted for the uses of dogma, as if philosophy were an alien without any definite character, intended only to meet the accidental wants of the theological disputant; till at last new and foreign principles and processes of reasoning have on all sides forced an entrance into the domain of dogma; and the Church seemed, as some of late have too crudely and absolutely stated, to be left without a philosophy (pp. vi. vii).

A second evil has arisen from Catholic philosophical differences, almost as serious as that which we have just mentioned, but entirely distinct. Many thinkers have of late pointed out, that all the higher and more gifted non-Catholic intellects have entirely abandoned the old Protestant ruck; that they are either in some sense on their road to the Church, or else are rationalists, pantheists, atheists. As against this latter class—which among men of great intellectual power is very far larger than the former,—the old controversial formulæ—the old “*probatur ex Scripturâ*,” “*probatur ex Patribus*,”—have become simply antiquated and obsolete. It is no paradox to say, that the controversial theology now most peremptorily required is controversial *philosophy*. If then we would estimate the seriousness of our present calamity, let us make a very intelligible supposition. Let us suppose that in the palmy days of Protestantism—in the period of Bellarmine or Bossuet—Catholic controversialists had been as much at issue with each other on first principles, as Catholic *philosophers* are now. What would have been the certain result? Catholics would have wasted their intellectual energies in disputing with each other, and would moreover have been incapacitated from combining against the common enemy; while Protestants would have been under little danger from an army divided against itself. Such alas! is the attitude now forced upon the Church’s children, in confronting those portents of unbelief which are the great intellectual peril of our time. Catholics are simply impotent to contest *collectively* against the evil. Some doubtless do individually gird themselves for the conflict: but many more are simply cowed and dispirited; they fold their

hands and gaze on the monster with alarm and disgust; or they compel themselves to forget his existence.

A third evil result, more or less closely connected with each of the two former, is exhibited in Catholic higher lay education. The "Pall Mall Gazette," in a very interesting and significant article issued last April 12th, alleges one characteristic and widely-extended calamity as having befallen the present age. It complains that Christians in general, and Catholics in particular, "have persuaded themselves to doubt whether it is necessary, or even desirable, that their religious belief should be true, in the plain common sense of that word. They have got into the way of thinking," it adds, "that there is an inferior article different from ordinary truth, which may perhaps be called spiritual truth, and which will for all religious purposes do quite as well, or rather much better. Their creed is . . . less a doctrine than a resolution, or . . . an attempt to believe. They are believers in a general sense." Now of course there is here very much exaggeration; but we wish we could be sure that it does not rest on a certain basis of truth. Catholic thinkers have seen the coming danger. They have constantly pointed out that now, when there has long ceased to be a Christian atmosphere diffused throughout society imbuing the mind unconsciously with Catholic doctrine and principle—nay, when the prevalent atmosphere has long been in character most opposite—it has become far more necessary than it was in earlier times, to inculcate dogma in one or other shape, as an express study for every class. In proportion as this is not done, the phenomenon described in the "Pall Mall Gazette" will be ever of less and less rare occurrence. But dogma cannot possibly be taught in a shape which shall find access to highly-cultivated intellects, unless in most intimate connection with philosophy. And thus two most lamentable results at once follow in Catholic higher education, whenever some philosophy is not carefully inculcated as the one fundamentally true and certain system. (1) A Catholic youth cannot be duly protected against that poisonous habit of speculative thought, which infects the whole air he breathes; nor (2) can he be trained in a due apprehension of those dogmata, which are given him by God for the very purpose, that he may direct his life by their constant contemplation.

Here then is the one pressing intellectual need of our time; that Catholics be philosophically united: here is the first, second, and third thing intellectually necessary. In fact, this has been among our principal reasons for dwelling so uninterruptedly in this REVIEW on the Church's infallibility

and authority within ground not strictly dogmatical; since it is in the most complete interior submission to her various philosophical decrees, that the earliest remedy must be sought for so deplorable an evil. Other things will have to be added afterwards, no doubt; but this must come first, and without this the others are futile.

But now, if philosophical unity can be obtained at all,—among the various philosophies which have a footing within the Church, is there one in particular to which all eyes would turn as to the nucleus of such unity? Of course there is. The connection is most intimate, as we have seen, between theology and philosophy; and yet there is no philosophy with which the Church has ever had official relations, except only the scholastic. No Catholic who fairly gives his mind to the matter will be able to doubt, that in its essential and fundamental principles scholasticism must be infallibly a true philosophy. We have already pointed out that dogmatic theology is based throughout on philosophy; and that a dogmatic theology, which should take a false philosophy for its basis, must by necessity be preponderatingly false. If then it be admitted—as all Catholics will admit—that the Church's dogmatic theology has been in every age substantially and predominantly trustworthy;—it must be no less infallibly certain, that those philosophical doctrines, which everywhere pervade it and are its animating principles, are fundamentally true.

But there is another and counterbalancing statement of the case, which it is no less important to bear in mind. We say that those philosophical principles, which pervaded and animated the scholastic theology, are fundamentally true. But this is quite a different thing from saying that—even as exhibited by its best exponents, by S. Thomas or Suarez,—the scholastic is a perfect and fully satisfying philosophy. As the connection of *theology* with philosophy was the ground of our general proposition in favour of that system;—so the *degree* of such connection must limit the *extent* to which the proposition itself may reasonably be carried. Take one instance of what we mean. The number is by no means inconsiderable of vital philosophical questions, which now profoundly agitate the mind of thinkers, but which three centuries ago had never been raised. It is not to a scholastic philosopher of the past, that a Catholic of this day would naturally look for their explicit solution; though he *should* reject any proposed solution of them, which is at *variance* with the fundamental principles of scholastic philosophy. Again, even very eminent scholastics may have fallen into various philosophical errors, not fundamental indeed, but very far from unimportant; and yet these errors

may so little have worked their way into the fabric of *theology*, that the Church may have had no call to interfere. Our own opinion is that the fact *is* so: but until we have given reasons for this opinion, we have no right of course to say more, than that the fact *may* be so for anything which theology declares to the contrary. We would allege also with some confidence, that numerous and emphatic as have been the Church's testimonies to the value of scholastic philosophy, they have always stopped very far short of stamping with her authority each several portion of its doctrine.*

We speak on this whole subject with unfeigned diffidence, and with deep submission to better judgments than our own. But there is such pressing necessity for speech, that we felt it could not be right much longer to forbear, however keenly we might feel our own incompetence. And we speak now with far greater comfort than would be otherwise possible, because we are able to follow in the wake of so admirable a treatise, as that of F. Kleutgen which we have named at the head of our article. Indeed this great work appears to us by far the most valuable acquisition to Catholic philosophical literature (so far as we are acquainted with that literature), which has been made since the time of Suarez. Its two main theses are just those two on which we have been insisting: (1) the scholastic philosophy is infallibly true, in its essential and fundamental principles; but (2), to be made fully available for our time, it needs large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. In illustrating these theses, F. Kleutgen exhibits, not only the widest, the profoundest, apprehension of scholasticism, but also a surprisingly fair and large-minded appreciation of other philosophical schools; treating his whole theme moreover with an accuracy of thought and expression, which cannot be surpassed. We may add that not unfrequently he warms with his subject, and rises into real eloquence.

As to the former of the two theses we have ascribed to him—viz., that the scholastic philosophy is true in its essential and fundamental principles—this is the one staple, the one pervading argument, of his whole work. We will quote one passage in particular: because (to our mind) it places the matter on precisely its true ground; and because it dwells on that doctrine concerning the Church's unintermitting

* Take, for example, the well-known decree against Traditionalism. "Methodus, quâ usi sunt D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, et alii post ipsos scholastici, non ad rationalismum ducit; neque causa fuit, cur apud scholas hodiernas philosophia in naturalismum et pantheismum impingeret. Proinde non licet in crimen doctoribus et magistris illis vertere, quod methodum hanc, præsertim approbante vel saltem tacente Ecclesiâ, usurpaverint."

infallible magisterium, which we have ever so prominently advocated in this REVIEW. We italicise a few sentences.

That the Church's infallibility extends also to those sciences which, without being theological, are nevertheless closely bound up with theology, this is not questioned (so far as I know) even by our opponents.* Now the Ecclesia Docens maintains in the path of truth the Ecclesia Discens, not only by means of that extraordinary magisterium in virtue of which she pronounces from time to time her judgment on particular errors ; but also by means of her ordinary and always active magisterium, in virtue of which she manifests true doctrines over the whole earth. And therefore, if she has the Holy Ghost's assistance when promulgating her decisions against new dogmatical errors—she is not deprived of the same assistance when she adopts measures which are of decisive influence over her abiding (stabile) magisterium. This magisterium consists in the manifestation and exposition of revealed truth, made by the Church's ministers under the guidance and supervision of their legitimate pastors. Now since we [the mass of the faithful] are to be led into 'all the truth through [the supervision of] these pastors, is it possible that in their office of guidance and superintendence they should be abandoned by the Holy Ghost ? Again who can possibly deny, that this manifestation and exposition of the doctrines of the Faith, uttered by the Church's ministers, is greatly influenced by the theology which they study ? And on the other hand who will deny, that this theology in its turn is notably affected by the philosophy which it uses for its purpose ? The Church's pastors therefore principally accomplish this their work of guardianship, by means of watchfulness over schools and over their direction ; and on this is principally founded the Church's inalienable right of ordering the studies of schools. If then, in the exercise of this right, the Church is not without *infallible light from on high*, what inference may be drawn from her practice in the case we are treating ? Here we are speaking of a certain philosophy, which for many centuries was taught in all the higher schools of Christendom ; and those precisely the centuries in which the Church exercised, incomparably more than in any other period, her right of directing education. And in spite of repeated allegations to the contrary, [I affirm that] she not only *tolerated* the use of this philosophy, but *promoted* it ; and indeed *prescribed* it to the most illustrious universities of the period, such as Paris, Rome, Bologna. This philosophy is bound up most unvaryingly and most intimately with the whole of scholastic theology : and scholastic theology in general—particularly that of S. Thomas,—has been most solemnly approved by the Church ; which urgently recommends it to us “in order to make us secure against all errors, and well equipped to contend against them.” [In this sense spoke the Pontiffs Sixtus V., Pius V., Alexander VII., Innocent XV., and others whom the author has elsewhere cited.]† Now is not this her practice a noteworthy exercise of her abiding magisterium

* We wish we could confirm this statement so far as regards *English Catholics*.

† Note of the Italian translator.

and one decisive [of the question before us]? Certainly this cannot be denied (vol. i., pp. 93-95).

This argument seems to us as irrefragable in its substance, as it is admirably expressed by the author. The Church is infallible in her abiding magisterium, and she cannot therefore sanction a theology which is wrong in principle: but her theology *would* be wrong in principle, if the scholastic philosophy, whereon it is based throughout, were fundamentally mistaken. Some readers indeed might doubt from the wording of the above extract, whether F. Kleutgen does not go even farther than this: they might doubt whether he can hold the second thesis which we have ascribed to him; viz., that this philosophy needs, for present purposes, large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. But the very words which next follow, importantly explain and qualify what has preceded.

We grant willingly that one may have quite just views concerning the Holy Ghost's assistance promised to the Church, and nevertheless hold that *certain particular doctrines of this philosophy are not correct*: even though the doctrines be *in some way connected with questions of theology*. One may hold that the scholastic philosophy, as a whole, is susceptible of *noteworthy improvements*, nay, and that from circumstances of the time it *needs them*: insomuch that, in this sense, it may with advantage be *superseded by a better philosophy*. But can one possibly grant that *a large part of its most characteristic doctrines is false*? that the *foundation and direction* of this philosophy is perverse? (p. 95.)

Such accusations are energetically alleged against scholastic philosophy by its assailants; and against such accusations our author persistently and emphatically defends it. In like manner he says elsewhere:—

We have never asserted that all the questions now raised were solved in times past; nor have we ever expressed a doubt that for their solution the ancient philosophy *might derive advantage from the modern*. That which we do deny is, that in order to perfect philosophical sciences it is necessary to deny the *fundamental principles* of antiquity and *abandon the road* which antiquity has constructed (vol. ii., p. 256).

Again:—

Considering the intimate connection between philosophy and theology, [Descartes and his followers] ought to have inferred that the speculative system, which had been received within the Church for centuries and indeed from the very origin of Christianity, could not be destitute of a *solid and true foundation*: that this system might well be *incomplete*; but not erroneous, *at least on the principal questions* (vol. i., pp. 114-5).

In vol. ii., p. 145, F. Kleutgen maintains that "a foundation" has been laid down by the scholastics "for the beginning of philosophical speculation; or at least that such foundation certainly may be laid down, without abandoning their principles." He will not contend then, that they themselves even laid down a sufficient foundation for philosophy; but only, that they have laid down no principles inconsistent with such true and sufficient foundation. Indeed (vol. ii., p. 171), he regards "the principle of causality" or "of sufficient reason" as a principle indispensably necessary to be taken into account, for any adequate theory on the laws of thought; and at the same time admits that "it is a merit of the modern philosophy" to have first "considered" this principle. As to some of the scholastics, our author is prepared to go much further; and is of opinion (vol. i., pp. 312-3) that by their mode of exposition they may have given a handle to the fearful error of Lockian empiricism itself. Descartes indeed, according to F. Kleutgen, would have been quite warranted in assailing *this or that particular scholastic doctrine*; his fault was that—

He did not content himself with assailing this or that particular doctrine of the scholastics. He began with the persuasion, that down to his time neither was the fixed point understood from which philosophy could start, nor the path along which it could proceed in security; and that consequently the scholastics not only could not really prove the truths which they taught, but besides taught a large number of errors (vol. i., p. 102).

It was from being inoculated with this preposterous contempt of the past, our author presently adds (p. 112), that Lamennais, Bautain, Gioberti, Hermes, Gunther, fell into the deplorable errors for which they have been condemned. And he proceeds to draw an important illustration from the great theological work of Melchior Canus. When that theologian began to teach, no one had methodically treated, as a distinct theme, the various sources of theological science; the relation of those sources to the first principle of that science, God's infallible word; and the comparative weight which should accordingly be assigned to each. Canus then had to treat a new subject; but he refused to treat it in a revolutionary spirit. He searched the old approved writers, to discover what views upon this new subject were most consistent with ancient dicta; and he firmly resolved that his addition to the time-honoured edifice should be in completest harmony with the ancient fabric itself. Such, adds F. Kleutgen, is the course now incumbent on a true Catholic philosopher. A criticism, e. g., of the cognoscitive faculties is simply essential, he con-

siders, for the philosophical needs of our time; and yet will in vain be sought among the scholastic writers. It is the business of a true Catholic philosopher, to consider first of all what views on this matter are *implied* in the schools; or (if *none* are implied) what views are in greatest harmony with their general system. It is infallibly certain that this system is true in its main essentials; and any view therefore must be unsound, which is incompatible with those essentials.

F. Ramière's work, which we have also named at the head of this article and from which we have made one or two extracts in our previous notes, is devoted to the theme with which we began: the urgent necessity now existing for Catholic philosophical unity. His remarks on that theme are admirable, and he is entitled to much gratitude for so clearly seeing its importance. He does not however impress us as being quite equally successful, in his treatment of the traditionalistic and ontologistic philosophies.

Against F. Kleutgen's and F. Ramière's whole argument—and indeed against the Church's whole claim of authority within the region of philosophy—an objection has repeatedly been made, both by Protestants and by rebellious Catholics. "Philosophy," say these men, "rests exclusively on reason; and ecclesiastical authority in such a matter is simply an impertinent intrusion. If reason establishes some truth, any one commits intellectual suicide, who doubts that truth in deference to an external monitor. If on the other hand there be any truth which *cannot* be established by reason, it has no right to be called a *philosophical* truth at all."

Now we have no space in this number for enlarging duly, on the relations which should be preserved between reason and faith in philosophical investigation; * but we must, at all events, give a brief answer to this plausible objection. Firstly then we will reply to its *latter* clause; and we will point out, that there is no cause whatever why a truth may not be of extreme philosophical moment, which cannot nevertheless be established by human reason. Take e. g. such an assertion as this: that theology teaches nothing *intrinsically repugnant*, in declaring the One Divine Essence to terminate Three Divine Persons; or again, in declaring the accidents of bread and wine to remain, after consecration of the Eucharist, without any substance in which they inhere. Human reason can neither prove nor disprove these truths; yet no one will doubt that they are philosophically most important. It is a mere question of

* We may perhaps refer, without impropriety, to Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction," pp. xxi-xxvii.

words whether you do or do not choose to call them *philosophical* truths; though we think they are properly so called. At all events there is every probability that some reason higher than the human—some angelic reason—can cognise them with certainty by its own light.

Next, as to the *former* part of the above-recited objection. One thing is plain at starting. To maintain that the dictates of any theology can conflict with the dictates of reason, is simply to maintain that such theology is so far false. He therefore who knows that the dictates of Catholic theology are infallibly true, will assume as a first principle that they can never impose on him an obligation of abandoning what his reason has established. It may well happen indeed, that you *think* you have established some tenet by reason, and that the Church may presently condemn that tenet. Just so schoolboys often think they have correctly performed a sum in addition or multiplication; yet they find their answer plucked.* Still they do not immediately cry out that their instructor is violating the sacred rights of reason, but rather take for granted that they have themselves made a mistake. In like manner the Catholic philosopher, if he finds some one of his conclusions condemned by the Church, is at once perfectly certain that either his premisses have been unsound or insufficient, or his inferences too hasty. He reviews therefore his past course of argument, fully expecting that he will make one or other of these discoveries. In most instances his assurance is speedily justified by the event. It may happen however that he is a long time in finding the flaw; nay, in some comparatively rare cases he may not be able to find it at all. Yet, even under such circumstances as these, a good Catholic remains confident that there *is* a flaw somewhere, and that his conclusion is really false and mischievous.

It is only in this last case, that any theoretical difficulty can be even alleged. If a Catholic philosopher however felt a moment's hesitation in submitting his judgment on the supposed hypothesis, we would thus argue with him in reply: You have long studied philosophy. It is quite a familiar fact to you therefore, that some of the world's greatest thinkers have held, as undeniably established by reason, various opinions, of which you see the utter baselessness and falsehood. Anyhow therefore it is *possible*, that this or that of your own philosophical opinions is similarly baseless; but

* This admirable illustration was used some years back in the "Tablet," on occasion (we think) of the Munich Brief.

that, from a certain narrowness or self-partiality, you are blind to the fact. Well, that which, under *any* circumstances, is abundantly *possible*, you are called on under *present* circumstances to accept as certainly *true*. Why are you called on so to accept it? Because your divinely given teacher has so decided. What can be more reasonable than this?

In fact we are confident it will be found, not only that the principle of authority is not *adverse* to the true interests of philosophy; but, on the contrary, that it is the only *conservator* of those interests. The one bane both of metaphysics and psychology has ever been, that philosophers have been so deplorably hasty in their philosophical processes; so deplorably careless, as to the sufficiency of their premisses and the correctness of their deductions. The Catholic philosopher enjoys a protection, to which externs are altogether strangers, against these fundamental and capital dangers. Nor in truth do we see how there is any hope of sufficient battle being given to the various forms of philosophical misbelief now prevalent, by any effort which can be put forth by individual philosophers following each his own light. The Church, and the Church alone, can secure that philosophical unity, which is so paramountly needed. A large number of her faithful children, through obedience to her voice, will themselves have learned to see under the light of reason the falsehood of this or that view, with which they may have originally started. Others, who have not yet come themselves to *see* this, will nevertheless firmly believe it, and will abstain from pressing their idiosyncrasies. And thus the army of truth, united in one compact phalanx, will have its due advantage against the disorganized and mutually divergent hosts of error.

There can be no more intensely practical question then, just now, than a consideration of the proper method for ascertaining the Church's voice, on this or that philosophical question. We will therefore conclude, by expressing our own humble suggestions on the subject. Even if our statements were found to be substantially incorrect, we should have done a very important work in inducing more competent thinkers to express themselves clearly on the matter. Our own impression however is, that every loyal Catholic will heartily agree with our principles as far as they go; though it is very probable that there may be others of almost equal importance, which have not occurred to our mind. We will not indeed here speak of the intellectual submission due to explicit ecclesiastical pronouncements, because we have so repeatedly enlarged on this. We will speak merely of the *other* means

which exist, for knowing the Church's judgment on things philosophical.

1. Every philosophical proposition is infallibly true, which is implied in the Church's dogmatic definitions. One example will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. It is infallibly true that the word "Transubstantiation" aptly and truly expresses that dogma to which the Church applies it. But the word would *not* truly and aptly express such dogma, unless certain philosophical propositions were correct concerning "substance," "accident," &c., &c. Such propositions therefore must be regarded as infallibly certain.

2. All philosophical principles are infallibly true, which pervade and animate the Church's one recognized dogmatic theology, the scholastic.

3. As to other scholastic philosophical propositions, the degree of ecclesiastical authority which they possess is proportioned to the degree of intimacy and pervasiveness with which they have inflowed into the scholastic theology.

4. Those scholastic philosophical propositions which have not so inflowed at all—however prominent and important they may be in a purely philosophical point of view—are to be judged exclusively by their own merits, and to be weighed impartially in the scale of reason. Yet there is the strongest reason for an *à priori* anticipation that, for the most part, they will be found far weightier in that scale, than the parallel propositions of conflicting philosophies.

Our readers will have seen, from the preceding remarks, that we are strongly disposed to one opinion, which we have not yet expressly mentioned. Undoubtedly the strictures on scholastic philosophy, uttered by a certain class of Catholics, are not only very superficial, but very disloyal to the Church; betraying indeed a most inadequate appreciation of her infallibility and her authority in teaching. But (speaking with great deference) we do think that some Catholics fall into an opposite extreme. Take e. g. Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet. Certainly we have not observed in it any direct expression on the subject to which we can take exception. Still its general *tone* almost seems to imply, that any one philosophical proposition, current among the scholastics, has pretty well as much authority as any other; and that the most intellectually dutiful sons of the Church are those, who accept every such proposition simply as a matter of course, without question or delay. Now it is abundantly possible, that there may be reasons for such a view of which we know nothing: we only say that we *do* know nothing of them; that we are not ourselves aware of any ground, on which such an

unquestioning and absolute acceptance of every scholastic philosophical detail can be defended. And the quotations, which we gave a few pages back, show at all events that in this we are following no less grave an authority than that of F. Kleutgen.

The sum of our whole argument may be thus stated:—(1) It is the normal condition of Catholics, that they be absolutely united on philosophical *essentials*; while there shall be a large amount among them of free discussion, on questions which are secondary indeed, but very far from unimportant. (2) For the last 150 years this normal condition has been suspended, and Catholics have been at mutual variance on the very foundations of philosophy. (3) From this calamity there has arisen, in many parts of the Church, a deplorable neglect of dogmatic theology properly so called; and also a very serious difficulty in the higher education of laymen. (4) From the same cause, it has become impossible to defend successfully on a large scale those fundamental truths of natural religion, which are now the main points of attack among many of the ablest and most cultivated non-Catholic thinkers. No successful war can be waged against the enemies of natural religion, unless there is a large and united phalanx of its upholders. (5) This unspeakably needed philosophical unity might without difficulty be obtained by Catholics (though not by other religionists), if Catholic thinkers would be but duly loyal to the Church's voice. (6) Lastly, such loyalty would be sufficiently secured by the acceptance of certain practical principles, which we have ventured (under correction) to indicate.

We submit these various opinions to the better judgment of Catholic philosophical inquirers. We have long been anxious to urge a Catholic crusade in behalf of natural religion, against the Mills and Bains and other its enemies, who in England are now so active and stirring. But no such crusade is possible, except in proportion as Catholics shall be philosophically united among themselves. We hope then that we may hereafter from time to time apply (as best we are able) the principles suggested in this article, to a treatment of the various vital questions now at issue between religion and its opponents. And the appearance of Canon Walker's pamphlet has suggested to us, that we should commence with that which is the most philosophically fundamental of all those questions; viz. the existence and authority of *philosophical axioms*. To this therefore we have devoted a separate article in our present number.

Meanwhile we cannot better conclude our present essay,

than by extracting a strong testimony to the scholastic philosophy from a very impartial quarter, the "Saturday Review." The passage terminates an able notice of Mr. Lecky's new work in the issue for May 1st. And this, be it remembered, is the testimony of a Protestant journalist; of one therefore, who is in all probability altogether unacquainted with what scholasticism has done, in the way of building up that unparalleled intellectual fabric the Church's dogmatic theology.

Mind is employed either in tracking out the knowledge of things outside it, or in examining its own thoughts and history. Its activity ought to take both directions: in the middle ages it long shrank, not without intelligible reasons, from the first; but surely the mind cannot be said to be idle when it puts forth its strength on the second. Now, though there was a vast deficiency in that hunting out and ascertaining the facts of nature and history which is so great a work in our days, there was no deficiency in that *which is more properly thought*—profound and patient and exact consideration of what goes on in the mind, of its efforts to know, of its materials and processes. The schoolmen have become a commonplace for sneers. But no one who ever studied any of the great ones among them could possibly say that mind in them was dormant. No one could ever say that men like Anselm or Aquinas did not treat the most difficult questions with a freedom and originality, which are ordinarily supposed incompatible with their religion. *In all that is of most essential consequence*, not only in the exhibition of what we know, but in grasping it firmly, clearly, comprehensively, in taking in all the sides of a question, in mapping out all its ramifications, in the sheer hard work of purely intellectual action on ideas and words, *they are still our unequalled masters*. Most surely, if they led, in their keen and subtle speculations, into many false and useless roads, they paved the way as nothing else did,—as *certainly neither ancient speculation nor Mahomedan science did*—for modern philosophy. They laid out the ground and prepared a language for Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant. Those ancient and unwearied pioneers of real thinking deserve more respect than they always meet, from all who know that real thinking is as necessary as the actual discovery of facts, for the true and solid advancement of knowledge.

ART. III.—THE RING AND THE BOOK.

The Ring and the Book. By ROBERT BROWNING, M.A., Honorary Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. In Four Volumes. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1868.

WE do not affect to approach our present task with the perfect calmness and temper of judicial indifference. Catholics, it is true, especially in these islands, have become by long habit somewhat callous to calumny; yet it is pitiful to find a man of genius, such as Mr. Browning undoubtedly is, himself the dupe of most fantastic prejudices, and helping to perpetuate and multiply them in the minds of others. Whatever may be the grounds of his contempt for the British public and his conviction that they "like him not," we are bound to say that he could not have taken a readier way of commending himself to their favour than by the construction of a tale in which, conformably to the venerable models of Mrs. Radcliffe's time, nearly all the scoundrels are priests; and though the hero is a priest too, he is so by an unhappy mistake; the author plainly indicating his opinion that being a priest is more of a hindrance than a help to being anything good. Perhaps it will be said that the character which he has drawn of the good Pope Innocent XII. is inconsistent with this view. We do not deny that Mr. Browning has meant to delineate him as, what he was, an eminently wise and holy Pontiff; but he has thought proper, in the execution of his design, to credit Innocent with sentiments and expressions which, however natural they would be in Mr. Browning, are highly improper, absurd, and ridiculous in the personage to whom they are attributed. We do not charge Mr. Browning with having entirely invented the anecdote given in vol. i., p. 17, but, as he tells it, it is not only incredible, but nonsensical. The Pope, we are told, was urged to condemn the errors of "those Jansenists, re-nicknamed Molinists," which he refused to do, on the ground that the world would not hate them so much if there was not some good in them. We are satisfied that even an "Honorary Fellow of Balliol"—by the way, what on earth is an "honorary fellow"?—would feel rather ashamed of himself, if so many errors could be detected in his relation of any incident of secular history as are obvious and glaring in this very curious little story. In

the first place, to say that the Molinists were only Jansenists under another name is almost equivalent with saying that the followers of Lord Cairns are identical with the friends of Mr. Bright. The circumstance of both having given attention to the doctrines of grace, is the sole circumstance in which the Jansenists and the Molinists were at one. The opinions of the Jansenists were as different from those of the Molinists, as the opinions of the late Sir Robert Inglis were from those of the late Mr. Feargus O'Connor. In fact, the very use of the name of "Molinist" by Mr. Browning, throws us into a state of confusion approaching that of his own mind on the point. For there were Molinists and Molinists; the former taking their name from the Jesuit, Louis Molina, whose *Concordia* was first published at Lisbon in 1588, and whose opinions were the cause of lively discussion under the reigns of Clement VIII. and Paul V.; that is, something like a century before the pontificate of Innocent XII. It cannot be to them that Mr. Browning refers; because they existed long before the Jansenists; they were never condemned by the Church; and perhaps at this moment their doctrine is more prevalent among Catholics, than any other on the subject. We will compassionate Mr. Browning's bewildered ignorance, so far as to assume* that the Molinists he speaks of—more properly Molinosists, belonging to one sect of Quietists—were the followers, not of Louis Molina, but of Michael Molinos; because Quietism was really a question much discussed in Innocent XII.'s reign. But it is highly improbable, to put it mildly, that Innocent, who did not ascend the Pontifical throne until the year 1691, was ignorant of the fact that Michael Molinos had abjured his errors in the year 1687. It is therefore also improbable that the Pope did not know what the "Molinists" were; and the whole story wears an air neither of truth nor of happy invention. It is known, however, that the Pope, out of his great respect for the character of Fénelon, proceeded with a slowness in his examination of the qualified Quietism of *Les Maximes des Saints*, with which the French court was much offended and affected to be much disedified; and we can only suppose that something Mr. Browning has heard or read somewhere in connection with that matter has grown, under the action of his imagination, into what he records. In the Pope's soliloquy (vol. iv.) there are far more monstrous perversions of history and reason, upon the exposure of which it is not our province now to enter. Those passages will be

* We may assert it. In vol. i. p. 162, he speaks of "Molinos' sect."
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of great value to Dr. Cumming, whether or not he goes to the Œcumenical Council, and may perhaps eke out the eloquence of some "worthy peer" like Lord Westmeath, in the deliberations of the Lords on the Irish Church Bill. But, as a specimen of the manner in which the Pope is made to talk Browning, we may be permitted to give the following :—

"Call me knave and you get yourself called fool !
 I live for greed, ambition, lust, revenge ;
 Attain these ends by force, guile : hypocrite
 To-day, perchance to-morrow recognized
 The rational man, the type of common sense."
 There's Loyola adapted to our time !

Considering the many years which Mr. Browning has spent in Italy, we are not competent to say that his use of "local colour" in his sketches is not generally appropriate and successful, but in the matter of Protestantism his mind seems as much untravelled as his heart. There was no English or Anglo-American colony in Rome at the end of the 17th century, and therefore no appreciable section of Roman society would have talked—as he makes "Half Rome" talk (vol. i. p. 140)—of "Thou shalt not kill" as the "sixth commandment," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery" as the "seventh." He has evidently read up several authorities, not all reliable, for the details of his work on ecclesiastical subjects, and it is strange how so simple a fact as the difference between the Catholic order of the Commandments and the Protestant should have escaped his notice, especially when we know that out of it has arisen the stale charge against us of suppressing one of the precepts of the Decalogue ; but this mere toe-nail helps one to take the dimensions of the whole Hercules of misinformation which is his normal state of mind. It is still more discreditable to him to have reproduced (vol. i. p. 24) an extremely silly play upon the names of three remarkable English Catholic Churchmen of our times, which originally—if indeed originality can be predicated of something not more an effort of the brain than sneezing or snoring—came from some of the stupidest of the witlings who write in some of the dullest of the "comic" papers.

Passing now from the consideration of Mr. Browning's claims upon the gratitude of Exeter Hall, we will say a few words about the general character of his poetry before proceeding to examine its specific manifestation in his last work. Few English poets, worthy of the name, that ever lived seem to have cultivated so little the *art* of poetical composition. M.

Sainte-Beuve, speaking of the Duke de Broglie, says that "*Sa pensée lui naît toute rédigée*;" which is true of several other orators and prose writers, not only in France, but elsewhere. It is not true, however, of poets. Many mere rhymesters are gifted with a facile improvisation; but there has never been a great poet, we believe, at least of those controlled by the laws of rhythm and metre, whose spontaneous flow of thought did not require to be poured into a mould of carefully arranged expression. From the very structure of the highest kind of poetry we possess, it is evident that all the great masters of the lyre thought it of the utmost importance to cultivate the mechanism of their art, and thereby enhanced, to a degree that they only could estimate, but at which we can guess, the power and beauty of the thought as it first flashed upon them. Now, Mr. Browning seems to us to labour under either a great delusion or a great mistake. He is under a delusion if he thinks that every thought springs perfectly accoutred from his brain, like Pallas from the brain of Jove. He is under a mistake if he thinks it is of no consequence in what fashion his intellectual bantlings are presented to the world; whether washed or unwashed, dressed or undressed, with limbs decently composed or awkwardly sprawling. We are aware, and various examples indeed sufficiently show, that the highest functions of social or political life can be discharged, not discreditably, without the assistance of hands or feet. Mr. Browning seems to be of opinion that his lines get on equally well with or without the usual number of limbs, or with more than the usual number, and whether or not the limbs they have got are in the right places. What would be thought of the artist who should send a picture or statue to the Exhibition of the Royal Academy, in which picture the "portrait of a gentleman," otherwise painted to perfection, had been left destitute of a nose, or which statue, chiselled in all else with the grace of a Chantrey, had been parsimoniously furnished with but one arm, or too liberally endowed with three? If such a work escaped the rigorous exclusion of the Hanging Committee, could the public, *spectatum admissi*, refrain from ridiculing and denouncing so preposterous a deformity? It may be that Mr. Browning would haughtily assert himself, like the Emperor Sigismund, superior to the paltry laws to which humbler poets are fain to yield. It may be that he would contend that for him who utters the burden of song with which the divine afflatus fills his soul, no voice is possible but that of the divinity speaking through him. If such were his explanation, it would only remain for us, while acknowledging the great and godlike

presence of Apollo, to note with some wonder his sublime indifference to etymology, scorn of syntax, and persecution of prosody.

Seriously, it is to us a matter of surprise that, in whatever other respects Mr. Browning's last poem may be superior to those which have preceded it, many of them give proofs of much more care in composition, and contain passages, if not of greater power, certainly of greater finish. The faulty lines in "Paracelsus," for instance, are few; though one does occur now and then to mar the effect of an otherwise fine passage. In such lines as

You first collect how great a spirit he hid,
and

To find the nature of the spirit they boast,

one has to make "spirit" *spir't*, or read the whole as prose. Again, there are lines in which the phrases "envy and hate," and "early and late," must each be read as having only three syllables. It is hard to know what to do with such a line as

Regard me and the poet dead long ago,

unless we make "poet" *pote*; the only authority for which pronunciation, as far as we know, is an Irish ditty, in which it is averred that there was "no one," not even

Fitzjerald the pote,
That ever yet wrote
A fit rhyme for the Ram.

But these faults are accidental and venial in comparison with the deliberate offences, as we are compelled to regard them, against rhythm, good taste, and even the English language, committed in "The Ring and the Book." The tale of the "Book," as we shall explain more fully further on, is told in a great variety of ways. One of those is what the author calls the *Tertium Quid*, the way in which the story ran among the "superior social section," supposed to be told by some "man of quality" in "silvery and selectest phrase." Let us give a few samples of the distinguished *Tertium Quid*'s exquisite phraseology:—

Go, brother, stand you rapt in the ante-room
Of her Efficacy my Cardinal
For an hour,—he likes to have lord-suitors lounge,—
While I betake myself to the grey mare,
The better horse,—how wise the people's word!—
And wait on Madame Violante. (Vol. ii. p. 21.)

Another :—

Why not have taken the butcher's son, the boy
O' the baker or candlestick-maker ? In all the rest
It was yourselves broke compact and played false,
And made a life in common impossible. (p. 27.)

Another :—

So Guido rushed against Violante, first
Author of all his wrongs, *fons et origo*
Malorum—increasingly drunk,—which justice done,
He finished with the rest. Do you blame a bull ?
In truth you look as puzzled as ere I preached. (p. 69.)

Very naturally. A few lines more :—

The Archbishop of the place knows and assists :
Here he has Cardinal This to vouch for the past,
Cardinal That to trust for the future,—match
And marriage were a cardinal's making—in short
What if a tragedy be acted here ? (p. 70.)

Or a farce ? Call'st thou this "poetry," good "Master" Browning ? To us it reads far more like "prose run mad." It is absurd to defend such writing on the ground of its "realism." Realism, if it means anything, means conformity to reality, and to say that it is in conformity with reality to make an accomplished gentleman, or for that matter any rational person, express himself in dislocated doggerel, is an insult to common sense. Shakespeare and the other great dramatists of the Elizabethan age far better understood how to reproduce the real as well as how to give form to the ideal by their art, when they relieved the measured and poetic language of their principal *dramatis personæ* by the homely but racy prose of the inferior characters.

Mr. Browning's genius is essentially dramatic, and many of his best efforts have naturally taken that form. The genuine and high inspiration of much of his poetry is indisputable. He has often great power of thought ; generally great vigour, and sometimes great felicity, of expression. In "insight and oversight," as he would say himself, the range and force of his imagination are transcendent. Properly disciplined and kept to his proper work, he might have been the Shakespeare of our century. As it is, he is not equal to Tennyson ; whom, nevertheless, he as far surpasses in power of conception as he is surpassed by

him in grace of execution. We doubt, indeed, if a more perfect "artist in words" than Tennyson ever lived. If it could be true, as it cannot be, that a great poet is made, not born, it would be true of him. But Browning is a born poet, and only lacks the sense or the modesty to see that something else is wanting to him to be among the greatest. For want of artistic cutting, his diamonds often show but dully beside the paste of other men. For want of artistic development, the thought that should have been starry is often simply nebulous.

Mr. Browning was strolling about Florence, as he tells us, one fine day in June, when he picked up from a stall in the Square of Lorenzo, and bought for "just eightpence,"* a small quarto volume—the "Book"; to wit, on which he has written four volumes—containing, partly in print and partly in manuscript, the account of a "Roman murder-case," for which crime a certain Count Guido Franceschini, of Arezzo, with four accomplices, was executed at Rome on the 22nd of February, in the year 1698. The documents comprised in the volume consisted of the depositions and pleadings in the cause, printed by proper authority, with some letters, explanatory of, and supplementary to them, from a Roman lawyer concerned in the case, to a friend at Florence. Thus we have the Book—"pure crude fact," as its purchaser calls it—but what of the "Ring"? That is a poetic illustration (with which this work commences) gracefully conceived and expressed:—

Do you see this Ring?

'Tis Rome-work, made to match

(By Castellani's imitative craft)

Etrurian circlets found, some happy morn,

After a dropping April; found alive

Spark-like 'mid unearthed slope-side fig-tree roots

That roof old tombs at Chiusi: soft, you see,

Yet crisp as jewel-cutting. There's one trick

(Craftsmen instruct me), one approved device,

And but one, fits such slivers of pure gold

As this was,—such mere oozings from the mine,

Virgin as oval tawny pendent tear

At bee-hive edge when ripened combs o'erflow,—

To bear the file's tooth and the hammer's tap:

* We had thought that a lira was of as much value as a franc—that is, about tenpence—but we take Mr. Browning's authority for the depreciation of the Italian currency.

Since hammer needs must widen out the round,
And file emboss it fine with lily-flowers,
Ere the stuff grow a ring-thing right to wear.
That trick is, the artificer melts up wax
With honey, so to speak ; he mingles gold
With gold's alloy, and, duly tempering both,
Effects a manageable mass, then works.
But his work ended, once the thing a ring,
Oh, there's repriming ! Just a spurt
O' the proper fiery acid o'er its face,
And forth the alloy unfastened flies in fume ;
While, self-sufficient now, the shape remains,
The rondure brave, the lilyed loveliness,
Gold as it was, is, shall be evermore :
Prime nature with an added artistry—
No carat lost, and you have gained a ring.
What of it ? 'Tis a figure, a symbol, say ;
A thing's sign : now for the thing signified. (pp. 1-3)

The author does himself less than justice in implying, by this comparison, that his share in the workmanship of the tale constructed out of the materials with which the "Book" supplied him is merely that of "alloy." The original plot is sensational enough. So deeply did it impress Mr. Browning, so unceasingly haunt and irresistibly fascinate him for four long years, that it did not let his fancy rest until it had thrown off a poem much longer (as others have remarked) than the *Iliad*, and nearly twice the length of the *Æneid*. Reduced to the briefest outline, this is what it comes to.—Count Guido Franceschini, of a very old family but very reduced estate, finds himself about fifty years of age, with slender worldly prospects, having in vain haunted saloons and antechambers in Rome for thirty years. In this plight, he is minded to better his condition by marrying into a wealthy plebeian family, and is introduced by a clerical friend to Pietro Comparini and his wife Violante, in whose reputed daughter, Pompilia, the gifts of fortune are united with rare beauty of person and perfect innocence of soul. Pietro, discovering the fortune-hunter's sordid motive, would save Pompilia, whom he believes to be really his child, from such an ill-assorted union ; but the match-making instinct of womankind is too strong in his wife ; the marriage is hurried on, and then all parties set off for Arezzo, which is Guido's home. If Pompilia had been Pietro's child, she would be heiress to a large fortune in her own right, presuming upon which her husband, with the co-operation of his two rascally brothers (priests, of course—as the "Ring" makes them, if not the "Book") and a most

unamiable mother—treats his wife and her parents as badly as possible. The Comparinis fly from Arezzo and return to Rome, where Violante, whom revenge and conscience combine in stimulating to do an act of justice, reveals the fact that Pompilia is not her child, but the daughter of a woman of the worst repute, purchased in early infancy with the view of keeping in the family the inheritance that must otherwise have passed to collateral heirs. Litigation ensues, and Guido, getting the worst of it, treats his young wife more brutally than ever; until, at last, she flies from his house in company with Giuseppe Caponsacchi, a young and noble priest of Arezzo, and travels by forced journeys towards Rome, to take refuge with the guardians of her childhood. Not only is her husband quite aware of her flight, but he has even as far as possible contrived it, and follows in instant pursuit, hoping to find a justifiable pretext for proclaiming his wife to the world as an adulteress, and killing her and her protector. In this, however, he is disappointed; for, overtaking them at an inn where Pompilia had been forced to halt from sheer exhaustion, while Caponsacchi keeps watch and ward at the inn-door, the young Countess is found buried in deep and tranquil sleep, alone, upstairs. The inevitable scandal resulting from even so comparatively harmless a discovery, and the proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts connected with it, have the effect of sending Pompilia to a convent of Convertite Nuns, and Caponsacchi into banishment at Civita. Before long, however, the worthy Guido, still fretting at Arezzo for the inheritance of which he has been balked, hears from his brother, Abate Paolo, at Rome, that Pompilia has left the convent, has returned to the villa of the Comparinis, and has given birth to a son, who is consequently his heir. Thereupon he forms another plot to murder the Comparinis and his wife, and, having hired four peasants to aid him in its accomplishment, carries it out most truculently. But he fails to make his escape: he and his accomplices are seized red-handed, and, after many pleas of denial, exculpation, and abatement of punishment, are sentenced and executed.

Manifestly this is a complicated business enough as it stands, and Mr. Browning's mode of treatment certainly does not err on the side of simplicity. First, he gives a summary of the story, at very considerable length, by way of introduction. Secondly, assuming with great probability that public opinion at Rome was somewhat divided on the question whether the Count should be put to death or not, he gives the view of the whole case as taken by "Half-Rome." Thirdly, he gives a different view of the case, taken by the "other

Half-Rome." Fourthly, *Tertium Quid* (whose acquaintance we have already had the honour of making) puts in his distinguished appearance, and tells it all over again in his own way. Fifthly, Count Guido, after being put to the "vigil-torture," is brought before the judges, and goes over the whole affair in such a way as to make, without much regard for truth, the best defence of himself possible under all the circumstances. Sixthly, Canon Caponsacchi, recalled from banishment, begins by "blowing up" the Court for sending him there, and then favours them with passages of his autobiography, going fully into the history of his flight with Pompilia. Seventhly, poor Pompilia herself, surviving as if by miracle for four days the mortal wounds received at the villa, gives on her deathbed an account of the whole matter from her point of view. Eighthly, Dominus Hyacinthus de Archangelis, *Pauperum Procurator*, and advocate for the accused, after an interminable quantity of doting parental drivel about his son, Hyacinth junior, draws up his pleas for the defence. Ninthly, *Juris Doctor Johannes Baptista Bottinius*, Advocate of the Fisc and the Rev. Apostolic Chamber, replies for the prosecution. Tenthly, the Pope, appealed to for a remission of the sentence, maturely ponders the whole proceedings, analyzes the characters and motives of all the actors, and decides upon letting justice have its course. Eleventhly, Guido, being waited upon before execution by a cardinal and an abate, with the hope of moving him to repentance, makes a second defence of himself on necessitarian principles, and reveals with hideous frankness the diabolical features of his character. Then there are half a dozen distinct windings-up of the tale, on the part of as many different interlocutors. If all this be not enough to test Mr. Browning's dramatic power to the utmost, we, at least, cannot conceive any test more severe. We dare not say, however, that he stands it triumphantly. Of such a method of narration it would be flattery to say that repetition does not "stale its infinite variety." Why it has been adopted by the author, it is hard for us to decide. If we were to guess, the result of our conjectures would not be complimentary, and might possibly be unjust. In dealing with a modern public, British or otherwise, an author is obliged to bear in mind that the times are changed from those when an emperor's sister paid for a few touching lines with a pile of sesterces. No doubt we have some modern instances almost parallel, in the liberality of the public, or at least the publisher. These are exceptions, however, that only prove the rule; and, indeed, an author ought to be highly remunerated for standing "on a tower in the wet," seeing how likely it is that his reputation

will catch cold of such a rash exposure. But ordinarily the public likes to get the value of its money, and, being naturally a better judge of quantity than of quality, the bulk of what it buys goes a great way with it. Isocrates put into his Panegyric "just what rushed into his head." Doctor Johannes Baptista Bottinius (who makes the comparison) had "to prune and pare and print," because "it paid." Probably it pays Mr. Browning better to do as Isocrates did.

The "subjective-objectivity" of his characters is well brought out on the whole, but "the voice of Jacob" is too distinguishable everywhere. The irrepressible Browning cannot help obtruding himself into the utterances of the hot and impulsive Caponsacchi as well as of the aged and meditative Innocent; into the last speech of the atrocious Guido as well as the dying declaration of the gentle Pompilia. His best-drawn character is Guido. Villains are very abundant in Italian history, and the crop of them in actual Italian life must be almost inexhaustible. Mr. Browning has turned his studies and his experience to great account in delineating so powerfully a character such as no country, perhaps, but Italy could supply. The wolf is the best type of such a nature—stealthy, ferocious, crafty, cruel. We certainly get rather too much of him: partridge surfeits, and surely so should wolf's flesh; but in many things his part is perfect. Let us take the beginning of his speech to the judges, after he has suffered torture:—

Thanks, Sir, but should it please the reverend Court,
I feel I can stand somehow, half sit down
Without help, make shift to even speak, you see,
Fortified by the sip of . . . why, 'tis wine,
Velletri,—and not vinegar and gall,
So changed and good the times grow! Thanks, kind sir!
Oh, but one sip's enough! I want my head
To save my neck, there's work awaits me still.
How cautious and considerate . . . aie, aie, aie,
Not your fault, sweet Sir! Come, you take to heart
An ordinary matter. Law is law.
Noblemen were exempt, the vulgar thought,
From racking; but, since law thinks otherwise,
I have been put to the rack: all's over now,
And neither wrist—what men style—out of joint:
If any harm be, 'tis the shoulder-blade,
The left one, that seems wrong i' the socket,—Sirs,
Much could not happen, I was quick to faint,
Being past my prime of life, and out of health.
In short I thank you,—yes, and mean the word.

Needs must the Court be slow to understand
How this quite novel form of taking pain,
This getting tortured merely in the flesh,
Amounts to almost an agreeable change
In my case, me fastidious, plied too much
With opposite treatment, used (forgive the joke)
To the rasp-tooth toying with this brain of mine,
And, in and out my heart, the play o' the probe.
Four years have I been operated on
I' the soul, do you see—its tense or tremulous part—
My self-respect, my care for a good name,
Pride in an old one, love of kindred—just
A mother, brother, sisters, and the like,
That looked up to my face when days were dim,
And fancied they found light there—no one spot,
Foppishly sensitive, but has paid its pang.
That, and not this you now oblige me with,
That was the Vigil-torment, if you please. (Vol. ii. pp. 73-75.)

There are many far more vigorous passages, but not quite such as propriety permits, if space allowed us, to quote here. In his second address, in which he makes a more unreserved declaration of his acts and motives, he thus justifies his treatment of his wife :—

You have some fifty servants, Cardinal,—
Which of them loves you ? Which subordinate
But makes parade of such officiousness
That if there's no love prompts it,—love, the sham,
Does twice the service done by love, the true.
God bless us liars, where's one touch of truth
In what we tell the world, or the world tells us,
Of how we like each other ? All the same,
We calculate on word and deed, nor err,—
Bid such a man do such a loving act,
Sure of effect and negligent of cause,
Just as we bid a horse, with cluck of tongue,
Stretch his legs arch-wise, crouch his saddled back
To foot-reach of the stirrup—all for love,
And some for memory of the smart of switch
On the inside of the fore-leg—what care we ?
Yet where's the bond obliges horse to man
Like that which binds fast wife to husband ? God
Laid down the law : gave man the brawny arm
And ball of fist—woman the beardless cheek
And proper place to suffer in the side :
Since it is he can strike, let her obey !

Can she feel no love ? Let her show the more,
Sham the worse, damn herself praiseworthy !

(Vol. iv. pp. 151-152.)

Further on, in his almost exulting cynicism, he says of the great ones of Rome who shall survive him a while :—

I see you all reel to the rock, yon waves—
Some forthright, some describe a sinuous track,
Some crested brilliantly, with heads above,
Some in a strangled swirl sunk who knows how,
But all bound whither the main-current sets,
Rockward, an end in foam for all of you !
What if I am o'ertaken, pushed to the front
By all you crowding smoother souls behind,
And reach, a minute sooner than was meant,
The boundary, whereon I break to mist ?
Go to ! the smoothest, safest of you all,
Most perfect and compact wave in my train,
Spite of the blue tranquillity above,
Spite of the breadth before of lapsing peace,
Where broods the halcyon and the fish leaps free,
Will presently begin to feel the prick
At lazy heart, the push at torpid brain,
Will rock vertiginously in turn, and reel,
And emulative, rush to death like me. (p. 192.)

The character of Pompilia is not only well contrasted with Guido's, but is itself an exquisite conception ; for which also, perhaps, Mr. Browning is more indebted to his Italian experiences than he would care to own. It is a type of simplicity, innocence, and purity. She can scarcely understand why scandal couples her name with Caponsacchi's as it has done. To her he is not only a priest, but a hero and a saint. He is the angel and the help from God that delivered her from her hateful, yet not hated, husband's power, when the first promise of maternity impelled her to dare and suffer everything for a young life not yet come forth to the day, yet dearer than her own. Her love for him is not that of woman : there is something of the supernatural in it. Her deepest human love is for her child ; but she has charity for all, even for her husband. Her excuse for him, however, that "he did not make himself," is so evidently out of keeping with her character, that Mr. Browning is driven to the awkward necessity of making Guido envy her for having hit upon it. Considering, also, that it was rather an ideal than the real and imperfect Caponsacchi, whom she worshipped, it seems unnatural to make her excuse her admiration in this way :—

If I call "saint" what saints call something else—
The saints must bear with me, impute the fault
To a soul i' the bud, so starved by ignorance,
Stinted of warmth, it will not blow this year,
Nor recognize the orb which spring-flowers know.
But if meanwhile some insect with a heart
Worth floods of lazy music, spendthrift joy—
Some fire-fly renounced spring for my dwarfed cup,
Crept close to me with lustre for the dark,
Comfort against the cold,—what though excess
Of comfort should miscall the creature—sun ?
What did the sun to hinder while harsh hands
Petal by petal, crude and colourless,
Tore me ? This one heart brought me all the spring !

(Vol. iii. pp. 73-4.)

Caponsacchi is a failure. If the author meant to make a hero of him, he ought to have been less like a young English parson. That is probably the highest type of the churchman—at least the young churchman—which Mr. Browning can conceive ; but a good young priest, such as one can imagine in Caponsacchi's place, though not less than a brave, true, and honourable gentleman, would also be something more. Possibly, however, Mr. Browning recognizes this, when he makes the Pope speak of Caponsacchi, though with affection, as a "scapegrace."

Nothing strikes us more forcibly in this very remarkable poem than the judicial retribution which seems to fall on genius rendered self-forgetful by too much self-contemplation, and, like Narcissus, falling souse into the water. The fatuity of Narcissus, too, however ridiculous, had this excuse, that the image he bent to gaze upon was really beautiful. But a wrinkled, and puffy, and blotched Narcissus, grinning with delight at the reflection of a countenance which he fancies still "as fair as Dian's visage," though to all but a set of silly sycophants it is simply hideous—that is a spectacle grotesque enough to tickle the very ribs of death with inextinguishable laughter. It is pitiful to see a great light of literature or art go out in a sputter and flare of noisome egotism. That was the end of Turner. It threatens to be the end of Dickens and Carlyle. It is very likely to be the end of Mr. Browning. Praise intoxicates them ; vanity blinds them ; the assurance of fame makes them heedless of how it should be legitimately retained. Then comes a reverse, if not a disillusion. Because King Nabucodonosor would inhale incense, therefore shall King Nabucodonosor eat grass. Just

when the pedestal is raised so high that the statue towers above every surrounding fabric, down topples the rickety idol and "shames its worshippers." Of what immense value would that humility which is only another name for self-knowledge have been to such men, were it but to make them obedient to those laws of art which are, after all, the only sure basis of their fame!

We must not omit to say, in conclusion, that this is not a book for all hands. The milk of babes is not at all the sort of fare that Mr. Browning sets before his readers, but very strong meat, sometimes horse-flesh indeed, and that of the coarsest, with nothing of a Francatelli's art to disguise it in the cooking. So far, perhaps, it is all the better.

ART. IV.—MILL ON LIBERTY.

On Liberty. By JOHN STUART MILL. Third edition. London : Longmans, Green, & Co.

BY the common consent of mankind, liberty is the very noblest of all the subjects which can occupy the human mind. In one shape or other, consciously or unconsciously, almost, if not quite, every sane man is engaged either in the defence of what he has already, or in the search for a yet greater liberty than falls at present to his share. The pursuit of wealth from the day labour of the poor to the great pecuniary operations of the rich; the clamour of parties; wars civil and foreign; the acquirement of knowledge divine no less than human; the self-discipline of saints and saintly men; in short, all efforts in every direction, have for their object either to escape the bondage of poverty and weakness, imperfection and sin; or to retain the present means, or enlarge the scope of action, spiritual, mental, or bodily; individual, corporate, or national.

Yet what is this thing which, in all ages, poets have sung, orators have lauded, philosophers have claimed as a right; for which patriots have worked and suffered; soldiers fought and died; and on which saints and theologians have insisted? Poets have exhausted their store of metaphors, one vying with another in boldness; orators have exaggerated every figure in rhetoric, philosophers have propounded the wildest

theories, patriots and soldiers have worn out their lives in patient labour, or have fought at hopeless odds in its behalf; the air resounds with its praises. But what is it? The most despotic nations, referring back to ancient days, rest the traditions of their greatness upon struggles for this priceless blessing, without which it is held that life would not be worth the having. That we must have liberty at any cost is taken as too self-evident to need debate. The proposition is one to which direct appeal is seldom made; so obvious is it considered, that it is argued from by implication only. But yet once again we ask, in what does it consist? Some regard it as a political, some as a social good; if in one case the former be established, little is thought of the latter; or, again, unless the latter be secured, of what value is the former? Some think it is for one class alone; some, for civilized nations only; some demand it for themselves and not for others; some would affix to it no bounds whatever, and some, who regard the thralldom of sin as the only slavery worth combating, rejoice in the glorious liberty of the bondage of Christ—deeming such bondage the best security for the widest freedom. Ideas regarding it are vague and contradictory. Men speak of it and write about it, but they do not define it. Nor is Mr. Mill an exception to this remark. In an essay of 200 pages, in which he professes to examine "Civil and Social Liberty, the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society on the individual," the reader looks in vain for a definition. This is the more astonishing because, in one of the early chapters of his book on Logic, Mr. Mill himself lays down what is tolerably self-evident that the first rule of logic is to see that terms be accurately defined. But, perhaps, like certain speakers in some well-known dialogues, Mr. Mill considers the word too plain to require defining. We propose here to review the Essay in question, for the purpose of seeing whether or no this be the case.

Like most other subjects in which men are interested, liberty has its two aspects. It may be looked at either in the abstract or in the concrete. A discussion on liberty may be taken either on its principles or on the practice of it. But it is clear there is no use in discussing its practical application without being first agreed on the principles by which we are to be guided. But in order to arrive at anything like a satisfactory notion of principles, we must first define the word itself. Now, as before remarked, this is precisely what Mr. Mill has failed to do. He leaves his reader at the disadvantage of having to pick out and join together the detached pieces of his puzzle; to learn the map of liberty as we used to learn

geography, with this difference, that under that system we knew when the whole map was complete, whereas Mr. Mill furnishes us with no means of such assurance. The only way open to us, therefore, is, to examine such principles as he asserts, either together or one by one, and so endeavour to make out his entire plan.

Now, after many pages he tells us the object of his Essay. "It* is," he says, "to assert one very simple principle as entitled to govern ABSOLUTELY the dealing of society with the individual, in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a sufficient warrant to justify compulsion: his conduct must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. . . . over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Again, he claims for every man† "absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical and speculative, scientific, moral, and theological; and of expression, as practically inseparable from opinion."

Moreover he says‡ that the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race. For if the opinion be right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth. If wrong, of what is almost as great a benefit, viz., the clearer perception of truth from its collision with error.

But in the next page he declares that we can never be sure that an opinion is false—and this he repeats in these words,§ "An approach to truth is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being"; and this he again repeats|| in almost the same words. Then¶ he says that he regards utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. And in another place** he tells the world that the truth of an opinion is part of its utility. And again, he says,†† "Altogether condemn the expressions 'the immorality and impiety of an opinion.'"

At page 22 he informs us that the principle laid down in the

* P. 21.

† P. 26.

‡ P. 33.

§ P. 41.

|| P. 95.

¶ P. 24.

** P. 43.

†† P. 45.

previous page is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. And that* "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end."

Again, we are told† that "complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action."

Moreover he elaborates the theory, that to silence any discussion is an assumption of infallibility. That is, it is not the being certain of the truth of an opinion, but the undertaking to decide a question for others, in which the assumption of infallibility consists. This agrees with the before quoted notion, that we can never be sure of the falsity of any opinion; and he argues that the assumption of infallibility is most fatal, precisely in those cases where the opinion is called immoral and impious, and he applies these remarks especially to the denial of the Being of God.

He declares further‡ that on any matter not self-evident there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it for one who is capable; and that the capacity of the hundredth is only comparative.

From all this it will appear that Mr. Mill does not commence with a principle, and on it erect his superstructure.

His plan is rather to do that for which he condemns others, whose arguments, he says, on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves; who narrow their thoughts and interests to things which can be spoken without venturing within the region of principles. We venture to think that had Mr. Mill's character depended on this essay alone, he would never have acquired the reputation of a "logical consistent intellect." For it will be perceived, on carefully examining the foregoing passages, that all he does is to take several of the current popular notions, which pass with the multitude for principles, and to push them to extremes, which are no doubt logical enough up to a certain point, but which fail absolutely when surveyed from a new point of view. The method is one with which every one who has argued much with Protestants must be perfectly familiar.

Thus, when he tells us that the sole end for which men can interfere with the liberty of their fellows is to prevent harm to others, we seem to have got hold of a principle; and when he further claims for every man the right, on this ground,

* P. 23.

† P. 38.

‡ P. 38.

not only to the most absolute freedom of opinion, but of expression, we seem to be making some progress. But the ground is cut from under our feet by his dictum, that utility is the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions. For we are driven back to consider what utility is, and how we are to judge of it. But here we are stopped again, for in the next sentence he affirms that it must be utility founded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Now we have always supposed that an ultimate appeal must be to a first principle. But no; here we have an ultimate appeal based upon something as unsubstantial as itself, viz., upon "permanent interests," which are neither explained nor even alluded to any further, except to say that they are founded upon the progressive character of human nature. So that the "very simple principle," which is "absolutely to govern society" in its dealings with the individual, rests upon vague considerations of "utility," which rest again upon "permanent interests," which are vaguer still; and these upon a knowledge of human nature, which is still more vague; for, he says, we can never be sure that an opinion is false; an approach to truth being the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being. These remarks, let it be remembered, are made to refer to a future state. Now, if the immortality of the soul be a matter of doubt, how can one be said to know anything definite of human nature in its entirety? His simple principle, therefore, has for its only foundation the old, exploded Pyrrhonism, the absurdity of which is no new discovery. For it is obvious that we cannot establish the principle that there is no certain knowledge, without declaring it certain that no certainty exists, which is a palpable contradiction. But if Mr. Mill is so clear that no certain knowledge exists, by what right does he come forward, and in a cloud of words proceed to delude his readers, admirers, and worshippers with talk about principles and rights and truth and utility? Why did he not begin his Essay with the declaration that his whole system is a mere guess? that he *knows* nothing of what he is writing about; and that, as there must needs be many errors to one truth, the chances are a thousand to one that he is going to write absurdities?

One cannot understand how it is that Mr. Mill should be so sure that no certain knowledge is to be found, and yet that he should argue in a directly opposite sense. It cannot be denied that he has in no common degree a logical mind. He sees plainly enough where many of the weak points in his argument lie, and he stops up the holes through which an objection might enter with the greatest ingenuity, or rather

with the cleverness which continual discussion and a perfect familiarity with popular theories and popular objections are calculated to impart. Nevertheless, after an argument of seven pages, commencing with the sentence already quoted, and ending with these words, "the beliefs for which we have most warrant have no safeguard to rest on but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded," supplemented with the further declaration that "an approach to truth" is "the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being"; and after telling us that he "regards utility as the ultimate appeal in all ethical questions," it does seem singular to find,* "the truth of an opinion is part of its utility." So that the ultimate appeal depends again upon truth, which cannot possibly be ascertained for certain. Moreover† we find, that holding the truth without knowing the arguments by which it is maintained, is not knowing the truth. But how can one know without being sure that one knows? Real knowledge is real certainty, and if certainty be denied, to talk of knowing the truth is a contradiction in terms. An ignorant man fancies he knows; but one who does know cannot be in doubt as to his knowledge, still less can he hold that all knowledge is doubtful. Acquaintance with the arguments by which an uncertain theory is maintained does not add one jot to the certainty of the theory itself, by the very condition of the case supposed. But Mr. Mill's actual words are, "We can never be sure that an opinion is false." We do not see that a quibble can be raised on this, for if we cannot know what is false, neither can we know what is true; and if we know a thing to be true, we know its opposite to be false, and this is the possibility which Mr. Mill denies. This will sufficiently guard us against any charge of misrepresentation.

Here it might seem advisable to stop. It might fairly be said that any edifice built on such shifting sands will soon fall; and no doubt this is true. Another age will review with wonder this return to the hopeless Eleatic scepticism. It will search for some moral cause as alone sufficient to lead a man like Mr. Mill into that very world of universal doubt from which the old philosophers struggled with such melancholy impotence to get free. Some future biographer may perhaps draw a parallel between Mr. Mill rejected from the British Senate, and the founder of the New Academy banished from Rome on the demand of Cato. But in the mean time his books are read; and with all the more avidity, because he says many

* P. 43.

† P. 65.

plausible things, and much that is true, and all in an attractive style; but chiefly because he brings into definite shape, and defends with more constructive power than others, the notions on which Protestantism is founded, and which have not hitherto been placed before the multitude upon a quasi-philosophical basis. Many of his remarks are, no doubt, what it is the fashion to call *suggestive*, and for these he is entitled to our thanks: they contain a foundation of truth, though, to be sure, like certain dishes in a celebrated banquet—

Longè dissimilem noto celantia succum,

they indicate a want of skill in the preparation. His attack upon authority, though more uncompromising, and though conducted with less reserve than usual, is but the legitimate result of common Protestantism, and he is quite justified in remarking how strange it is that men should admit the validity of arguments, yet object to their being pushed to an extreme; as if reasons could be good for any case which are not good for an extreme case. While, therefore, Mr. Mill holds a kind of intellectual supremacy over the minds of so many, and while, on the one hand, attacks upon authority are increasing in number and audacity, and while, on the other hand, the class of men is daily augmented, who, weary of their labyrinthine search after truth, are craving to be led back to authority by a process of intellectual conviction, it seems not unreasonable to give some sort of reply to his attack.

It is satisfactory to know that Mr. Mill deprecates* “the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic”—that which points out weaknesses in theory and errors in practice, without establishing positive truths,—“for as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot,” he says, “be valued too highly.” We will not stop to do more than to mention the difficulty of acquiring positive knowledge, since no certain truth is, according to himself, attainable. But we will recur at once to passages already quoted, and will allow the reader to judge how far they are consistent one with another. The negative logic will be found very useful here. For a system inconsistent with itself cannot but be false. If, therefore, we can show such inconsistency, Mr. Mill’s system falls to the ground; if not, the advantage will be with him.

As we have seen, he claims for every sane adult absolute freedom of opinion, and of expression as inseparable from opinion. He declares that to silence the expression of an opinion is

* P. 81.

to rob the human race; and also he condemns altogether the phrase "immorality or impiety of an opinion": and further, asserts that the assumption of infallibility, that is, the silencing of discussion, is most fatal in those cases where the opinion silenced is called immoral or impious.

It is evident, therefore, that should a schoolmaster open a school in which atheism is publicly taught, the State would have no right to put him to silence. To do so would be most fatal: his opinions being neither immoral nor impious, and being moreover possibly true, mankind would certainly be robbed, and might be deprived of the inestimable good of exchanging the false belief in God for the true belief in no God, should the latter be really true; for at present the world has not become prepared to receive so very recondite a doctrine. But, it may be said, though the State may not interfere with the schoolmaster, it may prohibit scholars from frequenting the school. This, however, would be to interfere directly with parents, and indirectly with the master too, and would be assuming the fatal gift of infallibility: whereas, we can never be sure that either the belief or the disbelief in God is true, for we are not sure of the falsity of any opinion.

But suppose the State to be profoundly convinced that its whole authority is derived from God, and that if the belief in God be destroyed, the proximate result will be anarchy, what course must it take? Provisionally it *may*, even according to Mr. Mill, and it *must*, by every reasonable consideration, act upon its belief, upon its strong conviction; that is, it may silence the schoolmaster or public lecturer, for the case is the same, upon condition of giving him complete liberty of contradicting and disproving the opinion of the State, which is the most palpable contradiction. But Mr. Mill is a logician. He recognizes the fact that "it is far from a frequent accomplishment even among thinkers to know both sides." He expressly mentions mathematical and physical speculations, and he maintains that on no subject except these does any opinion deserve the name of knowledge, unless after either an active controversy with opponents, or an equivalent mental process. Having this conviction, he must therefore have passed through such a process himself. He cannot have neglected to do so. He is enamoured of the Socratic dialectics. By them he will test every philosophical assertion, and he is no doubt equally willing to be so tested himself.

Let us, then, see how he would stand a dissection—we will not say after the Socratic method, but after such fashion as to a man of average clearness of perception is possible. Let us repeat two passages already quoted, and let us examine

them strictly. Mr. Mill is not the man to shrink from any proof, however strict. He courts trial. He is a hard hitter, and he does not expect any opponent to accept his challenge, which is offered to all comers, with the reverse of his lance: the combat is understood on both sides to be à l'outrance: ridicule and sarcasm are weapons which he does not disdain to use, and to which he does not object; and they are perfectly lawful. All that can be required is that the fighting be according to the rules of courtesy.

He says,—1st.* “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”

2nd.† “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application till men have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.”

Now every one who has ever read any of Plato's dialogues, either in the original or in a translation, knows that the first question which Socrates is always represented as putting has for its object on every occasion to get at a definition of common words used by the other interlocutors. The same may not be an inconvenient plan to adopt here, and as we have not Mr. Mill to interrogate, we must be content to assume, if possible, such meanings as he would not question. And first, as to the word “rightfully”; by this no doubt is meant justly, or according to justice; and justice, we may presume to be equally the right of all men; that could scarcely be denied: the words right and justice then are of universal application: they apply to all men, at all times, and under all circumstances, in one country as well as another: were they absent, the human race itself could not exist, for society would be impossible, because they are at the root and basis of all our mutual relations. This is an *abstract* idea of justice or right: in the *concrete*, in the practical application of justice, it will be admitted that as circumstances vary, so must the conduct change, which it is right or just to pursue under the circumstances. Thus, it is right to restore to a man his sword, but not if he be in a rage and likely to hurt himself or others with it; and so on in an infinite number of circumstances simple and intricate. So far then as to the word rightfully; and the meaning of legitimate, as used in the second passage quoted, appears to be synony-

* P. 22.

† P. 23.

mous with "rightfully." "Despotism," in the same passage, evidently means a government which actually interferes with the individual in a great degree, not merely in order to prevent harm to others, but for his own good.

It is obvious, therefore, that different forms of government are allowable or legitimate under differing circumstances. Now, as a perfectly free government is, according to Mr. Mill, the only rightful one in a civilized community, and as a despotism is legitimate in dealing with barbarians; and as there are many shades of national characteristics between gross barbarism and high civilization, Mr. Mill will no doubt admit that corresponding degrees of despotism or freedom must be as legitimate in their respective places, as either complete freedom or complete despotism. But opinions on civilization differ; scarcely will two men agree on a definition of the word: the Greeks considered all other men barbarians; the Chinese take the same view at the present time; and Europeans hold Chinese civilization very cheap. Whether any nation has arrived at the enviable condition of being capable of improvement by free and equal discussion, is simply a matter of opinion. It cannot be otherwise, for the facts are disputable in every conceivable case. Now Mr. Mill says, the only nations with which we need concern ourselves in this discussion have long since reached that condition. But the whole controversy turns on this very point. Have any nations, and what nations, arrived as a matter of fact at the condition contemplated? and if they have, who knows the fact, and how is it known? But Mr. Mill is laying down a principle. He cannot confine himself to this nation or that; a principle is of universal application, and the present principle concerns justice, which is the right of all mankind equally. But if it be alleged that he is speaking of the application of the principle only, we reply, the very use of the word "rightfully" implies something universal, and to confine it within the limits of what any individual may be pleased to call civilization, is to make justice a mere matter of opinion. And this is in truth what Mr. Mill does: the word, as he applies it, means this only, that *in his opinion* a nation or nations have reached a point at which a certain amount of freedom is a real right. He has not advanced the argument a single step. He must mend his definition, or give up his principle: he argues like a very Thrasymachus; he muddles together the expedient and the just in the old old style. He makes himself, or some other individual, the judge of when and whether a right which he declares to be absolute can be insisted on at a given time, or

at all. We mean this: if interference be only just under certain conditions, it is because subjects have a right to reject interference under any other conditions; but who is the judge whether those circumstances exist or no? Whether the decision on that point depends upon rulers or people, Mr. Mill leaves undetermined, so that on this theory, justice (for these people) becomes, we repeat, a mere matter of opinion, which is absurd.

But more, "despotism is only legitimate provided the end be the improvement of barbarians, and the means justified by actually effecting that result." That is to say, a ruler is justified in his despotism to-day provided such despotism actually improves his subjects twenty or fifty years hence. But his experiment, made in perfect good faith it may be, is not justified if it be not successful. So that *he* can appeal *during* the experiment to Mr. Mill's dictum in support of his despotism, and his subjects can appeal equally to Mr. Mill's dictum against it *afterwards* in case his plan fails. In other words, what is just to-day is to-morrow proved by the event not to have been just, at the very moment when it was just. It seems positively astounding that a man of Mr. Mill's logical habit of mind should put his hand to such sentences as these. But perhaps the explanation is to be found in another remark quoted above,* where he says that ninety-nine men out of a hundred are incapable of judging of any matter not self-evident. He has, it would seem, a contemptible opinion of the human understanding as it exists at present. He takes it for granted, perhaps, that the ninety-nine cannot discover his sophisms, and that the hundredth will not expose them. His propositions are, to say the least, not axiomatic. They do not strike the mind as truths at first sight; they require much patient investigation; and, after all, they are not convincing: the unquestionable ingenuity with which they are worked out would be a greater proof of genius were they original. But after all, they are, we repeat, nothing but popular fallacies more skilfully stated than usual. And it is this which gives them their chief importance. There is no profound philosophy in them. At least, having no claim whatever to be the hundredth man; being only *unus multorum*, one who runs; we confess, we have no difficulty whatever in admitting our inability to understand this fabric without basis, this lever without fulcrum, this progress from no starting-place and towards no goal, this knowledge begotten of doubt, this logic without premisses and without

* P. 38.

conclusion, or rather, let us say, this ocean of hypothetical propositions which yields before us and closes behind us, as though the whole intellectual life and activity of man were one infinite and eternal If.

So far as to Mr. Mill's principles. One or two other questions, however, suggest themselves for solution before we conclude. Does Mr. Mill really mean to say that the bulk of mankind, of whom, according to himself, so very large a proportion is utterly incapable of comprehending any question not self-evident, is to refuse to accept premisses on authority? Leaving aside altogether the practical contradiction of requiring the unintelligent ninety-nine, the very persons who cannot take in a proposition even when it is furnished them, to invent propositions for themselves, one would like to know from whence Mr. Mill got his own knowledge of the meaning of simple facts when playing around his mother's knee? Did he take no premiss on authority? Does he deny that the learner is under obligation to obey? Will he assert that in any conceivable condition of society any very considerable proportion of mankind can become teachers? It would lead one very much too far to prove the profound metaphysical truth conveyed in those few words, *nisi credatis non intelligetis*, unless you believe neither shall you understand. Suffice it to remark, that this saying is as philosophically sound, as it would be practically absurd to call upon the multitude even of educated men, in the midst of the struggle for life, to be for ever questioning first principles of metaphysics, of philosophy, or even of morals. For it is to first principles we ascend when we discuss the question of authority. Mr. Mill himself, in denying the claims of authority, does so only after a very profound investigation. Or, if he refuse to admit this, of what value are his conclusions? We are told that, before writing his book on politics, Aristotle studied the constitutions of many states; and we must presume that Mr. Mill has not only done likewise, but that he would require a similar course of study in those who are to discard authority; but to ninety-nine men out of every hundred such a study would be the most wearisome labour, not to say an utter impossibility. So that they must be slaves to Mr. Mill's intellectual discipline, in order that they may enjoy a liberty whose sweets they neither desire nor even understand.

Let us proceed now to make two or three remarks on the chapter on Individuality. In this chapter are many excellent ideas. But, unfortunately, even the pure metal often has not the true ring; it is like a cracked coin, which requires a searching test to prove its genuineness. Thus, when we are

told that "*even* opinions lose their immunity" when expressed under circumstances calculated to lead to some mischievous act, we at once admit the truth of the remark, however oddly the word *even* may sound. But when this principle comes to be applied, infallibility is at once assumed. For if it be true that private property is robbery, that* "interest on capital is a permanent source of injustice and inequality," or that "machinery in the hands of capitalists is a powerful instrument of despotism and extortion," and that therefore "machines and all the instruments of labour ought to be in the hands of productive labourers," what justice can there be in suppressing the expression of those principles, however public, and what mischief in seizing property and destroying machinery belonging to the employers of labour? The object of this chapter, however, is to insist upon the necessity for the universal development of the faculties of the individual, and to protest against the tyranny of society and of custom over the individual. It is too true, as Mr. Mill says, that at present society weighs heavily upon individuality, and that from the highest class down to the lowest every one lives too much under the eye of a dreaded censorship. And Mr. Mill will, no doubt, agree that the only remedy for such a state of things is to cause true principles to predominate in the mind of society at large. As to the way in which this desirable result can be brought about, whether it be by the free expression of false principles, the encouragement of charlatanry, the diffusion of newspaper philosophy and the metaphysics of novels, or by a method of a diametrically opposite kind, he and we will not agree. Nor is this the place to enter into the discussion. In this paper we are only engaged in showing Mr. Mill's inconsistencies. The establishment of our own theory is too long a task to be entered upon here; and we shall conclude with pointing out that his "applications" are quite at variance with, what seems to be, his fundamental proposition, if any such proposition can be said to exist. We shall give but two specimens, and let the reader judge for himself.

At page 169 the maxim is laid down, "that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to legal punishment." Now here again we are placed in the difficulty of not having a definition of the word used. What, for instance, does Mr. Mill mean by "actions"? Is the publication of opinions an "action"? If it be not, what is it? If it be, and if the

* Report of International Working Men's Congress in Brussels, *Times*, September 14, 1868.

general sense of mankind in favour of religion be founded in the truth, then it follows that to publish atheistical opinions should render the publisher subject to legal punishment. But no punishment for the expression of opinion is allowable, since the opinion may be true. Most likely Mr. Mill would indignantly disclaim the imputation of atheism if applied to himself; but we take it, that the question of the existence or non-existence of God is one on which the mind cannot remain in suspense. To doubt the existence of God is precisely the same, both intellectually and practically, as to deny the fact. Doubt excludes worship and the idea of religious obligation, quite as effectually as denial. You can neither worship nor feel responsible to a Being who may possibly not exist. Certainty is of the very essence of the recognition of responsibility or duty. A government must therefore be either atheistical or the reverse. Now no government has ever yet tried the experiment of professing atheism. Some have gone a long way in this direction, but none of which we ever heard has made the open profession; and till one is discovered which does not regard religion as the foundation of social order, the right to punish the publication of atheistical opinions cannot be denied in practice, even according to Mr. Mill's own maxim.

Again, Mr. Mill is an advocate for divorce in certain cases. Now he cannot deny that to pass a law legalizing divorce, or any other practice, is a direct encouragement to such practice. If therefore divorce be contrary to the law of God, to pass a statute legalizing it is to grant and encourage a liberty which is contrary to true liberty; and this cannot be, even on Mr. Mill's own showing, for he says, "the principle of freedom cannot require that a man should be free not to be free"; and by the same rule, a liberty which is contrary to true liberty is freedom in name alone, and not in truth; in other words, it is slavery to error. But, says Mr. Mill, the law of God on this point, as on others, is uncertain; and therefore the State has no right to restrict the liberty of the subject in the matter. That is to say, the State is bound, in behalf of liberty, to permit, and therefore to encourage, a practice which may be contrary to liberty!

We have done with Mr. Mill on Liberty. It is plain the English public at large views his Essay very differently from ourselves, for it has run through several editions. We suppose the explanation to be, that the great name of the author lends a sanction and an authority to notions which are the foundations of Protestantism, and the logical results of which have been obscured by the mist with which educational prejudice clouds the intellects of so many Englishmen.

ART. V.—THE SUPPRESSION OF ITALIAN MONASTERIES.

Convent Life in Italy. BY ALGERNON TAYLOR. London: Charles J. Skeet.

THE suppression of Italian Monasteries deserves more attention than has as yet, we think, been given to it. That God, in His all-wise Providence, should have permitted what was once regarded as the very salt of the land of Italy to be cast forth and literally “trodden on by men,”—and that so many of the Church’s children should have been thereby cut off from the means of embracing that higher life which all men cannot receive but “they to whom it is given,”—is surely worthy of our most anxious consideration and attention. In these days, when the idea of the kingdom of Christ upon earth is well-nigh banished from the minds of men,—when the little territory still subject to the Vicar of Jesus Christ is the one witness left among the nations to the great promise that all the kingdoms of the world are to become the kingdoms of God and His Christ,—when Christ’s religion is no longer regarded as the basis of European government and politics,—it is easy enough no doubt for the flippant, worldly-minded man, the shortsighted modern statesman, or the half-and-half Catholic, to speak glibly of monkish ignorance, idleness, and corruption, and to trace the suppression of Convent life in Italy either to its own inherent abuses and decay, or to urgent motives of state policy. It is easy enough to say that the salt has really “lost its savour, and that henceforth it is good for nothing but to be cast out and to be trodden on by men.” But such shallow, superficial views can never satisfy the minds of earnest Catholics, above all of those who know by their own experience what Convent life in Italy really was. We are living in an age of unanointed kings and uncrowned monarchs; when the framework of old royal Europe is breaking up, and men hardly know whether to look forward to a new order of things which the Church of God shall one day subdue and consecrate to herself, or whether the glory of Christendom is passing away for ever. Like France in the hour of her great Revolution, Italy, and perhaps even Spain, may have to sink to a yet lower depth of ruin and degradation; but like France

they may also live to see the resurrection of the Church. Or, on the other hand, it may be that the spirit of lawlessness, which broke out in rebellion against spiritual authority in the sixteenth, and civil authority in the eighteenth century, will gather fresh strength from year to year in those kingdoms which now occupy the seat of the old Roman Empire, until they culminate at last in the person of the great Antichrist, who is to be destroyed by the brightness of the second coming of our Lord. But be this as it may. Whatever the future which God may have in store for the Church and the world, the suppression of monastic life at any time in any country, but especially in Italy, must always be a subject of the deepest interest to every thoughtful Catholic.

Chosen in the Providence of God to be the special dwelling-place of the Vicar of His Son, and the resting-place of His Mother's House for so many ages of the world, the fulness of the Church's benediction had overflowed upon the face of that fair land; the blessings of grace had mingled with those of nature, and its olive- and vine-clad hills had become the homes and nurseries of well-nigh all the religious orders of the Church. It was to the heart of her highest mountains that S. Benedict, in the grace and beauty of his boyhood, fled away from the schools of the great city, and her Apennines became the cradle of Western Monastic life. It was on the gentle slope of her Umbrian hills that, when the world was growing cold in love, the blessed wounds of Christ were seen imprinted on the hands, and feet, and side of S. Francis of Assisi, who sent forth countless numbers of his children in their brown habits to cultivate his Master's vineyard amid her olive-trees and vines. Through her rich plains and crowded cities S. Dominic once passed on his mission of Apostolic love, and sent his white-clad sons to minister at her shrines, and hallow her universities. High up among the shady glens of Tuscany, or nestling amid the chestnut woods of the Alban hills, or overhanging the waters of the "sweet southern sea" and almost overlooking the ruins of an old Roman watering-place, the quiet cells of the hermits of S. Romuald have given sweet resting-places to the weary and the heavy-laden. Even wild Calabria became in her turn the joyful mother of religious children, and gave to the world, in the lives of the followers of the lowly S. Francis of Paula, the example of a perpetual Lent. But these are the glories which *have been*. Only to think of Italy at the present day, how sad it is! Where now is the hospitality of S. Benedict, or the contemplation of S. Romuald, or the poverty of S. Francis, or the learning of S. Dominic? Where now are the sons of S. Ignatius, whose lot

is ever bound up in His cause Whose name they bear? The dispersion of the Apostles was the salvation of the world; and it may be that they who are now scattered far away from their Italian homes in the green meadow lands of England, or the rapidly-growing cities of America, are silently but surely building up the walls of God's Church for generations that are yet unborn. But meanwhile their place knoweth them no more. The grass is growing in their silent cloisters, or, what is worse, the walls of their deserted convents are re-echoing the blasphemous oath or ribald jest of the soldiery of an excommunicated king; and the cells, which were once the happy dwelling-places of the captives of divine love, are now the gloomy prisons of the murderer and the felon.

Who that may have stood some twenty years ago upon the hills above Assisi,—say, for instance, in the little garden of the convent of the Carceri,—and looked down upon that wonderful Umbrian plain, so richly dowered with the choicest blessings of nature and of grace, can think of what it has now become without shame and sorrow? Even now, as you look down upon it, it still outwardly seems the same; perhaps for its rich beauty one of the fairest scenes which even Italy can show. A little to the right, beneath your feet, rise the battlements and towers and ruined citadel of the birthplace of S. Francis; forming as it were no unworthy setting for what may be called the glorious reliquary of S. Francis, the triple church built above his shrine. Its rose and lancet windows are filled with the richest colours of the fifteenth century. The roof of the upper church is painted by Cimabue, and in the vault of the middle church Giotto, inspired by Dante, has represented Christ giving Poverty in marriage to S. Francis. It is a sanctuary of Italian art, but its richest treasure is the shrine of him who loved to call himself the “little servant of Jesus Christ.” A little lower down, just as the hill sinks into the plain, rises the majestic dome of the church of Santa Maria degli Angeli, built over the little Gothic chapel in which S. Francis laid the foundation of his order and his rule. A little nearer may be seen the church of Santa Chiara, the first abbess of the Poor Clares, containing the body of the saint, whose hair S. Francis cut off with his own hands. And a little lower down again, the humble church and convent of San Damiano, rich in memories and relics of S. Francis and S. Clare, and from the walls of which S. Clare, woman though she was, drove back the Saracens: for she held in her hands the Body of Him who is strong to save. Somewhat to the left you may see the little village of Bevagna (the ancient Mevania), famous now, as of old, for its rich pastures and white cattle.

“Mevania’s bull,
The bull as white as snow;”

but more happy now in its possession of the body of a white-robed saint of the Order of S. Dominic, S. Giacomo of Bevagna. On a hill just above the village may be seen the little town of Montefalco, with its Convent Church, in which is preserved the still uncorrupted body of another blessed Clare of the Order of the Nuns of S. Augustine. Her heart has been taken from her body, and stamped upon its flesh is an image of Christ crucified, together with the instruments of His blessed passion. Still further on, as far as the eye can reach, stretches the beautiful valley of the Clitumnus, upon whose banks in old Roman times, as Virgil tells us, the white sacrificial bull was sent to graze until the time came to lead it in triumph to the Capitol. What a wondrous scene! Truly a land flowing with milk and honey! And here we may remark, in passing, that they who were always ready to lay the barrenness of the Campagna and of the country adjoining Rome, to the charge of the bad government of the Vicar of Christ (forgetting that in some cases, where the soil is poor, pasturage may be more profitable than tillage), had always a strange way of forgetting the wonderful cultivation of Umbria, the Romagna, and the Marches, when subject to the happy rule of the Holy Father. Rich indeed it seemed with the richness of earthly beauty and careful cultivation, to the pilgrim of twenty years ago, as it lay before his gaze in the clear light of an Italian sky; but richer far for the memory of S. Francis, which cast around it almost, as it were, the reflection of the glory of that unearthly paradise in which he is living now. Not a spot in all that lovely plain, but had been trodden by the blessed feet of him who bore the wounds of God! Not a village but had been hallowed by his shadow as he went about doing good! He even seemed to live again in his poor and humble followers, who with rough habit, and girdle of rope, and sandalled feet, kept watch around his tomb, and, poor themselves, preached the gospel to the poor in every hamlet of that happy plain. We have said that outwardly the scene still remains the same; but its higher glory has passed away. The children of S. Francis are no longer there. Their convents are desecrated, and desolate is their Father’s shrine. Nay, we have even heard that the spouses of Christ, the nuns of an Umbrian convent, have been left almost to perish by starvation, from neglect of the payment of the wretched pension with which the Italian Government had undertaken to support them on their suppression! “How has the gold become dim! the finest colour changed! the stones of the sanctuary scat-

tered in every street! Her Nazarites were whiter than the snow, purer than milk, more ruddy than the old ivory, fairer than the sapphire. Their face is now made blacker than the coal, and they are not known in the streets. It was better with them that were slain by the sword, than with them that died of hunger."

Or let us take another scene.—If there be one spot in Italy, after Rome itself, dearer than another to a Catholic heart, surely it must be the battlefield of Castel-Fidardo. On more than one account is it full of holy memories. It witnessed the martyrdom of a Christian army. The purple grapes were ripening for the vintage upon that September morning, on which, fortified by the bread of life, the crusaders of S. Peter girt themselves for battle: but a nobler vintage was in store. Nobly they fought, more nobly did they die; and the blood-stained earth of Castel-Fidardo bears within it, it may be, the seed of a harvest of glory for S. Peter's throne, which saints have foreseen in vision, and to which we are all looking forward with such longing hearts. They were sown in dishonour, they have been raised in glory; they were sown in weakness, they have been raised in power; and they are gathered now by the hands of the Great Reaper into the garner of God's choicest wheat.

But this is not all. The battlefield itself is girt around with holy places. It lies in a hollow formed by three high hills, Monte Camero, Osimo, and Loreto. On the first stands a monastery of Camaldelose hermits, on the second the shrine of S. Joseph of Cupertino, in the church of the Conventual Franciscans; while the third is the resting-place of the holy house of Nazareth, in which the Word was made Flesh and became Mary's son. Hardly ever, surely, could a spot of earth be found more suited to the calm contemplation of the religious life, than under the very shadow of those blessed walls, which had witnessed the hidden life of the Incarnate Wisdom and the Virgin Mother, and heard the words of Him who spake as never man spake. Yet the calm retreats of the hermits of S. Romuald and the Franciscan Friars are desolate and waste; and although the treasury of our Lady's house has not as yet been seized by the Government of Italy, yet we know that the hand of sacrilege is suspended over it, and that any day its fate may be the same as that of the orders of the Church. "God was the guide of its journey. He planted the roots thereof, and it filled the land. The shadow of it covered the hills, and the branches thereof the cedars of God. Why hast thou broken down the hedge thereof, so that they who pass by the way do pluck it?"

Well indeed may we ask ourselves what has been the cause of all this ruin. Great as is the evil before God and man and mighty the sin of the spoliation of the property of the religious houses, it fades into nothing in comparison with that far greater spiritual evil, which has befallen the Church in Italy by the suppression of the houses themselves. It is not, of course, possible to suppose that, with their suppression, all vocations to the higher religious life have at the same time ceased. And if not, it is impossible to exaggerate the extent to which the Church is crippled and the rights of Christian men and women interfered with and curtailed, by men who boast that they are acting in the fair name of Liberty. Countless must be the frustrated vocations which are crying to heaven for vengeance. Is, then, the life of interior prayer and contemplation to cease in Italy at the mere will of the State? To justify so tyrannical an exercise of power on the part of the Italian Government, we should naturally expect to hear of some flagrant abuses, or some well-known scandals, which might at least palliate—for they can never excuse—the crime and injustice of the suppression. When Henry VIII. suppressed the English monasteries, he at least put forward as a pretext their alleged dissoluteness and inefficiency. Yet, so far as we are aware, no such charge has ever been made against the religious houses of Italy. We have not now to do with the dissolution of the English monasteries, or the state of the English Church at the time of the Reformation. The evils and corruption of that period have doubtless been grossly exaggerated; we cannot, however, help thinking that the state of the monasteries and convents, and of the clergy generally, has been far higher in Italy during the last twenty years than it was in England previous to the Reformation. Take, for instance, the number of those Italian bishops and clergy, who have betrayed the Church and joined the Revolution; and contrast it both with the number and the corrupt lives of those who in England sided with Henry against the Church. Amongst the bishops, we have only heard of two or three; amongst the clergy (and we must always bear in mind how numerous it is) we can almost count them upon our fingers. We do not wish to be misunderstood. We do not, of course, mean, that out of so large a body of men there have not been many—perhaps very many—cases, where much of the true spirit of the religious vocation has been lost. Still less do we mean, that all the Italian religious houses were living up to the strictness of rule which they were bound to profess. But we do say that, speaking generally, the life led in Italian monasteries was blameless; and that even the worst-observed rule

of the most relaxed religious house offered to the eyes of men a far higher life than is led by those who have despoiled them of their property, and in doing so have robbed the widow, the orphan, and the poor. The very relaxations which had crept into some of the older orders, were fast passing away under the watchful eye of Pius IX., whose glorious Pontificate has been especially remarkable for the renewed life and vigour and increased efficiency it has given to more than one religious order of the Church. Upon the houses of religious women, we believe we may safely say, without fear of contradiction, that not even the shadow of suspicion has ever fallen. Yet many of these innocent virgins, who have consecrated their lives to Christ, have had to undergo such privations and hardships, as should send the blush of shame into the cheek of every true-hearted Italian.

Under these circumstances the little unpretending volume, which we have named at the head of this article, is of especial value. In his Preface the author, himself a Protestant, says :—

Recent political events in Italy may be expected to impart something of an historical character to these notes on Italian monasteries ; for, owing to the suppression of many of the religious houses of Italy—and among them, it is to be presumed, some, at least, of those noticed in the present volume—the description of these here given may possibly constitute a record of their appearance, and of the manner of life led within their walls, during the last days of their monastic existence.

The author gives a list of more than *threescore* monasteries visited by him in different parts of Italy. Benedictines, Camaldolese, Carthusians, Regular Canons, Dominicans, Franciscans of all kinds, Minims, Trinitarians, Barnabites, Jesuits, Passionists, and Lazarists—at all these he has had a look. Nor was his visit merely superficial, for he is evidently a careful observer ; and he was himself an inmate of some of the convents, and spent several weeks with the Barnabites at Genoa, and several months with the Capuchins at Rome. He is, as we have said, a Protestant ; but he seems to have made a careful study of convent life. He has diligently inquired for himself, and has formed his own judgment of all he has seen. He is, besides, singularly accurate in his descriptions. We may, therefore, fairly take his evidence as that of an impartial witness. Speaking of the state of morality and discipline among the religious orders, he remarks :—

It will, perhaps, be expected that I should give some opinion with regard to the present state of discipline among the religious orders of Italy. On

this point I may observe, that if I have felt diffident in pronouncing an opinion founded on my own experience in respect of the state of education among the priesthood, much more must I hesitate in recording opinions upon a matter which is necessarily, to a great extent, removed from the opportunities of personal observation open to any traveller; especially as in this volume I endeavour to confine my remarks to what I have myself seen or ascertained, to the exclusion, as far as possible, of merely hearsay testimony. Of course, however, I cannot avoid having formed some opinion on the subject; for after spending many months in monasteries, and conversing with a great number and variety of clergy of all ranks and orders, as well as with numerous lay Roman Catholics, I could not fail to carry away some impression with regard to the state of morality, and the observance of monastic discipline generally, among the religious orders.

That impression, whatever it may be worth, is, that *discipline and regularity of life are, for the most part, strictly observed* in the convents of Italy; although, doubtless, there are many instances where individual members of a religious community lead a life little in accordance with the spirit of the monastic institution. . . . As my opinion is in part founded on the conversation of monks and friars themselves, it may be as well to observe that I did not find it to be true, as many Protestants suppose, that the Roman Catholic clergy are always anxious to keep in the background, and even to deny whatever facts may militate against their order, or the monastic state in particular. . . . So far as regards the religious communities, at least, it would seem that they do not care to ignore occasional irregularities, being apparently conscious that such are the exceptions among a large body of men of generally exemplary lives.

His estimate of the state of clerical education is somewhat lower than that which we have ourselves formed. But it must be remembered that the author, although he tells us that he has conversed with the clergy of every degree, seems to have been thrown, in accordance with his own taste, more among the regular than the secular clergy. Now these latter enjoy, perhaps, higher educational advantages than can always be met with in convents, although of course there may be individual cases of greater learning among the regular than among the secular clergy.

Speaking, then, from my personal knowledge and observation of the Italian clergy, I am of opinion that they are usually well versed in the several subjects of their professional studies; they are good Latin scholars, and well read in dogmatic theology. Their Latin scholarship, however, is for the most part based on modern and mediæval Latin; for the classical authors of antiquity, Roman as well as Greek, appear to be but little, if at all, studied by the Italian clergy generally. They also, as a body, unquestionably possess a full share of that sort of experience of men and things, which is implied in the expression, a knowledge of the world. But there appears to be with the mass of the clergy a want of that general reading on

subjects unconnected with their professional studies, which is essential to a high degree of mental culture. In this respect, however, the Italian clergy are not peculiar; for the same may be predicated of the bulk of the clergy of most, if not all, Christian sects. At the same time it is only just to add, that among the Italian priesthood are to be found many men of deep and extensive erudition, in addition to mere professional learning, in which latter, as above mentioned, the great bulk of the clergy are not deficient.

At Velletri he made the acquaintance of a young friar of more than average attainments:—

He had studied English, and had acquired considerable proficiency in the language, being able to speak it fairly as well as read it. He proved, moreover, to be a first-rate Latin scholar; and some Latin correspondence with which he subsequently favoured me may be called, without exaggeration, a model of composition. When I visited Rome in the following year, I found that this friar had been sent to the Capuchin Convent there, to study foreign languages in the College of the Propaganda; it being intended, I presume, to turn his linguistic talents to account for missionary purposes. Many an English traveller, on seeing this Franciscan—who, like the rest of his Order, wore a habit of coarse brown serge and sandals on his feet—would not hesitate to speak of him half contemptuously, half pityingly, as a poor, ignorant, begging friar; and yet Padre T—, mendicant though he be, is a highly educated gentleman, and fit to associate on terms of intellectual equality with scholars of any nation.

He seems fully to appreciate the value of the study of “*Sagra Eloquenza*,” or the Art of Preaching, which is certainly much neglected among Anglican clergymen. Thus he tells us that only such of the priests are “allowed to preach as have studied with a view of appearing in the pulpit, and have thus earned for themselves the title of ‘*Predicatore*,’ or preacher.”

The part of monastic life which seems to have most impressed him, is the meeting together of each community for silent meditation and self-examination; although, like most Protestants, he seems to be unaware that meditation forms part of the daily life, not of clerics only, but of very many laymen living in the world. A religious community engaged in silent mental prayer must certainly be a novelty to any one, who is only acquainted with Protestant devotions.

Of all the parts of monastic life, and of all the various striking effects associated with it, none was to my mind so impressive as the meeting together of the community at the close of the day for silent meditation; a practice which, though I first became acquainted with it at San Bartolomeo, I found to be common to most, if not to all religious orders. Around the choir, each in his separate stall in private prayer, sat or knelt the whole community; the flickering oil-lamp, by which alone the church was preserved from total darkness, adding by its “dim, religious light,” and the indistinctness of its

effect, to the impressive character of the scene. For impressive it could hardly fail to appear to most unprejudiced minds.

Serious self-communion, involving examination of the conscience generally and of the actions and feelings of the day in particular, must necessarily be a solemn act, whatever may be the doctrinal opinions of him who performs it. And this self-communion, while it lies at the root of the theory of monastic life, has been embodied in the rules laid down by all the founders of religious orders; and so far as my opportunities of observation went, it seems to form an important part of the actual practice of the religious communities of Italy.

And again:—

This custom alone seemed to make a marked distinction between living in a monastery, or in the busy world. People engaged in the active duties of life seldom have the opportunity, even when there is the inclination, to make a habit of regular meditation, of daily self-communion at fixed hours and for a definite time, in whatever circumstances they may happen to be placed. Among the Capuchins, the impressiveness of this part of the devotional exercises of the day is increased by the meditation always taking place with the window-shutters or blinds closed, thus excluding the light of day . . . with the intention, doubtless, of giving a serious line to the train of thought, and by withdrawing sensible objects from the view, to lead the mind to concentrate itself more entirely on the interior state of the soul.

During his sojourn in Italian convents, our author had an opportunity of observing the "importance that is attached to the practice of auricular confession, as an essential part of religion, by both clergy and laity, and the safeguards by which it is sought to protect that practice from abuse." He tells us that limitations, in regard to licenses given to hear confessions, are "especially frequent in convents, where the number of persons in priest's orders is considerable, rendering it practicable to make a selection of those most suited for the duties of confession."

We wish that our space allowed us to lay before our readers a few anecdotes of Italian convent life. We can only find room for the following description of an Easter Sunday "pranzo," or dinner at the refectory of San Barnabà at Genoa.

I have often observed the general cheerfulness prevailing among members of religious communities. San Barnabà was an instance of this, although a more than usually rigid convent (being the novitiate house) of an unusually strict order. On Easter day, after the religious duties of the morning had been performed, and after the Paschal lamb had been blessed, as is customary in convents, the Superior dispensed with the public reading in honour of the festival of Easter, and the friars enjoyed the privilege of conversing whilst

taking their meal. There was a good deal of quiet conversation; and towards the end of dinner one of the friars—a stout, elderly lay brother of small stature and ruddy complexion, who had passed the greater part of his monastic life of thirty odd years in this convent—was asked by his Superior to improvise some lines for the amusement of the company. The lay brother requested to be furnished with a subject, to which the Superior replied by suggesting the name of their guest for the purpose. This was rather an unpromising subject for the good friar, who, however, made the most he could of it; for, rising at once and bowing respectfully to the Superior, he improvised several lines, which, whatever may have been their merit, served for the great amusement of his hearers, whose simple and hearty merriment on such slight grounds it was pleasant both to see and share in.

Our author seems to be perfectly fascinated by the charm of monastic life. He tells us that he has never enjoyed any invitation more thoroughly than to a convent dinner; and it is really amusing to see how the poor refectory and meagre fare, with their religious associations, become to him positive luxuries and pleasures. Nor must we forget to add, that while living in a convent he was careful to observe all its rules, and to conform in all things to its discipline, even when it included so severe a mortification as midnight rising. Thus he says:—

It was a pleasure to rise at midnight to matins, than which service, at such an hour, nothing makes you enter more intimately into the spirit of monastic life; and unless a person is competent to enter into that spirit, it is impossible to form a judgment approximating even to truth, in regard either to the favourable or unfavourable side of monastic institutions.

Since the publication of his "*Convent Life in Italy*," our author has published another work upon "*French Monasteries*," about which perhaps we may have something to say on a future occasion. It is true that he has hitherto regarded monastic life from an æsthetic point of view, apart from its theological bearing; but we would fain hope that so frequent a residence in the cloister, so familiar an acquaintance with unworldly men, may one day, by God's blessing, raise his heart and mind to the full appreciation of that higher religious life, which can be found alone within the unity of the Holy Roman Church. Of one thing we are sure, that wherever he may be, he will carry with him the prayers of those "cheerful, hospitable men, whose guest for so many months (to use his own words) he had the good fortune to be": and we know that the "continual prayer of a just man availeth much."

Such then, in the opinion of an unprejudiced and unbiassed Protestant writer, were the Italian religious houses almost at

the moment of their suppression. In an æsthetical, literary, but above all in a spiritual point of view, the loss inflicted upon Italy by that cruel and unjust act is well nigh irreparable. Our author remarks that the conventual life must surely have some peculiar charm attaching to it, when we find that wherever no legal obstacles are thrown in the way of monastic establishments, they exist in numbers that could scarcely be credited by most English people, and that they are constantly on the increase. This is true: but the charm of which he speaks, although he knows it not, is the gift of God the Holy Ghost; and woe to that country, which does despite to the Spirit of Grace! In the Convent of Campi, near Genoa, our author met with a poor boy, who was in the habit of assisting the lay brethren in their household duties. The boy, it appears, had been showing him his rosaries and medals, and had spoken to him, "with a sympathizing expression of countenance which a painter would have delighted to seize," of Him who suffered so much for us upon Calvary. He went on to speak of the suppression of the monasteries, and exclaimed:—"Ma che devirebbe de noi peccatori, se i frati non pregavano per noi? Se non era per i Religiosi, il mondo cadarebbe sotto il peccato. E stanno essi sempre in convento, e non fanno male a nessuno."* The simple words of that poor Italian boy sum up exactly our own thoughts upon the suppression of the religious houses. What will become of Italy? We know not, we cannot tell. But our thoughts wander back to that other people, who would not have the Lord to reign over them, or God to be their King; and we call to mind the terrible warning of their rejected Master:—"Therefore, I say to you, that the Kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and shall be given to a nation yielding the fruits thereof. And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder."

* "But what would become of us sinners, if the friars did not pray for us? Were it not for the Religious, the world would fall beneath the weight of sin. And these remain always in their convents, and do harm to nobody."

ART. VI.—MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.

The "Month" for July, 1868 ; October, 1868 ; May, 1869.

Letter to the "Tablet" of May 28th. By the Writer of the October article in the "Month."

WE published a short article last January on "the principles of Catholic Higher Education." We separated the question of principles from that of practice, thinking that there would be much greater probability of ultimate agreement among Catholics, if these two very distinct questions were treated apart; and we treated therefore exclusively the former. Our article produced a most valuable letter from Dr. Gillow, which we published in April; and this in its turn has brought one from Canon Oakeley, which our readers will find in our present number, and to which we beg their particular attention. The primary purpose indeed of Dr. Gillow's letter was to correct an error of fact, into which we had inadvertently fallen, and to which we shall presently refer; though the letter contained incidentally very much interesting and important matter, which will be of much service in our future argument. But Canon Oakeley's is precisely the kind of letter which we desired to obtain. Our article, we said in January (p. 87), "may possibly lead to discussion; and this again may result in the correction or enlargement of our views on this or that particular. In such a manner by degrees thoughtful Catholics, or the large majority of such, may arrive at such general agreement on the matter, as shall greatly facilitate the path of ecclesiastical superiors." We hope that other competent thinkers then may be induced to follow Canon Oakeley's example, and give our readers the benefit of their general view. Meanwhile for ourselves, we think we shall act more wisely if we abstain from speaking further on our own account, until we have had the opportunity of obtaining the utmost obtainable light from every quarter. It is in this way that we may best hope to be of service, in helping forward this urgent yet complicated question to a harmonious and successful issue.

Our only purpose then at present is a reply to some strictures on our January article, made in the "Month" of

last May. They are brought forward, partly by a correspondent who wrote the article of last October, and partly by the Editor himself in a comment on his correspondent's letter.

Now firstly we would point out, that our language towards the "Month" on this matter (and indeed on all others) has been most cordial. In the very article assailed, we refer twice (pp. 95-6) to the "able" arguments advanced by our contemporary; in the passage quoted from us by the correspondent, we comment on his "many admirable remarks," and on the real "service he has rendered" in the matter; and in April (p. 529) we express warm admiration of his excellent criticisms on the London philosophical examination. But there is one passage in our April number, which we may as well quote at length:—

Certain most orthodox persons have wished that young Catholics should undergo examination at Oxford and Cambridge: others, we trust not less orthodox, hold that nothing could be more disastrous than this; that it would be far better there should be no Catholic higher education at all. Undoubtedly in this instance one side has expressed its view with *exemplary gentleness and moderation of tone*; and we hope that the other side has not exhibited any faulty violence, &c. &c. (p. 380).

We have quoted this, for the sake of reminding our readers with what perfect courtesy we have conducted our argument; though undoubtedly we expressed strong dissent from one particular proposal, which we understood the "Month" to suggest. The first reference of the "Month" to this proposal was in its number for last July; and we here give the passage in full, without italics and precisely as it stood:—

On the whole then, the state of the question between the Catholic Colleges and the University of London is this. First, we are not brought into competition with the class of schools we desire to compete with. Secondly, the examinations are not such as suit our studies: classics are made too little of, and many other matters are made too much of. If there are schools which are suited by them, they are schools of a lower class, and with a lower style of education. Unfortunately, these are at present the only examinations open to us on terms that Catholics can admit. Cambridge and Oxford have indeed opened their gates wider than before, and they even invite the presence of Catholics. Degrees may be had there, but only on condition of long previous residence; and an invitation to residence at a Protestant University is one to which our only answer is "*Non possumus*." What we should like to see,—what we should agitate for, what, if we agitate, we shall be sure to get before long,—is the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations, and the throwing open of at least a part of the University emoluments to all comers, whether they have "kept

terms" or not. It has been already proposed to require only one year's residence before the degree: we have but to push the proposal one step further, and demand admission to their examinations after having educated ourselves in our own way. As for an English Catholic University, even if we could succeed first in founding and filling such an institution, and then in getting it chartered, it is quite conceivable that we might after all find we had got more than was good for us. We could not compare ourselves with others; and our numbers in England are so small, that without such competition we should stagnate. Our degrees, moreover, would carry no public value with them. What we want is, to educate ourselves entirely, and then to compete with the best-educated scholars in the kingdom (pp. 15, 16).

We understood the writer to be here describing that scheme, which (under the present circumstances of England) he thought more desirable than any other in the interests of Catholic higher education: it was the scheme which he "would like to see," and for which Catholics should even "agitate." And we understood this scheme to be, (1) that any non-resident Catholic should be admissible to "Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations" as they at present stand; (2) that he should study for those examinations at some Catholic college, which should educate him in its own way; but (3) that he should thus have every means of fully competing with non-Catholics at the end of his course, in the highest results of a good intellectual education.

Now we must enlarge a little on the second part of our statement, because of an explanation which has been subsequently given. It will be admitted by every one, that of all those studies which constitute a higher education, philosophy and history (if you put aside all reference to theology) are the most momentous; and that as regards "mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences," their value to youth of the leisured class, however great, is comparatively subordinate. Consider e.g. the various advantages so admirably described by F. Newman (in his work on the subject) as the most precious, nay the one characteristic, fruit of university education. Well: Mathematics, pure classics, and physics, hardly even *tend* to secure these advantages, except as preparing the student—which they do indeed invaluablely and even in some sense indispensably—for the more elevated discipline of philosophy and history. The very notion then never occurred to us, that philosophy and history were to be excluded from those examinations to which a Catholic should resort. Nothing short of a direct statement could have led any reader to imagine that so momentous an exception was intended; whereas there was not even the least *hint* of any such exception. Nay, the whole scope of the

article pointed just the opposite way. What advantage e.g. could possibly be gained by Catholic youths "measuring themselves with the best educated youths of the country" (p. 5 et passim), if the admeasurement only regarded proficiency in the lowest branches of study? Why you might almost as effectually measure a Catholic youth of two-and-twenty with non-Catholics by means of a *cricket match*, as by means of an examination confined to pure classics, mathematics, and physics. Then again the writer urged, that "without competition" with non-Catholics, Catholic education would "stagnate"; and it seemed therefore that on his view there could be no living education of Catholics in philosophy and history, unless they competed with non-Catholics on this ground. Moreover, in an earlier part of his article (p. 6) he had said in effect, that the final examination which he desired is one to which "*we can direct our curriculum with advantage to our education.*" His words therefore, in themselves and in their context, did irresistibly seem to mean, either that philosophy and history were not to be taught at all, —a view which did not occur to us as *possibly* intended, and which has since been heartily disclaimed—or else that they were to be included in the matter of a Catholic's examination at Oxford or Cambridge.

We took for granted, then—no other idea ever occurred to us—that the writer desired the competition of Catholic youths with non-Catholic on the field of philosophy and history, before an Oxford or Cambridge examining board. And we imagined an illustration. We supposed that in the palmy days of Protestantism, and in a country preponderatingly Calvinistic, a Catholic should suggest the competition of Catholics with non-Catholics in theology, before Calvinistic examiners. We had argued in the previous part of our article, that philosophy and history, far more than theology proper, constitute the present battle-ground between the Church and her most intellectually powerful assailants. We contended therefore, that the two cases are "perfectly parallel."

The "Month" of May however has explained, to our great gratification, that the whole of our comment proceeded on a complete misapprehension of the writers' language; and the explanation has been supplemented, by a letter which one of them has addressed to the "Tablet." Firstly the suggestion itself, it now appears, was originally made "simply as an alternative to the great evils of the London system" (p. 485); or, in other words, the scheme was never advocated as desirable, but only as less calamitous than the existing deplorable

arrangement. And secondly the writer intended, on the one hand that philosophy and history should be taught carefully in the Catholic colleges (Letter to the "Tablet"), but on the other hand that the examination of Catholic students at Oxford or Cambridge should be confined to "mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences" (p. 482).

We have no difficulty whatever in accepting this explanation. We are convinced that we entirely misapprehended the "Month" writers, and we retract unreservedly everything we said which was based on this misapprehension. We are only too glad to find fresh ground for recognizing what we have always maintained; viz. the complete agreement of principle between the "Month" and ourselves.

But unfortunately the Editor will not be content with this. He criticises (p. 485) our "*strange* misunderstanding of his contributors' *obvious* meaning." And he adds that "it is not easy to conceive a more complete instance of controversial unfairness" than is exhibited in our article; though he quite regards that unfairness as unintentional, and indeed as characteristically idiosyncratical. We must maintain on the contrary, that in every particular we interpreted the writers according to the legitimate objective sense of their language. We are sorry to inflict tedious details on our readers. But so much has recently been said by our contemporary about a certain "controversial unfairness" which is supposed to characterize this REVIEW in consequence of its Editor's incurable narrowness, that we think it really worth while to take this one particular case—which has been pressed as quite an extreme instance of such unfairness—and sift every item of the charge. It will be more convenient, if we begin with replying to the Editor, and then proceed to his correspondent.

The Editor's principal and fundamental censure is based on our total silence in January, as to the present connection of Catholics with London University. We are here, as military men would say, taken in flank; we are assailed from that quarter, from which assault was by us least expected. Our dislike of the whole Catholic connection with London University has ever been so intense, that our only fear was lest that dislike should be too apparent.

We may now however, we suppose, without impropriety express ourselves on the subject; as a writer in the May "Month"—identified by his signature with the correspondent who criticises our article—has thrown aside all reticence, and has apparently met with no censure for his plain speaking. If we are *permitted* to speak on the subject, we are only

too happy to do so; and we have the greatest possible gratification in giving whatever further publicity we can to his unanswerable argument. We will italicize one or two sentences, which impress us as especially telling:—

Is it not time that we should ask ourselves how long Catholics can submit to *have anything to do with educational bodies* to meet whose examinations our young men must, if they would secure success, [must] make themselves acquainted with and study the writings of the Mills, the Bains, the Huxleys of the day? These men are the prophets of modern progress. They have a name and a corresponding influence. They, at least some of them, write in a style which fascinates the young, now by its apparent clearness, now by its charming variety, its brilliant illustration, its poetic outbursts. The young are eager to learn, but naturally abhorrent of the labour of thought. Such teachers are pretty nearly sure to be popular with them—it is so pleasant to float along the stream of a lucid style without having to strain a muscle or being even once compelled to take to the oars! And so, dreaming placidly that they are becoming philosophical thinkers, and lulled into security by occasional vague panegyrics on the noble, the philanthropic, the useful, the inexperienced readers *drift unsuspectingly to the goal of atheism or scepticism*. Again, this new philosophy purports to bring mental philosophy into full harmony with physical science, and in a manner does so “by subjecting the elder to the younger and more vigorous brother, as modern thought demands.” There is a constant appeal made to sensible facts, to tangible discoveries, to practical achievements in the material universe. How tempting is the suggestion, that those who have helped us to more perfect dominion over external nature will, by the same process applied to immaterial substances, enable us, before many years have rolled by, “to exercise the same kind of control over the world of thought, as we already possess in respect of the material world,” to calculate the future course of the human race, or the actions of the individual will, with the same unerring precision with which we already foretell the occurrence of eclipses! *Not only is our poor fallen nature not insensible to such attractions, but there is a plausibility in sophisms of this kind against which it would be a wonder if any young man, not already versed in logic and in sound systems of philosophy, were proof.* The errors of our modern scientific writers lie deep down in their fundamental principles, which, if they be purely sceptical, as they often are, *no direct refutation can reach.*

Nor let it be supposed that the absurdity of scepticism is sufficient to ensure the unwary reader from being caught in the snare. Good care is taken to cover the pitfall with an exuberance of the most natural-looking and attractive herbage. Rhetoric goes a long way towards concealing the danger. Long trains of reasoning, or of clear and even truthful analysis, lure the already eager student on, till he is prepared to accept almost any conclusion which is confidently advanced. How can it be that a guide who has made so many hard problems easy, and led the way happily, with much science and skill, through so many entanglements, and triumphed over so many obstacles, should after all turn out to be a blind guide, ready in the

end to fall with his followers into the ditch? *Even those who unite natural acuteness with honesty of heart and sound faith find it difficult to resist first impressions or to detect the fatal errors which lurk under so much truth.* When at last they are startled by some proposition evidently at variance with Catholic belief, even if they have the grace to withhold assent, *they are not wholly saved from the influence long exercised over them.* Less patent fallacies have found acceptance with them; *the imagination is filled with delusive images; they are staggered by objections which they fancy to be insoluble, because they know of no sufficient answer themselves.*

It will be said, perhaps, that these dangers may be obviated if the student have a Catholic professor at his elbow to warn him against accepting falsehood, to expose fallacies, to answer objections for him, to inculcate and expound the truth. Well, let the experiment be fairly tried, but let us not make up our minds beforehand that it will be successful, and *let us not waste year after year of promising students in attempting what seems very difficult at the best, and may very likely turn out to be impossible.* We are ourselves not sanguine as to the result. That man knows little of philosophy or of the difficulties of teaching, who imagines that *two opposite systems of philosophy can be taught with any reasonable hope of our pupils entering fully into both.* Three years are not found too much to enable a student to master thoroughly one system. Let us remember what is involved in the endeavour in shorter time to make him realize two. For this he must learn *two sets of contradictory principles, he must retain in memory two distinct and intricate systems of terminology, he must bear constantly in mind the different senses in which the same words are often employed by either party, he must retain, with an accurate remembrance of the value of each, two sets of elaborate proofs.* Two brains instead of one ought to be at his service for two psychologies entirely distinct. Meanwhile, the unfortunate student is engaged upon half a dozen other subjects simultaneously. The examination he has to undergo at the end of his one or two years of preparation is conducted by men who are the leading advocates of the modern philosophy, who are not likely, therefore, to have mercy upon a candidate who advances views which they hold to have been exploded three centuries ago, and which they are constantly declaring to be too obsolete or too ridiculous to be refuted. Time presses, a multiplicity of subjects already nearly bewilders the student. *How will he regard the professor who loads him with so much additional labour to no practical purpose for his immediate end—a good place in the class list? What will be the result? At best, he will cram his poor head with a confused, undigested, and indigestible mass of matter. He will be a little further off from a genuine knowledge of philosophy at the end of his course than he was at the beginning. For it is better to know nothing than to be a sciolist in two conflicting systems.* He will run great risk of failure in his examination, without having acquired any sound knowledge to compensate by after usefulness for disgrace. Or, let us suppose he is happy and sensible enough to cleave to the truth, and prefer grounding himself in what will be of permanent service to him to securing immediate success by the sacrifice of truth. *Failure in this case is certain.* His resolve borders indeed on the heroic, but he has been put through a trial we had no right to subject him

to, and driven to submit to a punishment to which we had no right to expose him.

One only other alternative is possible. We ought not to disguise the fact that it is by far the most probable. Naturally eager to obtain academic success, impatient of any obstacle to its attainment, with or without conscientious misgivings as to the propriety of the plan, many, perhaps the majority, will apply themselves wholly to the acquisition of that philosophy which they will be expected at the University to know; they will cram themselves with the poison to the exclusion of the antidote; they will imbibe error, and neglect, if they do not reject, truth; and when the examination is over and success has justified their choice, they will go forth into the battle of life not merely unarmed against the gross materialism of public thought, but laden with false principles and errors cognate to those which they will encounter in the books and newspapers and magazines which English Catholics too often think themselves at liberty to read. They will stand in proximate danger of losing the Faith which their first essays in philosophy will have done much to weaken. The question will then be, with whom does the responsibility lie? Who put them into the occasion? (418-21).

In his letter (p. 484) the same writer expresses a hope, that Catholics "shall in time emancipate themselves from the thralldom of the ungodly University of London." And we would draw especial attention to another sentence; because it shows that the writer is not indulging in arbitrary speculation, but founding his view on "practical experience." "Every day," he says (p. 485), "of very practical experience in preparing candidates for the London examination in this branch convinces me more and more that this 'grievous hardship' will be found . . . quite fatal to any connection with the London University" (p. 485).

We have long held this opinion to the full; though we never could have hoped to express it so forcibly or defend it so tellingly. Our reason for having preserved profound silence on the matter up to last April, is extremely simple: viz., that various Catholic bishops have sanctioned the Catholic connection with London University; and that it did not therefore seem within the province of periodical writers, to argue publicly against its religious tendency. But since the "Month" has now spoken so openly and no rebuke has followed, we suppose it may be inferred that their lordships wish to see the whole question frankly and publicly discussed. One word however from them shall again close our lips on the subject.

We have been throughout greatly embarrassed by this conflict of duties; and we had at first indeed some difficulty, as to speaking at all on Catholic higher education. This was implied in the very first words the present writer put forth

on the subject, Oct. 1864, p. 372. Our opponent, we said, in advocating a Catholic college at Oxford,

implies throughout (and this is the most important point of all in a Catholic controversialist) that the question which he treats is one for the ecclesiastical authorities to decide peremptorily and without appeal. On our side we fully confess that these authorities have not yet spoken, and we infer that before doing so they are not unwilling to hear the whole question patiently and fairly argued out. We propose under such circumstances to take our own humble share in this momentous argument.

This has been our governing principle throughout: we have felt that the whole matter of education is one for the bishops; and that no private individual has a right to publish, except so far as their lordships may wish to hear discussion. We have thought ourselves accordingly precluded from publicly expressing any protest, on religious grounds, against what actually exists under ecclesiastical sanction; and we uniformly therefore limited our criticism to proposals concerning the future. We assure the Editor that we had various qualms of conscience, after our January article, as to whether we had not indicated too manifestly our hatred of the present Catholic connection with London University; and we were by no means without apprehension that we might be taken to task on the subject. But the particular rebuke which we have received, is precisely that which we least dreamed of anticipating.

The "Month" writer used in October incomparably less strong language than he uses now: indeed he expressly deprecated (p. 391) "abandoning the London University," before some connection with the older universities should be arranged. But when we found Dr. Gillow in April more or less speaking in the same direction with our own thoughts, we "supposed there could be no impropriety in our expressing cordial concurrence" (p. 529). We avowed therefore our hearty agreement with his opinion, that the change of studies involved in connecting Catholic Colleges with London, had been "in many respects the reverse of an improvement"; and that "the London philosophical examination in particular is a grievous hardship." And we would especially remind the Editor, that a whole month before he published his present comment, we had commemorated the "excellent service" done by his periodical "in drawing attention to the grossly tyrannical and intolerant character of this examination, and to the grievous religious injury which it is calculated to inflict." As Dr. Gillow spoke so strongly against the Catholic

connection with London University, we thought that at last we also had liberty to do the same.

Having made this explanation, we will take severally the various allegations made against our controversial fairness by the Editor and his correspondent.

1. The former gentleman considers, that our omission of all reference to London University originated in "willing or unconscious obliviousness"; and implies, unless we misunderstand him, that it arose from our conscious or unconscious tendency to judge unfavourably whatever appears in his pages. We assure him that nothing can be further from the fact than this last supposition, if indeed he implies it. We have always found a particular gratification in commenting on his services to the good cause. We are confident indeed that we have very far oftener expressed sympathy with the "Month," than he has expressed sympathy with the DUBLIN REVIEW.

2. The Editor says, that "we gave what purposes [purports?] to be an *exhaustive* list of *possible proposals* for supplying Catholic higher education, among which recourse to London does not figure." If he will look again at our article, he will find that his statement is incorrect in the very particular on which his whole criticism turns. Our words were these:—"Though Catholics are agreed on the great desirableness of a certain end, we hardly remember an instance on which so much difference of opinion *has existed* as to the appropriate means. In fact, no fewer than six different plans *have been from time to time proposed*" (p. 87). We did not profess to give "an exhaustive list of *possible proposals*," but a list of the proposals which *had in fact been made* during the recent controversy. Several writers have expressed great dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, and an earnest desire for some important change. Not one of these writers up to last January had proposed, as "the appropriate means" for this end, any longer or closer connection with London University. If this *had been proposed*, we should not have given any catalogue of proposals at all; because we thought ourselves precluded from speaking on the Catholic connection with London University, in such terms as would alone have expressed our conviction.

3. The Editor complains that we "employed against the suggestion made" in the "Month," "the very arguments which its contributors had already used to support their own conclusions." Some readers may have understood this to mean, that we appropriated such arguments without acknowledgment. But this is not what the Editor intends: for

what we did was, to quote (under inverted commas and with explicit reference) various sentences, in which the "Month" writer had argued powerfully on the evils of permitting Catholic students to be examined in philosophy by a non-Catholic board. Had we felt at liberty to express our full thought, we should have said that these excellent arguments tell indeed with irresistible force against London, but with force still *more* irresistible against Oxford and Cambridge. In fact our only doubt was, whether we had not given *too* broad a hint of our extreme aversion to the whole London arrangement. But we are quite unable to conjecture, how such a proceeding involves "controversial unfairness"; and still more, how it involves a controversial unfairness, than which "it is not easy to conceive" one more "complete."

4. The Editor considers that "the suggestion" of sending Catholics for examination at Oxford and Cambridge, "to whatever extent it had been made, had been made simply as an alternative to the great evils of the London system." Now we beg our readers to look back at that paragraph from the July "Month," which we have already quoted. The suggestion is put forth simply and unqualifiedly, as "what we should like to see," nay, "what we should *agitate* for." The Editor's present words imply, that there was some other plan which the contributor would have preferred to his own, but that this other plan was impracticable. What hint was there in July of any such preferable plan? What could that plan have been? Certainly not "an English Catholic University," for of this the writer spoke in disparagement. He considered it essential that Catholic students shall compete with non-Catholics; because "without such competition we should stagnate": and "what he would like to see" arranged as the means of such competition, would be "the admission of non-resident candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations." He advocated his proposal, not as the mere alternative from a worse evil, but on the contrary as being (under England's present circumstances) the best plan of all. We now indeed know that such was not his real intention; but we must contend confidently that this, and no other, is the obvious and legitimate objective sense of his words.

At this point we turn from the Editor to his correspondent.

5. This writer considers (p. 482) that the July contributor claimed for Catholics, in his proposal, "freedom to dictate the terms" of Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations. We cannot find in his article the remotest hint at anything of the kind. Let our readers judge.

6. The correspondent further considers the July con-

tributor to have advocated no more, than a competition of Catholics with non-Catholics, "in mathematics, pure classics, and the natural sciences." We have no doubt whatever that such was his subjective meaning; but we are more surprised than we can well say, that any one should account it the legitimate objective sense of his words, whether in themselves or in their context. On this however we enlarged sufficiently at the outset of our article.

7. We were the more desirous of doing justice to all that could be said for (what we understood to be) the July proposal, from the very fact of our feeling ourselves obliged to speak so vehemently in its disparagement. We supposed the writer therefore to argue, in its defence, that the examination at Oxford or Cambridge would turn entirely on the question of philosophical or historical ability and information, not at all on that of philosophical or historical *truth*. We certainly were not prepared to find our gratuitous candour turned against us as a proof of unfairness. Yet so it is by the correspondent (p. 483); who "finds nothing in the article which could by any possibility be twisted into the remotest resemblance to such" an argument. And so we are to be voted unfair, because in our desire of fully grappling with a subject, we credit an opponent's cause with a plausible argument, which he has not himself thought of bringing forward.

8. We now come to the October contributor, who is the present correspondent. He considers (p. 481) that he ought not to be held "responsible for the definite proposal" of July "signed by a different hand." But in the first place we would remind him, that he unequivocally identified himself with the July article. "In a recent," *i.e.*, the July "article," he says, "*we* discussed the question whether, &c. &c.," and "a similar inquiry into, &c. &c.," "is necessary to complete our task." He was professing to supplement the earlier article; to complete the task, of which a performance had commenced in July. Nor (apart from this) did we ever before understand, that articles in the "Month" written in the first person plural, from the mere fact of having a signature, are to be considered as expressing exclusively a contributor's private opinion, for which the "Month" itself is not responsible. Nothing indeed can be more intelligible than such an arrangement, when once it has been given out; and we will hereafter bear it in mind, whenever we may wish to comment on "the Month": but we had really no means of guessing the fact.

9. We observe with much surprise the correspondent's remark (p. 481), that "there is not a single word in his

article implying a desire for admission to Oxford and Cambridge, or for any sort of connection with them." We wish he had refreshed his memory, before he thus peremptorily contradicted our statement. Here are his words of October, as they stand in p. 391 :—

We . . . are *desirous* in the *interests* of our young men to look out for better chances, and, without abandoning the London University, to *agitate* for admission as non-resident candidates to the *degree examinations* of the *older universities*.

10. The correspondent expresses in the "Tablet" a further complaint. He says: "The writers in the 'Month' objected altogether to the examination of Catholics in philosophy by non-Catholics. . . . The October article insisted on this point emphatically, and at considerable length; yet it is represented as having recommended Catholics to subject our young men to such examination on this very ground." As to the July writer however, we can find in his article no opinion on the subject, beyond a very vague statement (p. 14) that "the department of mental philosophy affords by itself a whole budget of gravamina." It is exclusively therefore the October writer with whom we have here to do.

Now we certainly cannot concede the principle, that no writer should ever be understood to mean what his words obviously import, wherever such interpretation would involve him in self-contradiction: for the very large majority even of powerful thinkers fall occasionally into self-contradiction. But all this is really beside the present question; because we maintain that our critic has by no means rightly described the drift of his article. His words of October, 1868, are incomparably less strong than his words of May, 1869. In no part of his October article does he represent the philosophical examination of Catholics by non-Catholics as being so great an evil, that it may not easily be counterbalanced by a preponderating good. He says emphatically (p. 391) that "great indeed must be the evils which could equal in gravity the one terrible evil of" non-competition with non-Catholics;* nor does he give the slightest hint that, as regards the highest studies, he is urging his co-religionists again to undergo that "terrible evil." On the contrary, even as regards London University and its detestable philosophical examination, he exhorts Catholics *not to abandon it*, till they have secured a

* His words are, "of absolute isolation from the current of English mental life"; but he represents this evil as necessarily involved in non-competition with non-Catholics.

footing at Oxford or Cambridge.* Moreover, for many years London University enforced an examination of Catholic students in three books of Paley's "Moral Philosophy," and in Butler's Three Sermons. Yet so far from considering this an intolerable grievance—we always thought it *utterly* intolerable—he says (p. 395) that "the matter was too insignificant to call for remonstrance on the part of Catholics." Now these treatises are exclusively occupied with what may perhaps be considered the most vital and fundamental of all the philosophical questions, which are at issue between the Church and her assailants. They are occupied with the nature and origin of moral obligation. If the writer thought it quite "insignificant" that children of the Church should be interrogated by heretics and infidels on such sacred ground as this, why should we have taken for granted that he regarded the Oxford and Cambridge philosophical examinations as absolutely and peremptorily inadmissible?

If the "Month" contributors wish to understand what was our impression (when we wrote) as to their respective positions, we have no difficulty at all in explaining ourselves on the subject. We thought that, in their just hatred of what exists, they surprisingly underrated the evil influence of Catholic connection with Oxford or Cambridge; and we thought that they no less surprisingly *overrated* the importance of competition with non-Catholics. We thought that the July contributor by no means laid sufficient stress on the vital necessity of very vigorous philosophical and historical studies, as an integral part of any higher education worthy the name. And we thought that the October contributor, while fully feeling this necessity, by no means considered the notion so intolerable as *we* have always considered it, of Catholics preparing for a philosophical or historical examination before any non-Catholic board whatever. We need hardly add, that his May article has indefinitely changed our view of his standpoint, and has brought us into far more unreserved sympathy with his whole position.

11. The correspondent speaks (p. 483) in language of irony—which seems to us misplaced, and which is certainly out of harmony with his general tone—about our unwillingness "to delay even for a quarter" our "earnest and emphatic protest" against that plan, which we understood as having been proposed in July and endorsed by him in October. "Why," he

* These are his words, p. 391: "We are desirous . . . *without abandoning the London University*, to agitate for admission as non-resident candidates to the degree examinations of the older universities."

asks, "did we not rush to the rescue three months sooner?" But we did speak "three months sooner." In October (p. 421) we expressed ourselves quite as strongly against the said plan as we did in the following January. Of course however, the project assumed a far more important shape than it had done before, when the "Month" after an interval again pressed it forward, as we understood it to do in October. And as we were writing in January on the very subject of Catholic higher education, we did not wish to wait for our promised *second* article on the subject, before repeating our protest against (what seemed to us) the repeated proposal.

However the correspondent, in his letter to the "Tablet," very handsomely expresses himself "exceedingly sorry" for his "forgetfulness," and retracts the whole remark on which we have just commented. Of course nothing more can possibly be desired.

12. But that statement of the correspondent's which has surprised us most of all, occurs in p. 484. "Still less did the 'Month' ever propose 'resorting,' as the *Dublin reviewer* represents, to Oxford and Cambridge, and consorting, *by way of moral training*, with other residents at the University." Our sentence, thus strangely misunderstood, ran as follows:—"His proposal is to agitate for the admission of *non-resident* candidates to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations, with the view of Catholic students *thither resorting*." The word "thither" in this sentence referred, of course, to its immediate antecedent, "degree examinations": indeed, as our readers will have seen, the words "Oxford" and "Cambridge" had been used adjectively and not substantively at all. Moreover, by the very force of terms, those "thither resorting" were to be "*non-resident* candidates."* But secondly, even had the meaning of the sentence been doubtful, why should our critic take for granted that we intended it in a sense which would make it quite false, rather than in a sense which would make it quite true? Moreover, thirdly, the passage as a whole—quoted by our critic in p. 480—utterly refuses his interpretation; for its whole argument turns exclusively, not on *residence*, but on *examination*. And lastly, in the earlier part of our article (p. 87), we had described our understanding of the proposal with unexceptionable clearness; where we had spoken of "an agitation for the admission of non-resident students to Oxford and Cambridge degree examinations."

* The correspondent, in his letter to the "Tablet," says that this phrase is ambiguous. What other meaning did any one ever give it, except that of "candidates who do not reside," or "who have not resided"?

The correspondent indeed implies (p. 484), and expressly says in his letter to the "Tablet," that Dr. Gillow had been misled by us into a similar misconception of the intended proposal. But it seems to us that instead of Dr. Gillow "not having read the article in the 'Month'" (p. 483), we might rather accuse his critic of not having read Dr. Gillow's letter. Dr. Gillow describes the "Month's" proposal most accurately in p. 527, as emanating from "a Catholic periodical of reputation and influence." His critic forgets that in p. 522 Dr. Gillow had protested against two different things: viz., (1) against the "Month's" proposal; and (2) against the practice of those unhappy Catholic parents, who under present circumstances send their sons to reside at Oxford.*

We have now answered all the charges without exception which have been brought against us, of "controversial unfairness"; and we must say in perfect good humour that, to our mind, all the controversial unfairness has been *on the other side*. We are as far from suspecting our critics of unfair intention, as they are from suspecting *us* of such a fault. Nor indeed should we have thought of discussing the matter at such length, had it not been for the repeated attacks to which we have been subjected from the same quarter on a similar theme. It now only remains, to answer various questions which our critics have proposed, as to our own view on one or two points which have been incidentally raised.

The correspondent (p. 482) claims to know our opinion, on the value of that proposal which he *in fact* intended. We have of course no room to *argue* for our opinion, but we are most ready to express it; and if there appears a certain peremptoriness in our *mode* of expressing it, we hope our readers will ascribe it to its true cause—the exigencies of brevity. Indubitably the best Catholics may most legitimately differ on such a theme; and we are but expressing our own humble convictions. We consider then that if university honours were confined to mathematics, pure classics, and physics, philosophy and history must in practice entirely go to the wall. As the correspondent himself excellently speaks in May (p. 421), all the more able students would be "eager to obtain academic success, and impatient of any obstacle to its attainment"; they would therefore bitterly grudge every minute directed to intellectual labours that have no bearing on that success. The so-called higher education of Catholics,

* These are Dr. Gillow's words: "I am . . . curious to know what advantages . . . would be expected from graduating at Oxford, either as resident or non-resident members."

would therefore in fact become exclusively an education in pure classics, mathematics, and physics;* and we think that such a result would be far more calamitous, than if all connection of every kind were at once broken off with non-Catholic educational bodies. We think that such studies, if exclusively pursued to so late a period, would generate a dapper, pert, smart self-sufficiency, which, of all intellectual habits, is about the most disastrous; that a youth so trained would be led away in unresisting captivity by those plausible and unspeakably mischievous "sophisms," to which (as the correspondent admirably remarks, p. 419) "our poor fallen nature" is so easily attracted; and that he would thus be placed in profound antagonism to the Church's teaching and spirit. See our remarks in January, pp. 90, 91, 93, 94, 98, 99.

We were delighted to find the correspondent laying such stress, in his letter to the "Tablet," on "religious instruction," as a very important part of Catholic higher education. We ourselves also in January (pp. 101-103) dwelt earnestly on this. Here is to our mind another of the many reasons, which make it so vitally important to emancipate Catholic education as much as possible from every direct or indirect non-Catholic influence. Most certainly a Catholic student will never give his mind to religious instruction with the necessary keenness and prominence, so long as he studies for competitive examinations which do not include it in their sphere.

We will here make a brief digression, to express the great pleasure with which we have read certain remarks of Mgr. Woodlock, in the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record" for May, supporting our view of January. Mgr. Woodlock dwells on "the grievous intellectual loss sustained by those whose minds are submitted to a system of culture, from which is excluded a study of religion *proportionate to the other parts of their education.*" "The great men of the middle ages," laymen no less than clerics, "have left after them unmistakable signs that to the deep study of religion they were chiefly indebted for" "their mental culture" (pp. 360, 361). The great Catholic dogmata "exercise a wonderful influence in the development of the human intellect. Each one of them opens out a new field, on which the mind and its faculties may expatiate." "The study of religion," even in laymen, "should be *in proportion to the rest of the intellectual culture.*" "The knowledge of these

* The examination, we may add, must *in fact* be confined to mathematics and pure classics; for physical science is in these days made as ministrative as philosophy proper, to irreligion and atheism. See Professor Huxley *passim*.

divine truths disposes the educated mind, and sharpens the reasoning powers" (pp. 362-3).

The correspondent (in his letter to the "Tablet") requires us to explain our words of April (p. 529), that "any connection of English Catholic education with Oxford and Cambridge would produce immeasurably worse effects, than are generated by its present relations with London University." Certainly explanation is called for; but it is very easily forthcoming. We were writing in great hurry, at the end of the quarter, a short comment on Dr. Gillow's letter. When we spoke of "any" connection, we did not mean "any connection which the wit of man could devise"—as e.g. that Oxford and Cambridge converts should teach in Catholic colleges—but of any *such* connection, as had been proposed in that controversy to which Dr. Gillow's letter throughout referred. And we then were under the full impression, that all who advocated *any* resort to Oxford and Cambridge, advocated *at least* the full plan which was contained (we consider) in the legitimate objective sense of the "Month" articles. So understood, we entirely adhere to what we said in April; except, indeed, that the word "immeasurably" is somewhat too strong. But if it be asked, as to that particular plan which the "Month" *intended* to propose, whether we should regard it as an improvement upon what now exists, we are not prepared to answer. The present state of things is a "terrible evil"; and we think that what the "Month" proposes would also be a terrible evil.

Lastly, both the Editor and his correspondent desire us to speak expressly, as to that sentence of ours, rebuked by Dr. Gillow, in which we said that no education is as yet offered to English Catholic youths between the age of nineteen and twenty-two. We now of course know that this statement was incorrect; and that S. Cuthbert's College at all events (probably others also) do offer such an education. We will briefly explain the origin of our mistake. Our article, be it remembered, was exclusively on *principles*, and in no respect on *measures*: any mention of facts was quite incidental; and in referring to them, we proceeded merely on our current knowledge and impression.

The writer of the article had long been connected with a distinguished Catholic college: most certainly *there* no such lay education existed. He had never heard, there or elsewhere, in conversation or otherwise, that at other colleges things were different in that respect. In various conversational discussions which have taken place on the present urgent need, he never heard the fact mentioned. The two

sentences which he cited in January, and which had never been contradicted, confirmed him in his unsuspiciousness. We must add however, in fairness, that the "Month" October article (p. 392, note) does imply the reverse; and that if we had duly pondered that note, we should have obtained a clue for discovering our mistake. To that extent therefore we plead guilty of carelessness; and at all events we greatly regret that, culpably or inculpably, we did English Catholic colleges such injustice.

The correspondent indeed says in his letter to the "Tablet," that Dr. Gillow considers us to "have been misled by the 'Month' into the belief that Catholics do feel the want of a higher education analogous to that given at Oxford and Cambridge." On the contrary, we understand Dr. Gillow himself to admit that Catholics consider themselves to feel this want. "The opinion," he says (p. 517), "seems now to *pass current*, as a thing quite indisputable," that "the education given in our Catholic colleges" is "extremely deficient." Nor is his own satisfaction with the present by any means unmixed; for he holds (p. 528) that the philosophical difficulty is "almost fatal" to the London connection.*

We have never ourselves expressed or implied any opinion of our own, as to the extent in which such a system as that now existing at St. Cuthbert's can be considered satisfactory; because we avowedly reserved all such questions for a future article. But as our critics are so desirous that we should speak plainly, we will willingly do so. Our convictions are, (1) that the whole desire of competing with non-Catholics is a fundamental mistake, and can lead to nothing but mischief; (2) that there can be no endurable solution of present difficulties, except by keeping Catholic education and examination as completely aloof as possible† alike from Oxford, Cambridge, and London; (3) that there can be no *satisfactory* solution of them, except by a Catholic University.

Here then we conclude; having confined ourselves strictly, as our readers must see, to the defensive and explanatory. But the Editor of the "Month," since the appearance of his May number, has written a courteous and even kindly letter to the "Tablet" concerning this REVIEW. We cannot do better than quote this letter at length.

* Since this article went to press, Dr. Gillow's letter has appeared as a separate publication with a Postscript. He explains himself in the Postscript on this very head. He "never intended any such purpose" as "to show that there is no reason for the cry among Catholics for a university education."

† We do not forget, that to a certain (we believe comparatively small) number of Catholic students, some degree acknowledged by the State is very important for the advancement of their worldly interests. But practical details are external to the scope of this article.

SIR,—The letter from the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, which you have printed in your last issue, may seem naturally to call for a few words from me in reply.

I may be allowed to say that I heartily acknowledge and reciprocate the cordial feeling of which the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW speaks, as animating him with regard to the periodical placed under my charge. If there were no questions but questions of feeling, there would never be any difference between us.

I fear, however, that cordial respect and good-will, and even a general correspondence of views, may not always suffice to prevent involuntary misconceptions and occasional misrepresentations. As far as any such mistakes can be brought home to us, we shall, I trust, act to others as we ask others to act to ourselves; that is, we shall acknowledge them candidly and categorically, and we shall always rejoice to find that what have appeared to us important differences of opinion are not such in reality. For our own part, we have lately had to complain of one or two instances of what I have called controversial unfairness, as to which, however, we have always expressed our conviction that they have been unintentional.

One of these is now before the Catholic public. I am very far from saying that the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW had not a perfectly satisfactory reason, as far as the main purpose of his article in last January was concerned, for not mentioning the connection between the Catholic colleges and the London University. But, as this connection was the main subject of the article in the "Month," on which he took occasion to remark, it appears to me that he concedes the whole case when he acknowledges that he omitted to allude to it while making his censure upon a proposal which he supposed to have been made in that article. I do not see how a fair account *could* be given of the suggestion made in the "Month," by a writer who made such an omission. I can only say, that I shall not prejudice this case, and shall read with interest the promised explanation, how it has come to pass that the DUBLIN REVIEW has attributed to the writer in the "Month" a proposal "perfectly parallel" to the suggestion that "in some country preponderatingly Calvinistic, Catholic theological students should compete in theology with Calvinists before Calvinist examiners." These are the writer's own words, and if he can prove that they contain a charge which fairly expresses the sense of the article on which he comments, we shall be most ready to withdraw our complaint as to his injustice.* If he is not able to prove this, we shall expect from him an equally plain and simple retraction. I think that no one can doubt the gravity of the charge in itself, nor think that in defending ourselves against it we are forcing the person who makes it

* We should add one word of annotation to this sentence. The "Month" writers have not denied, that the illustration which we suggested would really have been "perfectly parallel," had they proposed that Catholic students should compete with non-Catholics in philosophy and history, before an Oxford or Cambridge examining board. The charge against us therefore in this sentence is merely the having *ascribed* to them such a proposal. We have already replied to that charge. We believe that all ordinary readers will have understood the "Month's" language precisely as we understood it.

into a position of antagonism. And yet, as I have already said, we should have allowed it to pass unchallenged, but for the use made of the article in the DUBLIN REVIEW by Dr. Gillow.

Your obedient Servant,

THE EDITOR OF THE "MONTH."

We assure the Editor of the "Month," that we are quite as anxious not to misrepresent his periodical, as he can be not to misrepresent ours. We also "shall always rejoice to find that what have appeared to us important differences of opinion are not so in reality": though indeed, except as regards this general question of Catholic higher education, we do not know any difference of opinion between the "Month" and ourselves, which we have ever *thought* important. Whatever differences of opinion do exist, concern almost exclusively (we believe) the appreciation of given *individuals*; or the greater or less severity of *language* which is called for on some given occasion; or the expediency of starting some given theological discussion; or other matters of the same subordinate kind. We were referring to things of this class, when we said in January (p. 228) that our general differences with the "Month" "concern not ends but means." And as to those "misconceptions" of which the Editor speaks, if he will on any occasion draw our attention to them by a private communication, he will always find us even eager to retract erroneous statements; and to apologize for them also, so far as we can see our mistake to have been culpable.

While our sheets are passing through the press, the July "Month" has appeared: a number unusually rich, apparently, in valuable contents. It contains a thoughtful paper on Catholic education, with great part of which we heartily concur. The preceding remarks however will have shown that, on one or two points, we must demur to the writer's conclusions; and there are other particulars also on which in some future number we may probably express an opinion different from his. On the other hand, we cannot exaggerate the intensity of our concurrence with his statement (p. 20), that there must be "a resolute sacrifice of foregone conclusions, jealousies, and prejudices" on all hands, if Catholics really desire the accomplishment of so important a work.

We are very sorry to infer from a note at p. 107, that he has not read the article on Oxford which appeared in the

number of this REVIEW for October, 1868. Perhaps he will be more disposed to do so, when we inform him that an extremely small portion of it was contributed by the present writer. He will find that the facts stated in it bear very materially on his practical conclusion. And we would specially draw his attention to those in pp. 424-5; which were furnished by a very able and thoughtful convert, whose Oxford career is quite recent.

ART. VII.—THE LIFE OF F. FABER.

The Life and Letters of Frederick William Faber, D.D., Priest of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri. By JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, of the same Congregation. Richardson : Derby. 1869.

ONE of many notes which mark the present Catholic revival in England as from God, not from man, is this,—that He has raised up, in a way so unlikely and unexpected, instruments so remarkable and admirable to labour in it. Future times, we cannot doubt, will most strongly feel this. In the present day we cannot speak freely upon it, because, thank God, several of them are still spared to us. But from time to time the thought is specially forced upon us; and it is so at this moment, when we once more look back upon the life, labours, and death of Frederick William Faber.

He was emphatically a man—one of a very small number—with whom it was quite impossible, at any period of his life, to have personal intercourse without feeling not only that one had never before met any man like him, but that there never can have been any such. Alas! how impossible must his own task have appeared to Father Faber's biographer when he sat down, pen in hand, to draw, as well as he could, the portrait of his beloved and departed father. Few things are more remarkable in the volume before us than Father Faber's descriptions of nature. It is impossible to read them without feeling how much more was seen in mountains, forests, lakes, seas, and cities by the gifted eye of the Christian poet than would have been visible to those of us ordinary mortals. But this is not all. What we feel still more deeply is that even his almost unrivalled gift of language is powerless to convey to others more than a very small portion of what he saw and felt. And yet any natural scene is much less

complex and varied than the outward shadow of the soul of a highly-gifted man as it is reflected in his countenance. To fix and record this gleam of the soul through the features is the constant labour and disappointment of high art. The painter best able to take a likeness often gives us, as we all feel, no shadow of the real man. Of all things a photograph is wont to be the most like, and the most disappointing. The man of genius, perhaps, succeeds in catching one of the expressions, in fixing one of those momentary rays with which the soul within lightens up the material features, as the sun kindles into glory a mist in itself dim and hazy, as well as damp and cold. And at best it is but one expression that is caught, and even that imperfectly; and the greatest master of his art, when he has lavished all his genius on the conception, and all his labour on the execution of a portrait of one whom he reveres not only for his powers of imagination and thought, but for his moral culture and discipline, is tempted to turn with disgust even from his noblest work, so imperfectly does it record the idea he is conscious of having received from the countenance he has represented.

And yet what is even this difficulty compared with that of painting in human words the life and character of one who was a poet, a genius, a Christian, a priest, and an eminent servant of God? The events of his life are easily related. But who shall describe his special gifts of nature; how his intellect, imagination, and affections vibrated under the touch of the material and moral world by which he was surrounded; the sweet notes of poetical melody which rang out from them under the touch; how his natural character and faculties were developed and matured; much more than this, how under the plastic touch of supernatural grace, his soul was gradually transformed into the image of his incarnate Lord, and (what would always be a part of such a portrait if it were possible that it should be complete) the infirmities and imperfections by which the work of the Divine Author of this new creation was interrupted, delayed, and distorted? Perhaps in the unseen state a power may be given to angels and saints to paint for the glory of their Lord the inner beauties of the souls of His servants, as earthly genius has painted their visible countenances. But here, on earth, assuredly any one who considers what has to be done will pronounce, "You have convinced me that it is impossible that any man should be a biographer."

After writing thus far, we have read for the first time F. Bowden's own expression of his feelings in the last page of his volume:—

No biographer can end his labours without feeling that they are incomplete. If he has been on terms of intimacy with his subject, he recalls many characteristic words and actions which he cannot permit himself to record. The very ties which bound him most closely to his friend, in which the dear memory is especially present, must be passed over in silence. Many a time,

when thinking of an incident which to him is full of eloquence, he must restrain his pen ; and at last he gives his work to the public almost with dissatisfaction. Facts may be stated clearly, and the course of events accurately traced, but the most faithful biography can only be an imperfect portrait, and those to whom the original has been familiar will ever miss the rich colour, the soft shading, and the thousand other nameless graces by which their love was won.

It would be unreasonable to hope that in the present instance it could be otherwise. There is scanty comfort in funeral honours ; a monument, *ere perennius* though it be, is a monument still ; a remembrance, but not so much as a shadow, of the living. Words cannot reproduce the gracious presence, the musical voice, the captivating smile—cannot give back to their earthly life the charm of person or the fascination of manner, any more than the fire of genius or the nobility of soul—and cannot therefore satisfy those whose labours were cheered and sorrows comforted, whose interior lives were formed and directed to God, whose brightest, happiest hours were blessed, by the wisdom, holiness, and love of Frederick William Faber (p. 519).

It is, however, but justice to say, that the work which it would have been impossible for any man to do perfectly, could hardly have been done more admirably than by Father Faber's biographer. The endeavour, of course, has been to make him, as much as possible, describe himself. This has been effected by giving large extracts from a journal kept during a tour on the Continent in 1841, and the whole or part of one hundred and thirty-eight letters. The journal gives a beautiful picture of his mind just when life was smiling upon him more than at any other period ; the letters probably are the best picture we could have of his gradual change from the age of twenty, when they begin, to just before his departure at forty-nine. As becomes a Christian, they shine ever more and more with a light from Heaven, and those towards the end of the volume, while as full as ever of his own most captivating natural qualities, as childlike, as brilliant, as affectionate, as thoughtful as ever, are in addition to all this, so manifestly pregnant with a supernatural wisdom and charity, that it is impossible not to feel that if any more of that class exist and could without breach of confidence have been given us, they would have been cheaply purchased even by the omission of any other part of this beautiful volume, sorry as we should have been to lose any of it. Our space will make it impossible that we should give any extracts from them, except such short quotations as may be necessary to illustrate different points upon which we have occasion to touch. But this we do not regret, for we cannot doubt that the volume itself will, without delay, be studied by all those, who, while Father Faber was yet spared to us, felt it to be a rare privilege given them by the Giver of all good gifts to have the opportunity of reading his books, perhaps now and then of hearing

him preach, and possibly once or twice of having a moment of conversation with him. And this we believe includes all English Catholics and even many Protestants, to say nothing of very many in foreign lands.

These letters seem to be the only materials which throw any light upon Father Faber's interior life. No doubt his sons and brothers in the Oratory are restrained from telling all that they could by the feeling of delicacy referred to in the passage we have already quoted; and if any religious journals exist, they are either too private to be published, or the time has not arrived when it could properly be done. We suspect, however (especially remembering a passage in his book on "The Blessed Sacrament"),* that nothing of the kind exists.

It could not be otherwise than it is, but the letters sometimes fail us just when we most desire farther information. For instance, it would have been most interesting to have known more details of the mental stages through which he passed in his undergraduate days. He seems first to have heartily accepted the movement of 1833; then to have had a strong feeling against it, under which he wrote to one of his earliest friends,—“I have been thinking a great deal on the merits and tendency of Newmanism, and I have become more and more convinced of its falsehood—observe, I believe [Newman himself] to be an eminently pious, humble-minded Christian, but I think he has sat at the feet of the early contemplative philosophers with an unscriptural humility—that he has imbibed their notions—and that his followers are likely to become a sort of Christian Essenes.” Lastly, about a year later he was one of its most earnest and convinced pupils, and so continued until it led him into the Catholic Church.

In most instances such a change in a man of one-and-twenty would be too natural to be very important or interesting. In his case it would be otherwise, because all that remains of his writing in those years is marked with a very unusual degree of power and thoughtfulness. It is, however, only to be expected that our information with regard to the younger years of a man who, like Father Faber, has been called by the grace of God, to “come out from among his own people and his fathers' house into a land” which it showed to him, will always be fragmentary. The friends

* “Never keep a spiritual journal, a record of pious thoughts, or any vestige of a religious autobiography. I do not mean to say that saints have not done so. But you must not do it. You will live in a land of dreams and conceits if you do; though perhaps you do not believe it now, you will actually come at last to say and do follies in order to write them down afterwards. If you would know how the infatuation of keeping a journal is entangled with every root and fibre of self-love, throw your journal into the

by whose affectionate reverence he was surrounded at the London Oratory during the years in which he was best known to the world had, with a single exception, made his acquaintance after he became a Catholic. One knew him only just before his change. The only Catholic friend who knew him in early days seems to have been the Rev. J. B. Morris. The letters addressed to him form a very valuable portion of the whole work. Those to another early friend, whose name is not given, but who is stated during the later years of his life to have been separated from him "by increasing divergence of religious opinions,"—to whom therefore we are so much the more obliged for what he has given—furnish most valuable materials which probably no one else could have supplied. But he seems to stand alone. Probably Father Faber's earlier correspondence is either lost, or in the hands of men who looked upon his becoming a Catholic as a defection, and have no wish to produce it. Be this as it may, the earliest scrap of a letter given in the volume before us was written when he was twenty.

The events of Father Faber's life were few; and perhaps the only thing worth special notice, except in connection with his character and works, is his almost constant suffering from ill health. His family were, as their name suggests, French Huguenot refugees. We have often been struck to observe how many of the English converts within the last five-and-twenty years have sprung from that stock. Probably every reader will be able at once to number several among his personal acquaintance. To mention no others, the list includes Father Faber by the father's side, and Father Newman by the mother's. We believe that no other class of English society equally limited has afforded anything at all approaching to the number.

He was born at the home of his grandfather, then Vicar of Calverley, in Yorkshire, June 28, 1814. When only fifteen he lost his mother, of whose memory his heart was ever full to the last day of his life, as having loved him with more than a double measure of a mother's tenderness. The references to his early loss of her, in his poems, are numerous and very touching. Four years later he lost his father. Till then his home had been at Bishop Auckland, his father being secretary to Dr. Barrington, the Protestant holder of the princely see of Durham. Afterwards his elder brother, a solicitor at Stockton-on-Tees, supplied the place of a parent. He was placed in the Lake country, in the house of a tutor who seems to have given him almost absolute freedom to wander where and as long as he

fire, and you will find out. Forget yourself and what you have gone through. God remembers. Surely that is enough."—("Blessed Sacrament," book ii., page 244, first ed.)

pleased; and his intense delight both in the natural beauties and historical associations of the district was one of the circumstances which developed the strongly poetical turn which was the most remarkable natural characteristic of his mind. Had Nature ever been allowed to have its way, Frederick Faber would have been a poet, and a poet only. Indeed it seemed as if his course in life was so distinctly marked out for him by his natural gifts and character, and by the circumstances in which he was thrown, that it was hardly possible he should be diverted into any other track. Nature and Providence seemed to have marked him beforehand to be the Anglican clerical poet of the nineteenth century, to combine the external circumstances of Keble with the genius of Wordsworth. To be an Anglican clergyman had been from his earliest youth both his destiny and his desire; and he had connections which would have secured him a comfortable benefice. An English parsonage amid mountains, woods, and lakes, with the schooling which, by God's gracious appointment, the heart and affections naturally undergo from the joys, anxieties, and sorrows of domestic life, would have been just enough to mature and call into the fullest exercise the great and unusual gifts with which Nature had so richly endowed her poetic son; and much has English literature lost by the constraining attraction of Almighty Grace which, when all was going on so smoothly and regularly, carried him away captive into an orbit wholly different, and, as men must have thought, of strange eccentricity.* To watch the operation of this Divine force, its gradually increasing power as he got more and more into its sphere, and, in the end, its complete victory, is one of the special interests of the reader of the volume before us.

In the preface to "*Sir Lancelot*" (edition 1857), he tells us: "It has always seemed to me that a love of natural objects, and the depth as well as exuberance and refinement of mind produced by an intelligent delight in scenery, are elements of the first importance in the education of the young."

"My perfect acquaintance with all the nooks and angles of the Westmoreland mountains, the scene of my first and very free school-days, and my familiarity with their changeful features, their biographies of light and shade by night as well as by day through all the four seasons, naturally decided me as to the scene of my poem." Then he goes on to say that he had restored "the physical features of the country to the state in which my boyhood always persisted in representing them to me during the many solitary afternoons and

* Wordsworth on one occasion, when staying at Elton, remarked that "if it was not for Frederick Faber devoting himself so much to his sacred calling, he would be the poet of his age." When Faber became a Catholic, the aged poet wrote to renounce his friendship.

lonely summer holidays spent among the ruined halls, castles, and moated houses which are so frequent on the eastern side of those mountains, the abbeys shrinking rather to the west. The forests were re-planted, the chases were filled again with deer, the ancestors of the red deer of the Duke of Norfolk, which still drank at the brink of Ulswater by Lyulph's Tower; the heronries slanted again over the edges of the lakes; the unpersecuted eagles woke the echoes of Helvellyn; spear-tops glistened in the sun on the steep paths that lay like pale green threads across the mountains; the castles rang with arms; the bright ivy had not mantled the ruddy sandstone beacons which warned men of the Scotch; the abbeys and chantries were haunted by church music; while the lesser cells in the secluded pastoral vales heard once more the nightly aspirations of wakeful prayer; and Cistercian shepherds could scarcely be distinguished in their white habits from the sheep they tended, as they moved across the fells high up above their moorland granges. As the warder on the battlements, or rather as the alchemist from his turret, saw that land of hills and woods and waters beneath the starlight long ago, so did I see it always in those ardent years. From earliest times it was to me the land of knightly days, and the spell has never been broken. When it became the dwelling-place of manhood, and the scene of earnest labour, the light upon it only grew more golden; and now, a year-long prisoner in the great capital, that region seems to me a home whence I have been exiled, but which only to speak of is tranquillity and joy" (p. 5).

On first reading this description, we could not help thinking how extraordinary must have been the boy who at fifteen or sixteen had an imagination so tuned to all the glories both of the scenery and the history of the Westmoreland mountains. But on looking more closely to the dates, we find that he was finally removed from that district (going, first, for a short time to Shrewsbury, and then to Harrow) in 1825, when he was, at the utmost, only eleven; and it does not appear that he revisited it till his manhood. A doubt may of course suggest itself whether he has not transferred to his early youth impressions, imaginations, and thoughts which, in fact, only came into his mind at a later period. But, apart from the minuteness of his own narrative, this would be quite contradicted by the fact that even during his undergraduate career at Oxford his mind was full of the poetic images suggested by his Westmoreland rambles. He wrote, in 1835, when only twenty-one, and when it appears he had never revisited the lakes since he left them ten years before: "Here, in Oxford, I literally live among the mountain scenes of my schoolboy days, and breathe the liberal air, and feel the mountain influences."

His next visit to the Lakes, so far as appears, was in the summer vacation of 1837, when he was exactly twenty-three. Then, following an Oxford custom, he took a party of undergraduates to read under his direction at Ambleside, and there it was that he made the acquaintance of Wordsworth,—

whose poetry had been the object of his earliest admiration, and had contributed largely to the formation of his own poetical spirit. In after years he used to describe the long rambles which they took together over the neighbouring mountains, the poet muttering verses to himself in the intervals of conversation.

The same summer he became an Anglican clergyman, and at once began to assist at the parish church of Ambleside. The summers of 1838 and 1839 he spent in the same way, returning to Oxford in October. In 1840 he became tutor in the family of a gentleman residing at Ambleside, undertaking at the same time the charge of the church and parish. In February, 1841, he made with his pupil a tour through France, Lombardy, Venice, Trieste, Greece, Constantinople, the Danube, Austria, and Prussia, returning to Ambleside in August. There he continued to reside until December, 1842, when he accepted the rectory of Elton, a college living with a rustic population of 800 souls, and an income of £500 *per annum*, besides a rectory house.

Hitherto his course had been externally nothing more than that of an unusually gifted and energetic man, who, taking advantage of good opportunities, had made for himself a very successful career in his profession as an Anglican clergyman. His prospects were brilliant. His university distinction gave him a start, and his talents and character, supported by his family connection with "golden Durham," gave promise that the rectory of Elton would be only the first step in his preferment. He was now eight-and-twenty, and his most prudent and natural step was to marry and settle in life. We need hardly say, therefore, that rumour was busy making matches for him. This always happens to every young clergyman of good prospects. In answer to Mr. Morris's inquiries as to the truth of these reports, he answered: "As one does not like foolish reports to go about, I may as well say that I have no prospect of it, however remote, and neither have nor have had any engagement on this subject. There is but one person in the world whom I should wish to marry—the person alluded to in my poem called 'First Love.' But I have not the least reason in the world for supposing she is in love with me; and I am quite sure she knows nothing of my affection for her; and there are few things less likely than my marrying her. . . . I shall not be surprised if I marry." This was just the tone which became his position. Meanwhile, he was adding to the distinction of his university career. In 1840 he published a volume of poems which "met with great success;" and in 1843 (on his return from his tour) a prose volume, under the title of "Sights and Thoughts in Foreign Churches and among Foreign Peoples," dedicated "to William Wordsworth, Esq., in affectionate remembrance of much personal kindness and many thoughtful conversations on the rites and pre-

rogative doctrines of the Holy Church." This book is full of his characteristic talents, and, together with his journal when abroad, gives the strongest proof of his powers of observation, as well as of the magic light in which his intensely poetical imagination clothed every object of beauty or grandeur which came before him.

We despair of giving by extracts any adequate notion of the power and beauty of this journal. Descriptions of natural scenes, which, to confess the truth, we are very apt to "skip" in reading most books, are in him as lifelike as pictures; and his peculiar temperament is strikingly illustrated by the touches of home associations which every now and then carry him away in a moment from the scenes that surround him, to Oxford or Ambleside. Thus, he writes to his brother from Pisa :—

You know the quiet meadow, from whose smooth turf rise the cathedral, the campanile, the baptistery, and the cloister of the Campo Santo, a group hardly equalled in the world. Of course I repaired there at once, pretty well knowing what to find. But it so happened that the turf is just now closely carpeted with white clover in full flower, and overpoweringly fragrant. The odour was of such a home kind, that away went buildings, art, history, Pisa, Italy, and the whole concern; my eyes saw, but reported not what they saw. I was in England; and yet the leaning tower fixed the exact spot in England, namely, the side window of the drawing-room at Auckland, looking out upon the Bishop's gateway, and wherein stood an old stained table, the drawer of which specially pertained to me. There I played the geographical game with my mother for hours; there I studied a fat duodecimo in red sheep, entitled the "Wonders of the World;" where the wall of China and the leaning tower of Pisa made an ineffaceable impression upon me. Oh! I cannot tell you how that tower brought my dear mother back to me. It was some time before I recovered this first mood and became alive to the real beauty of the wonderful scene before me (p. 179).

Externally, as we have said, Mr. Faber's course had hitherto seemed only that of a singularly gifted and successful member of the Anglican clerical profession. But it was only to a mere external observer that it could have seemed so. There is no doubt that, as his biographer says, from his earliest childhood, "the things of God had been his joy." In 1840, he mentions incidentally that God had hitherto preserved his virginal purity; and although at one part of his Harrow course he "had taken up infidel views," that seems rather to have been a temptation than a habit of mind. A hymn quoted by F. Bowden speaks of those earliest times, and "refers to the teaching of his mother, the sweet and wondrous things on which he loved to dwell"—

They bade me call Thee Father, Lord!

Sweet was the freedom deemed:

And yet more like a mother's ways

Thy quiet mercies seemed.

In such a boy infidel talk was likely to be the outbreak of a real internal temptation, to which he had sinfully given way, rather than of a mere desire of seeming clever. Dr. Longley, therefore, for the sake of his companions, required him to pledge his honour that he would never again say anything of the same kind before the boys; and then, taking upon himself the responsibility of keeping him, he gained so much influence over him by personal intercourse and prayers with him (we presume, in a word, "whining and sermonising"), that within a very short time, his efforts being seconded by the death of a school friend, the boy experienced the strongest religious impressions. Neither, so far as appears, did they ever afterwards fade away. They continued when he soon afterwards went up to Oxford. In a letter, written while still an undergraduate, he incidentally mentions that, before his "duties had called him to continuous study in books unconnected with religion," he had given "much time to reading devotional books, attending religious meetings, exhorting and praying in the cottages of the poor." Two years earlier, when only twenty, he wrote, in the very first letter we have, "Religious biography, which has ever been my favourite study, has this vacation occupied almost all my extra-classical hours." We need hardly say how little all this was like the ordinary tone either of public-school boys or of Oxford undergraduates.

Any one who knew Oxford a few years before young Faber entered it, must feel that if he had come into residence, thus prepared and thus minded, only five or six years earlier than he did—in other words, had he been the fourth or fifth of his parents' children instead of the seventh—he would have found the University in a wholly different state, and, humanly speaking, his whole course in life might have been very different. The so-called Evangelical school, which at that period had everything its own way at Cambridge, could hardly be said to be known at Oxford. The few graduates who decidedly belonged to it were men personally without distinction, and unfortunately placed for the purpose of exercising any influence on the University at large. How this matter may be now we cannot tell. Forty years ago, there was hardly less social intercourse between some of the four-and-twenty colleges and halls of which the University is made up, and some others, than between Grosvenor Square and Whitechapel, and those who considered themselves the representatives of the Evangelical school in Oxford chanced to reside in the Whitechapel quarter. The hero of "Loss and Gain," when puzzled between different views of religion, is represented as falling in with those of the Evangelical school. He is (chap. xvi.) invited to a tea party, in which he found himself in "another world; faces, manners, speeches, all were strange, and savoured neither of Eton, which

was his own school, nor of Oxford itself." This certainly would have been the case, had he chanced to fall in with the representatives of that school; but an Eton man was much more likely to have passed through his University career without ever hearing even so much as their names. The dominant school was that which was then known as "High Church," and has since been nicknamed "high and dry." So large a body of course contained in itself many smaller sections. It was strictly the representative of the "two-bottle orthodoxy" of a bygone age, in which the "monks of Magdalen" were so graphically, and we doubt not so correctly, described by Gibbon. "Decent, easy men, who supinely enjoyed the gifts of the founder: their days were filled by a series of uniform employments; the chapel and the hall, the coffee-house and the common room, till they retired, weary and well satisfied, to a long slumber. From the toil of reading, thinking, or writing they had absolved their conscience. Their conversation stagnated in a round of college business, Tory politics, personal anecdotes, and private scandal. Their dull and deep potations excused the brisk intemperance of youth." Forty years ago the outlines of the picture would have required considerable softening. Deep potations, however dull, had ceased to be characteristic of decent, easy clergymen of any school. The great increase of refinement which was unquestionably to be found in every class of English gentlemen was quite as great in the clergy and their families as in any other, and in Oxford more than elsewhere. Moreover, although the general standard among the Anglican clergy, of clerical demeanour, of professional diligence, and of theological knowledge has been wonderfully raised within the last forty years, so that the change between 1829 and 1869 is probably much greater than that between 1829 and 1789, still the change was already very great. Sydney Smith gave to Mr. Gladstone, "about the year 1835," the testimony of an acute observer, "the improvement in the clergy of my time has been astonishing. Wherever you meet a clergyman of my age you may be sure he is a bad clergyman." If Gibbon could suddenly have been placed in Oxford, his first impression, no doubt, would have been how greatly things were changed for the better. His second, that the new generation bore a strong family likeness to the old, such as we may trace in successive generations as we pass through the portrait gallery of some old family seat. If such was the rank and file of the party, there were, not to be separated from it, men of a much higher religious character. This was the school which was then connected with the names (now almost forgotten) of "D'Oyley and Mant," good men, desirous of doing their duty, and yet whose standard of labour, or of religious thought and teaching, would not satisfy earnest Anglicans of our day. Their ideal of excellence was

"the sober piety of the Church of England." They disliked the Evangelicals quite as much because they thought them vulgar, as for any real fault of doctrine and practice which they could point out in them. They loved to speak of the "moderation of the Church of England," and the censure of the Rev. Charles Simeon (so long the representative of the Evangelical school in Cambridge) was not quite unfounded when he said, "they are moderate men; who love God moderately and their neighbours moderately, and hate sin moderately, and desire heaven and fear hell moderately." Their whole way of looking upon and speaking of Church offices and dignities savoured of the words with which a well-known writer in the *Quarterly Review*, the organ of the High Church party, not near so long ago, began an article on the life of a distinguished divine. "Dr. —, after filling with the greatest credit the responsible and laborious offices of tutor and head of a college, sat down, in the evening of life, in the *otium cum dignitate* of a bishopric." It is only a very few years since that article was written, by a "friend of our admirable Church," but it would already be impossible that this should be said except by an enemy.

Another school had already risen in Oxford, although as yet it was only in its infancy. It was that which has developed into the present Broad party. It was then represented chiefly by Whately and a small group of satellites, which revolved about him in a somewhat limited orbit, and, like those of the sky, kept their faces always bent upon their principal. This school is too well known to need describing, and our space does not allow it. Its coldness and its practical ignoring of the supernatural, its constant attempts to defend Christianity by cutting off from it anything which might put it above the reach of human reason, would have made it singularly repulsive to Mr. Faber's whole disposition and character.

At the time of which we are speaking, however, the seed was already sown of a far different school, but, as becomes a work which came from God, it was as a grain of mustard seed, and as yet in the state in which it is "the least of all seeds." It had been sown by one of whom Dr. Newman has written: "The true and primary author of [the Tractarian movement], as is usual with great motive powers, was out of sight. Having carried off as a mere boy the highest honours of the University, he had turned from the admiration which haunted his steps, and sought for a better and holier satisfaction in pastoral work in the country—need I say that I am speaking of John Keble?" Deeply and justly as he was revered by those who knew him and were worthy to appreciate him, he had left no perceptible mark upon the University—none certainly which would have been perceptible by a young man coming up, like Frederick Faber, to another college. The great work that Keble had then done for the movement was that, as Dr. Newman says,

he had "formed" Hurrell Froude; and Hurrell Froude himself was one of those who do a great work, not by their immediate action upon the world, but by their influence upon one who most momentarily acts upon it. At the time of which we are now speaking, no one could have known that Keble's work in the University which he had left was not finished: a new comer to a different college might very probably never have heard his name.

It is, then, most probable that if Faber had entered Oxford five or six years earlier than he did, he would have left it with his religious views softened and refined perhaps, but not fundamentally altered, and would have become a clergyman of the Evangelical school: one of the most highly gifted and energetic he must ever have been, and very likely one of Lord Shaftesbury's bishops.

But little as he knew it, his circumstances and the circumstances of his time, the very hour and place of his birth, were being directed by infinite power and infallible wisdom, to bring him within the sphere of attraction of the Catholic Church. He came into residence in Lent Term, 1833. That summer the Oxford movement first publicly developed itself, and from its very commencement he earnestly followed the preaching of Dr. Newman at S. Mary's. As we have already mentioned, he was first delighted, then experienced a reaction in favour of the Calvinistic opinions which his family had inherited from their Huguenot ancestors, although, of course, softened by the "moderation" natural in men closely connected, either as clergymen or as managers of ecclesiastical property, with the Anglican Establishment. This reaction, however, did not last long, and before he took his degree he had become confirmed in his adherence to high Anglican views.

In this he might seem only to have swum with the stream, which then ran irresistibly in that direction. But no one who reads his letters, and makes the effort necessary to remember that they were really the productions of a young student of twenty or twenty-one (a very great effort we found it, to speak for ourselves), can have any notion of that sort. The letter of remonstrance and advice, written when he was only twenty-two (p. 63), to a friend, of whom he says that he loved him more than any one else on earth, is as full of thought and discrimination as if it had been the work of an experienced man. His remarks upon the religious movement going on in the University shows that he not only observed, but carefully meditated over, the whole tone of Oxford thought, and especially the varieties of theological schools and of the intellectual and religious character of the leading minds. And yet at that time he was not personally known to any of them. His introduction to Dr. Pusey and Mr. Newman he owed to his offering to undertake the translation of one of the works of the Fathers, for the series of which they were the editors. This was not till April, 1837. The

letter, written two months before, in which he argues that a man who holds the reality of grace, but rejects the doctrine of the sacraments, is inconsistent if he does not fall into Calvinism, was not therefore suggested by an older theologian, it was the result of his own thoughts. So, again, the contrast between the theological style of Keble and "the dignified gentleness and stately vehemence of Newman or Pusey." Throughout his early letters there is a power of intellect and a clearness and depth of thought which makes it a very serious matter of regret that there are so few of them. At that moment nothing could have been easier than to find in Oxford young men of his age by the score who adopted the prevalent views with the sincerity and facility of youth. There can have been very few indeed who rivalled him in the degree to which they had assimilated them to their own minds by serious laborious thought. It is the more important to insist on this, because one of men's most universal fallacies is their disbelief in the possibility of any man attaining high excellence in very different lines. No doubt it is *à priori* unlikely. Art is long and time is short; and moreover the gifts of God are so much apportioned between different men, that if a man has the natural qualities which specially qualify him for success in one art or study, there is, so far, less probability of his being equally qualified for a very different one. But over and above the instinctive sense of these improbabilities, there is a jealous feeling in most men which makes them reluctant to admit, that a man who very greatly exceeds them in any one gift or attainment is equally superior to them in others. Father Faber was so obviously and undeniably without a rival in brilliancy, both of imagination and expression, as a poet, an orator, and a converser, that it is not without an effort that any man can bring himself to give him credit for other gifts and attainments for which, as a matter of fact, he was distinguished—depth of thought, for instance, and accuracy of statement, the result of long and conscientious labour. This eminently applied to the severe study of theology, which was continued throughout his life. No man who ever had the honour or privilege of his intimacy can need to be assured that he, more than almost any other man, felt with S. Augustine: "*Tanta est Christianarum profunditas litterarum, ut in eis quotidie proficerem, si eas solas, ab ineunte pueritia usque ad decrepitam senectutem, maximo otio, summo studio, meliore ingenio conarer addiscere.*" We are confident that it needed only that he should have been a dry, iron, and somewhat rusty man to have impressed all who knew anything about him with a hearty admiration of his theological learning. Few people probably can even yet bring themselves to believe that one whose conversation, preaching, and writings were always sparkling so brilliantly with a lightning play of genius could really be a close thinker or an

accurate student. The feeling to which we have referred is, we think, the most probable, as it is certainly the least discreditable, explanation of the estimate of him as a superficial flashy preacher which appeared in a well-known Protestant paper immediately after his death. The writer was unable to bring himself to believe that anything so translucent could fail to be shallow. Those who know him only, or even first, through the volume before us, much as they will have lost in other respects, will at least be free from any temptation of that sort. No man can well read his earlier letters without being struck with the contrast between the thought shown in them and in those of almost any other man of the same age.

Happy indeed will be the reader who has not cause to be even more impressed with the contrast between another characteristic of these letters, and what he may remember of himself at the same age. It is impossible not to feel that God was throughout the object most at the writer's heart. In every stage of his mental progress, when he was inclining towards Calvinistic views, and when he became a decided follower of the Oxford school, he was evidently most earnestly set to serve and please God. Religion, from the first, was with him a most personal matter, not a mere exercise of the intellect, or, still less, a subject of party feeling.

Much, therefore, which the world little suspected, had already been going on in his inmost soul when, at eight-and-twenty, he became Rector of Elton. The letters are full of indications of it. For instance, while the reports of his immediate marriage were rife, he writes to Mr. Morris:—

Jan. 26th, 1841. A. S. I am getting case-hardened anent reports of my marriage. However, as I know you feel interested in the subject, I may as well say that I never felt so strongly determined by God's grace to "make a venture of a lonely life" as J. H. N. says [See Sermon xx., vol. iv., Edition 1868] as I do now. I have too little confidence in my own religious manliness to say more than that I am at present purposed to lead a single life, and that I have made it a subject of prayer that God would of His mercy corroborate that purpose in me. But enough, I am too weak a disciple to talk thus. I rather covet than enjoy the calm love of virginity. But it may be that God will reveal even that unto me (p. 81).

Great is the contrast between this and the common state of mind of a rising Protestant clergyman, who feels that as soon as he has obtained a benefice his next step ought to be to look out for a wife.

That there was something unusual in Mr. Faber's ministrations soon impressed itself upon those who knew him at Ambleside, where the congregation at the church was soon doubled, and where he published some religious tracts, which "had an extensive cir-

culution." The poet Wordsworth, who had become intimate with him, so well understood that in him pastoral work was to be an engrossing employment, that when Faber announced to him his intention of accepting the cure of Elton, he replied—"I do not say you are wrong, but England loses a poet."

His acceptance of Elton, however, was the turning-point of his life. It was in itself no slight sacrifice. The lakes and mountains of Westmoreland had been from infancy the home of his imagination. Elton is in the flats of Huntingdonshire. But he believed he did right, because the spring before this living had "hovered about my head like a bird, uncertain where to light."

Then again I positively refused it ten days ago, consulting my own wilfulness [and the consideration of it was again forced on him]. And as Pusey says somewhere, "events not of our own seeking are mostly God's ordering." Further, I feel that my chief rock of offence is subduing the poet to the priest, and I have felt more strongly this Advent than ever, that I have very sinfully permitted the man of letters to overlay the priest. *Abstinence* from poetry I could, with some small difficulty, practise, but Keble thinks it would be wrong, being obviously my chief, if not my sole gift; and *temperance* in poetry is most difficult, yet a plain duty in a priest. Now the necessity of parish duty comes like a Divine interference with my wilfulness, and I do not think that I am so far worldly that I shall dare to neglect that duty. And indeed the whole *pastoral* office, which is very unacceptable to me, seems aptly remedial to the poetic temperament. I feel so happy and open, I know not why or how, that I think I must be doing right; and oh! how slight a sacrifice, after all, will it be to part with this sweet mountain land, and all my dear friends, for a man of such faults as mine. My books are gone, and now my mountains go. God be praised. Oh, pray for me that, buried in that village, I may endeavour to lead an Apostolical life in church, parsonage, and cottages. God being my helper, I solemnly purpose to do so. Twice, if not three times, has Advent had a special mission to me. May my sole care in life be now to rehearse for meeting the true Advent, and the merciful fire of that day! *Ora pro nobis* (p. 169).

In this spirit he accepted the cure. It implied the absolute sacrifice of all he had and was to the service of God, but his conduct and resolutions in accepting it, in a man of his character, implied almost as decisively, though as yet he knew it not, that the sacrifice was not to be consummated in the Protestant Church. Less than four years before he had visited Belgium, "from which [although he already considered himself a Catholic] he returned with a strong feeling of dislike of the ecclesiastical practices which he had witnessed, and with something like a contempt for the intellectual condition of the Catholic clergy." So much was he now convinced that this judgment had been erroneous, that he had no sooner made up his mind to take Elton, than he "deter-

mined to examine closely in Catholic countries, and especially in Rome, the methods pursued by the Church in dealing with the souls entrusted to her." He went not as a critic, but a learner, "to gather hints for the work" which his own situation imposed; and with this view obtained from Dr. Wiseman introductions to Cardinal Acton and Dr. Grant, now Bishop of Southwark. He left Elton the day after he had "read in;" and started for Rome, through France. Owing to the kindness of Dr. Grant he saw much more of the action of the Church than a Protestant traveller usually can.

It was at this time that he acquired his first devotion to S. Philip Neri, his future father. He has recorded in the "Spirit and Genius of S. Philip," preached and published in 1850, the impression made upon him by a visit to the Chiesa Nuova. Speaking of the room in which the saint used to say Mass, he writes: "How little did I, a Protestant stranger in that room years ago, dream that I should ever be of the saint's family, or that the Oratorian father who showed it me should in a few years be appointed by the Pope the novice master of the English Oratorians. I remember how, when he kissed the glass of the case in which S. Philip's little bed is kept as a relic, he apologized to me as a Protestant, lest I should be scandalized, and told me with a smile how tenderly S. Philip's children loved their father. I was not scandalized with their relic-worship then, but I can understand better now what he said about the love, the child-like love, wherewith S. Philip inspired his sons. If any one had told me that in seven short years I should wear the same habit and the same white collar in the streets of London, and be preaching a triduo in honour of Rome's apostle, I should have wondered how any one could dream so wild a dream (p. 184).

Interesting as are his letters from Rome, we have no space for them. In six months he returned to Elton, resolved to "model his pastoral operations on the system pursued by the Catholic Church, and to work his parish (as he expressed it) in the spirit of S. Philip and S. Alphonso." He had already been much shaken in his adherence to Anglicanism. He wrote to Mr. Morris, "I have been much altered since I came abroad this time; but I am very, very, very Roman. I have *learnt* an immense deal both inwardly and outwardly, and I hope it will lead to something more than feelings." And again: "It has pleased God to make my journey mainly one of great suffering, both of body and of mind; what I went through at Rome, I am sure my most forcible words could not explain; and I think I told you I twice took my hat to go to the Collegio Inglese to abjure." His biographer adds:—

On each occasion some trifling circumstance interfered to prevent him from carrying out his purpose; and this he attributed, at the time, to his guardian angel, whom he fervently and frequently invoked. His anxiety on the subject was the cause of physical injuries, from which he suffered during the remainder of his life.

It seems to have been by the authority of Mr. Newman that he was held back. Anglicans of our day write flippantly enough about the early converts as having acted from "impatience," "cowardice," and the like, having been imposed upon by the bold claims of Rome, &c. Little can they imagine the living death through which they really passed before they made up their minds that it was lawful to them to renounce what people called (absurdly) the Church of their baptism. Thank God, if like a death, the process was like a most blessed death ; for no sooner was the dark river passed than they found themselves in "the Paradise of God." Life, doubtless, has brought and will bring many more trials, sufferings, and sorrows to all of them ; but it can hardly bring another like that.

Mr. Faber's course at Elton was very different from that of the modern Ritualists :—

Without paying so much attention, as most Anglicans were accustomed to do, to ceremonies and decorations, he relied for the reformation of his people on preaching, and on what he believed to be the sacraments. His services were conducted with proper decency and reverence ; but so little value did he set on what in many places were considered points of vital importance, that when the surplice controversy was agitating the Church of England, he told his congregation that he usually preached in a surplice because he preferred it, but that far from insisting on doing so, he would preach in his *shirt sleeves* if it would be any satisfaction to them.

He was at considerable pains to form a choir ; and full cathedral service was performed in his church on Sundays and saints' days during the last year of his residence at Elton. He circulated among his people a history of the Sacred Heart, thinking that nobody would object to devotion to our Blessed Lord. He also published three tracts on examination of conscience (p. 213).

The parish was a difficult one. It had been much neglected, and half the 800 inhabitants were "rabid Dissenters." Irreligion and vice of all kinds were almost universal. Reports were circulated to his discredit. In spite of all these difficulties, wonderful effects were soon produced, partly, no doubt, by his rare natural gifts, which at all periods of his life gave him a power of fascination (it could be called no less), such as those who knew him never saw in any one else ; but still more by his self-devotion, and by the effect, both natural and supernatural, of his preaching, in which natural eloquence the most unusual was but the instrument to bring home to the hearts of his beloved flock thoughts which flowed like the richest juice of the grape from the winepress in which was crushed a heart overcharged both with love and with suffering. Suffering, indeed, pressed hard upon him in various forms. He was utterly lonely ; so that he mentions, in a letter to Mr. Newman, that he sometimes did not speak for days together, except a few words to his servants ; and during the whole time he

was tormented by an internal conflict between doubts whether he was not guilty of sin and risking his salvation by remaining in the Church of England, and fears lest if he left it he should be acting from self-will. In this manner he spent two years at Elton. In them he formed his choir, restored the Church, and gathered around him a circle, many of whom had been Dissenters. Before he had been long in the parish—

A number of the parishioners, chiefly young men, began to go to confession to him, and to receive communion frequently. Out of the most promising of these penitents he formed a sort of community. They were accustomed to meet in the rectory every night at twelve o'clock, and to spend about an hour in prayer, chiefly in reciting portions of the Psalter. On the eves of great feasts the devotions were prolonged for three or four hours. The use of the discipline was also introduced on Fridays, eves of festivals, and every night in Lent, each taking his turn to receive it from the others. It would seem that these vigils excited the anger of the evil spirits; for mysterious noises used to be heard in the house at the time, often apparently just outside the door of the oratory, where the members were assembled. Sometimes on these occasions they took lights, and searched all over the house, but without finding anything which could account for the noises which had been heard. These disturbances did not avail to put a stop to their nightly meetings, which were persevered in up to the time of Mr. Faber's departure from Elton. Several of those who frequented the rectory were also members of a Society of St. Joseph, and employed in visiting the sick, as well as in other works of charity to the parishioners (p. 217).

A detailed account of Mr. Faber's life and labours during these two years at Elton would be most interesting. But it does not exist. He has left nothing of the kind; and nothing more than fragments can be collected from others. To the above account of the interruptions of the meetings in the rectory, the biographer adds the following footnote, which implies that upon this subject Mr. Faber was silent, even to his most intimate friends in future years, doubtless from humility:—"These particulars were collected by the late Father Hutchison from so many persons, who were present at different times, that he was quite satisfied of their truth."

In addition to his labours—

Mr. Faber's letters at this time spoke of his being engaged in frequent prayer; and the decline of his health told as clear a tale of abstinence and penance. In mental prayer he followed the system of S. Ignatius, and Rodriguez on "Spiritual Perfection" was constantly in his hands. He fasted rigorously, often taking for his dinner nothing but a herring and a few potatoes; and on more than one occasion during Lent he fainted while reading morning prayers. Sundays were the only days on which he could be said to take a meal; and his medical attendant ascribed many of his attacks

of illness to the want of proper nourishment. The details given by those who lived with him, in spite of the pains he took to conceal his austerities from observation, show the great extent to which he carried the practice of them. On this point he appears to have been his own director; and he was certainly most unsparing of himself, habitually wearing, among other penances, a thick horse-hair cord tied in knots round his waist. Yet he wrote (August 22, 1844): "It is very hard to keep alive the spirit of compunction where penance is in a great measure self-chosen, and has not the safeguard of being imposed from without, especially when one is effeminately inclined" (p. 220).

It was at this time that he published, in a series then appearing, "The Lives of S. Wilfrid, S. Paulinus, S. Edwin, S. Oswald, and others," besides two volumes of poetry. There are few, perhaps, who now remember the indignation which the publication of the life of S. Wilfrid occasioned. It was thought to be an act of wanton levity, needlessly outraging the feelings of English churchmen. Any one who so felt may be disposed to feel ashamed of the judgment (however natural) when he finds how serious, ascetic, and laborious was, at the very moment, the life of the author.

In Elton itself his life and labour seem to have put down all opposition. When he had been there little more than a year, he wrote to Mr. Morris:—

There are now seventeen persons strikingly converted, all *confitentes*; some really being led in extraordinary ways and perfectionwards; some confess weekly; five or six of them. Thirty-one persons came to the early Communion last [Passion] Sunday; and the sermons on examination of conscience seem to have moved the whole place. Numbers came almost daily in grief and distress, and I doubt not many of these will become *confitentes*. I can hardly open a book now, let alone write; for seeing people here *privately* occupies three or four hours daily, or averages that. (I have just been interrupted by a confession.) People are beginning to come beforehand when they wish to communicate; the little children in the school, by simple minute catechising on the Passion, open their little griefs and sins to me. The actual *face* of the village is changed obviously to worldly eyes, in sobriety and nocturnal quiet (p. 230).

On Sunday night . . . a very striking conversion and confession of a Methodist took place. [Another time.] . . . A great grown-up farmer, who had never shown any contrition, confessed; and though above six feet high, and very strong, he so nearly went into fits that I was obliged to fetch wine to restore him (p. 227).

These were what Anglicans delight to call "signs of life in the Anglican Church." Elton was so spoken of at the time by "a high authority in the Establishment." But Mr. Faber himself regarded it as "a place where Anglicanism had been fairly weighed in the balance and found wanting." He wrote to Mr. Newman;

"I cannot help fancying that the grace comes, always or mostly, through what, in my life, is borrowed from another system, not from what I have of my own; and so I feel as if I was living a dishonest life." But Mr. Newman, by whom he had hitherto been held back, was himself received in October, 1845, and at once wrote to Mr. Faber that "he was out of the one true fold." There were now only two things to detain him. He had borrowed from two members of his family a considerable sum, which had been spent on the house and glebe. If he gave up his living, he could never pay either principal or interest.

Feeling certain that if he consulted any Catholic on the subject, he would be advised to join the Church at all costs, he had recourse to an Anglican dignitary of his own party, who answered his question by saying,—*"Depend upon it if God means you to be a Catholic, He will not let that stand in the way."* Mr. Faber accordingly determined that this obstacle should not prevent him from carrying out his purpose, and he had only just dispatched the letter announcing this decision, when he was relieved from his difficulties by the generous act of a friend, who, hearing of his perplexity, wrote to him expressing sorrow that such a man as he was should have his freedom thus impeded, and enclosing a cheque for the amount of his debt, begged him to accept it on the condition that the subject should never be mentioned between them. The fact that this friend had no drawings towards the Catholic Church, and regarded the converts with a certain degree of bitterness, makes his generosity more noble (p. 236).

And then came the wrench—to tear himself from his beloved parish was to tear his heart out of his body; but he did not long hesitate:—

On Sunday, November 16, he officiated for the last time as Rector of Elton. He did not administer the Communion in the morning, as was stated at the time by those who wished to cast a slur upon his good faith. At the evening service, after a few preliminary words, he told his people that the doctrines he had taught them, though true, were not those of the Church of England; that as far as the Church of England had a voice she had disavowed them, and that consequently he could not remain in her communion, but must go where truth was to be found. Then he hastily descended the pulpit stairs, threw off his surplice, which he left upon the ground, and made his way as quickly as possible through the vestry to the rectory. For a few moments the congregation remained in blank astonishment, and while the majority turned slowly homewards, some of the parishioners, among whom were the churchwardens, followed him to the rectory and implored him to reconsider his decision. He might preach whatever doctrine he pleased, they said, and they would never question it, if only he would remain with them; but finding him immovable they took a sorrowful farewell and left him.

So much was he worn by anxiety and illness, and so keenly did he feel the separation from his place and people, that he feared to fail in the

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accomplishment of the sacrifice, and extorted a promise from those about him, that they would take him, if necessary by force, on the following day to be received. Arrangements had been previously made, and on Monday morning, November 17, 1845, Mr. Faber left Elton, accompanied by Mr. T. F. Knox, scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, whom he had invited to be received into the Church with him, his two servants, and seven of his parishioners, who had been members of his little community, and were resolved to become Catholics likewise. The party had hoped to escape notice by starting early, but the parishioners were on the look-out, and as they drove through the village every window was thrown open, and the poor people waved their handkerchiefs, and sobbed out, "God bless you, Mr. Faber, wherever you go." Their feelings will be understood by those who in later years felt the fascination of that sweet manner and musical voice, which with his sympathizing and loving heart attached so many to their father.

On the same evening he and his companions were admitted into the Church at Northampton, by Bishop Wareing; from that time Mr. Faber enjoyed the perfect peace of full Catholic communion, and he afterwards said, that when he was confirmed, he felt himself, like the Apostles at Pentecost, permeated by the sensible presence of the Holy Ghost. At the end of a letter to Mr. Morris, which, on account of illness, he dictated to one of his companions, he wrote with his own hand the words, "Peace, peace, peace!" In confirmation he took the name of his patron, S. Wilfrid, with whom he had been most connected through life (p. 329).

When his effects were sold at the Rectory after he left, numerous insignificant articles sold for many times their value, the poor parishioners vying with each other for the possession of some article that had once been his (p. 216).

We have heard that as long afterwards as when he was living at the Brompton Oratory, persons would come up from Elton on purpose to put themselves under his spiritual care.

Very soon after his conversion Mr. Faber, at the desire of the authorities, settled in a house at Birmingham with the young men who had accompanied him from Elton. This gradually developed into a congregation, called "Brothers of the Will of God," or Wilfridians, for S. Wilfrid was nominally, Brother Wilfrid really, the Superior. Circumstances compelled him almost immediately to make a short visit to Italy, in the course of which he wrote some very characteristic letters to some of the young men who had followed him from Elton. He was accompanied by Mr. Hutchison, who on their return joined the congregation. He had been an undergraduate at Cambridge, and was converted in great measure through Mr. Faber's influence. He was a man in many ways specially gifted, and besides other most important works specially his own, was Father Faber's right hand to the end, dying just before him. The community moved from Birmingham, receiving from John Earl of Shrewsbury the gift of Cotton Hall, near

Cheadle, to which they gave the name of S. Wilfrid's. A Gothic church was commenced, and Mr. Faber soon found himself living very nearly his old Elton life. Differences, however, there were, and right welcome ones; for he was now a Catholic priest, and he had the society of one or two educated members of his community, as well as the neighbourhood and kindness of Dr. Wiseman, Lord Shrewsbury, and others. The success of his work was even greater than before. He found a small Protestant village. In a few months "there remained but one Protestant family in the parish," and Mr. Hutchison wrote, "we have converted the pew-opener, leaving the parson only his clerk and two drunken men as his regular communicants." They had been at S. Wilfrid's only fifteen months when Father Newman returned from Rome to set up the Oratory in England. It was at once settled that the Brothers of the Will of God should be merged in the Oratory. By this change Father Faber sank from being Superior into a novice. This was what he felt least. The Oratory must, by its rule, be in a large town. He wrote to Mr. Morris:—

Giving up S. Wilfrid's seems to uproot one altogether from the earth, and the future is such a complete blank that one feels as if one was going to die. . . . Away goes home, church, flock, Eltonian children, and all. . . . In my first spoliation I kept my books and my Elton children; now I lose these two. Deo gratias et Beato Philippo. . . . You know what a desperate fellow I am for local affections, and S. Wilfrid's represents eighteen months of arduous and interesting struggle, besides its own excessive beauty. The trees I have planted, the walks I have planned, the streams I have turned, every one has got a shockingly tight hold upon me, and all the two hundred converts. Well, all that can be said is, that if I can dislocate myself with moderate indifference and *distaccamento*, I shall be a lucky fellow. God does not often give a man two opportunities of a holocaust (p. 336).

Next day, February 17th, 1848:—

Father Superior has now left us, all in our Philippine habits, with turn-down collars, like so many good boys brought in after dinner. On the solemn admission on Monday morning, he gave a most wonderful address, full of those marvellous pauses which you know of. He showed how wonderfully we had all been brought together from different parts, and how in his case and ours S. Philip seemed to have laid hands upon us, and taken us for his own whether we would or not. Since my admission I seem to have lost all attachment to everything except obedience. I could dance and sing all day, because I am so joyous. I hardly know what to do with myself for very happiness (p. 337).

His novitiate was cut short, by dispensation, after five months. Nine months later it was resolved to found an Oratory in London, and "as it was understood that Father Newman preferred to remain at Birmingham himself, and to send F. Faber at the head

of the London detachment," he took possession of the house in King William Street, Strand, on the 28th of April, 1849.

From this time the history of Father Faber's life is merged in that of the London Oratory, at the head of which he remained until his death. His chief interest was in his congregation, and to it his energies were almost exclusively devoted; its successes were his joy, its difficulties his heaviest cross; he sought to make no name or reputation for himself, but was content to spend his time, and health, and powers in the promotion of S. Philip's work (p. 363).

Compared with the life of most men, what had already passed would have been an unusually useful and brilliant career. But it was only in the summer of 1849 that what we may call the especial career of Father Faber began. All before was a sort of novitiate for it. The fourteen years, from his thirty-fifth to his forty-ninth, during which he was head of the London Oratory, were a life by themselves. They were a period of sufferings, severe, complicated, and almost incessant, in the midst of which, by labours to which it would be difficult to find a parallel, he achieved a work of which we must deliberately declare that its amount and importance will never be fully known until that day when the King returns to take account of His servants. That recollection is more than enough to satisfy those who love him, and who despair of explaining to others, nay, of fully realizing themselves, the amount of the return which will then be found to have been made for the many and precious talents committed to the charge of this "good and faithful servant" of God. Of external events there were few. He remained in King William Street till October, 1854, and then removed to the Oratory at Brompton, which was his home till he needed an earthly home no longer. In October, 1851, he started for the benefit of his health to the Holy Land, but was too ill to go further than Malta, whence he returned through Italy, reaching King William Street on the last day of the year. He paid one visit to Dublin, which was also cut short by severe illness. Once he took a lodging, for change of air, at Lewisham; one summer (through the liberality of a friend) at Lancing; and more than once he spent his holyday with one of his community at Ardencaple Castle, the Scotch seat of the Duchess of Argyll. With these exceptions his only change was between the Oratory in London and the country retreat which (like the religious communities at Rome) had been built for it on grounds belonging to one of the community, at S. Mary's, Sydenham. At first he was easily accessible. By degrees the pressure of so large a community compelled him to give up most of his penitents, and to see fewer visitors.

He was a very early riser, and had usually said his Mass in the private chapel of the house before the rest of the community were stirring. He

would take a cup of tea, and after making his meditation, wrote steadily till breakfast. The morning was principally spent in conversation and discussion with different Fathers, who reported to him the progress of the works entrusted to their care, and received from him the most necessary directions for their management. At all hours his room was the frequent resort of the Fathers, and there were few who would not have felt a blank in the day if they had not paid a visit to what seemed to renew, amid themselves, "the school of Christian mirth" of S. Philip's room at the Chiesa Nuova. Indeed, in all matters it was to "The Father," as in the affectionate parlance of the Oratory the Superior is always styled, that each was accustomed to turn—

"Secure, 'mid danger, wrongs, and grief,
Of sympathy, redress, relief."

On feast days especially he took pleasure in seeing all the Fathers as early as possible, and was particularly careful on such occasions that everything in his room should be more than commonly neat, so that his very aspect seemed to denote a festival. One Easter morning, when a Father noticed the orderly appearance of his room, he remarked that the napkin in the sepulchre was found *folded* at the Resurrection, showing that our Lord hated untidiness (p. 409).

There was nothing he liked better than to collect children about him. There was a highly-favoured set of boys who had the run of the house, and there are now men who look back upon the Oratory as the place where the happiest hours of their childhood were spent. It would be quite correct to say that Father Faber personally had an unequalled attraction for them, but in truth it was not for them more than for others. There was an indescribable charm in his private intercourse, a wonderful brilliancy in his conversation (in which we have often heard it remarked that, staying as he always did at home, and visiting no one, he was always, and without preparation, as much superior to those whose social power made them the idols of London society, as they were superior to ordinary men), a magic play of his voice and his countenance, an unequalled combination of tenderness of affection, unearthliness of aim, and worldly wisdom in all his opinions and advice, which gave him as much power in attracting learned men and men of business as he had over youths and little children. In this respect we believe it was the universal testimony of all who ever knew him that they had never met any one equal or second to him. The mystery to those who knew him was, how it was possible that a man so easily accessible and so much sought should do even a small fragment of the work which he actually got through. When asked how he managed it, he used to say it was no merit of his, for, not being able to sleep, he was obliged to leave his bed and work. As a matter of fact he had done a good day's work before other men who thought themselves hard workers had left their beds.

Still this alone would not have enabled him to effect what he did. He could not have done it if he had not had the special gift of doing work by the hands of others as well as by his own. This F. Bowden mentions in the passage we have just quoted; and in this sense we believe that the testimony in which all the fathers of the London Oratory were ever unanimous was no delusion of their partiality for him, but a sober estimate of fact, when they said that all the work done by the London Oratory was wholly his. A large community was at work, and what was actually done could have been done by no less effective machinery; but he himself was the mainspring of the whole. In this sense, as well as in his books, his work is still going on; and how great that work was we sincerely believe few persons even suspect. What the Oratory has done and is doing, directly, may partly be measured, by the continual thronging of the church and the confessionals, and by the Catholic population which has been gathered round it, in a district which, when it was begun, was among the most Protestant in the neighbourhood of London. Indirectly we deliberately believe it to have been one of the main instruments which, under the grace of God, has given to the Catholic Church in London, and even in England, a wholly new aspect. F. Bowden, of course, as being himself a priest of the Oratory, has felt it impossible to speak upon this subject with the plainness upon which we may venture. But even we should feel it unbecoming to express half that we feel upon it. The late Cardinal Wiseman—than whom no man had better opportunities of judging—used to say that he attributed chiefly to the Oratory the change which he observed in the whole tone and character of his diocese. How great that change was F. Bowden has given us some opportunity of judging by the startling statistics which he has collected in Chapter X. It is already difficult to realize the fact that only twenty years ago there was no public church in London or its neighbourhood served by any religious community. The change of feeling, even among good Catholics, may be indicated by the outcry raised against the "*Oratorian Lives of the Saints*" at their first publication, and by the repugnance to the popular services of the Oratory. F. Bowden says that the only image of our Blessed Lady in London was at S. Mary's, Chelsea. We have been assured by a person very accurate and trustworthy, and who had lived all her life in London, and had attended the Catholic churches from a child, that until after the Oratory was opened, she had never in her life heard our Blessed Lady referred to in a sermon, except for the purpose of explaining that it was a mistake to suppose that Catholics worshipped her. Such a state of things is no imputation upon the holy men who kept the smouldering lamp of truth from total extinction by their faithful labours in the midst of persecution.

It was but the necessary consequence of that persecution—the most dangerous to the Church, we firmly believe, of any that was ever carried on in any land or any age. For the peculiar character of the English persecution, after it ceased to be bloody, was, that it made the public exercise of Catholic worship, the public administration of the sacraments, and the public preaching of the truth of God, practically impossible for whole generations of men. Twenty years ago the Catholic Church in London had not yet emerged from the pit in which that crafty persecution had plunged her. And when the time came that it pleased God to deliver her, He did it as it were in a moment. The suddenness of the change was like nothing in nature, except the transition from darkness to a blaze of light at the moment of a tropical sunrise. Nor can we imagine any instrument so well qualified to effect it as a man so winning that it was impossible to have intercourse with him without loving, admiring, and reverencing him; so eloquent and learned that his sermons drew to his church even those who most desired to oppose his way of conducting it, and his books were bought and read over and over again, even by those who, if they could, would have prevented their publication; so gifted with poetical talents that, almost against their will, those who disliked the very name of English hymns sang, and learned, and dwelt upon those which he had written, and at the same time not merely inflamed with zeal, but bent upon a particular object which, to many good and zealous men, seemed mistaken, that of laying aside all concealment, and carrying on Catholic worship, and developing Catholic customs and practices exactly as if he were in the midst of a Catholic city, in a Catholic country, and under a Catholic government. The principle on which he did this was most simple and intelligible. The one legitimate exhibition of Catholicity is that which it puts forth where the Church is perfectly free to choose; and Catholics have no right to expect God's blessing on their labours if they acquiesce without necessity in any less full and complete exhibition. But vitally important as was this work of F. Faber's, it was one which, under the circumstances, hardly any man would have been able to accomplish, except the one man to whom, in the providence of God, it seems to have been assigned.

We must take men for what they are; and if there are those who find in Father Faber's private letters as they are printed in this volume Italian forms of expression which grate against their English ears, not so much because they are foreign as because they resemble English expressions with which we have quite different associations, they must set against these the fact of what F. Faber did. He found our country e. g. in a state of feeling, in which such Catholic practices as the forty hours were regarded, not by the irre-

ligious world, but by religious men and devoted priests, as Italianisms not suited to England, and never likely to be introduced into it; and he has left these things as natural to English Catholics as to Neapolitans or Romans. When a man is blamed, not for pursuing wrong objects, but for pursuing them by imprudent means, no answer is more exactly to the point than this—that he has succeeded.

Whatever foreign expressions he might sometimes use in private letters (and it is to be remembered they are never found in works intended for the public), no man was more sensible of the beauty of pure English. He longed that the weapon which heresy borrows from the translation of Scripture commonly used by Protestants should be taken out of its hands, by having that version published in a corrected form by the authority of the Church:—

If the Arian heresy was propagated and rooted by means of beautiful vernacular hymns, so who will say that the uncommon beauty and marvellous English of the Protestant Bible is not one of the great strongholds of heresy in this country? It lives on the ear, like a music that can never be forgotten, like the sound of church-bells which the convert hardly knows how to forego. Its felicities seem often to be almost things rather than words. It is part of the national mind, and the anchor of the national seriousness. Nay, it is worshipped with a positive idolatry, in extenuation of whose grotesque fanaticism its intrinsic beauty pleads availingly with the man of letters and the scholar. The memory of the dead passes into it. The potent traditions of childhood are stereotyped in its verses. The power of all the griefs and trials of a man is hidden beneath its words. It is the representative of his best moments; and all that there has been about him of soft, and gentle, and pure penitent, and good, speaks to him for ever out of his English Bible. As his sacred thing which doubt never dimmed, and controversy never soiled. It has been to him all along as the silent, but oh how intelligible, voice of his guardian angel; and in the length and breadth of the land there is not a Protestant with one spark of religiousness about him, whose spiritual biography is not in his Saxon Bible. And all this is an unhallowed power! The extinction of the Establishment would be a less step towards the conquest of the national mind, than if it were possible (but we are speaking humanly, and in our ignorance) to adopt that Bible, and correct it by the Vulgate. As it is, there is no blessing of the Church along with it; and who would dream that beauty was better than a blessing? (p. 395).

He worked, as we have said, by others; but his personal work was literally almost incredible. Long after he went to London he was still dealing with individual souls as he had done at Elton and S. Wilfrid's. He had not been many months in King William Street when he wrote to Mr. Morris,—

We are in the full swing of work: lawyers and medical students, &c., pouring pell-mell into the Church. I have received twelve quite lately.

But we keep them snug. I am worked off my legs, and, as Edward Bagshawe, who put on the habit to-day, will tell you, can hardly get through my controversial and spiritual correspondence. The success of the Oratory is most marvellous. We have nearly 500 communions a week now (p. 370).

The 1st February one of his fathers writes,—

Father Wilfrid is working like a steam-engine more than a man. Whether he is well or not I don't know. I hope he is, but his work is something quite prodigious. He has got up twenty-six sermons for Lent, is now giving a retreat, is getting up sermons against Transcendentalism, has written devotions for Jesus Risen, is to give the Tre Ore, and has poured out verses on Santo Padre by the mile (p. 372).

In the midst of the hubbub at the appointment of the hierarchy he wrote to Mr. Watts Russell at Rome:—

I go to bed like an animal every night, nearly worn out with fret and work, and I rise in the morning nearly as tired as I was when I went to bed. London is a frightful place for work. I dare say you see the English papers, and therefore know in what plight we are just now in England. We have the honour of bearing rather more than our share of the public indignation, which may be partly owing to the Bishop of London's honouring us with a charge. All over the walls you see, "Down with the Oratorians," "Beware of the Oratorians," "Don't go to the Oratory," "Banishment to the Oratorians." And in Leicester Square a triple placard of singular truthfulness: "No Popery! Down with the Oratorians! No religion at all!" We are cursed in the streets; even *gentlemen* shout from their carriage windows at us. All this is well. But the real anxiety is how our own people will conduct themselves (p. 377).

At this time they were still in King William Street, close to Leicester Square, and they wore their habits in the streets until Lord Derby's proclamation, a year later.

All this was not enough.

In addition to his work and anxiety as Superior, he also, after 1856, fulfilled the duties of novice-master, his favourite office, for which he often declared himself more fitted than for that of Superior, and he devoted to its discharge much time and attention. Moreover, as his name became better known by his books, he received applications for advice and assistance from all parts of the country. These were scrupulously answered, often at considerable length, so that his correspondence occupied a good deal of his time. One of his Fathers, finding in his room a large heap of letters ready for the post, expressed envy of his talent for answering letters. "Talent!" exclaimed Father Faber; "it's the fear of God" (p. 410).

Many of these letters, besides those of which we have quoted parts, are given in the volume before us. To give any idea of their value by extracts, would be like taking a brick as a sample of a

house. We are inclined to believe that no part of his works will be found more valuable. If there are any more such letters still unpublished, those who have them will incur a considerable responsibility if they are left in any danger of perishing.

Besides all this work for the moment, no man has yet done so much towards providing the Catholics of England with religious books.

For ourselves, we think that a man judging with eternity before his eyes, might choose to have been the author of Father Faber's hymns rather than of any other of the works written by him, or indeed by almost any man. Not merely did they so evidently flow from his own heart, but they have so exactly supplied a special want of English-speaking Catholics. We continually hear of travellers who light upon lonely congregations singing them in the backwoods of the United States and the wide pastures of Australia as they are sung several times every week in the congregations of every English town. How many solitary hearts they have stimulated, comforted, and consoled, can be known only to God. F. Bowden gives us some particulars as to their composition. The two first—"Mother of Mercy," and "Jesus my Lord, my God, my All"—were written on one evening at Scarborough, at the request of Father Hutchison.

The series of the "Lives of the Saints" was begun by him before he joined the Oratory. It consists of lives translated, without alteration or omission, from originals published in Catholic countries. The translations are by different hands, but he was editor. We need say nothing of a series which has been, and is, so extensively useful. Forty-two volumes of it have appeared.

Contemporaneously with the publication of the "Lives of the Saints" and the foundation of the London Oratory, Father Faber contributed much to the circulation in England of foreign spiritual books, such as those of Boudon, Surin, Rigoleuc, the two Lallemands, Courbon, Lombez, and Nouet. The spiritual doctrine of Louis Lallemand, and the octave of "Corpus Christi," by Nouet, were translated at his suggestion, and edited by him. He also published the School of S. Philip Neri as a supplement to the lives of that Saint and of his companions (p. 476).

How numerous his own works were all the world knows. They were far from being hastily or carelessly written. Those accustomed to attend the Oratory in those days will not need to be reminded that in substance at least most of them were preached long before they were published. No man was naturally more exposed to the temptation to carelessness which is induced by extraordinary facility of composition and delivery. But none could more conscientiously resist it. He says of his "conferences: "—

It has been my custom to have the notes of them, very full and detailed, prepared several weeks, often several months, before delivering them. They

were then revised before preaching, and very often annotated immediately after preaching, when necessary or desirable changes struck me in the act and fervour of delivery. There is nothing which brings out any want of logical sequence, or any disproportionate arrangement of thoughts, more vividly than the act of preaching; and I have repeatedly profited by this fact. The notes were then laid aside, some for two years, some for one year, some for a few months, before I finally revised them for writing, and at last wrote them out. I have long adopted this custom with what concerned the spiritual life, so as to secure myself from putting forth mere views struck out in a heat, and also that I might convert the opinions expressed, whatever their intrinsic value might be, into judgments ascertained with care, matured by experience, and revised with jealous repetition under various circumstances, and in different moods of mind (p. 477).

As an instance of his work the biographer gives a letter to Mr. Morris, dated July 17th, 1858, from Ardencape:—

My volume of Conferences was ready for the press months ago, and "Bethlehem" nearly a year ago. But Christmas year is the earliest date at which I shall publish "Bethlehem," as it is a wild Faberian work. . . .

Remember in catalogue reading, that my "Calvary," preached in the Lent of 1857, after eight years' reading, is now awaiting the period of gestation before I write it, so mention to me any books you see on the Passion. I have got about a hundred, some very valuable, which Watts Russell got at an old place in Venice. My last work at "Calvary" was an analysis of all the stigmata and *passional* phenomena of the Saints, out of Görres and others.

I hope you'll be able to read Scotus; I can't. I am obliged to do him in Montefortino. Subtilis himself is a needle in a bottle of hay (p. 478).

In July, 1853, he commenced the publication of his spiritual works. F. Bowden gives a most interesting account, for which we have not space, of the particular circumstances of each of these. He remarks: "The amount of sufferings he had to endure, and his perseverance under them, will best be shown by extracts taken almost at random from his letters between 1857 and 1861." "His courage seldom failed him, and he would continue his work under a pressure of bodily pain which would have prostrated many stronger persons." The extracts given bear out more than this. He writes, March 20, 1859:—

I am but a wreck of a man—my brain quite wrought out with lecturing and writing, and constant pain and lameness, so that I can get no exercise. There will be no respite now till May is done.

A year later he wrote, on the Feast of the Purification, 1858, to Father Hutchison, then in Egypt for his health:—

First of all, a happy new year to you, and a safe return. Then what shall I say next, or where begin my egotistical gossip? I have nothing interesting to say, and no news to retail. Your letter from Thebes has just come, and is

very jolly. I wish I could wander, but I should be simply miserable. I can't give up writing. Since the 15th of October up to the Epiphany, no use of leg—horrid pain; consultations of Wilson and Teggart in my room; never in the refectory since S. Wilfrid's Day; nevertheless, thankful. Now mending—can walk.

Now look here. It was *five* years last Sunday fortnight since I began, after High Mass, SS. Nominis Jesu "All for Jesus." Since then, 1. All for Jesus; 2. Growth in Holiness; 3. Blessed Sacrament; 4. Creator and Creature; 5. Edition of Poems, with 3,000 new lines; 6. Sir Lancelot, immensely changed; 7. Foot of the Cross; 8. New Hymns, besides the thirty new ones now; 9. Bethlehem; 10. Conferences; 11. Ethel's Book; 12. Innumerable preachings; 13. Three books partially prepared, viz., Precious Blood, Holy Ghost, and the second volume of Conferences; 14. Confessing and directing; 15. Business as Superior; 16. Correspondence; 17. A certain amount of intercourse with God; 18. The bearing of pain when I could do nothing else. It is plain that life can't be lived at this rate. But my mind is now like a locomotive that has started with neither driver nor stoker. I can think of nothing but being seized, put on board one of Her Majesty's ships of war as compulsory chaplain, and carried round the world for two years. If I was on land I should jib and come home. . . . I envy you two quiet evenings on the Nile. I am never quiet now. What you say about the lake is very interesting. We shall never understand the Bible till we see that natural things and divine are one. The whole notion of miracles wants reforming, and nature wants reaugurating. You must write a book when you come home (p. 419).

And thus he went on year after year, the only alternations of his life being labour and suffering, suffering and labour. To friends who visited him on the New Year he used to say, "Wish me anything except more new years." To a penitent in deep sorrow he wrote in December, 1860 :—

In sorrow there is a time when nothing but an increase of heavenly-mindedness will make it endurable. Earth, earth's interests, earth's occupations, become almost as insupportable as the sorrow itself. I feel in a measure what you are feeling. For some years past, even when not ill, my own life has been so joyous a burden, that every evening feels as if the past day were an enemy conquered, or a punishment inflicted and over, but that there was no strength left to bear another to-morrow. God lets me love Him just enough to hold on with (p. 450).

On August 12, 1862, he wrote from S. Mary's, Sydenham, to F. Bowden :—

The pain is now almost incessant, and the tedium of life almost more than I can bear. I am also greatly afflicted with those troubles, which generally choose this time of the year for their exhibition. However, silence is the best thing about them. At worst you can but drop under a burden which you can no longer bear. I do not, by advice, go in for the festa; and all members of the community are to be prohibited coming here,

except one a week to hear my confession, that I may keep my plenary indulgences. Thus I hope to struggle through some more miserable weeks of solitude without the ability either to read or take exercise (p. 500).

And yet it was not until the very last that the fear of death was removed from him, and even then he expressed uneasiness whether its removal might be a dangerous delusion. To Father Bowden he wrote, August 25, 1862 :—

The thought is growing upon me that I have an undiscovered disease, nephritic perhaps, and that in another twelve months I shall be gone. It sometimes depresses me—but it need not—only make me more pious. Pray for me (p. 500).

It was exactly as he suspected. Long before, he used to express the same to friends who chanced to see him, even when expressing the utmost weariness of life, but he added he saw no reason to think he got better by living longer. He wrote, July 21, 1860 :—

My sons must shew their love of me by unintermitting prayer for me, that my heart may be altogether changed, that I may be quite turned to God, more full of prayer, more brave in mortification, and more *abissato* in the sense of my own vileness. This is what you must do. You must not trust *me*, but God's Will in me. If people knew the graces I have had, they would see I was simply the greatest sinner that has ever been upon earth ; yet I sometimes think myself good, and I feel pleasure at others thinking me good. This makes me fear I shall go to hell ; so do not talk of trusting to me, but only to God's grace in me (p. 456).

The members of his community, says F. Bowden, could hardly bring themselves to believe "that so precious a life was in real danger ; it seemed almost impossible that they should lose him who had been their centre and leader from the first." But really to those who read his narrative, and see pain and weariness and humiliation settling down in a cloud every day darker and darker upon one so dearly beloved and revered, it is impossible not to look forward with some feeling of relief to the deliverance which was now drawing so nigh.

The last scenes are described by F. Bowden with such exquisite simplicity, affection, and pathos, that we are reluctant to feel it necessary to omit them. The last of those thrilling sermons, the like of which we can never again hear, was preached on Passion Sunday, 1863, on "Our Blessed Lord bowing His head upon the Cross :"—

On the 16th of June, after the visit of the doctors, it was thought necessary to administer to him the last sacraments at once. About half-past eight in the evening the holy Viaticum was brought him by Father Dalgairns, the senior Father and confessor of the house, accompanied by all the members of the community. Father Faber received it with great devotion, sitting in an armchair, dressed in his habit. He said the *Confiteor* very clearly, and

made all the responses himself. When the Blessed Sacrament had been taken back to the chapel, the same procession returned to Father Faber's room with the Holy Oil. Before receiving extreme unction, he replied to the questions appointed by the English ritual. To some of the answers he made slight additions. When asked whether he believed all the articles of faith which the Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and teaches, he said, "Most firmly, most firmly." To the question, "Do you, for God's sake, forgive from your heart every one who has offended you, or been your enemy?" he answered, "Yes, I do; I never had any." The next was, "Do you now, from your heart, ask pardon of every one whom you have offended by word or deed?" To which he replied, "I do, especially of every member of the community; I have been proud, uncharitable, and unobservant, and I ask pardon of all." After the questions he said again, "I have been unkind and uncharitable; I wish I had been more kind." And as, after the administration of extreme unction, the Fathers left the room, he repeated, "Thank you all," two or three times. Then, turning to the one who happened to remain in attendance on him, he said, "Ah, John, it's a grand thing to die a Christian;" and, after a pause, "I have nothing to forgive anybody for, nothing against a single member of the community. I would give my life for any one of them" (p. 506).

In this dying state he remained until September 26th.

On the evening of June 28, his forty-ninth birthday, he saw the members of the community one by one, recommending himself to their prayers, and giving to each some parting gift. To one he said, speaking with frequent pauses, "God has been so good, and arranged it all so well. I like to have it settled to-day. This is my birthday, and the doctor says I am going fast, and probably without pain—no, not without pain, for that is impossible; but with as little pain as possible. I wish to die stripped of everything. One thing we must all go on doing—pray that I may save my soul. He that perseveres to the end" (p. 507).

We must refer our readers to Father Bowden's touching narrative for more particulars of these last scenes. We pass to the close:—

He received the Holy Communion daily up to the 24th of September inclusive. A considerable change was perceptible on the 25th. He became quite still, and his attendants were able to put him into bed, which had not been done since the month of June. Here he lay supported by pillows, not speaking, but gazing steadily at a large white crucifix before him, and moving his eyes sometimes from one of the Five Wounds to another. As evening came on it was clear that his end was approaching, and his confessor, Father Dalgairns, determined to watch with him through the night, as well as Father Cumberlege. When he was told that his death was near, he only repeated fervently his favourite exclamation, "God be praised!" Shortly after midnight the Community was summoned to assist at his last moments, and the commendation of his soul was made, but the crisis passed over, and the Fathers again retired.

When the writer entered his room at six o'clock on the morning of the 26th, it was plain that he was not likely to live more than an hour. The time passed almost in silence; the dying Father was lying on his bed breathing heavily, with his eyes closed, or when open, still fixed upon the crucifix. About half-past six, Father Rowe said that he would go and say mass for him, and an intelligent look showed that his intention was appreciated. Just after seven a sudden change came over the Father; his head turned a little to the right, his breathing seemed to stop; a few spasmodic gasps followed, and his spirit passed away. In those last moments his eyes opened, clear, bright, intelligent as ever, in spite of the look of agony on his face, but opened to the sight of nothing earthly, only with a touching expression, half of sweetness, and half of surprise. His own words came forcibly upon one who knelt before him, for it seemed the realization of the picture which he himself had drawn:—

“Only serve Jesus out of love, and while your eyes are yet unclosed, before the whiteness of death is yet settled upon your face, or those around you are sure that that last gentle breathing was indeed your last, what an unspeakable surprise will you have had at the judgment-seat of your dearest Love, while the songs of heaven are breaking on your ears, and the glory of God is dawning on your eyes, to fade away no more for ever!”*

For this was the end of a life which from first to last had been *religious*. In early childhood the things of God had been his joy; as he grew up he had sought painfully and anxiously the truth as it is in Christ, and then had given up all to find it. Every letter tells that it was his engrossing thought, every line of poetry bears the mark of heavenly aspiration; the golden words wherein his work will be still continued, and the sweet music of his hymns of praise, speak in language which cannot be mistaken the singleness of purpose with which he sought the interests of Jesus, and the chivalrous ardour with which he promoted the Church's cause. To this he devoted talents, energy, and health, only caring to labour where the Will of God had placed him, and thus, when he came to die, his history might have been written in the simple words—he served Jesus out of love.

There is nothing more to be added. Those who have loved him and so often hung upon his lips, can only rejoice in the confident assurance, that when Christ who is our life shall appear, then shall he also appear with Him in glory. Well then may we wait with patience.

* “All for Jesus,” c. ii.

ART. VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL AXIOMS.

La Filosofia antica esposta e difesa del P. GIUSEPPE KLEUTGEN, D.C. D.G.
Versione dal Tedesco. Roma.

Essay on first Principles. By the Very Rev. CANON WALKER. London : Longmans.

Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists. A Review. By Rev. C. MEYNELL, D.D., Professor of Philosophy and Literature at S. Mary's College, Oscott. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

IN a preceding article we express the great wish which we have long felt, of promoting in any way we could so happy a consummation, as that English Catholic thinkers should be united in a phalanx against the irreligious philosophies now so rampant. Take one or the other essential truth, which these philosophies deny : we are very anxious to do what we can towards placing it in that light, which may exhibit its perfect harmony (1) with theology and (2) with reason ; and which may at the same time help Catholics in doing battle against the evil school which denies it. Canon Walker's pamphlet comes opportunely, in deciding us to make our first essay on the question of philosophical axioms. Nor could there be (we think) a better beginning than this ; because, as F. Kleutgen observes, in these "infallible" axioms philosophy has its "base and foundation."* Moreover, as might be expected from this circumstance, there is no other point on which the characteristics of each rival school are so sharply contrasted and come into such lively mutual conflict. We will begin our exposition then by exhibiting this conflict. When our readers have seen the vast and impassable gulf which separates scholasticism on this head from every antagonist, they will more appreciate what we have said in our earlier article, on the necessity of adopting the *fundamental principles* of scholasticism as alone suitable for a Catholic philosophy.†

* All acquisition of truth "would be impossible to us, if there were not within us certain convictions (conoscenze) which require no others in order to become evident. In these convictions is found the commencement of all speculation : and to determine them ; to prove their infallibility ; to demonstrate their relation with every other conviction ;—this is what is meant by 'giving philosophy a base, a foundation'" (vol. i. p. 118).

† This expression must not be misunderstood. "If we would speak

There are four fundamentally erroneous systems, with which the English Catholic philosopher is nowadays brought principally into conflict. As a Catholic, he is brought principally across "traditionalism" and "ontologism"; for these are the two errors against which foreign orthodox philosophers chiefly direct their blows. Strangely enough, these two errors, which more than any others meet his eyes as a *Catholic*, he hardly encounters at all as an *Englishman*: for in England, whether among Catholics or Protestants, both traditionalism and ontologism proper are almost unheard of.* In their stead there meet us in England two violently anti-Catholic systems, to which foreign Catholic philosophers—at least in Italy and France—pay comparatively little attention. The first of these—and immeasurably the most irreligious of all four †—is the empirical or phænomenal school of Mill and Bain: the second, the Kantian or sceptical school, prominently represented by Dean Mansel. These are the four capital errors, from which in these days Christianity has most to fear whether in England or abroad: traditionalism, ontologism, scepticism, empiricism.‡ We must maintain that followers of these four schools are as simply external to the true way of philosophy, as Lutherans and Calvinists to that of theology; because in either case those truths which are accidentally held, are held on wrong grounds, and (if we may so speak) in a wrong relative position. We are for the moment merely considering each school broadly and on the whole, without taking into

properly," says F. Kleutgen (vol. i. p. 61), "there is no such thing as a *Christian* philosophy; but rather a true philosophy, which [as being true] is in accordance with Christianity."

* In our next number we shall criticise Dr. Meynell's ascription to himself of "ontologism." To our mind he is as much and as little an ontologist as F. Liberatore.

English philosophers, with their experience, will be quite startled by F. Liberatore's opinion ("Della Conoscenza intellettuale," vol. ii. n. 58) that ontologism "is the most threatening danger of modern science." Hardly less are we surprised, when we find Dr. Meynell to have hoped (p. 35) that "sensationalism as a philosophy has become obsolete." Are Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley then obsolete writers, known only to antiquarians?

† "The most irreligious" *in itself*. We are not here considering this or that consequence, which legitimately follows indeed from other false systems, but which is disavowed by their upholders.

‡ *Pantheism* indeed may be perhaps considered a distinct philosophical system. It has not been mentioned in the text; because neither on the one hand is it prominently mentioned in Catholic philosophical books, nor on the other hand is it, as regards its *explicit* shape, at all common in England. Positivism, we need hardly say, is but one form of empiricism, unless indeed the two terms are synonymous. The "*Civiltà*," in 1867, published a course of articles against positivism: but very little notice is taken of that system in the ordinary Catholic philosophical courses.

account the shades of difference which exist among its upholders. And this being understood, we would, by way of introduction, briefly contrast their doctrine with the scholastic on this particular question of philosophical axioms. We will take an extremely simple instance, as being the better calculated to bring out the contrast. We will inquire then on what ground men are to hold, that "every trilateral rectilineal figure is triangular."

The traditionalist says: "I know this truth, because God originally taught it to mankind; and it has been handed down from generation to generation, till it reached my instructors who taught *me*."

The ontologist says: "I see God immediately, though not reflexly; and in seeing Him, I see the necessary truth that every trilateral figure is triangular."

The Kantist says: "My faculties are so constituted, that I *cannot help regarding* every trilateral figure as necessarily triangular. But whether *in real truth* every trilateral figure is necessarily triangular, I have no means of even guessing.*

The phenomenist says: "Every trilateral figure which I or anybody else has ever seen, has had three angles; and I have a right by the laws of induction to generalize this proposition within certain limits. But whether, if you went to the fixed stars, you would *there* find all trilateral figures triangular, I cannot tell."†

* We by no means intend to imply that Dean Mansel would express himself in this way; but we do maintain—and purpose in a future number to argue—that it is the only doctrine on the subject consistent with his principles. Take such passages of his as the following, which are but specimens of a large class. "It *may* be that the conditions of possible *thought* correspond to conditions of possible *being*; that that which is *to us* inconceivable, is *in fact* non-existing: but of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence" ("Prolegomena Logica," p. 72). In other words it *may* be that a quadrangular trilateral figure is impossible: but we cannot *know* that it is. Presently the Dean adds (p. 74), that we cannot tell "how much of the result" of the laws of thought is true *in itself*, and how much is "relative and dependent on the particular *bodily or mental constitution of man*." Again (p. 84), the necessity of necessary truth is "a necessity of *thought* depending on the laws of our *mental constitution*"; and not therefore known to man as an *intrinsic* necessity, apart from human thought altogether.

† "We should probably be as well able to conceive a round square as a hard square or a heavy square, if it were not that, *in our uniform experience*, at the instant when a thing begins to be round it ceases to be square."—Mill on Hamilton, p. 85 of third edition. "Axioms are experimental truths; generalizations from observation. The proposition 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space' . . . is an induction from the evidence of our senses."—Mill's *Logic*, vol. i. p. 260 of fourth edition. "In distant parts of the stellar regions . . . the phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted."—*Ib.* vol. ii. p. 104.

Such have been the incredible aberrations of many a thinker, in some respects able and even profound. Nay, such have been the incredible aberrations of many a thinker, who has looked down on the middle ages with self-complacent contempt as dark and unphilosophical.* Descartes himself, who set up as the apostle of philosophical reform, and who declared that no solid foundation had ever been laid for human knowledge until his own theories were given to the world ;—Descartes himself, we say, on this primary question of axioms advocated doctrines which are portentously absurd : though his system as a whole is now so obsolete, that it is not worth while troubling our readers with its consideration.† And all this time, while rival philosophies have been vying with each other in extravagance and paradox, scholasticism has remained firm in its original common-sense and straightforward position. Scholasticism, we say, has taught consistently throughout, that those axioms, which underlie the whole fabric of speculative truth and without which that truth must collapse, are immediately known with self-evident certainty by the light of reason.

It is our object in this article, to draw out what appears to us the true theory concerning axioms ; so far, at least, as is necessary for the refutation of those false philosophies which we have mentioned, and especially of empiricism, which is far the most actively anti-religious of all. We are throughout addressing Catholics, and assuming every principle on which all Catholics are agreed ; for we defer to a future number the task of defending our doctrine by reason, against our opponents of the Mill and Bain following.

By “axioms” are meant “necessary first truths” ; ‡ and

* We here speak of the other three systems. We would not call *ontologism* an “incredible aberration” ; though we regard it as fundamentally false and pernicious.

† Yet it may be worth while in a note to give a few of the sentences, which F. Kleutgen has extracted from this philosophical reformer (vol. ii. p. 216, note). “God is the author of all necessary truth,” says Des Cartes ; “it was as free to Him to appoint that the straight lines drawn from centre to circumference of circle should be unequal, as it was to create the world.” “Mathematical truths, which you call eternal, were made by God, and depend on Him just as other creatures do . . . These laws were ordained by God in nature, just as any king ordains laws in his realm ; . . . and they are all implanted in our mind, just as any king would [if he could] engrave his laws in the heart of his subjects . . . If God's will could change, then [like a king in the supposed case] He would change these laws.” Is it the scholastic philosophy then, or on the contrary its earliest opponent, which disparages necessary truth ?

‡ “Axiomata vocantur ea judicia quæ non modo per se evidentia sunt, verum etiam universalitatem habent atque ideo scientiarum principia constituunt. Atque hæc est ratio cur eo nomine, quod dignitatem significat, donata sunt : cum altissimum in cognitione locum obtineant.”—(F. Liberatore, *Logica*,

this definition will convey at once a sufficiently distinct notion for ordinary purposes. On the present occasion however, we must go somewhat deeper: we will consider firstly, what are "truths"; secondly, what are "*first truths*"; and thirdly, what are "*necessary truths*."

It is the more important to consider what is precisely meant by "truths"; because it appears to us that Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet betrays a certain confusion of thought on the subject, having its origin in a certain ambiguity of language. The author says excellently (p. 16), "that there are certain truths which are of necessary, universal, infinite import. Such are mathematical truths, arithmetical proportions, principles of immutable morality, and the like." He adds however (p. 17), that "so far as they are perceptible and discoverable by created intellects, they are indeed certain, necessary, immutable, but not with that certainty, necessity, and immutability which belongs to the divine knowledge. They are, in short, created finite verities." Similar language is found in p. 27, and indeed may almost be said to pervade Canon Walker's general course of argument. We think most of our readers will spontaneously feel that here is some entanglement; and in order to unravel it, we must consider the sense of this word "truths." We may add that no scholastic whom we have examined seems to us so clear and satisfactory on the whole matter of "*verum*," as Vasquez in his 76th and 77th disputations on S. Thomas's 1^a.

The word "truth" is, etymologically at least, derived from the notion of a cognizing mind and its true judgment. Now what is a judgment? What am I doing when I am said to form one? In an affirmative judgment, called "*compositio*," I am ascribing some attribute or attributes—represented in a proposition by the "*predicate*"—to certain *ens* or *entia*, real or imaginary, represented in a proposition by the "*subject*." In a negative judgment, called "*divisio*," I am judging that such attributes do *not* appertain to such *ens* or *entia*. We here, as is evident, use the word "*ens*" in its widest sense, as including both "*substance*" and "*quality*." And we will throughout, for the sake of obvious convenience, use the expressions "*term*," "*subject*," "*predicate*," when speaking of judgments, not less than when speaking of propositions.

Now a "*truth*" is neither more nor less than "*the object of a true judgment*." In other words, it is the "*convenientia*" or "*inconvenientia*" of a certain predicate with a certain sub-

n. 216.) And in n. 218 the author implies that axioms "*necessitatem et universalitatem includere*."

ject; the inherence of certain attributes in a certain ens or entia real or imaginary.

But Canon Walker seems to hold, that there are as many different *truths* as there are different cognizing *minds*; that the triangularity e. g. of every trilateral figure is a different truth, as cognized respectively by God and by man. Against this view we must maintain it to be indisputable, that the truth is one and indivisible however divers the intellects which apprehend it. Take a very simple case: the existence of Mr. Gladstone. Many different men know this existence, and God also knows it: moreover, each separate human cognition of it is entitatively different, and God's cognition of it is different *in kind* from man's. Yet surely the thing known—Mr. Gladstone's existence—is one indivisible truth. So the triangularity of every trilateral figure is known to God and known to man: yet the truth known is one and indivisible; and this truth is *in itself* "necessary" and "immutable," whether we think of it as known by God or as known by man. The attribute of triangularity "necessarily and immutably" appertains to all trilateral figures: and therefore the triangularity of all such figures is a "necessary and immutable" truth, whether that truth be contemplated by God or contemplated by man. What is precisely meant by these adjectives, "necessary" and "immutable," will be presently considered.

One final question may be asked on this head, and that a verbal one. There are certain propositions which are called "tautologies": those namely in which the predicate sets forth nothing, which has not been distinctly expressed in the subject. "A table is a table." "A tree is a tree." Or suppose I define a "pentagon" to be "a rectilineal figure with five sides"; and then gravely enunciate the proposition, that every pentagon has five sides. Should the objects of these propositions be called "truths"? In common parlance they are called, not "truths," but "truisms"; yet it will be convenient to include them under the general name of "truths."

Such then are "truths." But secondly, what are "*first* truths"? Whether or no the word "truth" contains any reference to a cognizing mind, the word "*first* truth" is simply unmeaning *without* such reference. Those are "*first* truths" to any given person, the knowledge of which need not in his case be obtained by reasoning from a knowledge of other truths. "I am in that state of bodily feeling which I call 'cold';" "I am in that state of mental feeling which I call 'out of spirits';" "all trilateral figures are triangular;" "it is wrong to disobey the command of an All-Holy Creator." Here are truths, varying indefinitely from each other in

character and in importance; but all agreeing in this, that a competent thinker can know them certainly, without inferring them from other truths previously known.

Lastly, to complete our definition of "axioms," we have to consider carefully what is meant by "necessary" truths. And this indeed is a question which must be treated with especial prominence in a time like this, when the very fundamental speculative error with which Catholics have to grapple, is the *denial* of necessary truth. Now it is a very strange circumstance; but we are not acquainted with any philosopher, either of the ancient or modern school, who has instituted a direct examination of this question. Nothing indeed is more probable, than that our very statement only shows the present writer's ignorance of philosophical literature; but at all events, under circumstances, we are obliged ourselves to make the best suggestion we can on the subject. We submit what we are going to say with much deference to philosophical students; and we hope at all events, that if our own explanation be not accounted correct or adequate, it may be the means of eliciting some other which may be fairly so considered.

As to the general import of the term indeed, there can be no difficulty whatever. The idea expressed by it is so pronounced and unmistakable, that every thinking person understands its meaning in a certain vague but practically sufficient way. Necessary truths, every one will say, are those truths, which God Himself had never any power of annulling; and such powerlessness is no derogation from His omnipotence. Still this will not suffice for a scientific explanation of the word. The idea "necessary"—as every one who rejects ontologism must admit—is anterior in our mind to the idea "God," and cannot therefore be explained by any *reference* to God. The question therefore must be precisely encountered, what is meant by a "necessary" truth?

Here a question at once suggests itself. F. Liberatore (Logic, n. 32) makes the important remark, that "if all things and ideas required definition, no definition of anything would be possible." There must be simple ideas incapable of further resolution, or else the resolution of complex ideas would be a process continuing ad infinitum. Shall we say then that "necessary" is a *simple idea*?

To begin, let us ask whether it is convertible with the idea "universal." Plainly not. Every necessary truth is indeed universal; but there may be many universal truths, which are not necessary. Take one instance out of a thousand. Let us suppose God to have determined, that He will never create any substance with some given combination of attributes; that

He will never e. g. create a flower, which shall unite the shape and colour of a violet with the smell of a rose. If this were the case, the proposition, "no flower looking like a violet smells like a rose," would be as absolutely universal as the proposition, "no two angles of a triangle together equal two right angles." And yet every one sees at once, that the latter proposition is "necessary," while the former would *not* be so.

Certainly then "necessary" is not synonymous with "universal." Are we obliged therefore to pronounce, that it is a simple idea and incapable of further analysis? We are disposed to answer in the negative; we are disposed to suggest that "necessary" means "*uncaused*." In order to explain this, we will begin with considering F. Kleutgen's statement (vol. ii. p. 179) that "cause," like "being" and "unity," is a simple idea.* This seems to us undeniable. The phenomenists indeed maintain, that the word "cause" expresses nothing but a certain universal and unconditional sequence of phenomena. But as no Catholic holds such a theory, the proper place to refute it will be in the article which we hope soon to publish, against that most pernicious school of thought which we have just mentioned. And we suppose that all who reject the particular analysis attempted by phenomenists, will agree with F. Kleutgen in considering the idea "cause" a perfectly simple one. We suggest then, that a "necessary" truth means "a truth of which there is no efficient cause." By a "truth" is understood, as we have seen, the inherence of certain attributes in a certain subject. In the case of "contingent" truths, this inherence is produced by some cause. In fact the lesson gradually learned from philosophy is, that the primary cause of all these truths, is either God's will, or else the free will with which He has endowed some creature. But consider e. g. the inherence in a triangle of the attribute, that "its three angles together equal two right angles." This inherence has no "efficient cause" whatever; its reason for existing is the intrinsic exigency (so to speak) of a triangle as such. In like manner, to pass from small things to great, consider the truth that "pride and envy are morally wrong in every creature"; or in other words consider the inherence of that attribute, which we call "morally wrong," in those acts which we call acts of pride and envy. This inherence has no "efficient cause." This inherence, we say, is not

* It can hardly be necessary to explain, that by "cause" we mean throughout "efficient cause."

produced by God's will, nor by any other "agency" whatever; its reason of existence is the intrinsic exigency (so to speak) of those acts in themselves.

If this be admitted as a just definition of the term "necessary," we can immediately lay down the proposition, that all necessary truths are eternal and immutable. If the inherence of a certain attribute in a certain subject be due to the intrinsic exigency of that subject, it must exist eternally and immutably wherever that subject is found.

By "necessary" truths then are meant "uncaused" truths; and these are eternal and immutable. On the other hand, as has continually been pointed out, all those necessary truths which have not God for their subject, are exclusively hypothetical and negative. It is no necessary truth e. g. that any triangle shall ever have existed in *rerum naturâ*: though it is a necessary truth that, *if* any triangle exist, its three angles must together equal two right angles. It is no necessary truth that God shall ever have created a rational being: but it is a necessary truth that, if rational beings *do* exist, in them pride and envy are morally evil. And so in every other case which can be named. F. Liberatore then infers with great justice (*Conoscenza intellettuale*, vol. ii. n. 103) that the eternity of abstract necessary truths is rather the eternity of a negation, than of an affirmation.

On the whole then, the most correct exposition will perhaps be as follows. By declaring a certain truth to be "necessary," I declare "the intrinsic impossibility of certain attributes being separated from"—or on the other hand "of certain attributes appertaining to"—"a certain subject, wherever and whenever—if ever or anywhere—that subject may be found." And by the phrase "intrinsic impossibility," in this exposition is meant, that this impossibility is not caused by any person or thing; nor by any agency of any kind whatever.

Here we see the meaning of various expressions, which are continually found in scholastic theology. Thus it is repeatedly declared, that God possesses "a knowledge of simple intelligence," whereby He cognizes all possible things. What is meant by "possible" things? Those things which can exist without contradicting necessary truths. A triangle with two of its angles together equalling two right angles—or a creature in whom pride and envy should be virtues—these would *not* be "possible" things. On the other hand, of any imaginary beings which would contradict necessary truths, it is said that they are "impossible"; that they are "chimeras"; that they "implicate a contradiction"; or, more briefly, "implicant" or "repugnant."

And now we are brought to an inquiry of very fundamental importance. The philosopher shows very early in his course, that there exists a large number of hypothetical and negative necessary truths. Passing onwards, he proceeds in due time to demonstrate the existence of God: and as soon as he has arrived at that conclusion, he is obliged to ask himself what is the *relation* between God and *other* necessary truth. This is the question which we are now to consider. And in treating every such matter, we must bear in mind what the scholastics ever inculcate; viz., that man has no immediate knowledge of God, and apprehends Him entirely through the analogy of creatures. It must be remembered therefore, that man's conceptions of Him—though true as far as they go and inappreciably momentous—yet are always most partial and inadequate; nor indeed are they ever *so* partial and inadequate, as when they are of His *Essence* rather than of His *attributes*. Any possible reply therefore to the question before us, must be at best vague and adumbratory. Our apprehension of God's Essence itself being so very incomplete, such also at best must be our apprehension of any doctrine which *concerns* that Essence. This being understood, we submit the following two propositions to our reader's judgment.

Firstly then, we say that God contemplates all necessary truths in gazing on His own Essence. This seems undeniably involved, in the scholastic doctrine concerning His knowledge of possible things. God, in gazing on His own Essence, comprehends it; *i. e.* sees in it all things which *can* therein be seen.* He thus contemplates therein all things which are intrinsically possible. But to do this, is to contemplate all those truths which limit the *number* of things intrinsically possible; and these are precisely all *necessary* truths. We affirm therefore, that God's cognition of necessary truth is intrinsic, and not extrinsic, to His vision of Himself.

Shall we say then that all necessary truths are *identical* with God? To mention no other difficulty, there seems an insuperable theological objection against such a view; because it would thence follow that every beatus, in seeing God, sees the whole mass of necessary truths. But in fact it seems unmeaning to speak of merely abstract truths, which are not even entia, nay which are merely *negative*, as identical with God.†

* See e. g. Suarez de Deo, l. 2, c. 29, n. 13.

† When Dr. Ward wrote his "Philosophical Introduction," he had not carefully looked into this question. He spoke in consequence very inaccurately from p. 44 to p. 47, and begs to retract the whole passage.

We say then secondly, that all necessary truths are "founded" and dependent on God's Essence; so that if, per impossibile, God's Essence were annihilated, all necessary truths would thereby cease to be. This does not seem the universal judgment of approved theologians: for Dr. Ward, in his "Philosophical Introduction" (p. 483), has quoted no less names than Lessius, Bellarmine, and Lugo, for the opinion that, even if God did not exist, there might be real sin. Our own suggestion is, that if God did not exist there would be no necessary truth at all; and no act therefore could be either virtuous or vicious.

Here one obvious difficulty may be raised. All necessary truths, we have seen, are "uncaused"; but if they are not "caused" by God, what can be meant by saying that they are "founded" on Him? The reply however is very easy. By "cause" we have meant throughout, as explained in a preceding note, "*efficient*" cause; and there may very easily be a "foundation," where there is no "efficient cause." It is most intelligible e. g. to say that some abstruse mathematical theorem is "founded" on certain axioms; in such sense, that if per impossibile the axioms were false, the theorem would lose its truth: yet it would be simply preposterous to call such axioms its "efficient causes." This then is what we would suggest concerning necessary truths: they are what they are, because God's Essence is what it is.

These are the two theses which we would express, in reply to the question started. For the first of them we have given, we think, sufficient grounds; but to vindicate the latter would here carry us much too far. Indeed, the more proper place for such a vindication would be in the philosophical argument for God's existence. Let us now see what is the language of modern Catholic philosophers; nor can we take better representatives of the class, than FF. Liberatore and Kleutgen.

In considering what is said by the former, our readers should call to mind that "possible things" with him, as with all the scholastic writers, means simply "things which can exist without contradiction of necessary truth." F. Liberatore then speaks as follows (*Metaphysica Generalis*, n. 103): "Since God has from eternity gazed on all possible things, it was necessary that in thinking them He should gaze on *some existing object* with which they are related. But such an object . . . could be nothing except *the Divine Essence*." And he proceeds to quote with perfect concurrence Leibnitz's statement, that "if there is any reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must be *founded*

on some existing and actual thing, and consequently on the *existence of the necessary Being*." Again, in his treatise on "Natural Theology" (n. 43): "Possible things, as regards their intrinsic possibility, are perceived in their own rationes, or in the ideas which the divine mind has conceived, in *considering His own Essence* so far as it is imitable." Once more (Ethics, n. 94): "*As I have often said*, the nature of things and the relations which thence necessarily emerge are manifested (dictantur) by the divine wisdom *contemplating the Divine Essence*. . . . Wherefore the natural law so attends (consequitur) human nature that it *cannot be torn therefrom*; and while that nature exists, the natural law cannot cease to exist, nor can it be otherwise than it is."

Turn now to F. Kleutgen (vol. ii. p. 212):—

An objection is raised, "if divine knowledge presupposes the *conceivableness* of things, and divine creation their *possibility*, it thence follows that God's intellect and power have their laws in the conceivableness and possibility of things." *Certainly*: only that this is not a law *external to God*, but exists *in God Himself*, and is *even His own Essence*. . . . The divine Essence is the *ultimate reason* for anything being conceivable or possible: inasmuch that the very divine Essence is the norm of what is conceivable or possible, and is accordingly the law of God's knowledge and power.

God's omniscience therefore consists in God's knowing all which is cognoscible, and not in His being able, by His knowledge, to make anything conceivable. Similarly He is omnipotent, because He can create everything creatable, and not because He can make anything [He pleases] possible. Nor in this can there be seen any limitation of the divine wisdom and power; since *God's infinite perfection is the very reason* why the inconceivable is inconceivable and the impossible impossible. . . . The inconceivable is that which, in consequence of the intrinsic contradiction which it involves, does not and cannot exist.

Again:—

The error of ontologists consists in this; that they are not content with regarding God as the *foundation* of necessary truths, but will have it that they are He Himself. (Ontologisme, p. 56.)

We have now sufficiently explained what are meant by those "necessary first truths," which are called axioms. But before proceeding further, there are reasons connected with the phænomenist controversy which make it desirable to engage very briefly in a supplemental inquiry. Truths are commonly divided by anti-empirical philosophers into "*à priori*" and "*à posteriori*" truths; the former being accounted "necessary," and the latter "empirical." We wish here to inquire whether this is quite an exhaustive division; whether

it can truly be said, that all non-empirical truths are necessary. We reply that this *cannot* truly be said. There is at all events one large and most important class of exceptions, whether or no there are others: we refer to truths testified by *memory*.

The only "empirical first truths" *strictly* so called are, we maintain, truths of present consciousness. "I experience that feeling which I call being 'cold,'" or "which I call being 'out of spirits,'" &c., &c. These truths are doubtless known to me immediately by experience. But take the following: "*a short time ago I was cold*," or "*a short time ago I was out of spirits*": these cannot with strict accuracy be called "empirical first truths," because they are *not* known to me immediately by experience. You will say perhaps, that they *are* immediately known to me by *past* experience. But consider. A truth evidently cannot now be known to me by past experience, unless I now know that I *had* that past experience. We ask therefore this very simple question: *How* do I now know that I had that past experience? Not by an act of *experience* most incontestably, but by an act of *memory*: by an act which, under the light of reason, carries with it its own evidence of truth, just as axiomatic judgments do; but which is essentially different in character from an act of experience.* Truths then, which are testified by clear memory, are "first truths" indeed, but not *empirical* first truths. Yet certainly they are not *necessary* truths; and it cannot therefore be sustained that all first truths are either necessary or empirical.

It seems to us that it will be found far more convenient in practice, to employ the phrase "empirical first truths" in a much wider sense than the strictest; in fact, so to extend its signification, that it shall include not those only which are known by present experience, but that far larger number which are known by clear memory of the past.

Are there any other first truths, which are neither necessary on one hand, nor yet empirical on the other? We are not aware that the question is of any importance; but we think that there *are* such. Suppose, e. g., I am near a house, or a tree, or a table. I immediately cognize the existence of certain "accidents," as so many empirical first truths. But

* Mr. Stuart Mill, in his essay on Hamilton (p. 203, note, third edition), admits it to have been proved on the anti-empirical side, that "the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate"; that "no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well founded." By this admission we consider that he lays the axe to the root of his whole system, as we hope to argue in our future article; but his admission is characteristically candid.

further I cognize a "substance" which underlies these accidents. The existence of this substance is undoubtedly no "empirical first truth": yet neither is it a "necessary" first truth; for it is evidently one of that class which, when God performs the Eucharistic miracle, cease to *be* truths. If God can by His power enable the accidents of bread and wine to remain without any supporting substratum, He must be able to do the same in regard to all other accidents whatever.

We have now therefore completed our idea of axioms: they are "truths"; they are "first truths"; and they are "necessary truths." We will next submit to our readers one or two propositions concerning them. We shall occasionally use the words "intuition" and "intue," to express that act whereby the mind cognizes an axiom.*

1. All axioms are intued in the individual before they are intued in the universal. This is one important truth admirably elucidated by Dr. M'Cosh, in his excellent work, "Intuitions inductively considered": a work which has been far less widely known (we think) than its intrinsic merit deserves. In a future article we hope to show, that the thesis which we here advocate is closely connected with the scholastic doctrine, about all knowledge commencing with *sense*; but on the present occasion we will do no more than exhibit its truth. When I hear the proposition e. g., that every trilateral figure has three angles,—I first imagine some *particular* trilateral figure, and verify so far the proposition: then a moment's consideration shows, that this property is by no means peculiar to the particular figure which I have summoned to my thoughts, but on the contrary that it extends to all trilateral figures as such. And a very brief introspection will suffice, we think, to convince our readers, that the case is similar with every axiom.

2. We have spoken of the affinity which exists, between this doctrine, and the scholastic doctrine that all knowledge begins with *sense*. It is of vital importance then to point out, that the scholastics never dreamed of representing experience as our informant on the *truth* of axioms. We may fairly here take F. Kleutgen as a specimen of the whole school. He protests vehemently (vol. ii. pp. 261, 262) against any such doctrine being attributed to them. "Although the mind does not form" axioms, he says (p. 262) "without preceding sensible representations,—nevertheless it knows their *truth*, not from

* The verb "intue" is not common; but the "Month" of last March used it in its criticism of Dr. Meynell, and we may be allowed to follow its example.

these representations, but in their own light (da loro stessi).” Again (p. 261): “The truth” of any intellectual conception, “in so far as it is universal and abstract, does not depend on the actuality of sensible representation.” To the same effect Suarez: “That self-evident knowledge of axioms (principiorum evidens cognitio), which is their special attribute (quæ propria illorum est), does not arise from any medium, but from *the light given by nature*, so soon as the signification of the extremes is understood.” Nor is there any approved scholastic writer who speaks differently.

Some Catholics fear, lest the desolating system of empiricism should be favoured by the scholastic doctrine, that knowledge begins with sense. But they should remember that those philosophers of the present day who most energetically *abhor* empiricism, fully agree with the scholastics in this particular. It is Mr. Stuart Mill’s own statement of his opponents’ view that, according to that view, “*à priori* perceptions are *not indeed innate*, nor could ever have been awakened in us *without experience*; but experience is only *the occasion* by which they are irresistibly suggested.” “Among the truths,” continues Mr. Mill, “which are thus known *by occasion of experience*, but not themselves the subjects of experience, Coleridge includes the fundamental doctrines of religion and morals, the principles of mathematics,” &c. &c.*

Dr. Meynell (p. 45) accuses Canon Walker of holding, that “the knowledge of first principles is due to sensible experience.” If by “due to sensible experience” Dr. Meynell only means “*occasioned* by sensible experience,” he does but ascribe to the Canon a view, which is held at this day by the strongest *à priori* philosophers. But if he speaks of sensible experience as the *ground of conviction*, surely he should not have brought forward so unfavourable an allegation without citing passages in support of it. If Canon Walker held such a view as this, he would be at the very level of Mill and Bain. But we cannot see the faintest sign of his holding it. On the contrary, he says frequently (see, e. g., pp. 31, 35) that “first principles are images or reflections *from the divine truth* ;” in p. 57 he says that *the light of reason* is able to show at once their truth; and in p. 60 he adds that “the intuition of first principles is the noblest power of man.”

3. Many axioms are *deducible*. In particular, it may often happen that some truth is demonstrable from truths more obvious than itself, and yet—even apart from such demonstration—is self-evident to more practised intellects, so

* “Dissertations and Discussions,” vol. i. pp. 404, 405.

soon as its terms are apprehended. This is, we believe, the universal doctrine of the scholastics; and it is illustrated with much force by Suarez in *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3. Again, in d. 1, s. 6, he enlarges on the greater or less effort which is necessary, according to the diversity of intellectual power, in order that this or that man may be brought to intue some axiom by sufficiently penetrating its terms.

This scholastic doctrine seems to us undeniably true. Let us give one out of the innumerable instances which at once suggest themselves. Every one, we suppose, who admits axioms at all, would consider it axiomatic that $7 \times 3 = 3 \times 7$; or, in other words, that $7 + 7 + 7 = 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3$. Yet there is a very large number of youths or less educated men, who could be brought indeed by *demonstration* to see this truth; but who could not at the same moment hold both subject and predicate so firmly in their mind, as to *intue* the truth expressed by this proposition. Nay, we may go further: for the *general* truth is axiomatic that $a \times b = b \times a$; while there are still fewer men than in the former case, who would be able to *intue* this truth.

But further. It may very often happen, that axiom A is in itself deducible from axioms B and C—or, again, from axiom A and empirical first-truth B—in cases where, to the mind of most men, axiom A is itself more obviously self-evident than axiom B or axiom C. Some Catholic philosophers say in this case, that A is not *demonstrable* from B and C; because the word “demonstration” implies, they consider, that the demonstrating premisses are more obvious than the demonstrated conclusion. In order therefore to avoid this purely verbal question, we have used the word “deducible” in our thesis instead of “demonstrable.”

4. We now come to a question, which to us seems far the most fundamental of all; nay, which we cannot but regard as the very point of divergence, between sound philosophy and empiristic unbelief. We are the more desirous that competent Catholic thinkers should give their mind to what we are here about to urge, because no upholder of the scholastic philosophy—not even F. Kleutgen—impresses us as being by any means alive to the extreme momentousness of the issue involved. We are to consider then, whether axioms may or may not be “synthetical.”

An “analytical” judgment is one, in which it is judged that the idea of one term is contained in the very idea of the other. To take a very obvious instance. Let it be supposed that “hard” is a complex idea, which includes the more simple ideas, “resisting muscular pressure.” Then to say that

"every hard substance resists muscular pressure" is to express a purely analytical judgment; for the predicate is obtained, by analyzing the very idea of the subject. All judgments which are not analytical are "synthetical." This being understood, we will institute successively two distinct inquiries: viz. firstly are certain axioms synthetical? and secondly, *if* so, how large a portion? As to the first question then, we will begin with considering whether the scholastics give it a negative answer; and we will then examine it ourselves on grounds of reason.

On the surface it would appear that Catholic philosophers—those at all events who follow the scholastics—are unanimous for the negative. The phrase itself was originated by Kant; and since his time it appears to have been quite a commonplace with such Catholic philosophers, to denounce his "synthetical *à priori* judgments." But such a view as to the meaning of these philosophers is a little premature, to say the least of it. It must be remembered in the first place, that Kant's doctrine *as a whole* is, in the eye of every Catholic, most monstrous; for he denies that man has any ground for embracing axioms as *certainly true*. And the detestation of Catholic philosophers for the boundless scepticism of his general doctrine, may have indisposed them from carefully considering its particular details. We are confident it will be found, that these philosophers are in general very far from being opposed to Kant on the particular question of synthetical axioms; though we readily admit that most of them *think* themselves opposed to it very decidedly.

F. Kleutgen however does not even *think* himself opposed to it. On the contrary, he holds Kant to be entirely right in the matter of doctrine, and only ill-advised in his use of the term "analytical." "It is sufficient to observe," he says (vol. ii. p. 184), "that Kant defined an 'analytical judgment' in too literal, and therefore too rigorous, a sense." All that is meant in calling a judgment "analytical," he continues, is "that by simply considering the ideas of the subject and the predicate, one comes to see that there really exists between them that relation which the judgment expresses." Now, according to *F. Kleutgen's* use of language, it is most undeniable that every axiom is analytical; for it is the very *notion* of an axiom, that on simply considering the ideas of its subject and predicate, a competent thinker cognizes its truth. The only question at issue then between F. Kleutgen and Kant, on this particular matter, is most purely verbal: and for our own part indeed, we cannot but think Kant's use of the term "analytical" the more appropriate and more service-

able of the two. But as to the question of doctrine, there is no difference at all. F. Kleutgen is as clear as Kant himself, that certain axioms are, in Kant's sense of the word, "synthetical."

No writer can be taken as a more representative specimen of modern Catholic philosophy, than F. Liberatore. Let us next therefore consider his view of the matter. It must be admitted that he expresses dissent from Kant's doctrine (*Logic*, n. 233); but we must nevertheless maintain, that when he proceeds to explain himself, there is no real difference whatever on the matter between him and Kant. We will take one instance. He fully admits it to be an axiom (n. 235) that "a straight line is the shortest of all lines which can be drawn between two given points." On what ground does he consider this axiomatic? Does he think that the idea, "shortest between two given points," is *contained* in the idea "straight," so that the former can be seen in the latter by means of *analysis*? He is as far from thinking this as Kant is himself. Here are F. Liberatore's words, the italics of course being our own:—

The notion of greatest shortness is evidently *derived* (*elicitur*) from the very idea of a straight line. For since a straight line is stretched out uniformly (*æqualiter*) between the extreme points, *every one sees* that it is shorter than all curves which have the same termination. For the straight line passes over just as much space as is intercepted between the given points; but curves pursue a winding direction, and diverge on one side or the other. Wherefore they are more extended, and pass over more points than those which intervene between the two given extremes. . . .

As to the other examples which [Kant] adduces, we think nothing of them; for it is very manifest that those judgments are obtained either by experience, or by the *immediate comparison of ideas*, or by reasoning.

F. Liberatore then considers any judgment to be "analytical," which is obtained by "the immediate comparison of ideas;" or again, of which the predicate is "evidently *derived* from the very idea" of its subject. But to be "evidently *derived* from" is surely quite different from being "evidently *contained* in." We hold quite as strongly as F. Liberatore does, that every axiom is obtained by "the immediate comparison of ideas"; and that in every axiom the notion of the predicate is evidently derived from the notion of the subject. But Kant entertains the same doctrine, so far as we can understand him, no less firmly than does F. Liberatore himself.

Then as to modern Catholic philosophers in general, there is no proposition more constantly quoted by them as axiomatic, than "*parentes sunt honorandi*." But no one in his senses

can say, that the idea "parent" includes the idea "one to whom honour is due"; that the latter idea can be obtained by a careful *analysis* of the former. Dmowski gives as axioms "Deus est amandus"; "nemo est lædendus": and says that there are many (plura) such (Phil. Mor., n. 33). But surely he could not have thought that these are "analytical" in Kant's sense of that term. When such philosophers then say that all axioms are analytical, they undoubtedly use the word in F. Kleutgen's meaning; they merely intend that "by considering the idea of the subject and predicate, one comes to see that there really exists between them that relation which the axiom expresses."

Passing from moderns to the scholastics, so far as we have been able to examine the matter, two facts are, in our view, abundantly evident. Firstly, they never considered the question explicitly at all, nor had any notion of its momentousness; but secondly, they constantly call some proposition axiomatic, of which no one could dream that it is "analytical" in Kant's sense of that term. It may be worth while however to mention, that in one place Suarez is accidentally led to mention that class of propositions, which Kant afterwards called "analytical"; and that no one who reads the passage will for a moment suppose him to account *all* axioms as such. The passage occurs in *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3, in the paragraph headed "*varia placita*." He first mentions what we have already called "tautologies" or truisms"; such as "*ens mobile est ens mobile*," "*substantia est substantia*," "*accidens est accidens*"; and these he calls "identical" propositions. Next he mentions a different class of propositions: viz. those in which "a distinct idea is predicated of a confused one;" as e. g., where "the definition is predicated of the thing defined." Such a proposition, he says, "is not 'identical,' but 'doctrinal.'" An obvious instance of this would be one which we have more than once adduced: "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." This is just what Suarez would call a "doctrinal" proposition, and Kant an "analytical" one. And what we are now pointing out, is what will be evident to any one who reads the passage: viz. that Suarez never dreamed of regarding *all* axioms as possessing this "doctrinal" (i. e. "analytical") character, but on the contrary treated these "doctrinal" axioms as an exceptional class.

There is another point of view, from which synthetical axioms may be regarded. We have already pointed out that many axioms are *deducible*. Now some Catholic philosophers seem to hold, that "the principle of contradiction"

is the only axiom which *needs* to be assumed, and that all the rest are reducible to that principle. In other words, these writers hold, as we understand them, that all other axioms can be deduced from the principle of contradiction by help of empirical truths, without postulating any further axiom whatever. "The principle of contradiction," we need hardly say, is the principle: "it is impossible that the same thing can at the same time both exist and not exist." And to hold that no axiom except this principle is absolutely indispensable, is equivalent to the doctrine that all axioms are analytical. This is so important a proposition, that we will give some little time to its exposition. We maintain therefore firstly, that if all axioms were analytical, it would follow that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction; * and we maintain secondly, that if certain axioms are synthetical, it follows that all other axioms are *not* reducible to the principle of contradiction. We will successively illustrate these two statements.

Firstly then, if all axioms were analytical, it would follow that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction. This is clear; because the truth of an analytical proposition at once resolves itself into this principle of contradiction. Let us take our habitual instance, "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." We assume of course, as an empirical truth, that the idea "hard" includes the idea "resisting muscular pressure." If therefore the above-named proposition were false—viz., that all hard substances resist muscular pressure—it would follow that the same substances at the same time do, and do not, resist muscular pressure.

Secondly, if certain axioms are *not* analytical, it follows that all other axioms are not reducible to the principle of contradiction. The reason of this is equally obvious with the reason of our former statement. All synthetical propositions, however well established, can be denied without any violence whatever to the principle of contradiction. Take e. g. the synthetical proposition that the earth moves round the sun: if I denied this proposition,—whatever else could be said against me, no one could possibly allege that I violate the principle of contradiction.

Those philosophers then who hold that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contradiction, hold equivalently that all axioms are analytical; whereas those who deny that all other axioms are reducible to the principle of contra-

* Dmowski, e. g., says: "Omnes veritates necessariæ reducuntur ad principium contradictionis."

diction, hold equivalently that certain axioms are synthetical.* Or conversely. Those who regard all axioms as analytical, consider that no other axiom except the principle of contradiction *need* be postulated, in order to a sufficient basis for human science; whereas this proposition is emphatically *denied* by those, who regard various axioms as synthetical.

Now Suarez devotes a whole section (d. 3, s. 3) to debating what axioms are requisite for a demonstration of the "passiones de ente"; and he is led to this inquiry (as he begins with stating) by Aristotle's doctrine, that the principle of contradiction is the first and almost sole principle into which all scientific demonstrations should be resolved. He implies (we think) as his own opinion, that *many* different axioms are required. But at all events he lays it down as absolutely certain, that at least *two* are necessary in the strictest sense; and that the principle of contradiction therefore by itself will not suffice.† This is laid down under the head "*aliquot certiora pronunciata*"; and we may be very certain therefore (to say the least) that it was no unknown or rare opinion among the scholastics.

Finally it seems to us, that even if the scholastics had been unanimous in considering all axioms analytical—though such a circumstance would undoubtedly have carried with it considerable weight—yet this is not a question on which their concurrence should be accounted a final and decisive authority. We have spoken on this general subject in our second article; and we have expressed a humble suggestion, that scholastic philosophy is only authoritative so far as it is embedded in scholastic theology. But we do not believe any theological proposition was ever advocated, which would suffer the slightest detriment from admitting the syntheticalness of certain axioms. Indeed we believe we might go much further, though we will not insist on this. As to a declaration of *the Church* against the syntheticalness of axioms, no one has even alleged that any such thing exists.

We cannot see therefore any ground of authority which should prevent us from holding, if reason seems so to declare,

* We cannot for the life of us see how Dmowski would resolve into the principle of contradiction his axioms, "*Deus est amandus*," "*Nemo est laedendus*." But he is so accurate and thoughtful a writer, that we distrust our own criticism of him.

† "*Necesse est ut [scientia] sistat in principiis seu propositionibus per se notis. Secundo ex hac ratione concludi videtur, hæc principia non tantum sed plura et ad minus duo esse, debere, saltem quoad hoc ut sint propositiones immediatæ et a priori indemonstrabiles . . . Sunt ergo necessaria plura principia prima etiam in hac scientiâ [metaphysicâ].*"

that certain axioms are synthetical. Nay we are confident that on the whole this is really the doctrine both of the scholastics and of their modern supporters. We pass therefore to the ground of reason; and *on* that ground, our difficulty is to understand how there can be a second opinion on the matter. "Every trilateral figure has three angles." Surely I may have taken in the whole idea expressed by the term "trilateral figure," before I have even asked myself any *question* about the number of its angles: and when I did ask myself the question, the answer elicited was a real addition to my stock of knowledge; nor had it constituted any part whatever of my idea "trilateral figure." Then take the particular instance debated between F. Liberatore and Kant. It is no exaggeration at all to say, that a thousand people understand all which is *meant* by a "straight line," for *one* who has ever formed the judgment that such a line is the shortest road between two given points. F. Liberatore, in the passage already quoted, carries his readers with him to this latter judgment, not surely by teaching them to *analyze*, but to *build upon*, their idea of a "straight line." Or going from the most trivial to the most weighty instances—consider the axiom which we have already so often cited: "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally wrong." Plainly I may have imbibed the full knowledge of what is *meant* by "the disobedience of a rational creature to his Holy Creator," before I have thought about it being wrong at all. Doubtless I at once *intue* the truth that such disobedience is wrong: but in doing so for the first time, I arrive at a knowledge which I did not before possess; my judgment has been synthetical and not analytical.

This being admitted, the further question remains, *how large a proportion* of axioms are synthetical. We reply, all serviceable axioms without exception. "A table is a table," "a horse is a horse," "a tree is a tree,"—these are axioms, for they are "necessary first truths": but they are not *serviceable* axioms; they will never advance science one single step.* Now we maintain that all analytical axioms, so far as they are axioms, are of this tautologous and unserviceable character; and that their real value is entirely psychological and empirical. Take the instance which we have so often given: "all hard substances resist muscular pressure." So far as this is a *necessary* proposition—i. e. so far as it is an axiom—it merely declares that all hard substances are hard, and that all things without exception which resist muscular pres-

* "Illa propositio est identica et negatoria."—Suarez, *Metaph.*, d. 3, s. 3.

sure, resist muscular pressure. The value of the proposition is psychological; and consists in its declaration, that the idea "hard," as conceived by the human mind, includes the idea of "resisting muscular pressure."

We entreat Catholic thinkers to weigh the arguments which we have adduced for the syntheticalness of serviceable axioms: because (as at present minded) we cannot but think the question very fundamental indeed; and we are very desirous therefore of correcting our own view by that of more competent judges. So much at all events is certain: that neither Mill, nor Bain, nor any phænomenist in the world, would dream of denying the self-evident character of all *analytical* truths; and that consequently, if Catholics on their side *confined* self-evidence to such truths, *so far* at all events they would not rise above the phænomenist level. Our own impression is, that the whole controversy against empiricism will be found ultimately to turn on this very question of synthetical axioms.

There is more than one further proposition on axioms which seems to us of great importance: but we must not occupy too large a portion of our number with things philosophical, and must hasten therefore to a conclusion of this article. We will only here add that, according to our view of the case, the number of axioms is very large indeed; and that the number of axioms is very far from inconsiderable, which must *by absolute necessity* be postulated, as a foundation for human science in its full attainable extent. Nor are we aware that we at all contravene the ordinary doctrine of scholastic philosophers in expressing this judgment.

The necessary objective validity of logical reasoning is of course to be accepted as axiomatic. Science, in the widest signification which that word can bear exclusive of revelation, comprises that vast body of truths, theological,* metaphysical, ethical, psychological, social, physical, which is founded on first truths (whether empirical or non-empirical), and is elaborated by those logical processes, which possess (as we have just observed) necessary objective validity. Necessary truth then is the very back-bone of science, so that without it science cannot exist: while yet on the other hand if science handled *exclusively* necessary truths, it would be a kind of abstract and ideal structure, resembling a skeleton uncovered by flesh. All this is excellently set forth by F. Klentgen. He points out e. g. (vol. ii. p. 202), that "thought" supplies "the necessary and universal," experience only "the contin-

* We refer, of course, to truths of *natural* theology.

gent and particular"; that by experience taken alone the mind can never be certain of objective truth; that whoever doubts the existence of the necessary and universal, must renounce all scientific knowledge. "By abstract thought," he presently says (p. 214), "we cannot indeed know the *existence* of things: but we *can* acquire a certainty, not only that certain things are intrinsically possible and others not, but also what would be the mutual *relations* of the former if they did exist, and according to what laws they would operate and live." Abstract thought, he says, cannot show e.g. that bodies exist; but it *can* show that, *if* they exist, in them is verified "all which mathematics teach concerning quantity, and physics concerning motion." We have no room here for illustrating and enlarging on these pregnant principles; but we have thought it desirable to point out—in opposition to some Catholics and to some non-Catholics—how violently opposed to the modern empirical school is the very fundamental notion of scholastic philosophy.

We have said in an earlier article that some modern upholders of the scholastic philosophy claim for it, if we understand their meaning rightly, a far more complete immunity than F. Kleutgen does, from omissions and even mistakes. We now further add, that the same writers, so far as we can form a judgment, put too much in the background (though of course they do not dream of denying) that very vital part of the scholastic philosophy, which dwells on necessary and universal truths. In both these respects F. Kleutgen seems to us quite a model: and we have endeavoured, under his guidance, to express one or two doctrines, which are thoroughly in accordance with the scholastic philosophy, while they are especially needed at this time. Of course we may have made various incidental mistakes; but, taking our position as a whole, we would ask whether it may not afford a common platform, on which both Canon Walker and Dr. Meynell may harmoniously stand. We would ask Canon Walker, whether we have said anything, which even tends to conflict with the fundamental principles of scholasticism; and we would ask Dr. Meynell, whether we have not admitted, as heartily as he admits it himself, the existence of "an *a priori* positive objective element of thought, distinct from the mind itself, and stamped with the characters of necessity and universality" (p. 5). If both writers answer our question in our favour, we may perhaps flatter ourselves that we have made one little step, towards the attainment of greater philosophical unity among Catholics. At all events, we heartily sympathize with Dr. Meynell in his utter repudiation of any philosophy, which

shall not thoroughly secure the objective necessity of certain fundamental truths; though we must contend that this foundation *is* secured by the scholastic writers.

We are very much disappointed that we are obliged to break off our article almost abruptly, without entering on one or two important collateral points, and without any comment on Dr. Meynell's general argument. Especially we wished to dwell on that "light of reason," in which all axioms are self-evident, and on which the scholastics have excellently spoken. But we will insert in October what we are obliged here to omit; and we have evidently much more chance of being read, if we do not unduly tax our reader's patience. We must not however conclude, without one word of protest against Dr. Meynell's treatment of F. Liberatore. We certainly agree with Dr. Meynell's March critic of the "Month," in deprecating his *tone* towards so considerable a person and so loyal a son of the Church: for ourselves however, we rather wish to dwell on F. Liberatore's *doctrine*. We cannot profess anything like a thorough acquaintance with the "Conoscenza intellettuale," which we never even opened until we were induced to do so by Dr. Meynell's pamphlet. But wherever we have looked at it, we have found it to express a very different doctrine from what Dr. Meynell had led us to expect. Dr. Meynell considers that all thinkers are denounced by F. Liberatore as "virtually ontologists," who admit "an *à priori* objective element of thought stamped with the character of necessity and universality;" nay, and that "no reader" of the work "will call this in question." Well, we have not been *readers* of the work, but only *dippers* into it. Still we have lighted on many such passages as the following; and as we had been prepossessed by Dr. Meynell's statement, we observed them with extreme surprise.

It is no wonder that Locke's theory issues finally in destroying logically all *à priori* knowledge; in reducing science to mere *empiricism*; from whence germinate *materialism* and *scepticism* (vol ii. n. 213).

The opinion "that there is no knowledge except from the senses" *would destroy all science*; since science has for its object truth, *in so far as it is necessary and immutable* (n. 59).

But a far more important passage occurs in the preceding page, because it throws clear light on F. Liberatore's whole attitude towards the ontologists. He there professes his perfect agreement with them, in holding "*the absolute and immutable nature*" which "*the truth*" of first principles "*shows itself to us as objectively possessing.*" He agrees with

the ontologists also, in utterly rejecting any such notion, as that human convictions of necessary truth are but "subjective forms of the human mind." He calls this error a "fatal rock, by impinging on which the bark of science would make total shipwreck." He only condemns ontologists, so far as they fancy that there can be no security for the objective necessity of those truths, except by supposing man to see them here on earth in the very vision of God. Certainly, so far as this particular passage is concerned,—and it is a very critical and decisive one,—we can see no important difference between F. Liberatore and Dr. Meynell himself.

ART. IX.—THE REVOLUTION IN SPAIN.

Le Roi d'Espagne. Par APARISI Y GUIJARRO. Paris : Jouast.

THERE is hardly any more extraordinary instance of the political sagacity of the Duke of Wellington, than his conviction, repeatedly and emphatically expressed now nearly fifty years ago, that Spain was about to be ruined by a series of military revolutions. In the year 1820 occurred the first of those insurrections of the Spanish army, since so frequently known by the name of *Pronunciamientos*; and while it was yet uncertain how it should end—whether, in fact, the king would hold out, or succumb—the duke wrote to his old friend, General Alava, a long letter breathing the strong and almost native interest which he always took in Spanish affairs. "*Tenez, mon cher !*" he says towards its end. "I have read of many misfortunes which have befallen nations. I have seen much of public calamity in the course of my life. But no one has ever seen the like of that which will come to pass in Spain, if the king should be so unfortunate as to capitulate to, or even to treat with, the revolted troops. As you know, I do not love republics, and, above all, *la Constitucion Española*; but I would prefer a thousand times the success of the revolt and the establishment of the Constitution to the capitulation of the king." The Duke of Wellington was a soldier, but there never was a statesman, civilian, ecclesiastic, or jurisconsult in any age or country who had such an utter horror of Prætorianism. He understood and he believed in the British Constitution, and soldier as he was—the very greatest and best of British soldiers—he yet felt that the secret of its supremacy

and duration was the strict subordination of the numbers and attributions of the standing army to the authority of Crown and Parliament. He knew if it was possible to suppose the case of a mutiny of the Guards, investing Buckingham Palace and deposing Ministers in Downing-street, that the end of the British Empire would have begun; and he applied those principles—true principles wherever civil society exists—to the case of Spain.

A few weeks afterwards, writing to the Duc de Richelieu, after some words as to the then state of affairs in France, which conclude with this remarkable sentence, "I only foresee chaos for the world, if that which is at present established cannot consolidate itself," he goes on to speak of the state of the Peninsula in these terms:—

Since I last wrote to you, I see that the King of Spain has yielded everything; and so far as I can see, the concession has been made to his perfidious generals and his revolted army; for it does not appear that the people, or even the Liberal party which undoubtedly exists in Spain, have come to the front at all. All has been done throughout by the officers and soldiers of the army; and lo! here is a revolution effected against the well-understood wishes, if I do not deceive myself, not only of the king but of a majority of the nation so great that it may well be called unanimous. . . . God knows where all this will end, even in Spain. It is a triumph for the party of disorder such as they have not had since the month of March, 1815. But it really is even more important. Then the revolted army had the excuse of attachment to their old chief; and that chief was Bonaparte, who knew how to restrain them and to moderate their excesses, and who knew the consequences of a revolution produced by a military revolt; but in Spain we have the pure unmitigated evil, and the example is terrible.

The same week, writing again to General Alava, in the course of a letter which exhibits a degree of emotion, almost foreign to his calm and contained character, he exclaims:—

Where is the Government that will know how to restrain, and that will be able henceforward to restrain this army which has overthrown the government of the King? Who can give assurance that it will not overthrow the "Constitution," and everything except itself, as easily as it has upset the King's government? If the Government of Spain must henceforth reside in the army, into the hands of what general or generals shall it fall? Who is to be the Bonaparte? All these questions are important questions to solve, and, from the depth of my soul, I pity those whose lot depends on their solution.

These words were written nearly fifty years ago, on the 30th of March, 1820; and it is not enough to say that they are as true to-day as they were then—because they are more

true—they were even more true in foresight than in fact. The duke saw the germ, and he knew what it would grow to—we see the deadly tree. Steadily, ever since the date of those letters, events have so worked that the sword has become the sole authority in Spain. It is a stratocracy in a much more strict sense than the first French empire ever was. "That empire," as Mr. Grattan said, "is a stratocracy, elective, aggressive, and predatory; her armies live to fight, and fight to live." But the Spanish stratocracy does not even fight—it lives only to cabal and plunder. Ever since it first took form, in 1820, each successive attack that it has made on the Constitution of its country has been accompanied by the disgraceful withdrawal of the Spanish flag from some renowned post or some opulent land. It has not even fought to maintain the empire which Spanish soldiers conquered and established. In his first letter to General Alava, the duke uses these memorable words:—"In any case, let this revolt end how it may, I believe that your colonies, except Mexico, of which you must take good care, are lost." Within little more than a year afterwards, even Mexico had declared its independence; as now the days of the Spanish occupation of Cuba seem to be at last numbered; but, unfortunately for the separated Spanish colonies, the spirit of stratocracy had already infected their vitals. The government of Mexico, in particular, has been ever since transacted through a series of barrack-yard revolutions, amounting to two hundred and forty, according to the last computation; and public power has devolved in the Spanish colonies, as in the mother country, through a succession of generals, each rising for his turn of rapine. The present Spanish revolution differs from its predecessors mainly in this respect, that the generals having, as the Duke of Wellington predicted, at last subverted everything in Spain except the army itself, find that they must now share their spoil even with the sergeants. All the ranks of the army have been degraded by a universal promotion, the scandalous reward of the soldier's breach of his oath of allegiance. The army estimates, lately laid before the Cortes, show that in the infantry alone, the revolution has added 1,635 commissioned officers to the retinue of General Prim. Last year there were 65 colonels, there are now 141. Last year, there were 176 lieutenant-colonels—the present number is 266. In the next rank, that of Chief of Battalion, a stroke of the pen has more than doubled the roll of officers; in 1868 the figure was 399, it is now 804. The captains have increased from 1,455 to 1,671; but the number of lieutenants, in consequence of the rush of promotion in the upper ranks, actually fell from

2,397 to 2,133. In the list of sub-lieutenants, however, we see an increase, which shows that in this revolution, at all events, the Spanish sergeant does not go unrewarded. When Queen Isabella left Spain, there were 1,888 officers holding the rank of ensign, many of them, it may be supposed, honourable and loyal young soldiers, commencing in ardour and good faith to discharge the duties of a noble profession. This first step has been won in a way which it will not be well to remember, even though it may yet fall to the lot of many among them to serve their country by years of loyal duty and deeds of worthy valour. At present, the rank which they held is almost swamped. General Prim has made, in the course of six or seven months, no less than 1,200 sub-lieutenants. There are 3,000 officers of that rank now. In the Spanish Infantry altogether, there are 8,015 commissioned officers of all grades, as against 6,380 who were borne on the Army List last September. Nor, we may feel sure, has less been done for the Cavalry, Artillery, Marines, and Navy. Thus the Spanish Revolution eventuates in a bloated brevet. Thus the Spanish army comes to be represented before Christendom as a greedy horde of Prætorians, false to military honour, covetous of rank which ceases to have value when given wholesale, the heaviest, the most exorbitant, and the most unmanageable burden on the finances of an insolvent country.

The history of Spain ever since the date at which the Duke of Wellington wrote the passages which we have quoted has amply proved his wonderful foresight. It is a history of military mutinies. Every country in Europe has suffered more or less from the action of the Revolution; but Spain is the only country in which the civil government has been regarded as the proper spoil of its military chiefs. Looking back over the space of time which separates us from the period at which Wellington wrote, it is safe to say that the fortunes of the Spanish monarchy were wrecked in that reign, in the first place by the submission of King Ferdinand to the military revolt of 1821, and in the second place by the promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction, which, on the eve of the birth of the Princess Isabella, suddenly altered the order of succession to the throne. Whether that act was constitutional or unconstitutional, we are not now concerned to discuss. The old controversy of Carlist and Christino has come to a bitter end. The throne to which Don Carlos denied his niece's right no longer bears a Bourbon. It has remained for now nine months, and is likely to remain for some little time longer, vacant. But who can doubt that if a prince of a pious, vigorous, and patriotic character, such as Don

Carlos certainly was, had succeeded to the crown on the demise of King Ferdinand in 1833, that the whole history of Spain would have run in a different course? Who can doubt that the lot of Queen Isabella herself would have been happier and more dignified? If ever there was a prince who, in the finest qualities of his character—in his defects as well, it may be alleged,—was essentially Spanish, it was Don Carlos—a man then of mature age, of large experience, of a character grave and solid, and whom the Spanish nation had for many years regarded as its future sovereign. Instead was carried from her cradle to the throne a little girl not yet quite three years old; while when the King's will was opened, it was found that he had named his widow Regent, a Neapolitan princess, then lately married, and never much beloved by the Spanish nation. The civil war which followed, and which lasted for six years, was a great evil; but the worst part of it was the foreign intervention, which enabled the cause which was not the cause of the majority of the Spanish nation to triumph. Nor was it so great an evil as the system which became the settled order of Spanish government. As soon as the Queen's title had been made to prevail by force of arms, as soon as the civil war had come to an end, the rule of the Captains General began. First, Espartero deposed the Queen mother from the Regency, banished her from Spain, and had himself declared sole Regent in 1841. Before the end of that year was made the attempt of the Conchas, Diego Leon, and other generals, to force their way into the royal apartments and carry off the Queen—an attempt only defeated by force of arms at the very door of her Majesty's chamber. At the same time O'Donnell had gained the garrison and shelled the town of Pampeluna in the interest of the Queen Regent; but hearing of the failure of the Madrid conspiracy, was obliged to take refuge in France. In 1842, the General in command was obliged to bombard Barcelona on the score of its Republican sympathies; but in 1843 Barcelona "pronounced" much more effectually. Then for the first time the name of Prim appeared in Spanish history, as the desperate enemy of Espartero, whom he subsequently succeeded in the leadership of the Progressista party. Under Prim's influence—he was then a colonel and deputy—a revolutionary junta proclaimed the deposition of Espartero from the Regency; while the Provisional Government, composed of Serrano, Caballero, and others, declared him a traitor to Spain. At the same time, to avoid the struggle of so many rival ambitions for the office of Regent, the unfortunate young Queen, then only thirteen years of age, was declared to

have attained her majority. The first Regent had been banished to France; the second was now obliged to take refuge in England. Narvaez, who had commanded the principal body of troops which declared against Espartero, rose to the dictatorship, but not until Olozaga had been banished; and Prim, who had been one year made a count and a major-general, found himself in the next sentenced to six years' imprisonment for a conspiracy, coupled with an attempt on the life of Narvaez. The Queen mother was recalled to Spain. Her marriage with Munoz, which had taken place within two months after King Ferdinand's death, was recognized by Royal decree. But soon Narvaez was obliged to follow Espartero into exile. And then came the "Spanish marriages," the work of Louis Philippe's astute ambition, whose long revolved result we see in the relations which the Duc de Montpensier had and has with the cabal of officers who effected the late Revolution. In 1847, Prim and Serrano reappear, one as Captain-General of Porto Rico, the other of Andalusia, while Narvaez is once more gazetted Prime Minister. He held office then until 1851. A period of frequent ministerial crises followed, which was brought to an end in 1854 by the military insurrection of Vicalvaro, headed by Serrano, Dulce, Ros de Olano, but above all by O'Donnell, who then rose to supreme power, at first in conjunction with Espartero, but afterwards alone. It is impossible to justify the way in which General O'Donnell obtained the control of Spain, but it is equally impossible to deny that throughout the unusually long period during which he remained Prime Minister, he conducted the affairs of the country with dignity, energy, and wisdom. Within a few years the imports of the country rose from the value of seven millions sterling to upwards of thirteen; the exports from five millions to ten millions and a half; the revenue from £11,379,264 to £18,126,314. The war of Morocco showed that the Spanish army, however corrupt some of its superior officers, still possessed the undaunted valour and the solid discipline which, in distant days, when it was commanded by the Prince of Parma, placed it at the head of the armies of Europe, but which, during two centuries, it was commonly supposed, had utterly degenerated. It was generally believed that Spain, long almost excluded from the comity of nations, would soon reappear as one of the great Powers. The question of the cession of Gibraltar began to be seriously discussed in England. The people of the United States abandoned utterly the attempts to annex Cuba, which had been frequent during the previous ten years. In the Government of Spain itself, a

regular constitutional system appeared to have been inaugurated, for though O'Donnell was in power for the greater part of the twelve years which followed the *coup d'état* of Vicalvaro, yet he willingly went into opposition more than once, and always so conducted himself as to strengthen the system of Parliamentary Government and to elevate the credit and honour of Spain. But towards the close of his last ministry, the old evil spirit reappeared. Prim, who since he organized the *pronunciamiento* of 1843 against Espartero, had risen to all but the highest rank in the army, and had moreover been made a grandee and a marquis, grew weary of seeing the supreme power pass from the hands of O'Donnell to Narvaez, and from those of Narvaez to O'Donnell. He conspired, and rebelled. But O'Donnell crushed the attempt with hardly an effort. It was his last service to Spain. He soon afterwards resigned office. Within a year, both he and Narvaez died; and the conspiracy of Prim, which had proved such a fiasco in 1867, steadily spread through the army and navy, aided, it is well believed, by the gold of the Duc de Montpensier, until in October last it brought to an end the reign of the unfortunate Queen Isabella. Well may the writer, to whose excellent sketch of recent Spanish history we are indebted for the recapitulation of all those outrages on the honour of Spain by those who were its sworn defenders—well may he say,—

Ever since Queen Isabella's infancy, she has known nothing but civil war, insurrections, treasons, massacres, atrocities committed either in her name or against her. Her early education was unhappily neglected, and the little she ever received was during the regency of Espartero, when the Countess Mina, widow of the famous chief during the War of Independence, was her governess. When only ten years old, she was left without her mother's care—such as that care was—and with hardly one disinterested adviser, surrounded as she was by those whose principal object was to force their way into power. At the age of thirteen, she was declared competent to govern an unsettled nation. She was barely sixteen when, to promote the selfish policy of Louis Philippe, she was married.*

Nine months have now passed since the deposition of Queen Isabella, and the most monarchical of European countries is still without a king, unless in so far as the bayonet is king. Serrano is in the place from which he expelled Espartero a

* A paper in the *Times* of October 28th, 1868, on the Spanish succession, written, we presume, from its clear, energetic style, and its intimate knowledge of Spanish affairs, by the Paris correspondent of that journal, Mr. O'Meagher, who himself served with distinction, under Sir De Lacy Evans, during the civil war.

quarter of a century ago, Regent of Spain but without even an Infant to represent the ancient royalty of the twelve kingdoms, whose crowns had in the course of ages at last devolved on the Spanish Bourbons. The country which, ten years ago, showed such conditions of progress and prosperity, is fast falling into a state of utter anarchy and insolvency. It is not merely that the revolution has completed the ruin of the credit of the country—it has destroyed many of the chief sources of its revenue. The public offices swarm with new, ignorant, and corrupt officials. The finance minister himself complains that it is impossible to obtain an exact knowledge of the resources and revenues which are at his disposal. In many places, the people resist by force of arms the levy of taxes. In many places they believe and act on the belief that the revolution having abolished taxation should proceed to abolish property also. The mutual animosities of even the highest members of the government are so great, that no one who has real knowledge of Spanish affairs would be surprised to hear any day that Prim had effected a *coup d'état* against the Regency of Serrano, or that Serrano had outlawed Prim. Topete has in the Cortes publicly declared that there was danger of a *coup d'état* from one or the other, and though this gallant sailor could not keep the oath he had sworn to be faithful to his queen, on whose hand he pressed the kiss of Judas the day before he betrayed her, yet no one doubts his word on such a point as this. It is only according to precedent. It is according to the common course of the history of Spain ever since the death of King Ferdinand. It is precisely what the Duke of Wellington foresaw and predicted fifty years ago.

Meantime, however, the public press, almost without exception, disguises, denies, or misrepresents the state of the case. In regard to Spain, nothing is told as it is, everything as it is not. There is the conspiracy against the truth of certain well-known writers, who are as sure to be found wherever there is an outbreak of human calamity and impiety, exulting in their worst excesses, as the petrel joys to flutter in the van of storm. There is the conspiracy of silence. How many English journalists have ventured to say of these Spanish generals and admirals what they really feel? In the worst days of the worst sovereigns of England, what would be thought of officers who were continual conspirators against the Government, whose epaulettes they wore, whose pay they drew, whose titles they took? If an English admiral or general had acted even towards George the Fourth as Serrano, Prim, Topete have acted towards Isabella,

what would be his place in history? How is it, then, that the natural instincts of Englishmen, and their oldest political traditions, have become so perverted, that they seem to see with pleasure Spain in the hands of a band of vain, covetous, and dishonest officers? Is it because, after all, it is not merely the army but the Revolution that is enthroned in Spain?

We have read with the greater interest, because it is so difficult to understand how public opinion really tends in Spain, the very earnestly and eloquently written pamphlet, whose title we have prefixed to this article. It is, at all events, the frank and manly expression of faith of one loyal Spaniard, who believes that a restoration of Queen Isabella is impossible, that the election of the Duc de Montpensier would be an infamy that could not endure, that the Spanish nation will never consent to be ruled by a foreign king, and therefore that the true policy of all good Spaniards is to call to the throne of his ancestors Don Carlos de Bourbon et d'Este, the grandson of the Don Carlos of the civil war, who now bears the title of Duke of Madrid.

M. Aparisi's pamphlet derives much of its interest from the judicial tone of the writer's mind, and from the brief explanation which he gives of his personal position and antecedents. His style is quaint, simple, and convincing, and there is a considerable touch of humour in his declaration, that he is quite sure he shall not be suspected of falsehood, because all his compatriots know him, and are well aware that nothing would pay him for lying. This is an odd preamble. "I don't ask anything from anybody, neither from the King, nor from the people, except that justice which is everybody's due, liberty to do honourable work, and eight feet of earth in which to hide my corpse." He has not suffered in purse, person, or esteem by the revolution; he has had friends of all shades and grades of opinion, and he retains them; he has quarrelled with no man, but he has come to an irresistible conviction that Spain must be ruled by a man, by a king with the prestige and the right of a Bourbon, and the indispensable guarantee to Catholic Spain of being a good Catholic. He believes that the man for the position is Don Carlos. He has arrived at that conviction after a curiously elaborate investigation, undertaken in an entirely impartial spirit, subsequently to a painful and critical examination of the condition of things in the Cortes, and without any individual prejudice whatever. Of the revolution M. Agassiz writes with the utmost contempt. He says:—

This revolution was fruitful in evil, because it was a chastisement, and, as it was nothing more, God condemned it to a dishonourable sterility for good.

Hideous bankruptcy is not only at our doors, as Mirabeau said, it is in our house. . . . But a people does not die ; Spain cannot die. Recalling the words of Chateaubriand, I refuse to believe that I write on the tomb of Spain. I have consulted oracles which do not deceive, and she who was always the beloved of Almighty God and the right arm of Christianity shall not die. But, after these great troubles, who will re-establish order in Spain ? Who will give us a State government, the peace we sigh for, and real liberty ?

With frankness and simplicity M. Aparisi relates his entire ignorance of Don Carlos, and his hesitation to accept the accounts of him given by the enthusiastic admirers, who declared him perfection, and the pessimists, who said he was utterly insignificant. He made the Prince's acquaintance, cultivated that acquaintance into intimacy, and records the result in several highly interesting pages, from which the following is an extract :—

Now, I have seen him, known him, passed many long days with him ; and I, who, if I know anything in this world, know at least a little of the human heart, boldly salute Don Carlos de Bourbon and d'Este as the hope of Spain. I venture to tell the people of Spain that their king lives in an unpretending house in the Rue Chauveau Lagarde.

In that house everything is exemplary. The table is simple, dress is modest, the manner of receiving is cordial and unaffected. One seems to breathe an atmosphere of antique virtue under that roof. I have often said to others, when we left their house, "If it were possible for Don Carlos and Dona Margherita to live at Madrid as private gentlefolks, and if Madrid knew them as we know them, Madrid would turn Carlist for the love of them." As for me, I do not know a nobler or purer heart than that of Don Carlos. During many hours of calm and serious conversation, I have often tried to make his heart vibrate, and always found it had a ready echo for great things. He lives in Paris, where pleasure spreads her nets on every side for youth ; and he passes his days in study, and his evenings in the society of his beloved wife. What passion, what thought rules this young man ? Spain. I cannot with truth proclaim him a *savant*, but I have remarked his ready intelligence and his sound judgment. I have heard him make remarks which were not only just but profound ; and I have observed that, whenever great deeds or sublime sayings are quoted to him, he takes them as matters of course, quite natural, as though his intelligence and his heart harmonized with greatness. The principal attraction of the young prince is that he unites with the frankness of youth a certain reserve rarely found, except at a riper age, and that he appears to possess docility which seeks counsel, together with firmness which knows how to form immutable resolutions. When he bends down and speaks out of the expansion of his heart he is a young man whom we must love ; when he lifts up his forehead and throws his head back, the king appears, to command respect. I know that affection is not impartial, and I confess that I entertain devoted

affection for the young royal couple, but I hope my readers will admit that I must have seen some fine qualities in them to provoke that regard. If the noble character of Don Carlos does not belie itself, Don Carlos will be the most popular and beloved king that Spain has ever had. I trust in God that he will not change. His sureties are the Christian education he has received, the frankness of heart and intensity of judgment so happily united in his character, the prayers of his pious mother, and the constant example of his sweet, tender, and most exemplary wife. Dona Marguerite de Bourbon is enchanting. I have seen her often beside her child's cradle, occupied with household cares like Isabella the Catholic. Her universe consists of that cradle and her husband. How simple is her manner, how great her goodness to the poor, how unceasing her charity towards the sick ! When she speaks with her lips, her heart speaks, and all she says is beautiful, for she possesses that rarest of gifts, exceptional intelligence, and is unconscious of it. Happy the man who calls her his wife. Happy the people who shall one day salute her as their queen.

There is something to our mind deeply touching in the enthusiasm with which this old and gifted Spaniard gives all the loyal devotion of his heart and soul to the cause of this prince and princess, whom he found in their modest mansion in a little street at the back of the Madeleine, but whom we hope he may soon salute at the Escorial as King and Queen of Spain. We have some reason to believe that his praise of them is by no means exaggerated—that Don Carlos is a young man of a serious, studious, and resolute character, internally impressed with a faith in his mission, and whose whole life is devoted to prepare himself for the task to which he believes God has called him—a king of men by natural gifts as well as hereditary right. Every one who has had the good fortune to know the Princess Marguerite must have been struck by her high intelligence, her brave spirit, and the charming dignity of her manner. Public opinion in this country certainly ignores their right, indeed almost ignores their existence. Some twenty-five years ago there was a somewhat similar case. There was a pretender to the crown of France, who had lived in this country for many years. He had not, however, contrived to make himself agreeable to the leading spirits of the class who manufacture public opinion. In those days, if he was ever spoken of at all, he was spoken of with supreme contempt, as a sort of addle-pated charlatan who kept a tame eagle, and talked in the turgid style of a bulletin. But one fine day he became President, and then Emperor ; and in addition to his other distinctions there is one quite original, which may now be safely predicated of him. He has been the subject, or the object, of more leading articles than any human being born since Adam, written by the self-same writers in every strain,

from unbounded panegyric to unmitigated vituperation. The Prince who at present aspires to the crown of Spain at a moment when Spain is in quite as dangerous a condition, to say the least of it, as France was in 1848, is a very different character from the Prince Louis Napoleon ; but he is like him in this respect, that he has a fixed faith in his right, that he is ready to risk his life for it, and that he has made the aspirations and interests of Spain the study of his life. The moment has not yet, perhaps, arrived, but we believe it is near at hand, when Don Carlos will only have to show himself to the Spanish people to be hailed as, in a very real sense, the saviour of society, and the worthiest king his country has had since the death of Charles III.

The topic of Spanish royalty is indeed one whose interest, vital to Spain itself, is one of deep moment to all Christendom. An ancient and illustrious kingdom, a noble and pious people, have now for nine months been the booty of a handful of military adventurers. Elsewhere the revolution has been able to build up as well as knock down ; but in Spain, those who hold power know that its foundation must be Catholic ; and all they can do is to maintain a precarious interregnum, in which every sort of opinion is tolerated except that which sustains one cause. That cause is the cause of Don Carlos. Occasionally Mr. Reuter informs Europe that a number of Carlist officers have been arrested, or that a band of peasants who shouted for Charles the Seventh has been fired upon. General Prim's instinct leads him to see that the great danger of the present Government, and of Prætorian Government in general, lies in the growing disposition of the mass of the Spanish people and clergy towards a Carlist restoration. Such a restoration would, we believe, be not merely the saving of Spain through the revival of what was once the freest and the most Catholic of monarchies, but a blow to the revolution throughout Europe hardly second in importance to that dealt to it at the battle of Mentana.

ART. X.—A GLANCE AT CATHOLIC HOME POLITICS.

THERE are two subjects of imperial importance now actively agitated, in which Catholics have an especial concern. Indeed, the interest and life of the Catholic Church enter, as the woof into the warp, into these critical and national questions. We refer of course to the Irish disestablishment and to popular

education. On the former of these questions, events are hurrying on with giant speed to their conclusion. Mr. Gladstone having had the good fortune to be in full harmony with the people of these realms, has, with a tact and decision surpassed by no former statesman, already steered the principle contended for through both houses of the Legislature. Amidst the rapid throng and pressure of events, it would be impossible to draw out theories or to exhibit arguments in this number of our REVIEW, which could in any way practically touch the question. The last throes and efforts of the dying Establishment party will have passed away, almost by the time these pages are in the hands of our readers.

The grand legislative enactment of this session will naturally form the subject of our study and estimate in its complete shape; and what very few comments we now can offer, must be considered by our readers subject to more or less modification, as possibly resulting from more mature reflection. But our present impression is that, so far from the House of Lords and the Conservative policy having stood in the way of the Catholic Church, it has, by a fortunate combination, promoted her interest. Had the Bill become law when it had passed the third reading of the Commons, the result would have been that the Protestants would have retained a large proportion of their property, and the Catholic Church would have had its large Maynooth endowment commuted for an insignificant sum. The Protestants would have been in possession of the enormous revenues of Trinity College, while the Catholics would have been almost entirely stripped of their educational fund. And more than this, though Irish Anglicanism would have been disestablished, it is by no means certain that the retention of houses and glebes and churches by the Protestants, while the Catholics continued on in their poverty, would not have left throughout the country the savour of a dominant spirit. The Lords, however, as we write, show themselves inclined to remedy this defect and injustice. Although they may make larger grants to the Protestant communion, yet if the effect of this is to give houses and glebes to the Catholic Church, they will, pro tanto, have improved the status of the Catholic clergy and their people. They will have taken away the stigma of inferiority, by giving equal rights in houses and lands to the Catholic Church with the Protestant communion. One point must be clearly borne in mind. The Catholic Church in Ireland will accept no stipendiary grant—nothing which can present even a superficial appearance of dependency upon the State. The grant of glebes and of houses will be nothing more than a very inadequate act of restitution; and yet the Church would certainly decline to receive even these, unless they were vested in the control and authority of the hierarchy. A cunning

game might be attempted by an astute politician, of placing rights in houses and lands in the hands of the priests, to be played off against the bishops; and such an effort may, very possibly, in fact be made in order to divide the clergy. This has been attempted more than once before, and has always failed. The priests themselves are as determined as the bishops, that nothing shall separate their interests from those of their hierarchy. They feel, as all must feel, that the only condition on which glebes and houses can be accepted is, that they be placed irrevocably in the hands of the Church, to be settled and regulated by proper authority; just as it is proposed that the Protestant communion shall exercise control over whatever may be eventually given to it for its share of the spoils.

We think also that Catholics have every reason to rejoice, in whatever may strengthen the House of Lords as a substantive and independent power in the state. The peers' recent resolve to be led by Lord Salisbury rather than Lord Derby, may have important results in this respect; nor could anything be more thoroughly satisfactory, than the former nobleman's exposition of the true legislative position of the Upper House. In this very session we have to thank that House heartily, for its important mitigation of the odious Scotch educational measure introduced by Government. And as time goes on, Catholics will more and more turn to that House and to the Conservative party, for protection against the bigotry and tyranny which liberalism so prominently displays, in all matters connected with education.

And this brings us to the second great question which we mentioned at starting—the question of Catholic popular education. During the winter a series of meetings were held all over London upon this subject. On the 24th of June a large and enthusiastic gathering of the Catholics of London assembled in St. James's Hall. It will be sufficient if we indicate in the briefest terms the advance made during the past three years in the diocese of Westminster.

The Archbishop who presided at the meeting began his speech by drawing the following contrast between the opening and closing of the first period of three years since the founding of the Diocesan Fund.

First:—

1. In the two years preceding the formation of the Diocesan Fund, the number of children attending our schools had diminished by 500.
2. In many of the most populous parts of London additional schools were urgently needed.
3. The number of pupil teachers had greatly decreased.
4. The Reformatory School at Brook Green was overcrowded, and insufficient for the number of boys constantly committed by the magistrates.
5. S. Nicholas's Industrial School at Walthamstow was still more over-

crowded, and a still larger number of boys were being committed by the magistrates to Protestant schools.

6. In the Middlesex Feltham School there were about eighty Catholic boys educated as Protestants.

7. S. Margaret's Industrial School (Queen's Square) for girls was in a very unsatisfactory state.

8. In the workhouse schools of the metropolitan district only there were from 1,200 to 1,500 Catholic children systematically educated as Protestants, and not one as yet had been rescued.

9. There was no fund for education in the diocese.

Second:—

1. At the close of these three years (*i. e.*, at the present date), 3,000 children have been added to our schools.

2. Thirty additional schools have been formed.

3. The pupil teachers have increased by nine in the last year.

4. A house and 11 acres of land have been purchased in Essex for the reformatory school, which will be enlarged by the outlay of £3,000, so as to hold at least 200 boys.

5. S. Nicholas's Industrial School has been removed to a large house with eight acres of land in Essex. The house has been enlarged so as to receive 250, and a chapel and refectory are about to be built.

6. Not a Catholic boy remains in the school at Feltham.

7. S. Margaret's School for girls has been removed to Finchley, and is in a most satisfactory state.

8. 230 children have been removed from the Poor Law Schools, and 170 more have been applied for.

9. The Diocesan Fund has received and is receiving such support, as to warrant our confidence that its work is not only permanent, but will extend itself every year.

Not the least remarkable and important feature that we have to note, is the perceptible increase in interest in, and the determination among all classes of Catholics to promote, the proper Christian development of popular education.

The meeting held in St. James's Hall was an indication of this feeling. It was largely attended, and a settled resolution seemed to have taken possession of all present to look upon the Christian education of the poor as among their paramount duties. If we have dwelt with some particularity upon the working of the Westminster diocesan system of education, it is because by so doing we conveniently register the efforts which Catholics are making throughout Great Britain in the cause of education.

We conclude with quoting some remarks from the "*Tablet*" on one especial feature of the St. James's Hall meeting:—

Two feelings seemed to run through every speech, and to animate the enthusiastic audience which crowded the hall. The one was a strong, quiet

determination to carry this matter through, and to leave no stone unturned until there remains no Catholic child throughout the land who is robbed of his faith. The other feeling was that the English nation was not guilty of this thing, nor the English Government ; but the guardians only. England in the main, men felt, was just and fair ; the nation had not helped us, simply because the nation did not know ; and it was our work to keep the facts of workhouse bigotry and wrong before the minds of our countrymen. But for the guardians, the hour of peace and persuasion was over ; and if they would not yield because right is right, they must be taught to yield because law is law. The greatest hit, perhaps, was made by Mr. Maguire, when he contrasted with English oppression Irish fairness. In a large Irish union, of which he has for years been guardian, a Protestant clergyman and a Protestant teacher do what they like with the Protestant children. Tampering with the faith of children there is wholly impossible. Nay, when a short time ago a Presbyterian minister applied for all necessary powers to train up in their religion some twenty Presbyterian children, this also was freely accorded by the Catholic Board of Guardians. The meeting is the beginning of entire victory. It was a pledge, on the part of the richer and more influential members of the Catholic body, to carry on with firm, quiet determination the work pursued with such wonderful success during the past three years ; and determination and unity, in a cause which is right, never fail to win.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS.

WE are induced by Mr. Maskell's language on the Holy Father's temporal principedom (see p. 233 of our present number) to print at length the letter written on that subject by Cardinal Caterini and approved by Pius IX. We borrow the English translation which appeared in the "Month" of last February.

Confidential letter of His Eminence Cardinal Prosper Caterini, Prefect of the S. Congregation of the Council of Trent, addressed, by the command of His Holiness, to the Bishop of N., on 8th April, 1864, concerning a certain Canon Theologal who held wrong opinions as to the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff.

"MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND REVEREND LORD,—In a letter of your Lordship, which lately came to hand, I find a copy of your letter addressed to you by the Canon Theologal N., and you will easily imagine what an impression it made on me. Yet, from the tenor of this letter, I must own that it is sufficiently plain that the writer of it is sound at heart, and that his reluctance to sign a retraction proceeds not from malice, but from an imperfect knowledge of theology and history. He himself declares that *he is not obstinate*, and begs to be instructed in *the new doctrine*, which, as he believes, is of *recent introduction*.

"Might not your Lordship have directed him to the celebrated collection of documents relative to the Temporal Power, wherein not only the Allocutions and Encyclicals of our most Holy Father, but the letters of nearly all the Bishops of the world, are to be found? From what he may there gather he may easily construct the following argument: If the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops—in other words, if the whole Catholic Church—is of such a mind, wherefore should I not hearken to its voice? If I hear not the Church, am I not under the stroke of that dread sentence, 'Whoso hears not the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican?' When the Pope, the universal teacher, the representative of Jesus Christ, speaks, who shall dare to contradict him, and refuse 'to lead his understanding into captivity,' whether the reason of the doctrine or command be plain to him or otherwise? And, granting that the matter in question does not *directly* concern the Faith, are we, on that account, to refuse to hearken to the voice of the Supreme Pastor? Who does not know that, besides the articles strictly of Faith, there are others, closely connected therewith; as, again, with moral precepts, as, for instance, 'Thou shalt not steal?' If unwilling to give this theologal the instruction he has need of, you might commit this task to his Confessor, or to some other learned ecclesiastic, who might treat privately

with him, and, in the spirit of charity and meekness, might strive to bring him back to a better frame of mind, and to enlighten him, having beforehand called down help from on high. The Canon aforesaid, being old as he is, must doubtless remember the time when Napoleon I. invaded the dominions of the Roman Church, as well as the protestations of Pius VII., and the excommunication fulminated by him against the invaders. So that this is 'no new teaching of very recent introduction,' as he deems it, but of ancient date.

"Yes, and of very ancient date. He may read 'The Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes,' with notes by Cenni; Brunengo's 'Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes;' Steccanella's pamphlet on 'The Import and the Violation of the Pontifical Pronouncement on the Temporal Princedom of the Holy See;' Bellarmine's 'Treatise on the Roman Pontiff' (book v., c. 9); and especially Theiner, in his work entitled, 'The Two General Councils of Lyons and Constance on the Temporal Princedom of the Holy See.' He may also consult the recent publication of Roscovany, 'The Roman Pontiff,' tom. v., where he can find every document relating to this subject, from the fourth century till A.D. 1865. If, perchance, he have not at hand the above-mentioned work of Theiner, he should consult the Acts of the two Councils. He will find that in the first, that of Lyons, Innocent IV., wishing to put an end to the war which Frederic II. waged against the Church and its civil princedom, having discovered that the excommunication already fulminated against him was of no avail; that his crimes and usurpations had but increased, for he had seized upon certain cities within the territories of the Roman Church—[as is stated in the sentence pronounced against him, 'the domains of the Roman Church, to wit, the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Benevento . . . the patrimony of S. Peter]—he will find, I say, that Innocent IV., in presence of the assembled Fathers, of the ambassadors, and of the advocate of the accused Emperor, solemnly deprived him of his royal dignity. This solemn act of an Œcumenical Council, with the Roman Pontiff at its head, supplies evident proof of the lawfulness and antiquity of the civil princedom of the Holy See, and demonstrates its inviolability, its fitness, and necessity. He will further learn that, in the Council of Constance, the temporal power of the Holy See was no less solemnly affirmed and vindicated by the condemnation of the propositions of Wycliffe; the 33rd of which ran as follows: 'Pope Sylvester and Constantine the Emperor did wrong in endowing the Church.' By this condemnation, the Council not only affirmed the lawfulness of the Church's holding temporal endowments, but insisted especially on that one which is the most noble of all, the most advantageous, and necessary to the free and unrestricted exercise of the spiritual power committed to the Roman Pontiff, namely, his civil princedom. But not only in words, but by its deeds did this Council bear witness to the lawfulness and necessity of the temporal power. It assumed the civil administration of the States of the Church during the interval which elapsed between the abdication of the pseudo-popes and the election of the legitimate Pontiff Martin V., at a time when, in the absence of a visible head, the Church was represented by this general Council of Constance. The fact here alleged is established by the documents Father Theiner has collected in

his work above mentioned. It may be thence inferred that, to assert that the doctrine as to the necessity and fitness of the civil principedom of the Holy See is a *novelty of but recent introduction*, is historically *false*, and doctrinally *erroneous*. It is equivalent to attributing error and usurpation to the Popes who have received and maintained their temporal sovereignty over the States of the Church, and to gainsaying the two celebrated Councils of Lyons and Constance, which both, by word and deed, have sanctioned this temporal principedom. To assert the contrary would be to renew the error of Arnold of Brescia, Calvin, and other heretics (see Natalis Alexander, Hist. Eccl., tom. vii., 11th cent., chap. iv., article 8, 'On the followers of Arnold;' and Bellarmine, loc. cit. chap. x.; Mamachi 'On the Church's Free Right, &c.,' tom. i., book 1, chap. v.). These heretics, in their hostility to the Church and the See of Rome, taught that it was foreign to the spirit of the Gospel to conjoin spiritual jurisdiction with civil power—a proposition deservedly branded as heretical. But Canon N. may more profitably consult the Constitution of Nicolas III., given on 18th July, A.D. 1278. 'Fundamenta militantis Ecclesiae,' which may be found in c. 17 de Electione in VI., and which would seem expressly written to meet the difficulties he opposes. He will find at the very beginning that *it is not without a miracle* that the sovereignty over Rome is joined to the Supreme Pastorate of the Roman Pontiff, he being the chief Teacher of the Christian people, to whom full power has been committed by Christ for the government, direction, and guidance of the Church Catholic. Now, in order to the free exercise of this high charge, and to the unfettered development of an activity reaching far and wide, his civil principedom is useful, and even necessary. Without it, the independence of his spiritual jurisdiction could not be maintained, for the supreme Law-giver of the Church would be under the control and at the mercy of the sovereign whose subject he would be. But, as the spiritual Father of all Christians, and the guide of the consciences of kings and subjects alike, he must needs be free to disregard the private advantage of any particular prince, and be independent of every one. This is impossible, except he be supreme in his own dominions, unrestrained by the will and command of any other. Without this temporal principedom, the Pope would neither be, nor be held to be, free from outward pressure. His judgments and pronouncements could not be duly promulgated, if, as might often happen, the prince to whom he was subject deemed them adverse to his own interests; and, in the contrary case, suspicions, quarrels, and excuses would arise amongst other princes, the consciences of the faithful could never be sufficiently assured, nor could he command due reverence and obedience. Hence, Nicolas II., treating, in this Constitution, of the civil sovereignty of the Popes, very properly alleges the freedom and independence of the Apostolic Ministry as the main reason for the temporal power. 'We do not deem it meet that the earthly emperor should rule where the Heavenly King has set the High Priest and chief of the Christian Religion; rather should the chair of Peter, now established on the throne of Rome, enjoy *full liberty* in its action, nor to be subject to *any*, since, by a Divine decree, it has been set over all.'

"The Pope then proceeds to further considerations in order to establish

more fully the advantage and necessity of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiffs for the good of the Catholic Church. But if it be urged that as it was not needed in the early ages of the Church, it cannot be absolutely necessary in our time, we reply that this objection betrays ignorance of the ways of God. He Who pursues His end 'mightily yet sweetly,' works out His purposes in their appointed time, and in the manner which approves itself to His infinite wisdom. Listen to what Bellarmine says *loc. cit.* e.g. : 'Granting that, strictly speaking, it were better that the Popes should confine themselves to spiritual things, and leave temporal concerns to kings, yet on account of the evils of the times, experience proves that not only is it *useful*, but even *strictly necessary*, for Divine Providence to bestow temporal dominion on the Roman Pontiff and some other Bishops. If in Germany there had been no prince-Bishops, none would have kept their sees. Hence, as in the elder covenant, the High Priests were long without temporal principedom, yet in the time of the Machabees religion could not have been maintained unless they had been kings as well as Priests ; so also in the history of the Church, in its early days it needed not the temporal power to shield its majesty, but now this is absolutely necessary.' To the above-named constitution we may add the well-known and most ancient process, 'In Cena Domini,' which decrees excommunication against all invaders of Papal cities and territories. Nor should we omit the Bull of that great and holy Pontiff S. Pius V., 'Admonet,' 29th March, A.D. 1567. This Pope, being fully convinced, not only of the fitness and advantages, but also of the necessity, of the Temporal Power, and wishing to safeguard it in every possible way, forbids every sale, exchange, and even enfeoffment, 'whether under pretence of *necessity or evident utility*,' and decrees, against Cardinals or any others, the most grievous penalties, even excommunication, to be incurred *ipso facto*, if they should counsel or attempt to persuade the Pope for the time being to do any of the things aforesaid. He further orders that all newly-created Cardinals should bind themselves by oath to observe this constitution, and, 'moreover, to withhold their consent from the Popes, who may contravene it, and not to seek to be absolved from this oath, or to accept such absolution, *even if offered* . . . all violators thereof to incur the penalties of perjury, and perpetual infamy in law and fact.' But he rests not here, for, after having said, 'What we deem unlawful for ourselves to do, we hereby point out to our successors, who, we trust, will not be unmindful that we shall have to give an account of our stewardship at the judgment bar of Jesus Christ, in the day of His coming,' he has, of set purpose and in an ingenious manner, striven to render it inviolable, even for his successors, by providing that the Cardinals, in conclave assembled, shall again bind themselves by oath to its observance ; so that, 'whosoever shall be elected Pope, after his accession to that dignity, shall make this promise, and, after his enthronement, shall reiterate the promise and oath aforesaid, by special letters confirming the same.' These quotations from authentic and ancient monuments, not to mention several others which we omit, if duly set forth by an intelligent man, must convince and persuade Canon N., if, as I am willing to believe, he be sincere and of sound judgment. He will surely confess and admire with what wisdom and justice the glorious Pontiff Pius IX. gave

expression to the following views in his Allocution of 20th June, A.D. 1859, and in his Encyclical of 19th January following:—‘By a special interposition of Divine Providence, it has come to pass that, amid the multitude and diversity of temporal rulers, the Roman Church also should possess a civil principedom, subject to none (*‘nemini obnoxium’*), whereby the Roman Pontiff, the Supreme Pastor of the whole Church, being subject to no potentate, may exercise, in fullest freedom, throughout the whole world, the power and authority committed to him by Christ our Lord, of feeding and ruling the whole flock of God; and may daily more easily extend our Divine Religion, as well as succour the divers wants of the faithful, and afford assistance to such as call for it, and do all other good works, in so far as he shall see that they befit the times and circumstances of the Christian commonwealth.’ It will further behove Canon N. to consider that our modern ‘Arnoldists,’ who vaunt the fervour of their attachment to the Catholic Faith and their ardent love for the people, are, in very deed, the most cruel enemies of the people, and still more so of the Church; to compass whose overthrow they assail, under the empty and specious pretext of love of country, the civil principedom of the Pope, which is of all the most ancient, the most legitimate, and the mildest; and this they do, because they are full well aware how much this principedom contributes to maintain the Supreme Ruler of the Church in that independence which is essential to the universal exercise of his Apostolic Ministry, hoping, after having got rid of the Temporal Power, to make short work of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Supreme Pontiff; or at least, so to weaken its influence over the world at large, that it may become their prey, and that they may drag mankind into schisms, heresies, and unbelief, and even more shameful crimes. Let Canon N. cast a glance over the wretched state of Italy since 1859, and I am sure he will not be able to refrain from tears. Let him behold the straits to which the Bishops are reduced; some imprisoned, others exiled from their dioceses, the rest molested, or forced at least to hold their peace, so as not to be able to suspend from the celebration of mass priests who transgress. Were the Roman Pontiff deprived of his civil principedom, would he be treated better than the other Bishops of Italy? Would it not be even worse with him? What was Pius VII. able to do when first imprisoned and then dragged into foreign lands, and deprived of all means of communicating with his subjects and the rest of the faithful throughout the world? And why was he so treated? Because his conscience forbade him to comply with the unjust demands of Napoleon I. The same would happen again and again, and even daily, were the King of Sardinia, or any other prince, to be the sovereign of Rome. Ought not this theological to yield to such considerations as these, and to confess the fitness, the antiquity, the advantages, and necessity of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff? I will wait until your Lordship inform me of the success of your pastoral solicitude, and of the efforts of the person to whom you shall have committed the task of instructing Canon N. Meanwhile, in token of profound respect, kissing your hand, I remain, &c.”

[We are informed of the success of this letter by the reply sent to Cardinal Caterini by the Bishop of N., wherein the Bishop says amongst other things:

"I have ordered your Eminence's letter to be read by the Archdeacon, the chief dignitary of the chapter of my cathedral. The theologal N., having seriously considered the matter, came to me mourning, and sighing, and begging absolution for what he had done, which I imparted to him, in virtue of faculties received, in the presence of three ecclesiastics," &c.]—Note of the editor of the *Acta*.

The second document which we place before our readers this quarter, is in no respect official; but as we mentioned in our last number (p. 468, note) an attack on the "*Civiltà*" put forth by "*Le Français*," our readers will be pleased to see our Roman contemporary's reply. There appeared in the "*Civiltà*" of Feb. 6 a long letter from a French correspondent, from which we gave considerable extracts in our last number (pp. 468-471); and which mentions among other topics the expectations entertained concerning the coming Council by that large majority of French Catholics, with whom the writer is in sympathy. He designates these as "Catholics simply so-called;" in contradistinction to the "liberal Catholics" who hold, with greater or less distinctness, certain tenets which the Church has condemned, on liberty of worships and of the press.

Soon after this number of the "*Civiltà*" appeared, a letter was published in "*Le Français*"—which some persons (to our amazement) have actually ascribed to Mgr. Dupanloup—alleging that the "*Civiltà*," in publishing its French correspondent's communication, was in fact professing to publish a quasi-official programme of the Vatican Council. One would have thought so absurd a supposition would have been rendered impossible, were it only from the simple fact that the "*Civiltà*" communication professed to come (as of course it did come) from Paris; whereas evidently Rome itself would be the only source of any quasi-official information. To send news from Paris to Rome as to the future proceedings of a Roman Council, is very much the same thing with what would be called in England sending coals to Newcastle. Still this charge against the "*Civiltà*" was not only vigorously repeated among the French "liberal Catholics," but seems to have found acceptance in other portions also of Catholic Christendom.

The "*Civiltà*" speedily put forth a general reply, without specifying its individual assailants; and "*Le Français*" rejoined on that reply. What we now publish is the answer made by the "*Civiltà*" to this rejoinder. Our readers will observe that the Roman writers attach no credit whatever to the rumour of Mgr. Dupanloup being their opponent "*Lein Français*."

Among the various journals which have directed certain censures against us, already refuted by us in our 458th number, was the *Français*; which is determined to see in our *Reply*, not a confutation of the unjust charges brought against us, but a correction of the inaccuracy of one of our correspondents in France, discovered and brought into strong relief by the *Français*. Such a misrepresentation is no matter of surprise to us; for a writer who could represent our simple exposition of facts and our statement of the wishes cherished in France, as a *programme* to be followed by the Vatican Council,—might easily, with equal audacity, change a protest into a correction, and substitute a confession and reparation of faults committed by us, for a confutation of calumnious accusations brought against us. The first misrepresentation was unquestionably voluntary; the second has been no less so. To refute it once more seemed to us therefore lost time: both with regard to the journal which, by using such arms against us, shows that it seeks rather to obscure the truth than to throw light upon it; and, with regard to our readers, who were in a position to discover on which side the truth lay, by a simple comparison of the accusations with the reply made to them. We therefore took the course which seemed to us most fitting, by prolonging the controversy no farther; and, in our preceding number, we kept absolute silence on the subject.

This silence we should have continued to preserve, but for two circumstances, which have imposed upon us the painful duty of an explicit protest and a plain answer. The first is an interpretation put on the moderate tone of our first confutation, which we are bound expressly to contradict: the second is the effect produced by our silence, which we are bound now to destroy. Our endeavour, in repelling the accusations brought against us, to avoid all asperity of language, has been attributed, not to moderation, but to a deference supposed to be paid by us, as indispensably due to some high personage, who may have suggested, or at least approved, the two famous articles in the *Français*. Nothing could have been more remote from our intention; for nothing, in our judgment, could be more improbable than the supposition implied. The articles in the *Français* bear the name of a certain *Monsieur François Beslay*, said to be young in years, and an advocate by profession; and indeed the audacity of the attack, and the substance and force of the accusations, bear upon the face of them the impression of both these qualities of their author. Moreover, the manifest falsehood of the censures passed upon us, the discourteous tone of these censures, and the intention, if not manifest, at least slenderly veiled, with which these censures have been published, give us no kind of reason to fear that any personage worthy of respect has concealed himself under the name of the author of these articles. This we have never believed, or even suspected; and now, since others believe and suspect it, we formally disavow such a belief or suspicion as wholly foreign to our intention. We used courteous terms, because it was our purpose to refute the accusations, and not to vilify our accusers. Nor shall we account ourselves discourteous in this second reply; although, by its very nature, we shall be constrained to throw the whole blame, not upon the accusation, which ought to have vanished before the first confutation, but

upon the accuser, who has thought fit to return to the attack armed with such dishonourable weapons.

The second circumstance which has compelled us to break silence, is the effect which our silence has produced upon a certain number of journals, of no slight authority with many persons : such (as to mention two only) the *France* and the *Mémoriale Diplomatique*. They have given a relation to their readers of the controversy between the *Français* and the *Civiltà Cattolica* ; while, like the *Français*, they have concluded by asserting, not that we have refuted by evident reasons the false accusations brought against us, but that we have made a satisfactory reparation for inaccuracies of which we had been guilty.

As long as this misrepresentation was confined to the *Français* alone, we might have held our peace ; but we cannot possibly remain silent when others are induced, either by levity or partiality, to adopt its erroneous statements. We shall reply therefore (though sorely against our will) to the last article in the *Français* ; and, to avoid any new subterfuge, we shall plainly show that from the first article to the last, it has falsified our idea ; and artfully substituted that which it has been pleased to attribute to us, for that which was really expressed in our pages.

In the two first articles of the *Français* there was a manifest misrepresentation. What a French correspondent wrote to us concerning the wishes and expectations of the French nation, Monsieur Beslay made to appear as a *programme* of what was to be done in Rome by the Fathers assembled in Council. He could not otherwise have accused us of having divulged the secret of the Theological Commissioners for the Council ; of having reduced, to two heads only, the end, the scope, and the immense materials for the definitions and decrees of the Council ; and, lastly, of having reduced the authority of the Bishops in Council to a simple adhesion to the will of the Supreme Pontiff. In our reply we called attention to this substitution of one thing for another ; and, without retracting anything which our French correspondent had asserted concerning France, we refuted all the malicious insinuations and offensive consequences which the author of this misrepresentation had drawn from it. Now what is the sum of his reply to our confutation ? He returns to the charge ; and in another article has recourse to new misrepresentations, directly contrary to our assertions. We said in reply, "Our correspondence is a chronicle, not a *programme*, as you assert ; that chronicle is open to discussion ; but until it is demonstrated to be untrue, we account it to be faithful. Your charges against it are unfounded, and the consequences which you draw from them to our disadvantage are illogical." Now what answer does our crafty antagonist make to this confutation of ours, in the twenty-fourth number of the *Français*, published in April ? It is hard to believe, but so it is : he congratulates himself on the success of his efforts in bringing us to reason ; and, full of this idea, he takes the following assumption as the theme of his new article :—"The editors of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, in an article published in their last number, have rectified in the most satisfactory manner the serious inaccuracies into which their correspondent had fallen. It is important to us to mark distinctly those

points which have been rectified." Having after his own fashion endeavoured diffusely to prove his point, he thus concludes the article and the argument. "We have said all that was to be said : an error was committed, we pointed it out, and it has been repaired." Who would not suppose, on reading this introduction and this conclusion, that our whole reply had been simply a confession of error and a retraction of false assertions? Now we defy our readers, whoever they may be, to find a syllable in our reply which is not, on the contrary, a defence, and a confirmation of what was written in this much-disputed correspondence. So complete is the opposition between the reality of the facts and the audacity of the assertion, that we cannot find any excuse to shelter the writer's good faith ; and to call it a simple confusion or an innocent equivocation, would require a much larger dose of stupidity than we feel courage to attribute either to ourselves or to our opponent.

But this plan of reversing ideas appears still more wilful when we come to examine, point by point, all these *rectifications* which M. Beslay has enumerated. Let us consider them patiently one by one.

The first *rectification* attributed to us is very important : it would make us repudiate the responsibility of our French correspondent's letters ; which ought not to have been admitted into our pages, without the *explanations, extenuations, and reservations* now appended to them. Now what are these *explanations, extenuations, and reservations* which we are supposed now to have made? There is not a syllable on the subject in our reply : but the whole depends on a slight change of expression, sufficient to enable Beslay to make his assertion, but not sufficient to induce any right-minded or judicious reader to believe him. Here are the two passages—i. e., our own words and Beslay's version of them :—

"Nor does it suffice to say that, having admitted the correspondence into our periodical, we are OURSELVES the authors of everything which is written therein. THIS WOULD BE TRUE were we treating of doctrines; not when we are treating of facts."

The fact of our having admitted the said correspondence into our review does not imply our RESPONSIBILITY for the contents of that correspondence. WE ACCEPT THIS RESPONSIBILITY when doctrines are treated of, not when facts are in question.

We never spoke of responsibility, we spoke only of appropriation. That which was said of the opinions of Frenchmen (whether of a whole or a part of the nation, is of little importance, as is also the truth or falsehood of the statement concerning those opinions) cannot be said to be either our correspondent's thought or our own. If we had printed a dissertation written by a correspondent upon a point of doctrine,—by simply printing it in our pages without protest of any kind, we should have made it our own. But when we print a correspondence in which it is said that such or such a person thinks such or such things, these thoughts are not to be attributed to us ; they are no thoughts of ours. In fact, immediately afterwards we added this other sentence :—"A correspondent states the fact that in China such an opinion is held : does the person who prints that correspondence necessarily hold the opinions of the Chinese?" Why then

was the word *responsibility*, which has nothing to do with the matter, introduced into the sentence? The reason is plain: it was necessary to make us say that we refuse to answer for our correspondent. Now, far from refusing the responsibility of his assertions, we assumed it: with the simple reservation necessary in every question of fact—of *solid and evident proof* being brought to the contrary.

The second *rectification* attributed to us, has little weight in itself, but is very serious in the intention of our opponent. He glories and triumphs in the idea that we have at last recognized a right in the *Français* to correct, in the name of France, the notices received from our correspondent concerning views, opinions, and events in France. It is not a little strange that such a point should be brought forward; for we should not have supposed that anyone ever doubted or could possibly doubt it. The point liable to discussion is rather, which of the various relations which may have been written on this subject, best merits the belief of men of sense. Thus, for example, it may be a matter of discussion whether the contrary opinion of M. Beslay ought to prevail over that of our correspondent; who may possibly by age, experience, position, and political wisdom be a better informed and more trustworthy witness than himself. If we have made a passing mention of such a claim on the part of our correspondent; it has been only in order to exclude the calumnious insinuation that some political or pontifical secret has perhaps been violated by him. To what purpose, then, were our words wrested and made the subject of a separate number, as if we had at first denied or questioned what we afterwards acknowledged to be true and just? *Le besoin de la cause* is a phrase which advocates have introduced into the French language, and it may be perhaps the fittest reply to this question.

We have refuted, not without some indignation, the charge that, by means of this correspondence, we have endeavoured to narrow the wide action of the Vatican Council to the definition of two dogmas only. And in this refutation we appealed to the good faith of our readers; reminding them of all which, for a long time past, we have been publishing concerning the magnitude of the evils to be healed, and of the blessings to be derived by the Church from the work of this august assembly. It would seem that on this point M. Beslay had a visitation of remorse, and desired to make us honourable amends. But he soon returns to his ordinary style; congratulating himself in his fourth number on having brought us to acknowledge our French correspondent's information to be incomplete, and of having thus rendered it full and entire. And by what argument does he prove this? Because the silence of our correspondent destroyed all the hopes excited by so many other demonstrations and so many other testimonies. Unhappy logic, when it falls into the hand of a sophistical rhetorician! Hitherto it has not been held to be a law of inevitable necessity to say everything that can be said whenever we open our mouth; it has been simply considered necessary to speak to the purpose, and to say nothing irrelevant to the subject in hand. For the future, to avoid incurring the suspicion and wrath of the writers of the *Français*, we should be obliged, whenever we give any information or discuss any

point relating to the Council, always to begin from the beginning, and to repeat the same things over and over again. As we cannot make up our minds to do this, we must resign ourselves henceforward to incur their displeasure, without hope of reconciliation.

The fourth number is also devoted by Monsieur Beslay to a misrepresentation, of no great importance indeed in itself, but very cunningly devised. He had accused us of having assigned a very brief and insufficient time to the Council. We replied, that to assign to it a period, whether long or short, would be an audacity bordering upon insanity—an audacity of which assuredly we have not been guilty. Our French correspondent had spoken only of a persuasion rooted in the minds of many Frenchmen; not of any limit, fixed either by them or by him. Now what does our crafty opponent say in his fourth article? "See," he says to us, "how much reason I had to make all this disturbance! As a Frenchman and a Catholic, I am bound to defend French Catholics from an accusation, which the *Civiltà Cattolica* itself calls a folly." What a wonderful mind must this writer possess! He constitutes himself a champion; creates an imaginary adversary and imaginary blows; returns them in his own fashion, thus wounding himself; then exclaims, "I have conquered."

In the fifth *rectification* attributed to us, Monsieur Beslay is still more ingenious than in the fourth. Speaking of the authority of the bishops in the Council, he does us the honour to say that we have "happily succeeded in rectifying the assertions of our correspondent by filling them up, extenuating, or modifying them." Any one reading this sentence would suppose that, having destroyed a heavy mass of accusations, we had deserved the praise of skilful defenders. Nothing of the sort. Our correspondent had never dreamed of infringing the rights of the bishops in the slightest degree. This accusation had been gratuitously brought against us by Beslay himself, with what justice any of our readers may judge. In refutation of it, we quoted what we had amply said and proved upon this point; we had nothing to rectify, to modify, or to explain. Our own words, quoted literally by Beslay to prove his assertion, demonstrate the contrary. "A man must be without the most distant acquaintance with the elements of theology," we said, "to be ignorant of this doctrine, and must be in some other place than Rome to be able to print it." These words say plainly, "We never thought what you supposed us to think, because we know a little theology; and if we had thought it, we could not have printed it, because we are in Rome." Is this to *retract*, to *rectify*, to *modify*, to *extenuate*? And could this be supposed simply by a mistake, or printed without an intention artfully to conceal the truth?

In the sixth number another *rectification*, or rather another blunder, is attributed to us. We ourselves, according to the *Français*, have given, in our own reply, the clearest proof of being ill-informed of what is passing in France. And why? Because we have adduced the testimony of M. Emile Ollivier as an authority, and claimed him as an ally. This is a little lesson for us as to M. Ollivier's authority in religious matters, and a kind warning against claiming him as an ally. But did we really quote him in that character?

The following were our express words :—

"If our cautious observations concerning the observance of the canons in France have thus excited the bile of our accuser, and brought down so long a philippic on our heads, we wait with impatience for his reply in defence of the French Church to the recent work of M. Emile Ollivier. In the number of the 19th January he deplores in exaggerated terms the fact that the Church in France is governed as a city is governed in a state of siege."

Now where in these words is a shadow of authority attributed to Ollivier? Where is his alliance sought against the *Français*? Where is his testimony quoted? Is not the drift of our words opposed to all this? We here invited the *Français* to contradict the facts and figures brought forward by Ollivier, which, though we might believe them *à priori* to be greatly exaggerated, we could not contradict point by point: to us he was neither an authority nor an ally. This quotation was made simply to show, that it was no imprudence on our part to print in Rome our correspondent's cautious observations, when such lamentations were heard from the mouths of Frenchmen in France itself; and that if such lamentations were worthy of indignation, that indignation ought assuredly to be reserved for him who had expressed them so bitterly in the very midst of the clergy of France.

In his seventh number M. Beslay demands justice of us, for having accused him of fighting against us with unfair weapons, in bringing against us the words of the French Bishops, printed in the course of last Lent. "We said, we could have said nothing of the kind," says M. Beslay. We never asserted that he had professed to do this in explicit and formal words; we simply said that in placing, by a somewhat clumsy artifice, in juxtaposition with the calumnies attributed to us, certain passages of the Bishops' Pastorals,—he had endeavoured to make it appear that the reproofs, therein addressed to certain calumniators of the Bishops and applied to certain suggestions of mischievous journalists, were directed against us. This he cannot deny. The first article of the *Français* concludes thus: "In our next we shall confront the rash allegations of the anonymous correspondent of the *Civiltà* by the authentic declarations of our Bishops." But this is not enough. The long article, which quotes several beautiful passages from the Bishops' Pastorals, opens by declaring the indiscretion of our correspondent in giving information concerning the feeling of France before the Bishops had spoken; and then proceeds as follows: "Therefore it is that Mgr. Chalandon, the Archbishop of Aix, has felt it necessary to put his flock on their guard against those indiscretions by these wise and well-weighed words." Nor was this enough. For, besides printing certain phrases relating to his accusations against us in italics, he here and there intersperses his quotations with bitter and malignant reflections, as if he wished to keep alive in the mind of his reader the idea, that all these weighty episcopal words were either directed intentionally against us, or, at least, were in their application opposed to our opinion. This is what we call a clumsy artifice,—these are what we called unfair weapons. We may have been severe, but we were

not unjust ; and unfortunately the late reply addressed to us by the *Français* confirms us in our opinion.

On this occasion we have determined to speak our mind fully, that no one may be deceived by the artifices of a writer, who mingles blows with genuflexions, and, under the pretence of defending French Catholics, attacks the Catholics of Rome. The *Français* belongs to that category of liberal Catholics, who desire reconciliation, but are the first to declare war against others ; who claim the sweet gentleness of Evangelical charity for themselves, but reserve the gall and wormwood of party spleen for their adversaries ; who defend the authority of the Pope and the Church so long as it supports their teaching, but cast it aside whenever it is adverse to them ; who fear lest the Council should confirm doctrines distasteful to themselves, and exclaim against the indiscretion of those whose hope is different, because their belief is different, from theirs. It is no marvel therefore to us that they should exclaim so loudly against us, who know nothing of these base compromises between politics and faith ; and who have on our lips, because we have in our hearts, but this one sentence—*Catholics with the Pope now and for ever*. As such, we always have the honour to receive the first attacks, which, although they appear to be directed against us, are for the most part aimed at what is far above us—even against the Catholic doctrine itself. This has ever been our consolation and our reward—a consolation and a reward which we hope our poor labours will never fail to deserve. By God's help we shall follow courageously our accustomed path according to the principles of truth and justice, and the rules of charity and Christian prudence ; and if we meet with honest adversaries, we shall stretch forth our hands to them to draw them to that centre of truth to which we have the happiness to belong. As to adversaries who use weapons manifestly unfair, we shall simply unmask them, pointing them out to the simple, that they may be aware of their dangerous arts and avoid them without delay.

Notices of Books.

Life of Mother Margaret Hallahan. By her Religious Children ; with a Preface by his Lordship the Bishop of BIRMINGHAM. London : Longmans.

THIS is a most refreshing book. It would be so if it were only the life of a very remarkable woman. We are all of us so cut and dried, so run into moulds, and so thoroughly conventionalized, that a picture of a real, racy nature, which has developed itself without the help of education into something remarkable, would in itself be refreshing. The book ought to be read by all Englishmen and women, Catholic or otherwise, if it were only as a study of character. Protestant and Catholic alike have read with the deepest interest the lives of Madame Récamier, Madame Swetchine, Eugénie Guérin, and the sweet *Récit d'Une Sœur*. We can promise all that in this book they will find a life, to take the very lowest ground, as full of thrilling interest as any of these. Here is one, who up to the age of forty was a poor servant in Belgium, who came over to England friendless, penniless, unknown, and who, without a farthing to start with, in the course of twenty-three years had founded five convents, with public churches attached to them. This was done without bazaars, lotteries, or begging-letters. The finding of money, when it did not exist, some may be inclined to think a miracle, to be ranked at least with healing the sick. Yet not only did she raise the material building, but she did more. She did not found an order, for she adopted S. Catharine of Siena's rule ; yet she refounded it, for it had ceased to exist, certainly in England, and, we believe, at least in the same shape, everywhere. This she accomplished by a marvellous gift of attractiveness and a native nobleness of soul, felt by all, whether men or women, who approached her. All felt a power in the shy, yet frank and loving look of her eyes, in the perfectly natural dignity of her manner, and in the terse, and, not infrequently, humorous energy of her words. "How men love their kings !" is a dictum of a well-known writer. We may parody it, and say, "How men love their queens." This was a queen of God's own making. She collected around herself a hundred women, whose life she influenced as the sunbeams have power over nature. They were of all ranks, from her own lowly state to those who bore in the world the noblest names of England, old Catholics and converts of yesterday, those of the highest education, and those of the small culture of times of Catholic depression. There were no distinctions of grades amongst them ; all cooked, scrubbed, washed, and peeled potatoes in turn. All talents were employed, painting, music, historical writing, fine needle-work for churches, the teaching b-a ba to pottery children, tending the poor

in the hospital, instructing the convert. If anyone could do a thing for God, she was bidden to do it in God's name without let or hindrance. Mother Margaret was one of those before whom all petty jealousies and every little passion vanished; all smaller personalities were elevated by her presence. The ruling of a hundred women in perfect peace and harmony is no small thing. So firmly was this rule established, that it bids fair to last even after her death. In addition to this she was the friend of many, whose names, though they are Catholics, are well-known in Protestant England. Many a priest called her mother. Truly this is one whose life is worth reading. This is a "peep behind the grills" worth taking, especially as it is perfectly plain that the author is far too much occupied with the one central figure to aim in the least at making studied revelations. Mother Margaret has been very fortunate in her biographer. This book is written with an honest and honourable enthusiasm. The author knows that she has something worth saying, and she says it simply and heartily without caring a rush what the world will say. There is neither stiffness nor cant, neither tall English nor fine writing. Thank Heaven, there is no aim at the picturesque. Though the author never conceals a predilection for Gothic, utterly at variance with the audaciously eclectic taste of Mother Margaret, yet the grand figure which she brings out so beautifully, is never made to sit for her photograph under cathedral arches or long-drawn cloisters. Many of the opinions recorded were by no means those of her contemporaries, nor even (on open questions, such as that of government education) of many among those of her own faith; but neither the nineteenth century nor even the views of Catholics are consulted. There is even in the author, as we shall notice presently, an occasional viciousness, which helps the impression of perfect honesty which the book conveys. She everywhere forgets herself in the object of her thoughts: she has produced a narrative written in excellent, vigorous English, while it is also full of the striking and pithy eloquence left us in the recorded sayings and letters of Mother Margaret. The author has written while her heart was hot and her memory fresh, and the result is that even those who did not know Mother Margaret will gain a considerable insight into the grand loving being over whom the grave has just closed.

It is already a great gain for the world to have before it the record of a most virtuous life, of a soul, we beg pardon for the expression, without humbug or meanness. To Catholics the book will have a pathetic and a deeper interest. The last years of the history of the Church in England since 1845 have been very memorable. Since then many have grown grey with work and thought; many have gone to their rest. The pages before us are a most valuable contribution to this portion of the story of the fortunes of the Church. Mother Margaret was most closely connected with the Catholic movement in all its parts. Many will be touched to see the name of the dear and venerable old man, Bishop Walsh, who governed the central district at that time. The Cardinal and the present Archbishop of Westminster are often mentioned. She had ever a generous and affectionate respect for Father Newman, who was often the subject of her fervent prayers. Her relations with Father Faber and other members of the London Oratory were those of most intimate friendship. Above all, however, she herself is in a

marvellous way a connecting link between the present and the past. By no means the least interesting part of her life is the glimpse which it affords of the depressed state of the Catholic Church in her early days. Then comes the time when her soul expanded, and she learned to breathe freely and grow, in the thoroughly old Catholic atmosphere of Belgium. When fully matured in the Christian life, she comes over to England, and then she finds herself called to take a prominent part in a state of things, of which neither she nor anyone else had any anticipation. Inside and outside the Church there had been going on two movements perfectly independent of each other, which were now to be blended into one. Before a single one of the prominent Oxford converts had been received, the Catholic Church in England had been lifting herself up from long inaction, and the deep still waters had begun to be stirred up by the breath of a new life. We learn from these pages how a great work had been going on at Coventry under the auspices of Dr. Ullathorne, and how quiet Catholic missions had been re-invigorated by the preaching of Dr. Gentili. At the same time, at Oxford, the hearts of men, who knew no more of the state of the Catholic Church in England, than if it had been in another world, were being moved by God's Spirit to throw off the chains of heresy and to enter into the blessed freedom of God's Church. "The forty-five" was the year of Father Newman's reception and of Mother Margaret's profession.

Yet, after all, it is neither as a study of character, nor as a portion of history, that we must look at this life, but as a bit of hagiology. "Saint" is a great word, often most lightly used. To pronounce any one a Saint, belongs exclusively to the Church. Yet some lives are distinctly saintly. What we mean by this, it would take us too long at this moment to analyze, yet we are quite sure that any one reading the pages before us, will rise up with a feeling on his mind that this was a soul leading a supernatural life. There is a perfume of antique piety about Mother Margaret which is to be felt. To call it mediæval, or by any name which denotes an era, is absurd. It is simply the old original Gospel. It is the Imitation of Christ, that book of all times and of all ages, carried out *to the letter*. This is much to be dwelt upon; for even Catholics often speak as though the nineteenth century rendered the old style of Christian perfection impossible. The life of Mother Margaret is a better refutation of this fatal error than a thousand arguments. *Solvitur ambulando*. The thing has been done. A priest who knew her very intimately, and who loved her well, will never forget the look which she gave him—a *gusa di leon quando si posa*—when he once urged her to warm the new choir of the church. "No," she said; "no more dispensations!" This was the spirit of her whole life—the pure Gospel of Christ, without adaptations. This life of hers is sure to be read and admired. Far and wide in England, and even all over Christendom, men will read with delight the graphic story of this noble life. Those who know the life of St. Catherine of Siena, will recognize with ease how much the mother and daughter had in common. There are the same lowly details in early life: years spent in cooking, washing, and all the menial work of a poor family; vows of chastity taken, kneeling on kitchen chairs; hair cut off, and youthful beauty spoiled by an unworldly dress. Then there is the same miraculous power of attracting hearts—

human wills bowing before the simple majesty of Christian love in its strong tenderness—men as well as women calling Margaret mother, as once Catherine was called La Mamma; the same fearless intrepidity joined with womanly timidity. No one can doubt that, if occasion had called for it, Margaret would have behaved at Avignon and Florence with Catherine's courage, even though we smile at her superstitious cowardice before embarking on the sea. Many will be taken with the tranquil, almost idyllic beauty, of many parts of her monastic life, and all will praise her broad philanthropy and exhaustless charity. Here, all will say, is a wonderful woman, who did a grand work! But let us never forget that the moving spirit of the whole was the strict old Christianity which we are tempted to call that of other days. That it is still lived by many is, of course, a fact; yet the spirit of the age is against it. The world is a restless, troubled world, rushing about in railways, reading rapidly, and seldom thinking. Even our literature is one of sharp pamphlets and smart controversy. Our very religion is restless. The exigencies of work are so tremendous, that even religious persons often speak and act as though work could do instead of prayer. The worst feature of all is the attempt to unite religion with a plunge into the wild excitement of London life. Many speak as though England would be converted by the admission of Catholics into the highest circles, by the wearing of chignons and low dresses, and the reading of the *Saturday Review*. This was not Mother Margaret's view. She did a grand and a marvellous work, but its deep foundations were laid in prayer and the interior life. In the little parlour of Dr. Ullathorne's presbytery at Coventry, principles were laid down which certainly were not those of the nineteenth century. "The generous dispositions of the sisters were fostered by the direction under which they were trained. Two rules were given them in the beginning by their spiritual father, who desired to form them in a truly heroic spirit; they were to banish from their vocabulary the words 'uncomfortable' and 'impossible,' and his precepts on this head were enforced by example. Another of his maxims, which Mother Margaret often loved to recall, was, 'First put on the spirit of Christ, and then the spirit of the rule on that.'"

We need not say that the insular prejudices of our countrymen are as little spared by Mother Margaret as the long trains of ladies and the peculiarities of the girl of the period. She imported the devotions of Catholic countries without one jot of abatement. It is for this reason that we are anxious to point out one or two blemishes in the book before us, which are blots on what is otherwise so wonderfully well done. We really must protest against its being said that "though her visit to Rome in no way shook her preference for the Gothic style," she had "a sort of affection" for St. Peter's! Is affection for St. Peter's a thing not to be mentioned without an apology because, forsooth, it is not Gothic? Of course every one has a right to be Gothic if he likes; but it is too bad to say that the tomb of the Apostles is an object of patronizing affection, though it *has* the drawback of not being under pointed arches. Again, no one must suppose, from strong expressions used with reference to liturgical services, that Mother Margaret disliked English hymns. Her enjoyment of the popular services of the London Oratory, and the use of vernacular hymns at Stone, are sufficient to show

that the words used by her in her indignation at hearing that Father Faber's hymns were sung by Protestants do not represent her ordinary state of mind. Above all, there is a passage with respect to Father Newman's letter which might tend seriously to misrepresent her. It is said that "when, as it was read aloud to her, the reader came to that page in which he enumerates, in order to condemn, certain exaggerated and preposterous expressions, culled by a Protestant controversialist out of various foreign writers (some of them on the Index) she stopped her ears." This passage misrepresents not only Mother Margaret, but Father Newman. That she stopped her ears we have no doubt; as who would not on hearing that "in a literal and absolute sense;" "simply" and "unconditionally" "the Blessed Virgin is superior to God"? Of course Mother Margaret, with Father Newman and every man who had not taken leave of his senses, "would rather believe that there is no God at all, than that Mary is greater than God." But that is a very different thing from saying that these were "exaggerated and preposterous expressions culled out of foreign writers." This is implying that these expressions, as used by foreign writers, were exaggerated and preposterous; and siding with the "Protestant controversialist" who took them in their literal sense. This is what Father Newman expressly denies. He says that he is looking at them, not "as spoken by the tongues of angels, but according to that literal sense which they bear in the mouths of Englishmen and English women." Mother Margaret would have been the last person in the world to use the term "foreign" as a term of reproach to Catholic writers, least of all would she have thus applied the epithet to S. Alfonso Liguori. We trust that, in a second edition, these words, which were not in Mother Margaret's mouth or mind when she stopped her ears, may be omitted.

On the whole, however, the life before us satisfies even Mother Margaret's friends, and that is saying a great deal. It has wonderfully few faults, and marvellous excellencies. Even as a literary work it is beautiful. We sincerely congratulate Mother Margaret's religious children on their execution of a difficult and delicate work. They have erected to her a monument more permanent than brass. We trust that some day the letters mentioned by the Bishop of Birmingham in his most touching preface will see the light. There were depths in that great soul as yet unrevealed, marvellous ways of God, loving and painful crucifixions, supernatural sorrows, and pains heroically borne. The bed of fire of her last days was the finishing touch to her likeness to S. Catherine and her Lord. One who loved her very tenderly, and who has been privileged to know much of that great soul, may perhaps be permitted to finish this notice with some words of a letter just discovered, written by one of S. Catherine's disciples to another, a month after the Saint's death, in 1380: "*Credo che tu sappi come la nostra Reverendissima e Carissima Mamma se n'andò in Paradiso Domenica, addì 29 d'Aprile. Lodato ne sia el Salvatore nostro Gesù Cristo crucifisso benedetto. A mene pare essere rimasto orfano. De la Mamma si vole fare alegranza e festa, quanto ch'è per lei; ma di quelli suoi e di quelle che son rimasi in questa misera vita, ène da piangere e d'avere compassione grandissima. Prendo alcuno conforto perchè nel mio cuore ène rimasa e incarnata la Mamma nostra assai più che era in prima: e ora me la parebene conoscere.*"

History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. London: Longmans.

MR. LECKY has chosen for his subject one of the most interesting and practically important questions which can possibly be treated: and we must add in candour, that he shows himself throughout earnestly desirous of being thoroughly impartial; of holding the balance with a jealous fairness between Catholicity and heathenism. Moreover he is in some sense personally unbiassed: for whereas on the one hand he is not only a decided Theist but a determined opponent also of utilitarianism, on the other hand it is equally plain that he is no believer himself in revealed religion.

Yet a more grossly and monstrously unfair book never was written. There is no more prominent feature of his volumes—none which more gives them their characteristic aspect—than his sustained and bitter invective against the ascetic standard of morality: and yet he has never once set himself systematically to set forth what that standard is. Surely he had no right whatever to speak as he has spoken, unless he had not merely performed this task in sufficient detail, but also expressed accurately his own *antagonistic* doctrine on men's moral duty and legitimate attitude towards their Infinite Creator. This fact alone would be fatal to the credit of his volumes; that he has given no hint from first to last what that practical Theism *is*, which he would prefer to the Catholic.

The ascetic—or rather (as we should maintain) the Christian and only true—standard of morality seems to us based on two fundamental truths; the one ethical, the other psychological. It is an ethical truth, that every man is more virtuous, in proportion as the desire of pleasing God is in one shape or other the animating and pervading principle of all his actions. And it is a psychological fact, that God is a far more permanently satisfying object to the highest and deepest human affections, than any creature can possibly be. This therefore is a practicable and is the one true path of virtue; viz., living to God and resting the heart and affections predominantly on Him. He who directs the general course of his life on any other rule whatever, makes a vital mistake in that matter which, immeasurably more than any other, concerns his nearest and dearest interests.

But certain chosen and exalted souls have been endowed by God with a power of making Him, far more than others can, their one exclusive object. The great mass of men, according to God's merciful intention and provision, are involved in a thousand innocent interests and enjoyments, which are by no means directly religious, though they conduce (in the case of such men) to His more cheerful and effective service. But the more highly endowed person whom we are now considering, would be faithless to his vocation if he acquiesced in those interests and enjoyments: it becomes on the contrary one chief purpose of his life to mortify and repress them, in order that the whole of his complex nature, the whole current of his thoughts and affections, may be more unreservedly and undividedly concentrated on God. His life tends to become one protracted

prayer and meditation : and this, however various and complicated may be the duties of his worldly calling, and however assiduous he may be in the fulfilment of those duties. With him, worldly engagements are instruments and occasions of serving God, but they have in themselves no interest and attraction. It is in some sense his greatest delight, to live in poverty and sickness ; to mortify the flesh unintermittingly by every studied device ; to be despised and hated by men : because all these things so importantly and blessedly increase his power of making God the exclusive thought of his earthly existence.

But now further. Among saints and saintly men themselves—otherwise so singularly harmonious and homogeneous in their characteristics—there is one very broad distinction ; which affords, in fact, one of the most interesting possible studies in ascetical psychology. We have no space here to theorise on it ; rather we would refer our readers to the seventh and eighth of F. Newman's "Occasional Sermons," which have always impressed us as being among his most powerful and original essays. The distinction to which we refer is this : one large class of saints have always been drawn towards God by *mortifying*, the other by *sanctifying*, human personal affections—the love of parent, of brother, of friend. This distinction of course depends ultimately on a certain fundamental distinction of character ; a distinction, which may or may not be capable of analysis, but which, at all events, is intrinsic, and fixed by God. To use F. Newman's own instances, S. John could no more have walked perfectly along S. Paul's path, than S. Paul along S. John's. And our present purpose is to point out the obvious truth, that those favourite marks of Mr. Lecky's attack—the saints of the desert—are shown by the very fact of their eremitical life to rank in one category and not in the other.

Let us here pause for a moment to point out Mr. Lecky's deplorable shallowness and irreligiousness in such passages as the following. A saintly ascetic, living on the thought of God,—praying day and night with most fervent solicitude for his fellow-men,—living in constant promptitude (as will be immediately seen) to do them any kind of practical service,—is accounted by Mr. Lecky (vol. ii, p. 114) "a hideous, sordid, and emaciated maniac ; without knowledge, without patriotism, without natural affection ; passing his life in a long routine of useless and atrocious self-torture, and quailing before the ghastly phantoms of his delirious brain." To crucify the flesh, is to be "hideous and emaciated" ; to dwell in thought on the Infinite Creator, is to be "without knowledge" ; to desire passionately the highest good of his fellow-countrymen and fellow-men, is to be "without patriotism and natural affection" ; to think that spiritual blessings are the one legitimate end of man's aspirations, is to be a "maniac." Again (p. 120), "Tens of thousands of the most devoted men fled to the desert, to reduce themselves by maceration *nearly to the condition of the brute*." We had thought it characteristic of a brute, that he knows nothing of God, and cares only for being sleek and comfortable ; but Mr. Lecky holds that brutality is most closely approached, by a life of prayer, meditation, and austerity.

We said incidentally, that a solitary was always most eagerly disposed to do his fellow-men any practicable service. Mr. Lecky's own pages abound in

instances of this. "S. Ephrem, in a time of pestilence, emerged from his solitude to found and superintend a hospital at Edessa" (p. 86); "when Antioch was threatened with destruction, the anchorites poured forth from the neighbouring deserts to intercede with the ministers of the emperor;" (p. 88) a "solitary hermit often planted himself with his little boat by a bridgeless stream, and the charity of his life was to ferry over the traveller;" (p. 89) "saints wandered through the world begging money, that they might give to beggars, or depriving themselves of their garments, that they might clothe the naked:" (p. 100), &c. &c. It is most honourable to Mr. Lecky that he always takes pains to place such facts before his readers; less honourable, that he does not see their bearing.

Two more considerations must be added, in order to complete our theoretical statement. We believe it will be found that the primary end of those bodily mortifications which so amaze and confound ordinary men, has been commonly what we have already mentioned; viz., a desire of fixing the heart more exclusively and caressingly on God. But a second very powerful motive is added, the resolve of doing penance for sin. Man's sinfulness is very deep, and his perception of it grows far more rapidly than his avoidance of it. Even putting aside therefore those comparatively few cases in which anchorites have in early life been profligates, in every instance they are profoundly penetrated with a sense of sin and with a desire of expiation.

Then further came the sacred duty of living purely and chastely. Many of them, in Mr. Lecky's opinion (p. 125), were "physically incapable of a life of celibacy;" yet he admits in the same breath that most of these very men did, in fact, lead it irreproachably. How were they enabled to do so? Of course, primarily by means of prayer and meditation; but secondly and indispensably, by means of those "macerations" and austerities, which Mr. Lecky considers a "brutal" (p. 120) exchange for marriage with "Syrian or African brides" (p. 125). It must be remembered too that, according to Catholic doctrine, in proportion as men rise in saintliness, God permits the evil spirit to assail them more violently and unintermittingly. Never does He place them in circumstances under which they have not the fullest moral power, through such help as He gives them, of avoiding mortal sin. But as their strength for resistance becomes greater, He rejoices to give them an occasion of approving themselves heroically, and thus of growing more rapidly in perfection.

There can be no doubt that the whole eremitical movement of those early centuries was specially ordained by God, as a salutary remedy for then prevalent evils. The "Spectator" of May 8 has some powerful and singularly candid remarks on this, in its review of Mr. Lecky.

"It was of the very essence of the revolution which Christianity was destined to effect, that an ample field of spiritual experience should be conquered from the family and the world and their occupations, and vindicated as a part of the higher life of man for ever. And this would hardly have been effected, without some lengthened period of what we may call *naked* spiritual life; spiritual life, in which the monopolizing influence of the human affections over the mind had been resisted and repelled. For this purpose the soul had to do battle, not merely against the body, but against

the family affections of the Western nations for centuries. That was no time when domestic life could have been spiritualized in the sense in which we now use the term, without first going through an internecine conflict, generations long, and leaving the ideal victory in the hands of the solitary religious spirit. Not only in the lives of the Greeks and Romans do we see how clinging and carnal were the natural ties of paganism . . . but even in the New Testament itself there is ample evidence that the relations of the family—certainly the relations of the sexes—had none of that play and depth and delicacy of tenderness, which makes them shade off so naturally, as it seems to us of the present day, into the religious affections themselves."

And though our readers are doubtless familiar with the masterly comment on Mr. Lecky which appeared in the June "Month," we cannot resist the temptation of reprinting one paragraph, which bears closely on much that we have been saying.

"Mr. Lecky has, indeed, read the lives of the Saints of the desert to little purpose, and to little purpose studied the character of those brutal forces against which Christianity was waging war, if he cannot see that a strong remedy was necessary to counteract a fearfully strong tendency to vice; that a protest of the most vehement kind was needed against the appalling immorality of the age; that these same rugged mystics were full of a strong common sense, of much wondrous kindliness, of a spirit of courtesy and beautiful modesty, of sublime spiritual aspirations, of heroic courage, of a divine charity which softened the seeming asperity of their manners, and exercised an influence for good, altogether incompatible with the qualities he ascribes to them, and with the motives he assigns to their life of self-denial and self-sacrifice. He may be pardoned for not being able to take the measure of their sanctity: but the narratives he has read in Tillemont, Rosweyde, and the Bollandists, furnish a host of facts which ought to have shown him that the monks and hermits of the desert were neither without knowledge nor passions nor imagination; that their prayers were anything but a mechanical routine; and that as they grew in age and experience, they grew also in thorough humanity of spirit and a wisdom not without its touches of gentle irony and sweet compassionateness for the weaknesses of men" (p. 565).

Nor should we omit to remind our readers of that very striking selection from dicta of the desert saints, which appeared a year or two ago in successive numbers of the "Month," under the signature "J. H. N." Mr. Lecky would have been unspeakably amazed had he read those papers.

One justice is done to the solitaries by Mr. Lecky, which is by no means universally rendered them by non-Catholics. Read, by way of contrast, Tennyson's poem on S. Simeon Stylites. The orthodox Protestant doctrine is, that they were miracles of pride and self-complacency; and Mr. Lecky indeed most gratuitously (p. 129) speaks of this vice as "very common among" them: but he admits that it was in direct antagonism to their recognised ideal. He proceeds, in the very passage which we have just cited, to recount the legend of a solitary who was permitted to fall into impurity as a punishment for pride. In the note at p. 196 he refers to similar stories; and in p. 197 he expressly says that "the disposition of humility . . . has probably" nowhere "been so largely and so *successfully* inculcated as in a monastery." He cannot mean to *contrast* monks with hermits in this particular.

This concession however at last does not cost Mr. Lecky so much as it might seem. As the "Month" has pointed out (p. 561), he is by no means an unreserved opponent of pride and admirer of humility; and when he admits therefore, that the heathen ideal of virtue is mainly based on the former and the Christian on the latter, he by no means holds this consideration to be so decisive as an unwary Catholic would expect.*

There is no accusation more constantly brought by Mr. Lecky against the ascetical standard of morality, than its indifference to *patriotism*. What does this come to? If it is meant that a man, saintly according to the Catholic ideal of saintliness, is not keenly sensitive to the sins of his fellow-countrymen, and most disinterestedly desirous of promoting his country's religious interests,—such an accusation is on the surface false, and even preposterous. But if it be meant that he accounts national greatness and glory as very contemptible objects of pursuit, such an accusation is a high and (we are confident) richly-deserved enlogy.

Very much more remains to be said; but we have been already carried to so great a length, that for the present at least we must conclude.

Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Part the First.
London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IN no particular perhaps is English Catholic literature so deficient as in published sermons; and we are particularly glad therefore that the Jesuit Fathers are projecting a continuous publication of the kind. They could not have begun more auspiciously. We confess indeed that we have not yet read F. Hathaway's course on our Blessed Lord's Temptation; but it is really difficult, without appearance of exaggeration, to express our sense of the value of F. Coleridge's on "the latter days." Its title may give some readers an impression of its being abstruse and technically theological; but no impression can be further from the truth. Nowhere have we seen the religious and moral characteristics of the present time so truthfully, vigorously, and profoundly set forth; a picture so vividly drawn, and yet not *overdrawn*.

F. Coleridge shows himself a true son of the Church, by the sacredness which he ascribes to civil government. It is "the principle of law and order and right and obedience, the rule of conscience and the national law, as represented in the fabric of human society," which, according to S. Paul's testimony, keeps back the manifestation of Antichrist (p. 14). "The supernatural society of the Church . . . in a certain sense rests upon the civil society" (p. 15); in such sense that "if any power of evil can

* The Church has infallibly defined: "*Fortitudinem gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem Christianorum Dei caritas facit.*"—*Conc. Araus*, canon 17.

utterly subvert and undermine the latter, it will go far towards obtaining a momentary victory over the former." Consequently (pp. 18, 19) the present attacks of infidelity are directed, not against particular dogmata, nor even principally against the dogmatic principle, heartily though that be detested; but against "social order and right."

"Pius IX. has had to warn the world as to things which are the very foundation of Christian and even of natural society; the sanctity of marriage, the parental right of education, even the natural right of law and property and justice, which the secret sectarians of our own times are doing their best to undermine. And if in a year's time we are to see, what has not been seen for so many centuries, the Bishops of the Catholic Church assembled in a General Council around the Vicar of Jesus Christ, it is not only and not entirely for the needs of the Church and of religion as such, but for the needs of human society and civil order, the very foundations of which are being sapped by the enemies both of God and man" (p. 19).

The following most impressive account of Voltaire is given, for the purpose of illustrating man's tendency to venerate both "genius" even "of the lowest kind," and also "success" achieved even "by the most unprincipled means," if their hero's career has been directed against the Church of God, and in harmony with their own carnal "aims and desires and longings."

"You may have read, my brethren, in the history of the last century, how that miserable man whose name has become famous as the patriarch and apostle of modern infidelity, the man who began, or at all events carried to its height, that system of calumniating and scoffing and sneering at Christianity which has so many followers still—though his contemporaries knew him, as we also know him from his biographies, to have been eaten up by meanness, petty spite, vanity, jealousy, avarice, insatiable pride, ostentation, and love of applause, so that his character appears to us to have nothing in it that any one could heartily admire or love in any way—yet how, at the very close of his long drawn-out life, when the hand of death was already creeping upon him, he had himself transported once more to Paris, and how he there became the object of universal homage and, it may almost be said, of worship. Worship, for no other reason so much as that he had been a brilliant forerunner of Antichrist in his doctrine, in laughing at religion and encouraging men in infidelity! And then all ranks of that gay and thoughtless society, dancing, as it were, at that moment, its last fling over the half-wakened fires of the volcano beneath its feet, which was so soon to burst forth and engulf the revellers in destruction—all ranks, I grieve to say, from the partner of the throne of the successor of St. Louis down to the lowest hangers-on of the light literature and the theatres of the time—came or sent in succession to the ante-chamber of that dying infidel as if to burn incense before him" (pp. 35, 36).

And F. Coleridge dwells earnestly (p. 38) on the vast importance—an importance which even good Catholics do not always sufficiently realize—of refusing "homage to the world's idols—to *intellect*, to power, to success, to wealth"; and giving all our honour "where *alone* honour is due, to humility, and purity, and meekness, and self-sacrifice, and charity, and zeal for the glory of God."

The ablest of all seems to us the third sermon on "The Great Apostacy"; in which the author brings out a singularly powerful and (so far as we happen

to know) entirely original comparison, between the heathenism of Apostolic time on the one hand, and that moral corruption on the other hand, which S. Paul predicts as characterizing the reign of Antichrist, and to which society is now so rapidly hurrying. In the old heathenism, says F. Coleridge (p. 52) "there were three diverse and often conflicting elements." There was a simply good element, which came from God, and which was embodied in great part of Roman and Grecian laws, institutions, poetry, philosophy. Again, there was a simply diabolical element (p. 54): for the heathen deities were no poetic creations; they were, as S. Paul testifies, the evil spirits themselves, who were worshipped by rites of the foulest impurity and the most revolting cruelty. Lastly, there was a third element, which may be called paganism proper; viz. (p. 53) the "system of human life and human society," as carried on "according to the impulses and unbridled lusts of the natural man."

Now—and this is the singularly original and pregnant remark of F. Coleridge's to which we referred—if you compare with each other S. Paul's respective descriptions of contemporary heathenism and of the future anti-Christian apostasy, you will find that the simply *diabolic* element is peculiar to the *former*; but that the *pagan* is in the very same degree characteristic of *both*.

"I do not find, in any of the prophetic descriptions of the restored paganism of modern days, that the system of the worship of false gods is to revive, with its abominable rites of blood and its mysteries of licentiousness. Wherever the Cross has been once firmly planted, we may surely hope that the world has seen the last of the public worship of Satan. In S. Paul's description of the latter days, I find the *blasphemy of the true God substituted for the worship of devils*" (p. 56).

"And now, my brethren, what need have we of any subtlety of inquiry or refinement of speculation to tell us that this modern heathenism of which the prophecies speak is around us on every side? Mankind are in many senses far mightier, and the resources and enjoyments at their command are far ampler, than in the days of old. We are in possession of the glorious but intoxicating fruits of that advanced civilization and extended knowledge, which has sprung up from the seeds which the Church of God has, as it were, dropped on her way through the world. Society has been elevated and refined, but on that very account it has become capable of a *more penetrating degradation, of a more elegant and a more poisonous corruption*. Knowledge has been increased, but on the increase of knowledge has followed the increase of pride. Science has unravelled the laws of nature and the hidden treasures of the material universe; and they place fresh combinations of power and new revelations of enjoyment in the hands of men, who have not seen in the discovery increased reasons for self-restraint or for reverence for the Giver of all good gifts" (p. 57).

"Or, again, my brethren, let us turn from public to private life. Look at social life; look at domestic manners; consider the men and women of the present day in *their amusements, their costumes, the amount of restraint they put upon the impulses of nature*; compare them at their theatres and their recreations; compare them *as to their treatment of the poor and the afflicted classes*; compare them, again, as to the style of art which they affect, or the literature in which they delight, with the old heathen of the days of S. Paul. I do not say, God forbid! that there is not a wide and impassable gulf between the two, for that would be to say that so many centuries of Christendom

had been utterly wasted, and that the Gospel law has not penetrated to the foundations of society, so that it is not true that our Lord rules, as the Psalmist says, 'in the midst of His enemies,'* even over the world, which would fain emancipate itself from His sway. But I do say, that if a Christian of the first ages were to rise from the dead, and examine our society, point by point, on the heads which I have intimated, and compare it, on the one hand, with the polished refined heathen whom he may have known at the courts of Nero or Domitian, and, on the other, with the pure strict holiness of his own brethren in the faith who worshipped with him in the catacombs, *he might find it difficult indeed to say that what he would see around him in London or Paris was derived by legitimate inheritance rather from the traditions of the martyr Church than from the customs of the persecuting heathen.* He would miss the violence, the cruelty, the riotous and ruffianly lust, the extraordinary disrespect for humanity and human life, which distinguished the later Roman civilization; but he would find much of its corruption, much of its licentiousness, much of its hardness of heart. The unregenerate instincts of human nature are surging up like a great sea all around us; society is fast losing all respect for those checks upon the innate heathenism of man, which have been thrown over the surface of the world by the Church" (pp. 58, 59).

Nor, on the other hand, should it be forgotten, how much deeper guilt is involved in living heathenishly after Christianity has been fully known, than was involved in so living during what may be called the world's religious twilight.

The preacher concludes his sermon (p. 62) by dwelling on the unspeakable importance of that struggle which is so close at hand—the struggle for vindicating, against the political efforts of liberalism, worldliness, and irreligion, the sacred principle of religious and doctrinal education.

If there be any of our readers who have not already mastered F. Coleridge's course, we are sure they will not repent of acting on our hearty recommendation, and giving to that course their most careful and studious attention.

The Formation of Christendom. Part Second. By T. W. ALLIES.
London: Longmans. 1869.

THE pleasant fellow who saluted the prostrate statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, begging the god to remember, if his turn should ever come again, the civility shown him in his adversity, would be much tempted to think that the time of his reward was coming if he lived in these days. A Pagan reaction has decidedly set in. Perhaps that *ver rongeur*, to which the Abbé Gaume called attention some years ago, has had something to do with it; but a still more efficacious cause has been that modern spirit which, sick of the false Christianity it has found insufficient in its mental and moral needs, yet refuses to turn for help to the true Christianity, against which it has conceived such strong though unreasonable prejudices. It is as

* Psalm cix. 2.

painful as it is wonderful, to see so many intellects of a high order working themselves back to the unhappy religious condition of, at best, a Socrates or a Cicero. It is sad to see a sober-minded Lecky become, not indeed the eulogist of Pagan corruption, but the apologist of Pagan morality; while, in another sphere of thought, the *not* sober-minded Swinburne urges his muse to take, not flights but plunges, into depths whither the foul fancy of a Catullus hardly dared to venture.

Almost the only work in our contemporary English literature calculated to supply an adequate corrective for such a perversion of the intellect and the heart, is that of which a second instalment is now before us. It is nearly four years since the first part of Mr. Allie's work was under notice in our pages, when its general plan and the author's method were examined in some detail. All that was then said as to the practical importance of studies which furnish us with a complete view of the change from heathenism to Christianity, has received repeated confirmation in the intervening years. The most active intellects of our time, outside the Church, have forced religious controversy past all the outposts and the lines of the old discussions of this great question, and have daringly raised the issue of a comparison between the world as it was before Christ and the world as it has been at its best under the Christian law. Upon the eye of the tired man of business, skimming over his evening paper as he rushes by express train to his suburban dinner, no less than on that of the student plodding leisurely through a solid volume in his quiet library, the question has obtruded itself, "How is mankind the better for its alleged redemption?" The interest of such an argument is certainly the reverse of speculative, and no higher or worthier labour can engage a thoughtful mind than to treat it comprehensively, and, as far as may be, exhaustively, in the cause of Christian truth.

The actual condition of society as affected by the prevailing polytheism among the greatest and most cultivated people of antiquity, is vividly set before us in the first chapter of the present volume. We are enabled to realize the state of men's minds when their religion was a complicated and oppressive chain of minute superstitious observances, by which, nevertheless, even the free-thinkers of the time were so acted upon, that Julius Cæsar himself "never mounted a chariot without uttering certain words for good luck and preservation against calamity." Still more powerfully have we presented to us the depravity of human morals under the influence of a course of teachings and examples which made virtue, as we know of it, not only in some sense impossible but almost inconceivable. Varro, quoted by S. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*), divides the Pagan theology into three branches, —the fabulous, the natural, and the civil. By the second he understands the theories of philosophers concerning the physical nature of the gods. By the third he means that which all members of civil communities, the priests especially, are bound to know and administer. But S. Augustine points out that this was inseparably connected with the first, which Varro calls the fabulous theology, and treats as only fit for the theatre; because it was the very same gods who, though ridiculed to a certain extent in the

theatres, were worshipped in the temples ; worshipped, too, by rites so foul that an exact reproduction of them on the public stage durst not have been attempted.

"Conceive, then (says our author) every revolting detail of adultery, prostitution, incest, or of dishonesty, or of violence, which the perverted invention of modern writers has ever dressed up for the theatres of great cities in this and other countries. They will perhaps yield in turpitude to that which the theatres of the Roman empire exhibited. But what these theatres represented in mimic action was the exact image, as reflected in a mirror, of what was transacted at the solemn service of the gods in unnumbered temples. The exact image, so far as it went, yet stopping short in some respects, for our eyewitness above cited declares that gratitude was due to the actors, inasmuch as they spared the eyes of men, and did not lay bare upon the theatre all that was hidden within the walls of temples. It was not enough, then, that all the many games and spectacles in which such things were represented were dedicated to the gods, acted under their especial sanction, even enjoined by them as means of gaining their favour or averting their wrath, which alone would have made them answerable for the immorality so portrayed ; not enough, even, that actions of this quality were in the theatres ascribed to the gods who presided over them ; but these acts of immorality were not the fictions of poets or the acting of players, but the very substance of the theology itself in which the worship of all these nations was embodied. Priapus appeared to make a laugh on the stage exactly in the costume in which he was worshipped in the temples, or in which he entered into the rites of marriage ; a costume of indescribable turpitude, the shame of our human nature. The players on the stage and the statues in the temples equally exhibited Jove bearded and Mercury beardless, Saturn in decrepitude, and Apollo in youthful beauty. In the rites of Juno, of Ceres, of Venus, of the mother of the gods, words were uttered and scenes acted such as no decent person would suffer to be spoken or acted before his own mother ; or rather they contained, as a portion of themselves, the worst crimes which the theatres represented ; nay, crimes which they stopped short of acting, and persons so infamous that they were not tolerated even on the stage, where yet to take part was a civil dishonour. What, then, was the nature of those rites wherein those were chosen to take part whom the utmost license of the stage banished from its boards ? Let us conceive—if such a conception can be adequately represented to the mind—that the vilest drama ever acted upon a modern theatre was being daily carried on in all the churches of Christendom by troops of priests and priestesses, with all the paraphernalia of costliest worship, with prayers, invocation, and sacrifices, as a service acceptable to the Ruler of man's lot, and as an account of what that ruler had himself done, and of what he loved to be imitated by others. That would be a picture of heathen worship in the time of Augustus ; that would be the moral food on which was nurtured that crowd of nations which acknowledged Caesar's sway ; that the conception of divine things wrought into the minds of the hundred millions of men who formed the Roman empire. Was it surprising that all worshippers of the gods should look for their example rather in Jupiter's actions than in Plato's teaching or the moral judgments of Cato ?"

Before men could learn to serve the One true and living God, they had to renounce the service not merely of vice and error, but of the very spirits of evil, through whose perpetually-working inspirations their minds were perverted and their hearts depraved. This idea, without which one cannot at

all understand the character and magnitude of the change that had to be wrought, is developed in the following passage :—

“ When we look upon this idolatry, occupying not one country or race, but all ; not merely bewildering savage or uncivilized man, but throned in the chief seats of the world's choicest civilization ; when we look upon its endlessly divergent forms, its palpable contradictions, its cherished or commanded immoralities, its crowd of debasing, irrational, heterogeneous superstitions, its cruelty, sensuality, and fearfulness, all these being no less an insult to man's reason than a derogation from God's majesty, who is there that does not feel this to be the strangest and most astonishing sight which history presents to man ? And yet there is a unity which runs through it all, and stamps it with a double mark. Not only is it a service due from man to God, which is paid by him to the creature rather than to the Creator, but more especially it is that service paid by man to God's enemies, the fallen angels. These it is who have assumed the mask of dead men ; these it is who, within the sculptured forms of Jupiter, Juno, Mars, and Venus, of Baal, and Derketo, and Mylitta, of Anubis and Serapis, of Thor and Woden, and so many more, receive man's adoration, and rejoice above all things in possessing his heart. These it is who have seduced him by exhibitions of visible beauty, have lain in wait for him by fountain, forest, and field, and filled the groves and high places with the charms which best pleased him under the name of worship ; or have promised to disclose future things to him ; or, again, have harrowed his soul with phantoms and terrors of the unseen world. These incoherent systems ; these deities, whose functions ran into and athwart each other ; these investments of human passions, and even unnatural and monstrous vices, with immortality and terrible power ; these rivals ever quarrelling with each other, and jealous for the possession of man's homage, all serve the purpose of those behind the scenes, are puppets under their command, and have a common end and result in the captivity of their victim. More even than this ; while they seem disunited and contradictory, they are really one, marshalled by the power, directed by the mind, held in the hand of him who is called ‘ the Ruler of this world,’ ‘ the power of darkness,’ ‘ the might of the enemy,’ who ‘ holds the power of death ;’ ‘ the ancient serpent, who leads into error the whole world,’ ‘ that malignant one in whom the whole world is lying,’ ‘ the prince of the power of the air, the spirit who now works in the children of disobedience,’ who musters ‘ the principalities, the powers, the world-rulers of this life's darkness, the spirits of wickedness in ethereal places,’ to serve him in his conflict with man's flesh and blood ; in fine, for S. Paul's language goes one point beyond even that of his Master, and terms him not merely the ruler, but ‘ the God of this world,’ that is to say, this manifold idolatry is the establishment of his kingdom, the enthronement of his godhead over men, the mark of their captivity and prostration before him.”

To prevent misconception, we must observe that, in most of our previous remarks, we have been pursuing a train of thought rather suggested than distinctly followed in the work before us. Mr. Allies does not, for example, in the present volume, draw out that strongly marked contrast between heathen and Christian society which we cannot help keeping before our minds : it is rather his purpose to show the energetic and progressive action of the Gospel, its verities and its virtues, upon the repulsive and resisting materials he has described. But, following up the subject from our own point of view, these pages present us with an important figure, a splendid fossil, a moral *ichthyosaurus* of the most respectable Gentile period, in

the person of Junius Rusticus, the model minister of a model emperor, Marcus Aurelius. How true it is that "there is nothing new under the sun!" Rusticus is really a representative man, not of his own time only but in some sense even of ours. With but the proper change of costume, it needs scarcely an effort of the imagination to call him up before our mind's eye on the shady side of Pall Mall or in the garden of the Luxembourg, talking, in the latter case, philosophic common-places with the congenial Rénan, or, in the former, recognized as the light of his journal and the life of his club, a great man and a great statesman, capable of "revising" an education code, of adding a fifth quarter to the year, or perhaps of undertaking the mighty mission of suppressing the *vir* to substitute the *virago*. If this be fancy, at least it is fact that he was "a perfect specimen of the Roman gentleman and noble, a blending of all that was best in Cicero, Lælius, and Cato;" that the Emperor made him Prefect of Rome, and honoured him with the still higher title of his "friend." Nor was he a debased idolater, this excellent Rusticus; his Deism was probably of a higher and more definite type than that of some of our most *geistlich* contemporaries. In the discharge of his official duties, however—which combined in some sort those of a Lord Chief Justice, a Lord Mayor, and a Bow Street magistrate with us—this philosophic friend of an exemplary emperor is a very heathen of heathens; coarsely reviles the "wretches" of Christians who are hauled before him, and makes the roughest corporal punishment his test of truth. It is a weakness with men who are neither cultured nor sanguinary enough, to look upon his persecution of the Christians as a blot upon the otherwise estimable character of Aurelius, and the conduct of Rusticus in his official capacity will necessarily lower him in the opinion of such persons. But we are not at all sure that this is not the very point in which our modern Junii Rusticii most highly approve the example of the Emperor and his "friend."

We should have been glad, if space permitted, to make some extended reference to the chapters in which Mr. Allies traces the action of the Gnostic heresies and the Greek philosophy; but we have already said more than enough of a book that cannot fail to be in the hands of our readers.

Mary, Queen of Scots, and her Accusers. By JOHN HOSACK, Barrister-at-Law.
London and Edinburgh: Blackwood.

MR. HOSACK'S volume has reached us so close upon the eve of publication, that we are constrained, notwithstanding its exceeding interest and its especial claims on our pages, in which its subject has been so often discussed, to postpone our full review of it. The publication is most opportune, and will be welcomed by every conscientious student of history. The memory of the ill-fated Queen of Scots has been the theme of a long and still unexhausted controversy. The works of her assailants, from Buchanan to Froude, would make up no contemptible library in point of bulk; and although, as is too often the fate of the weak and unpopular, her defenders

have met with but scanty sympathy, they, too, beginning with Bishop Leslie, form a goodly series. The controversy which, from the date of the searching investigations of Goodall, Whitaker, and Tytler, had in some degree slumbered, was revived with much of its old acrimony by the publication of the new materials brought together by Prince Labanoff and other foreign collectors, and by the researches of Miss Strickland, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Burton, and others, in the state-paper offices of England and Scotland.

M. Mignet, Mr. Burton, and, still more recently, Mr. Froude, have undertaken to reconsider the case in the light of the new evidence thus collected. The judgment of these writers is decidedly adverse to the Queen; that of Mr. Froude, especially, to a degree which bespeaks passionate and almost vindictive antipathy.

Mr. Hosack, in the temperate and scholastic volume now before us, reviews the entire case, and carefully considers every portion of the evidence, ancient and modern. To this reviewal he appears to have brought all the qualifications for a calm and impartial judgment. As a Presbyterian in creed, he may be regarded as at the least free from all prepossession in favour of Queen Mary. He is a lawyer of long standing and high reputation, and his previous publications attest at once his eminently cautious and judicial temperament, and his familiarity with English and Scottish constitutional history.*

We must reserve for our review all the particulars of the investigation; here only premising, that the result is to demonstrate by every rule of judicial procedure the utterly worthless and unreliable nature of the evidence which the accusers of the Queen of Scots have urged against her, as well as, in most instances, its inconclusiveness, even if it were unexceptionable in weight and in character.

Roma Sotterranea: some account of the Roman Catacombs, especially of the Cemetery of San Callisto. Compiled from the works of Commendatore De Rossi, with the consent of the Author. By Rev. J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, D.D., President of S. Mary's College, Oscott; and Rev. W. R. BROWNLOW, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1869.

IT had long been a subject of regret that the vast store of information on the origin, the history, and the present condition of the Roman catacombs, which the learned and indefatigable explorer, Commendatore De Rossi, had brought together in his various publications, remained practically closed against ordinary inquirers into a subject, towards which even the unlearned are attracted by the touching associations which surround it, and by the profound and important interests which it involves. To many the

* "A Treatise on the Conflict of the Laws of England and Scotland." Blackwood. 1857.

language proved an insuperable difficulty; and many even of those who were sufficiently familiar with the language, were shut out by the costliness, and still more by the unpopular form of the publications.

We can hardly imagine a more acceptable service, not merely to this unlearned class, but even to the most learned of our Christian archæologists, than has been rendered by the reverend authors of the "*Roma Sotterranea*." Nor do we hesitate to say, that in describing their work as "compiled from the works of Commendatore De Rossi," they have conveyed to the reader quite too humble a representation, as well of the nature of their task as of the manner in which it has been executed. "Two courses," they write in their preface, "were open to us; either to bring out a translation from the Italian original, or to embody in a work of our own the most interesting and important facts which these volumes contain. The first would have been incomparably the easier, and in some respects the more satisfactory course. But the size and cost of such a work would have put it entirely beyond the reach of many whom we were most anxious to benefit. We therefore decided on the plan adopted in the volume which we now introduce to our readers, and which we believe will be found to contain as fair a summary as its dimensions would allow—not only of De Rossi's two volumes of '*Roma Sotterranea*,' published in 1864 and 1867, but also of many articles in his bi-monthly '*Bullettino de Archæologia Christiana*' of papers read by him before learned societies in Rome and elsewhere, and of his occasional contributions to works of others, such as the '*Spicilegium Slesmense*' of Cardinal Pitra." All this undoubtedly the "*Roma Sotterranea*" of Messrs. Northcote and Brownlow fully realizes. How much of their own they have infused into their work, we hope to show by a careful review of the volume in October.

Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682. Par CHARLES GÉRIN, Juge au Tribunal Civil de la Seine. One vol., pp. xviii.—571. 8vo. Paris: Lecoffre. 1868.

THIS unpretending volume has made a great impression in France. It could not fail to do so. The author modestly says:—

"I offer to my readers, in good faith, not a book, but the materials for a book, a collection of documents bearing upon the history of the assembly which drew up the famous propositions. It is possible that I may, some day, write the history. But I am already convinced that it will be impossible to give any complete and correct narrative of it without consulting the present volume. I do not profess to have had access to all the sources of information. One of the most precious has been closed to me, I mean the archives of the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. No one will be astonished at this. But I have done my best to supply its place, by giving the preference, in my selections from all the public collections of Paris, to documents written by the opponents of the Holy See; the papers and portfolios of the ministers of Louis XIV., of his magistrates, and of the Jansenists; and I feel certain that no one who comes after me will find anything to contradict my conclusions."

And it is not too much to say that these conclusions totally reverse the opinions hitherto prevalent upon this important historical subject, not only in England, where men were naturally led away by Protestant prejudices, but quite as much in France. People in general have seemed to think that the French clergy have always held views as to the power of the Pope contrary to those entertained by Italian divines and by the Court of Rome, that owing to the Popes pressing their claims farther and farther, the clergy of France met in 1682, and passed certain resolutions, of which the real author was the illustrious Bossuet, but which embody those ancient and consistently held opinions, and which were gladly and *ex animo* received by the whole French Church. For instance, Charles Butler, in his "Memoirs of English, Irish, and Scottish Catholics," vol. ii., p. 220, says:—

"Seventy-five years after the date of the last of the briefs of Paul V., the assembly of the Gallican clergy, in 1682, subscribed their celebrated declarations respecting the civil and temporal powers. These articles passed unanimously, and the monarch was desired to publish them throughout his kingdom. The declaration met with little opposition in France. Out of France the case was very different, and an interesting and instructive narrative might be framed of the contests to which it gave rise. It appears from [a manuscript of the celebrated Fleury] that Bossuet wisely moderated the too ardent spirit of some of the leading members of the assembly, who proposed much stronger terms for the language of the declaration than those afterwards adopted by the assembly. A good history of this interesting church document is wanting."

Charles Butler's impression is exactly what we conceive to have been general; that the declaration expressed the general and unanimous feeling of the clergy of France; that this was no temporary phase of opinion, but only what had always prevailed, and that what took place was an enthusiastic feeling, a popular movement such as might naturally be expected when a great nation, containing millions of able and cultivated minds, was eagerly vindicating against foreign usurpation liberties which it had always enjoyed. The king's part in the matter seems to have been only that he acceded to the unanimous request of the clergy, that he would give to their declarations the force of law, by publishing them in his kingdom. In particular it is clear that Butler considered the moving mind in the whole matter to have been that of the great Bossuet. And it was owing to his wisdom only that the feeling of the French Church and nation was not expressed in much stronger terms.

There is hardly a single detail in this picture which is not expressly contrary to facts which are attested by documents of unquestionable authority, hitherto unknown, and now discovered and published by M. Gérin. To begin with that upon which the whole in fact turns, the declaration was no spontaneous act of the French clergy, but reluctantly made under very strong pressure; indeed, it would by no means be an exaggeration to say, under compulsion, from the king and his ministers. More than this, it was only part of that system of tyrannous injustice and oppression by which Louis XIV. made, not only his own name, but the name of France terrible to all Europe. His foreign policy and his treatment of the Church are the

only parts of his public life which can be said to be still living. Macaulay remarks, with great truth, that the peculiar character of English political history has had an injurious effect upon our historical writers. England (thank God) has never known any violent change, like the Revolution of 1789, sweeping away all that went before it, and laying new foundations of the whole social order. Our constitution and laws, although continually modified, remain, on the whole, the same; and, therefore, a constitutional act which took place at any period however remote, may be a precedent in our own day. His own example is that the proceedings of the Lords and Commons during the practical interregnum caused by the illness of Henry VI. was appealed to as a governing precedent, when the question had to be treated during that of George III. In France, on the contrary, the Great Revolution so completely swept away all the institutions of former ages, that no part of its past history is now interesting, except in a purely literary aspect, for no sane man would think of appealing to anything before 1789 as a precedent, still less as proving what is the present law. In its political bearing this has been a great blessing to England, for it has led to our uniting in a measure not known to any other society—"revolution with prescription, progress with stability, the energy of youth with the majesty of immemorial antiquity;" the drawback is, that "as there is no country where statesmen have been so much under the influence of the past, so there is none where historians have been so much under the influence of the present." The French historian as a general rule is free from this temptation. But there is one exception, and that is, when he treats of the relations of France to foreign countries, to rival sovereigns, and especially to the Vicar of Christ; Napoleon I., Louis Philippe, and Napoleon III., would never be tempted to quote the acts of Louis XIV. as a precedent for their internal administration; but in dealing with foreign nations they claim to be his heirs, and to have a right to everything conceded to him by England, Spain, and Germany, and most especially by the Popes. And hence it is exactly upon this one question that modern French writers are under a strong temptation to be unfair. We have little doubt that warm partisans of the Second Empire will consider M. Gérin's book as an attack upon the Napoleonic régime.*

In truth, there were few of the outrages by which Napoleon I. compelled every European power to feel that between him and them there must be a struggle for life and death, for which Louis XIV. had not given him more or less precedent. Towards the Pope, in particular, almost as soon as he took into his own hands the government of France, he went to the extreme of insolence. The saintly Innocent XI., both in his temporal sovereignty and his government of the Church, was subjected to insults and outrages at the hands of the most Christian king, only surpassed by those which Pius VII. suffered from Napoleon. And it was by no means as a voluntary expression of the sentiments of the clergy of France, but solely as one of the weapons in this unholy war, that the Assembly of 1682 was both forged and

* This notice was written before the admirable article of the June "Month" had appeared.

wielded by Louis XIV., and even more by his able and unscrupulous minister Colbert. This we are clear, no moderately candid man can ever doubt again after reading M. Gérin's book. But more than this—if he reads the two first chapters he will hardly deny that the dispute between the king and the Pope had its origin, not in any ambitious attempts of the Holy Father to extend his own power, but in his refusal to make himself a partner in the grossest possible abuses, which the king and his ministers were imposing upon the Church, and opposition to which was the unquestionable duty of his office.

It was for this purpose that the Assembly of 1682 was convened. But we doubt whether many persons in France, perhaps whether any in England, are aware that that Assembly was the second which Louis XIV. had called to aid him in this very work. One and twenty years before, when he had just taken the administration into his own hands after the death of Mazarin, Louis, with the most cynical shamelessness, and without any plausible excuse, had picked a quarrel on a subject connected with the temporal government of Rome, with the Sovereign Pontiff Alexander VII. He then sent an army into Italy, and compelled the Pope to accept terms of peace, which were intentionally insulting, but which were disgraceful, no doubt, rather to the Catholic Prince who dictated them, than to the Pontiff who was forced to submit to them.

At the same time, to increase the insult to the Pope, he summoned a meeting of clergy at Paris for the purpose of voting a declaration derogatory to the authority of the Holy See, and what most strongly marks the animus of the proceeding is that the shameless quarrel with the Pope then existing having been made up the next year, the subject of the declaration was allowed to sleep for one and twenty years, and only brought up again when Louis had by the most openly tyrannical attacks upon the legal and canonical rights of the French clergy, involved himself in a new dispute with Innocent XI. Many interesting particulars as to the former assembly will be found in the introduction to M. Gérin's volume.

We need hardly say that to Catholics the religious authority of the Assembly of 1682 (whatever else might be said about it) would be absolutely nothing, even if it had really possessed the character of a national council, because its declarations were immediately pronounced null and void by Innocent XI.; a sentence which has been deliberately confirmed by Pius VI., and again by our Holy Father Pius IX. But this does not deprive M. Gérin's work of a high interest and value. We regard the question as one which touches not the doctrine of the Catholic Church, but the honour of that noble French Church, the mother of so many saints and martyrs, whose children are at this moment the most noble and most successful missionaries of the Cross of Christ, which in every time of trial has been so glorious in her deeds and sufferings, and the resurrection of which, after she had been trodden down, apparently for ever, by the Great Revolution, has been the greatest ecclesiastical event of the present century, and the happiest omen of new victories awaiting the Catholic Church in other lands, in which she is, even now, sharing the passion of her Lord. It would be impossible to think without deep pain that so glorious a Church had indeed

identified herself with a system of which Benedict XIV. declared that it is contrary to the doctrine "received everywhere save in France," and which Pius IX. has pronounced to be "contrary to the mind of the Catholic Church."

From this disgrace M. Gérin effectually clears the French Catholic body. For the Assembly of 1682 had as little claim to represent the French Church as one of the packed assemblies under Cromwell to represent the English nation. A national council consists of all the bishops of a nation. The Assembly of 1682 contained only 34 out of the 130 bishops of whom the French episcopate then consisted; and even these, so far from representing the whole body, were selected, almost without the colour of free election, by the king and his ministers. The documents published by M. Gérin on this subject are exceedingly curious and important. Letters have been preserved showing that the ministers wrote in the name of the king to different archbishops, stating what bishop the king wished to be commissioned to represent the province.

In some cases, in spite of his instructions, the electors chose some other prelate. The ministers then wrote back to them that the king's service required that, in spite of the engagements they had entered into with him, they should select another in his place. Beyond this, it does not seem that opposition went.

But even the bishops thus nominated were not left free to act at the Assembly as their consciences directed. A form of procuration was drawn up by a creature of the government, the unworthy Archbishop of Paris, and forced upon the electors, who were obliged to charge their representatives to take side against the Pope, and in favour of the king and his ministers, in the matter in dispute, and to sign whatever should be agreed upon by the majority of the Assembly for that purpose.

Lastly, we have a curious testimony to the fact that the declaration did not represent the real feeling and wish, even of the packed assembly by which it was formally adopted. M. Gérin has found a paper drawn up by the Procureur-Général de Harlay, who had been the chief manager of the affair on behalf of the king's ministers, which declares that the majority of the bishops who subscribed the four articles put their signatures to them against their will, and that "they would gladly have given a contrary opinion the next day, if they had been allowed to do so."

The result unquestionably is: first, that the "declaration" of 1682 has now for ever lost whatever weight and importance it has ever been supposed to possess, as the spontaneous expression of the opinion of an important branch of the Catholic Church in the seventeenth century; next, that the French clergy of that period are henceforth freed from the disgrace and suspicion which has long attached to them among Catholics, as if they had been little better than half-Catholics. The name of "Gallican," as attached to certain opinions, has become so strongly fixed, that it would be vain to attempt to change its meaning. But, henceforth, candid and well-informed men must feel that it has been given under a mistaken estimate of facts. It is notorious that the opinions called Gallican are not those of the French Church at the present day—that no one would think of asserting. But the result of

M. Gérin's labours is to prove that they were not those of the French clergy, at what Frenchmen love to call "the great period" of France. In fact, we much doubt whether there has ever been a day at which they would not have been indignantly repudiated by the great majority of the French clergy.

Against this, we have only to set an unhappy fact—viz., that M. Gérin proves the existence of a miserable spirit of servility among a considerable number of French prelates under Louis XIV. It cannot be doubted. But we regard this as a disgrace, not so much to the French nation or the French Church, as to the system then prevailing, and which now bears the name of the *ancien régime*. We know no reason to believe that the result of the same system would have been better among Englishmen than it actually was among Frenchmen. We should not forget that, in the time of Henry II., S. Thomas of Canterbury stood alone—the other English bishops being, to a man, on the side of the king.

This leads to another question upon which we have not space to enter here, but of which we hope to speak in our next number. One man there was whom we might have hoped to see acting under Louis XIV. the part of S. Thomas. Why cannot we give that glory to the illustrious Bossuet? Of his conduct in the matter, and of that of the king himself, we would gladly say something, if our space did not oblige us to conclude for the present.

It is most natural Protestant writers should take for granted, that the Church is responsible for acts done by professedly Catholic sovereigns, with the professed object of bringing heretics into the fold. Hence the *dragonnades* of Louis XIV. have always been charged upon her. We have little doubt they will continue to be so charged. But after the publication of M. Gérin's book it will be most unreasonable; and in fact excusable only on the plea of ignorance, and that an ignorance which a little trouble would have removed. With this view we would call especial attention to a slight skirmish between the author of the article in the "Month," to which we have already referred, and the Editor of the "Spectator," that has taken place since our own notice was in type. The "Spectator" of June 5, remarking on the article in the "Month," said: "We cannot help expressing some surprise at reading that the fall of the Bourbons is owing to their oppression of the Holy See, and especially to the conduct of the great Bourbon, Louis XIV. Is not this ungrateful to the author of the *Dragonnades*?"

The writer in the "Month" addressed, in answer to this, a letter which the "Spectator," with its usual fairness (in which it is an honourable contrast to many other papers), published in its number of June 12. We have verified the references of this letter; and we may as well add (what the writer does not mention, although we think it a curious fact) that the answer to Talon, which is not known to exist elsewhere, has been preserved among the papers of M. Harlay, who (as all readers of M. Gérin's work know) was the chief agent of Louis XIV. in his attacks upon the Holy See: so carefully was all that issued from the Pope watched by Louis and his ministers. The letter says:—

"I believe it is uncertain how far Louis was himself aware of the cruel nature of the measures carried out in his name; but it is certain that the Dragonnades, like the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, formed part of a policy pursued by his Ministers at a time when he was at issue with the Holy See, the object of which policy was to gain credit for him as a good Catholic while he was behaving in the most overbearing manner to the Pope. It is certain also that Innocent XI. disapproved both of the Dragonnades and of the Revocation, as he disapproved also of the violent measures of James II. in England; and that he was abused in consequence by the French courtiers for not being a good Catholic. The feelings of the Pope are expressed in a *brochure* put forth by his order in reply to the invectives of Talon, the Advocate-General of Louis, from which I make the following translation:— 'The reunion of all the Protestants of France to the Roman Church is doubtless a work which would have gained the king immortal glory, if the manner in which the execution of this great enterprise was undertaken had not spoiled it. The Pope could not have failed to acknowledge, not only in word, but in deed and by new favours, the great service which his Majesty would thus have rendered to the Roman Church. The Church and all her ministers would have shown him, by new marks of esteem and respect, how much she was obliged to a prince who had laboured so powerfully and so efficaciously to increase the number of her children, by causing those who had unjustly separated themselves from her to return to her bosom. But the Pope, the Church, and her most wise ministers know that an increase of people is not always an increase of joy, according to the words, "Thou hast multiplied the people, and not increased the joy" (Isaiah ix. 3). They have too much discernment to see any great cause for rejoicing in an external and apparent conversion of nearly two millions of persons, who, for the most part, have only re-entered the fold of that Church in order to stain it by an infinite number of sacrileges, and to profane all that is most holy in her by professing the Roman religion without real change of sentiments.'

"M. Gérin, from whose pages I take this quotation (320), quotes also correspondence of the time in which it is mentioned that the Pope did not like to hear of the conversions worked by the Dragonnades, saying, 'Qu'on se relevait d'une erreur pour retomber dans un autre,' and 'Qu'il ne pouvait approuver ni le motif ni les moyens de ces conversions à million, dont aucune n'était volontaire.'—I am, Sir, &c.,

"THE WRITER IN THE 'MONTH.'"

Tractatus de Sacramentis in Genere.

Tractatus de S.S. Eucharistiæ Sacramento et Sacrificio. } Auctore JOANNE

B. FRANZELIN, e Soc. Jesu in Collegio Romano S. Theologiæ Professore.
Romæ. 1868.

THESE are very remarkable books by the Professor of Theology at the Roman College. Their sobriety and dignity of tone, lucidity and piety, do honour to the school from which they proceed. We are particularly impressed with the large mindedness conspicuous throughout. There are great writers, like Petavius, who cannot draw due attention to the Fathers, without a hit at the scholastics; others again, who practically confine themselves to scholastic, and neglect patristic; a third class who, professing to treat dogma, are rather controversialists than dogmatic theologians. But

F. Franzelin appreciates equably and impartially every portion of the matter appropriate to his theme ; while he is perhaps unequalled in his constant reference at every turn to the Church's authoritative teaching. One part of the later volume will have special interest for *English Catholics*. The author's patristic side brings him across Dr. Pusey ; whose incredible misapprehensions are exposed with a merciless analysis, more withering though not more solid than that which Father Harper in England, quite independently, applied to the same remarkable subject.

In a notice like this, we must either confine ourselves to pointless generalities, or fix on some one particular for exclusive remark. For more than one reason, we are disposed to dwell a little on that portion of F. Franzelin's second treatise, which concerns the reality of the accidents remaining after the consecration. The author throughout his book is very sparing in his use of philosophical terms. He indeed rather employs theology to illustrate philosophy than philosophy to throw light on theology, though of course he does both. He quotes with approbation (p. 155, note) Father Newman's dictum in the *Apologia* :—"What do I know of substance or matter ? Just as much as the greatest philosophers, and that is nothing at all." What philosophy he uses is scholastic, and principally from Suarez. He even takes the view of the later schoolmen against S. Thomas, that a body keeping its extension might miraculously be extended in many places at once ; which, according to the school of S. Dominic, is impossible : "*Etiam per miraculum fieri non potest ut idem corpus sit in pluribus locis presentia circumscriptiva et quantitativa.*" Goudin. *Physica. Disp. 3. Qu. 4.* Faithful, however, as is our author to the schoolmen, he is by no means a slave to the past, and he completes the scholastic theory by a hypothesis which, though original in him, he says that he subsequently found to be that of Leibnitz, in his "*Systema Theologicum.*" "*Vidi postea totum hunc modum explicandi quoad rem ipsam esse eundem quo Leibnitzius voluit, 'succurrere morbo quorundam potissimum inter Reformatos' in Systemate theologico*" (p. 272, note).

This hypothesis is intended to explain the continued presence of the accidents of bread and wine after the consecration. The schoolmen had contented themselves with proving that there was no contradiction in the notion that quantity, colour, taste, and odour are really different from the substance, and therefore by the power of God may remain after the conversion of the substance into that of the Body of Christ. They had, however, not analysed in what consisted the natural connection between substance and accident, nor probed to the bottom the nature of the accidents themselves. The error of the Cartesians, who held that the accidents were mere effects on our organs, miraculously produced by God after the removal of the substance, and therefore merely subjective, obliged theologians to reconsider the matter. Our author first proves very lucidly, on theological grounds, the utter untenableness of the Cartesian view, and then proceeds to state his own hypothesis. The schoolmen had always held that the quantity of the bread remained after the consecration, and it was always a difficulty with modern views of matter to see how there could be any real distinction between matter and its quantity, so as to allow the latter to remain when the former was gone. What was this quantity apart from the substance, and consequently from the

matter, which in the scholastic view with the former makes up the substance? Our author answers that this quantity is a certain force or power of resistance, an *ἐνεργήμα*, radiating from the substance, which he calls *ἐνεργεία*. This is quite intelligible, just as it is easy to understand how the rays of light are distinct from the body of the sun. And as there is nothing inconceivable in God's maintaining miraculously the light after the destruction of the sun, so the quantity in this sense can easily be conceived to remain after the disappearance of the substance of the bread. This theory, though a development of the schoolmen, yet is a distinct move onward. It is a development out of the scholastic view of quantity; for we must banish modern quantity from our minds when we use scholastic language. Quantity is defined to be:—"Accidens extensivum seu distributivum substantiæ in varias partes integrantes." Goudin. *Logica Major*. Disp. 2. Qu. 3. In fact, scholastic quantity implies at least three modern notions, impenetrability, extension, and organization. S. Thomas, for instance, says, 4 Cont. Gentes:—"Positio quæ est ordo partium in toto, in ratione quantitatis includitur." Goudin adds: "Ista quinque, extensio, seu distributio in varias partes, occupatio loci, seu extensio ad certum locum, impenetrabilitas, divisibilitas, et mensurabilitas conveniunt substantiæ per quantitatem." Father Franzelin goes a step beyond this, and conceives it to be a positive force of resistance emanating from the substance. Again, while the schoolmen use, concerning the relation of substance to accident, such material terms as "inesse," "sustentari," our author considers the accident to be an active effect flowing from the activity of substance as a cause.

It is quite plain from this that Father Franzelin makes use of modern theories of force as an improvement and a complement of the scholastic. So high an authority as one holding his position is a model of the mode in which the schoolmen may be used. He keeps their main principles, yet he does not hesitate to improve upon and to complete them. In one sense even his theory is a correction as well as a completion. The scholastic account of materia was very confused. Our author, by making quantitas a real force, proceeding from it, gives a meaning to what seemed a mere negation.

Not content, however, with furnishing us in his own person with an instance of a legitimate development of the scholastic idea of substance, he also notices a theory which he considers as its perversion. A modern author whom he does not name propounds, in order to account for the presence of the accidents after the conversion of the substance, a new doctrine respecting substance. He makes it to consist simply in a negation. The object is a substance the moment that it is not sustained by something else; it ceases to be a substance as soon as it is so sustained, even though intrinsically it remains perfectly the same as before. The author of this hypothesis seems to have been led to adopt it by the application of Boscovich's theory to the explanation of the Blessed Sacrament. According to that view, matter being simply a collection of unextended points in space, related to each other by various combinations of mechanical movement, it becomes impossible to account for the presence of the accidents after the removal of the substance. Assuming the substance to be the points, and the accidents the result of their movement, it is inconceivable that this movement should remain, when the

thing moved is destroyed. He is, therefore, obliged to invent a theory of substance, which will allow it to be intrinsically unchanged after it has ceased to be a substance. This he effects by the negative view of substance above described. Father Franzelin objects strongly to this view, as opposed to the Council of Trent: "Sine ullo prorsus dubio Concilium docet, totum illud esse prius quod non est accidens seu species converti seu desinere per conversionem in corpus et sanguinem Domini. At juxta novam sententiam nihil entitatis desinit in pane, sed tota physica realitas manet eadem, solo modo existendi mutato; quod nunc ea realitas dicitur non esse in se, sed in altero scilicet in corpore Christi."

It is very valuable to the theologian to have in Father Franzelin's book an example at once of the right and the wrong mode of dealing with the philosophy of the schools. There is a development from it which is a lawful unfolding of its idea and a real progress. On the other hand, there is a corruption which disintegrates and destroys. On the one hand no purely mechanical or mathematical explanation of the laws of the universe is deep enough to be the basis of the doctrine of the Blessed Sacrament. On the other, we have the authority of F. Franzelin for the application of the dynamical view of matter, though under the correction of theology. Use has before been made of Leibnitz's views in a modified form, both by English and foreign writers, for the defence of the Blessed Sacrament. We are not aware however, that any authority as high as that of Father Franzelin has as yet given them his sanction.

Die Theologische Censuren. Katholik. 1869. I. 3 und 4 Heft.

THERE seems a very large concurrence of Catholic opinion, that the Vatican Council will probably put forth some definition on the Church's infallibility; and it can hardly be doubted that, if such be the fact, some important light will be thrown on that particular controversy in which this REVIEW has been especially engaged. Under these circumstances, we think it in every respect the preferable course to refrain from saying another word on the details of that controversy, until the Church may have either spoken, or else indicated her intention of not immediately speaking at all.

We are perhaps stretching a point when we apply this resolve to the particular case of Dr. Scheeben's treatise; because, whatever difference of opinion there may be on *other* kindred points, we suppose the number of English Catholics could almost be counted on one's fingers, who doubt the Church's infallibility in her various theological censures, "erroneous," "temerarious," and the like. Not to add, that the recent placing of Christmann's work on the Index may possibly have converted some even of these few. Still, though we must of course notice a treatise which the author has sent us from Germany for the express *purpose* of being noticed, it will

perhaps be better if we confine ourselves to a brief exposition of its general contents.

The treatise is made up of two articles, which have lately appeared in the *Katholik* of Mayence, of which Dr. Scheeben is the editor; and we will begin by noticing an important remark which he makes as to the authors to be consulted on the question. Among those he refers to are Montagne, "De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis," to be found in Migne's "Cursus Theol.," tom. i., and Gautier, "Prodromus ad Theol. Dogm.," in Zaccaria's "Thesaurus Theol.," vol. i. Of these he says, "The two last works are especially valuable, because their authors lived at a time when, in consequence of the acts of ecclesiastical authority,—and the warm discussions of the learned, resulting from the Jansenist controversies,—the subject appeared in a much clearer light, than at the time of the great theologians already named. This progress in the development of the doctrine is often overlooked; and the reputation of the great theologians of the classical *Sæculum Tridentinum* is indiscriminately alleged in support of views, which it was possible, indeed, to hold in their time, or rather which they had not as yet clearly and distinctly rejected, but which, in the light of later facts (especially the Bulls 'Unigenitus' and 'Pastoralis Officii' of Clement XV.), and the more sharply-defined action of the Church, remained hardly tenable any longer."

We will now give Dr. Scheeben's more important Theses:—

Thesis I. That judgment of the Church which pronounces any theological censure (supposing it to possess all the formal conditions) lays on every Catholic the obligation, in virtue of his obedience to the Church, of receiving it unconditionally; i.e., of inwardly and sincerely assenting to the censure itself, and firmly holding the censurableness and perverseness of the propositions denounced in the judgment.

Thesis II. These judgments, as regards that which they formally contain, i.e. the declaration of the censurableness, and of the particular species and manner or of the formal ground of the censurableness, are infallible; and hence the obedience above referred to demands the exclusion, not only of every practical and actual, but also of all theoretical and hypothetical doubt of the justice of the censure.

Dr. Scheeben adds that *this infallibility is so certain, that most theologians, in qualifying its denial, leave only the choice between "error" and "hæresis."*

He adds in a note an important quotation from a decree of the Council of Embrun (1727) on the subject of the "Unigenitus," and the theological censures therein contained; the Council having been "plenissimè" approved by Benedict XIII.: a quotation which has already appeared in our pages, but which it may be as well to repeat.

"Constitutio 'Unigenitus' . . . est dogmaticum definitivum, et irretractabile judicium illius Ecclesiæ, de quâ divino ore dictum est, 'portæ inferi non prevalebunt adversus eam.' Si quis igitur eidem Constitutioni corde et animo non acquiescit, aut veram et sinceram obedientiam non præstat, inter eos habeatur, qui circa fidem naufragaverunt."

Thesis III. Furthermore these censures, not only in virtue of ecclesiastical obedience, but also because of the unquestionable certainty resulting from them, impose an obligation (under pain of mortal sin) actually to reject the condemned propositions as *untrue*.

Our readers may remember that we have always considered the question an open one, whether every censured proposition is quite certainly not censurable only, but *untrue*. Dr. Scheeben however holds, that the objective falsehood of all censured propositions must be received, under pain of mortal sin, as at least morally certain. It would be too long in a notice to give his reasons. We will only add therefore, that amongst them he states that Steyart, Montagne, Regnier, and, to the best of his knowledge, all the theologians without exception who have urged the Church's censures against the Jansenist evasions, have maintained this opinion.

Thesis IV. Censures once pronounced by the Church are irreversibly binding for all time, so far as they affect the *doctrine* (as distinguished from the expressions) contained in the propositions.

"I am well aware," so Dr. Scheeben concludes his second article, "that the theses I have here maintained have been in whole or in part decried in England and Germany as 'theological extravagances.' This, no longer unusual, sort of private censure will however only be effectual, when it is accompanied by a thorough refutation of my arguments, and also by an exact assignment of the limits within which one can move *without extravagance*."

Das Oekumenische Concil. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Neue Folge. Unter Benützung römischer Mittheilungen und der Arbeiten der Civiltà. Herausgegeben von FLORIAN RIESS und KARL VON WEBER, Priestern der Gesellschaft Jesu. Freiburg in Brissgau, 1869.

THE children of the Church, as well as her enemies, are for once agreed ; both feel and know that the nineteenth general council—the first Council of the Vatican—will do a work which the former hail with joy, but which the latter hate and fear. Catholics are praying everywhere for the good issue of the Council, and learned theologians are busy teaching the unlearned what a council of Holy Church is. The present generation comes to the consideration of an old fact, as if that fact were new, because more than three centuries have passed away since the last general Council was dissolved. A very great service, therefore, is rendered to us when learned men, thoroughly saturated with the spirit of the Church, supply us with the results of their thoughts. No doubt much error has crept into many minds on this question, and many men have adopted very false notions about councils ; for it could hardly be otherwise in Europe, where anarchy has established itself as the normal state of intellect and morals. Secular law is a very potent instrument, but it is not to be trusted alone ; and that is the

only weapon which governments now recognize. It is not capable of doing the work offered it, and the consequence is either confusion, or a tyranny of the most debasing nature, called the will of the majority. For many years the men who have brought us into this condition were in the habit of saying that intellect and worth ought to reign; but as they meant nothing but their own intellect and their own worth, the end is what we see: every man is enlightened, and every man is worthy; therefore brute force has come to be the law of Europe, for no intellect will bow to another.

In these calamitous times, then, the Sovereign Pontiff has proclaimed the old doctrine that kings must reign by justice, and that the people must obey the law. He has called together from the four corners of the earth the true princes of the people of God, and He with them will send forth once more the law from out of Zion, and the word of God from Rome, the true Jerusalem. Some of the governments of this world have been startled by this act of supreme rule, and would gladly, if they dared, hinder its accomplishment. The spirit of Herod is still active; and though the godless governments of the day will not venture to slay, they will do their best to thwart, and, failing that, to worry and annoy.

The first general Council was held under the protection of the first Christian Emperor, but the nineteenth under the protection of no secular prince whatever. This is the progress of the nineteenth century. Every state in Europe has fallen away, as a state, from the profession of the faith of Christ. The world is gone back to the old paganism, and the Church has her work to do over again if the mercy of God allows the world to last long enough for her to do it.

In these days of multifarious reading and inaccurate thinking, it will do us all good, even the most faithful children of the Church, to be reminded of the truth from time to time. We shall have a keener interest in the Council if we have a clearer knowledge of its nature. It is our custom to pray, when asked, for the intentions of others; but we pray more earnestly when we know what those intentions are, and more earnestly still if we have any personal interest in them. His Holiness has summoned a General Council, and has commanded the faithful to pray for the good success of it; the faithful now, as always, obedient to the voice of the Chief Shepherd of the sheep, are doing what they have been commanded to do; and learned men, seconding the orders of the Pope, are helping us all to make those prayers more fervent by giving us the means to know what a general Council means. We are but imperfect Christians, however fervent, if we do not give up our understanding also to be guided and informed in the spirit of the Church; and the more accurate our knowledge of her powers and prerogatives, the keener will be our interest, and the more absorbing our love. There is a majesty about the house of God which captivates of itself, and the true esteem of that majesty comes ordinarily by cultivating the sense of it. Holy Church is not merely the treasury of grace from which we are daily and hourly supplied, but she is also the strong tower on earth where the Divine jurisdiction is lodged.

The summoning of a General Council is one of the highest jurisdictions conceivable; and brings out into clear light the unity of the Church, and

the sovereign authority of the Holy See. Bishops assemble diocesan, archbishops provincial synods, but a general synod can be assembled only by the Pope. His voice alone is heard in all lands. "No man," say the writers before us, No. 2, p. 15, "can have jurisdiction over another, if he is not his superior, and over the bishops of Christendom, the Pope alone is supreme." Thus it is an act of his sovereign rule this summoning of a Council, and the obedience yielded to that summoning is a witness in the highest degree to the unity of the Church. Those who do not obey are not within the fold, for "My sheep hear my voice."

The two Jesuit Fathers, to whom we owe the work before us, seem to have spared no labour, for they have begun as it were at the beginning, and mean to proceed on a definite principle to the end. They have published the Bill of Indiction with a translation, but we must express our regret that they have omitted the signatures of the cardinals. Their Eminences will be in the Council in virtue of their rank, and as they are not personally summoned themselves, their right and their high dignity would have been more evident to those unacquainted with the matter, if their share in the summons had been made clear to all. Then follows the Apostolic Letter, also translated, addressed to all those who live outside the city of God, and which many persons seem to have carelessly read, for they have said that the letter is an invitation to attend the Council. It is an invitation or a prayer to those it concerns to return into the unity of the Church; for none may sit in the Council but those whom the Pope acknowledges as his subjects.

The Fathers discuss next the nature of General Councils, of which they give the list, the objects thereof, and the probable matters which the next Council will have to entertain and determine under the guidance of the Pope. Then follows an account of the impression made on heretics and schismatics by the publication of the Bull of Indiction. This done, they enter on another matter, and treat of the theory of Councils as Canonists, and we have from them most interesting chapters on the summoning of convents—who may do so, who may be summoned, that is, who may sit therein, then the authority of the members of a Council, and who presides over them. All these questions are very lucidly yet briefly examined, and in the third number we have an essay on the relations of the Council to the Pope, and the use of them, though the Pope alone is infallible.

There is also another matter not unworthy of notice in these publications from Maria Laach; at the end of each number the Fathers give an account of books, pamphlets, and tracts which treat of the future Council, and which are almost daily appearing in some part or other of Europe. If any one who hitherto has not felt much interest in the Council soon to be held, will take the trouble to look at the Latin portions of the three numbers we are noticing, he will be surprised, certainly, at the interest other people take in it, and we hope, also, not a little ashamed of his own want of sympathy with the Church of which he is a member. The cross of the Pope is heavy, but God has spared him one cross, which was given to all of his predecessors, for at no previous time has there been so loyal and so united an Episcopate; and with the absence of this cross comes a fervent priesthood and a praying laity. It

must be a consolation to him, amidst the bitterness of his trials, to see the devotion of private persons when the powers of the world are either hostile or hold aloof. The anarchic doctrines which civil governments have encouraged for their own ends are like "crows coming home to roost," and the result is, that the Pope's supremacy shines forth daily more and more, that men, distrusting their own governments, look out for something stable and solid, and they can find nothing in the whole world to answer their expectations but the Rock of Peter.

Catholic Higher Education. A Letter to the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, Reprinted with a P.S. By JOHN GILLOW, D.D. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS letter appeared in our last number. On occasion of publishing it we expressed a few comments on it, and we have added a few more in a preceding article. Here, therefore, we will but heartily recommend it to our readers' most careful attention.

Brief Exposition of the Origin, Progress, and Marks of the True Religion. By HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL GERDIL. Translated by EDMOND W. O'MAHONY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Longmans.

THIS little work draws out clearly (as was to be expected from its distinguished writer) the ordinary historical arguments for the Church's divine authority. The author traces her origin up to the creation of the world; he speaks (p. 9) of those "just men" "who continued in regular succession," and "kept alive" "faith in God" and in the promised Redeemer; he recounts God's covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (pp. 10, 11); and continues the history of the Jews up to the appearance of our Blessed Lord (pp. 10-20). At this period, says the Cardinal, it was generally understood by the Jews that the appointed time had arrived for the Messiah; and a great number of impostors therefore successively appeared which had not before been the case. God the Son also became incarnate and founded the Church on S. Peter (p. 25).

This Church exists in our own days. It is one, Catholic, and Apostolic; and can be no other therefore than the Roman. Take e. g. the great Eastern schism (p. 69). The Eastern schismatics themselves admit, and must admit, that the Roman Church was orthodox before their separation from her: the question therefore is, which of the two societies has changed? No one can allege, that the Roman Church differed in any one respect immediately

after the schism, from what she had been immediately before that calamity ; whereas the Photians made a most vital change, by rejecting the Roman jure divino primacy from their creed. Hence it was their society, and not the other, which apostatized from the true Church.

The whole essay will repay perusal ; and English Catholics are indebted to Mr. O'Mahony, for making it accessible to those who are not familiar with Italian.

The Present Position of the High Church Party in the Established Church of England. By WILLIAM MASKELL, A.M. London : Longmans.

IT is Mr. Maskell's great merit, that he clings with firmest tenacity to his point, about the royal supremacy, and about the consequent absence from Anglicanism of all consistent dogmatic authoritative teaching. His present volume contains two essays, which he published nearly twenty years ago on those themes, and which (it may be almost said) no one has ever *professed* to answer ; and he has now added the review of a recent Anglican work—a review which will be found equally overwhelming in its refutation of error.

Yet it seems to us, that his Preface leaves Mr. Maskell open to a reply *ad hominem* ; that on two different subjects (if we rightly understand him) his own position is to the full as logically inconsistent, as is the very Anglican theory which he so successfully opposes. In one of these however, we cannot be at all sure that we rightly apprehend his meaning ; and as it is more vital even than the other, we will begin by quoting the whole paragraph to which we refer. It concerns, primarily, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

“ This, as a doctrine, always appeared to me to flow, naturally and as a most certain consequence, from a right acceptance of the tremendous mystery of the Incarnation. Nevertheless, in earlier days, men who rank amongst the highest and most saintly of Christian doctors did not so regard it. In our own time, the consent of all theologians had long been unanimous upon the question, and the demand everywhere for a definition of it had continually grown more and more urgent. So much so, that when the decree or bull of 1854 was published it seemed to add but little to the certainty of the doctrine. An Ecumenical Council has been summoned, and will soon meet at Rome. We cannot imagine that it will separate without a further testimony and witness—equal in authority with the voice of God Himself—to the truth of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception” (pp. 7, 8).

After the best consideration we can give this paragraph—and particularly taking it in connection with that which follows—we cannot but understand the author to lay down, that the Immaculate Conception is not yet taught infallibly by the Church as of faith, and will not be so taught until some

future Ecumenical Council shall have declared it. We proceed at once to give our reasons for so interpreting his words ; but it will give us the sincerest pleasure (we need not say) if he utterly repudiates our interpretation.

He says distinctly, that when a Council declares this dogma, such declaration will be a testimony equal in authority with the voice of God Himself.

But most assuredly, whenever a dogma first receives such a testimony as this, its "certainty" is indefinitely greater than it was before.

Yet the Bull of 1854, says Mr. Maskell, "seemed to *add but little* to the dogma's certainty." Indubitably therefore, he does not consider the Bull "*Ineffabilis*" as having given an infallible testimony.

Now as regards the strict logical wording of the passage, Mr. Maskell may hold that the *subsequent reception of this Bull by the Episcopate* did testify the dogma infallibly. If this is his meaning—and we sincerely hope it is—there is no cause of complaint ; for Gallicanism is undoubtedly as yet a tolerated opinion. But it will be observed, that the author has been profoundly silent on this episcopal reception of the Bull ; and every reader will admit that the paragraph, in its more obvious sense, points to the *Vatican Council* as to that authority, which will for the first time teach infallibly the Immaculate Conception. And this view of Mr. Maskell's meaning is made the more probable, because he at once goes on to say that "the whole question" of the Immaculate Conception "has been put" "most clearly" by a living theologian, when that theologian speaks of a *Council* as "the normal seat of infallibility." We shall presently defend the theologian cited ; but here we are saying, that we cannot see how the reference to his words has any meaning, unless Mr. Maskell intended to advocate that very opinion against which we protest.

Now every bishop and every priest throughout the Catholic Church teaches, that the Immaculate Conception is at this moment obligatory as of faith. If therefore we rightly understand Mr. Maskell, we cannot see how (on his view) the position of Anglicans would be logically bettered by their becoming Catholics. Mr. Maskell invites them into a communion, wherein (on his own showing) the whole body of teachers, without exception, impose a dogma as of faith, which has never been so declared by any competent authority. Surely if this were the case, Anglican converts to the Church would be placed under a spiritual yoke, even heavier than that by which they have before been oppressed.

We are most unwilling to suppose that Mr. Maskell can deliberately intend to deny the infallibility of the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* ; and we will for the present therefore say no more. We must at once however point out, that if he intends to credit *F. Newman* with this doctrine, he fundamentally mistakes the whole passage on which he relies. We confess indeed frankly, that we cannot quite accept *F. Newman's* words in calling "the Pope in Ecumenical Council" "the normal seat of infallibility": because it is only for some grave and exceptional crisis that a Council commonly meets, whereas the Church's infallibility is ever active and unintermittent. But it is most certain, that when *F. Newman* says "normal," he is as far as possible from meaning "exclusive." Take this very dogma itself, the Immaculate Conception. *F. Newman* throughout (of course) takes for

granted that it has been infallibly declared of faith. Then he speaks (p. 396) of "the various theses condemned by Popes, and their dogmatic decisions generally," as indubitably falling within the sphere of infallibility; while he admits them to be much more numerous than the canons of Councils. Moreover, in his second letter on Anglican ordinations, he says (we speak from memory) that the Pope, *ex cathedrâ*, can decide the question infallibly; and if *that* question, then of course, *à fortiori*, questions more strictly dogmatical.

The second particular on which we have to criticise Mr. Maskell, is his language about the Pope's temporal principedom.

"No one," he says, "can believe this to be essential, in the slightest degree, to the just authority, and some may doubt whether even to the well-being, of the Catholic Church. To myself it is almost a matter of indifference. I can find no claim which the Holy Father has to his earthly dominion other than, or beyond, that of any other sovereign of Europe. As it seems, he has the same right, neither more nor less than they: in other words, neither his nor theirs is a Divine right. It is for the people of the Roman States to decide whether they are content to remain under his government or not. No reason has yet been shown why they are not entitled to change it, if they think it well to do so, just as much as Frenchmen half a dozen times this century, or Englishmen in 1688" (p. 7).

On this point, at all events, Mr. Maskell has left no possibility of doubt as to his meaning. Yet even on this point there is room for doubt on *another* head; there is room for doubt whether he is aware what has been taught by ecclesiastical authority on the subject. And here also therefore, we cannot but hope that on maturer reflection he will heartily wish the paragraph unwritten.

1. We would first entreat his attention to the following passage, from the Allocution "*Maxima quidem*" delivered by Pius IX. on June 9th, 1862:—

"It is a pleasure on this subject to commemorate the truly marvellous agreement, with which you yourselves, together with the other our venerable brethren the bishops of the Catholic world, have never ceased both in letters to ourselves and in pastoral letters to the faithful, . . . from teaching, that this civil principedom of the Holy See was given to the Roman Pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence; and that it is *necessary*, in order that the same Roman Pontiff, never subject to any prince or civil power, may be able to exercise with fullest liberty [his] supreme [spiritual] authority, . . . and provide for the greater good of Church and faithful."

It is truly significant, that from unacquaintance with this and similar documents, Mr. Maskell has been betrayed into saying that "*no one can believe*" what the Pope and whole Episcopate not only believe but *teach*. Surely indeed Mr. Maskell must know enough of what is commonly said by devout Catholics, to make it most surprising that he can have ventured on such a statement. We will pass on however to our general argument.

In the above recited sentence Pius IX. says by undeniable implication (1) that the question of this civil principedom is one on which it is within the competence of Pope and bishops to pronounce; (2) that the bishops of the

whole Church have on this head agreed with him ; and (3) that they have accordingly pronounced on it a very definite judgment. Moreover this judgment, as Mr. Maskell will be the first to confess, is directly contradictory to his own opinion. Now in his last essay, he urgently dwells on the absence of *dogmatic teaching* in the Establishment, as a reason for Anglicans leaving its communion. But what is his own argumentative position ? He entreats them to leave a body in which the united Episcopate teaches *no* doctrine, for one in which the united Episcopate teaches *false* doctrine.

2. But further, the Pontiff has not only testified that the whole Ecclesia Docens is united in teaching that doctrine which Mr. Maskell denies, but has also distinctly declared an *obligation* of holding it as incumbent on all Catholics. Cardinal Antonelli, acting avowedly as Pius IX.'s mouth-piece, sent to all bishops the well-known Syllabus ; in which it is declared, that "all Catholics are bound (debent) to *hold most firmly*" that "doctrine concerning the Roman Pontiff's civil principedom," which is "clearly laid down" in six Pontifical Acts there mentioned. In these Acts Pius IX. teaches, that this principedom was ordered by Divine Providence that the Pope might have that liberty which is "*required*" for his spiritual office ("Quibus quantisque") ; which is "so *necessary* for the flock's salvation" ("Si semper") : that the principedom "has a spiritual character from its relation to the Church's good" ("cum Catholica") : that all Catholics should unite against any effort to overthrow it (*ib.*) ; that the aggressive acts of its assailants are *de jure* "plainly null and void" ("Novos et ante") : that Victor Emmanuel's "spoliation" of the Roman territory was "nefarious and sacrilegious" ("Jamdudum cernimus"). All this, Mr. Maskell will probably admit, is tantamount to declaring, that the Pope's right to the States of the Church is inviolable : a proposition against which Mr. Maskell however inveighs, as contradictory to the rights of "the people of the Roman States," or in other words as contradictory to true morality.

A very large number of bishops, as is well known, have expressed unreserved assent to the Pontiff's teaching in the Syllabus ; nor has any one bishop (we believe) publicly protested against it. According to Mr. Maskell therefore, Pope and bishops unite in declaring their subjects *obliged* to hold a certain doctrine, which is not only false, but contrary to sound morality.

Lastly, we would press on Mr. Maskell's attention the letter written on this subject by Card. Caterini, at Pius IX.'s command. This letter was translated in the "Month" of February ; and Mr. Maskell's preface induces us to give it what further publicity we can, by appending the translation to our present number. A certain priest, it appears, had denied "the necessity and fitness" of the Pope's civil principedom ; alleging this "doctrine" to be "new," and "of recent introduction." He had been enjoined by his bishop to sign a retraction of his error, but had hitherto refused. Cardinal Caterini, writing by Pius IX.'s command, enlarges on "the inviolability, fitness, and necessity," "the strict necessity," of this principedom. He urges that the doctrine, rejected by the priest in question, had been taught by "the Roman Pontiff and the bishops ; in other words, by the whole Catholic Church" : and that to reject it is to incur "the dread sentence pronounced on those who refuse to 'hear the Church.'" The priest was convinced by this letter ; and came to his

bishop, "mourning and sighing and begging absolution." May the same document in the present instance produce a similar effect !

We will not say more in our present number, as to the propositions which we have mentioned. It is quite probable that we may have mistaken Mr. Maskell's meaning on the first head, and that he is not himself fully aware of the Church's teaching on the second. We are most unwilling to suppose, that one who writes so ably and with so hearty a will against the Anglican imposture,—who shows himself (see pp. 10–17) so indignantly intolerant of domestic disaffection to the Church,—shall have deliberately and with full knowledge placed himself in a position, which is no less logically self-contradictory than ecclesiastically rebellious and disloyal.

The Month. May, 1869. London : Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

WE should much weary our readers, if we drained every controversy to its last dregs ; if we rejoined on every fresh reply, and replied to every fresh rejoinder. Although therefore we cannot profess to think that the "Month" writer has treated us at all justly,* in his remarks from p. 393 to p. 395, we will not pursue the matter in detail. But he asks two straightforward questions, which claim at our hands a distinct answer.

1. He wishes to know what doctrinal view we attributed to Mr. Liddon, which could justify the interpretation we thought imaginable of the "Month's" comment on that gentleman. We should say that Mr. Liddon's doctrinal view is quite obvious, both from his words and from his well-known agreement with Dr. Pusey. He considers that the Apostles taught the Church the whole body of dogma which they had received from God ; and that the Church of subsequent ages possesses no infallibility, except only in *testifying* that body of dogma. He protested accordingly against any "assumption, in the modern Church, of some power to discern and proclaim truths altogether unknown to the Church of the Apostles." To this the "Month" replied in August, that "The Church does not assume, and never has assumed, any power to 'discern and proclaim truths altogether unknown to the Church of the Apostles'": thus repeating Mr. Liddon's very words.† We still think that

* We do not doubt, of course, that his *intentions* have been perfectly just.

† The whole sentence runs thus :—"The very passage from the Bull, 'Ineffabilis Deus,' which he quotes, shows in the most distinct manner that the Church does not assume, &c., &c." We are now aware that the "Month" writer lays much stress on these earlier words, as interpreting the later ; and indeed, as we said in October (p. 547), they enabled us to *guess* that he intended the later in a restricted sense : but we cannot admit that this sense is the obvious or legitimate one, so far as regards language and context. Mr. Liddon denies, not only the Church's power of teaching such further truths as *de fide*, but quite as strongly her power of infallibly discerning, proclaiming, and enforcing them *at all*. Surely our contemporary's sentence in its obvious

"the obvious and grammatical sense" of these words, in themselves and still more in their context,—apart from the "Month's" well-known character,—would imply agreement with Mr. Liddon, as to the extent of infallibility which the post-Apostolical Church possesses. We still think, as we said in January, that had it not been for the explanation which our criticism elicited from our contemporary in November, "his words would have been widely considered as a pointed declaration on what he himself accounts the unorthodox side." And this the rather, because (as we proceeded to point out in January) he had up to that time felt it his duty, for reasons which he then assigned, to give no opinion on the recent infallibility controversy.

2. Our critic wishes to know the meaning of a note appended to p. 47 of our January number. This question also we can very easily answer. To say that all the Church's post-Apostolic infallible determinations "are simply the unravelling of matter given by" the Apostles, would be to imply that these determinations are entirely confined to teaching either the Faith or deductions therefrom. But such a doctrine is most unsound and pernicious; because the Church—as the note points out—"often puts forth infallible determinations" of a different kind, "for the purpose of *protecting* the Deposit." Take the very instance we have so often given; the thesis, that Jansenius's book equivalently contained five certain propositions. Who could say that the infallible determination of this thesis is "simply the unravelling of matter given by" the Apostles? And so with numberless other cases.

The "Month" apparently draws some inference, from a purely gratuitous supposition as to the respective authorship of text and note in this article. Such a comment is certainly unusual, and does not seem to us quite legitimate. But if we rightly understand our contemporary's meaning, his impression of fact is quite mistaken. The whole article—text and notes—was printed precisely as it finally left the writer's hands; and the whole—we still include notes as well as text—expresses his deliberate judgment.

We have expressed on more than one occasion—last of all in a preceding article—our great unwillingness to appear in any kind of antagonism with the "Month": for we thoroughly sympathize with its general principles, we are most grateful for the ability with which it supports them, and we have the sincerest respect for its conductors. But it still fastens on us a charge of (unintentional yet) idiosyncratic and habitual unfairness. We cannot consent, either by words or by silence, to be understood for a moment as admitting, that there are any solid grounds for an accusation which is certainly serious.

drift would be understood as declaring, (1) that Mr. Liddon is quite right in his doctrinal *principle*; but (2), that the definition of 1854—as is proved by the "*Ineffabilis*"—in no way *contravened* that principle.

The Carlow College Magazine. Nos. I. and II. Carlow : M. Fitzsimons.

THIS is one of those enterprises of which we may say that it is better to have dared and failed than never to have dared at all. We must not be understood, however, as playing the part of Calchas by this remark ; we really see no reason why the "Carlow College Magazine" should not have a long career of success. Relying for contributions not only on present but also on past Carlovians, it is likely to command the services of many writers of ability ; and the two numbers before us give very fair promise of literary excellence. Some of the subjects are evidently beyond the range of the schoolboy mind ; and, if they are to be placed to the credit of the present residents of the College, seem more likely to have come from those who "rear the tender thought" than from the tender thinkers themselves. Most of the papers bear marks of the immaturity which almost invariably characterizes the products of youthful minds : but they will not be read with the less interest on that account ; and they prove that the writers are capable, with time and culture, of distinguishing themselves highly in the field of intellectual endeavour. The verses are far above the average of fugitive pieces of that kind : those on "My Garden," in No. I., are not undeserving of the name of poetry. The very severe young gentleman, who gives us the contents of his "Satchel," is right in denouncing the faults of Cockney pronunciation, though they are not those into which his contributors are likely to fall. But how does he excuse himself, under the circumstances, for such an offence as this?—"Y. Z. No *wise head* would perpetrate such folly." Does the word "head" begin with an "h" *mute*?

The first number contains a philosophical article, evincing no traces whatever of juvenility, but on the contrary displaying much maturity and power of thought. The great value and thoughtfulness of many remarks incidentally expressed in this article, make us the more regret that we are obliged to protest emphatically against its general thesis. In fact, we cannot understand the writer's words in p. 15 as expressing any other doctrine, than that which Dr. Meynell himself (p. 3) admits to have been "pronounced by the authorities at Rome unsafe to be taught ;" viz., that "man enjoys in this life a direct and immediate cognition of God."

The article however is most interesting ; and contains so many incidental remarks of great truth and importance, that we hope to consider it at greater length in October, in connection with Dr. Meynell's pamphlet. For the present we will only draw attention to a letter which appeared in the "Tablet" of June 19th, pointing out that the writer is mistaken as to what he says about the Jesuit Fathers in p. 13. The "Tablet" correspondent states that, whatever may have been formerly the case, at present no ontologistic teaching is permitted in any college of the Society.

The Barnet Magazine. Vol. II. Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE "Barnet Magazine" has reached the completion of its second year, and is now before us, bound in one convenient little volume. We have, on a former occasion, called attention to the excellence of its aim, and to the effective manner in which it is conducted by its editor, the Rev. F. Bampfild, the priest of Barnet. We are glad to find that a recommendation which we gave in these pages last year has found acceptance; and that the substance of this interesting and instructive periodical is transferred to several local magazines which have been established in connection with it and with the Catholic Truth Society during the past year. We trust that it will become still more widely known and localized. We understand that arrangements can be made with the Catholic Truth Society, by any mission or district which is desirous of having its own local Catholic magazine; so that, at the least possible cost, and with great efficiency, even poor missions can secure to themselves their own Catholic local magazine.

First Letter to Very Rev. J. H. Newman, D.D. By Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. London: Rivingtons.

WE must do Dr. Pusey the justice to say, that in two respects this book is a great improvement on the original Eirenicon: for (1) it contains no one thing throughout, calculated to give Catholics unnecessary pain; and (2) it speaks strongly on the greatness of our Blessed Lady, and on the veneration with which Christians should regard her. The title-page mentions "the reverential love due to the ever blessed Theotokos"; and in p. 21 the author testifies that she is "raised above" angels, archangels, cherubim, and seraphim.

Otherwise the volume is most unsatisfactory. So far as regards our Blessed Lady, Dr. Pusey's former volume dwelt on two totally distinct matters: viz. (1) her Immaculate Conception; and (2) the devotion to her sanctioned by the Roman Catholic Church. Now F. Newman devoted his pamphlet almost exclusively to the latter of these two subjects; on the former he hardly spoke, beyond giving a singularly lucid exposition of the defined dogma: whereas *F. Harper* entered into the whole of Dr. Pusey's argument on the Immaculate Conception with such complete success, that his volume has been unanimously accepted by Catholics, as their reply to Dr. Pusey on that particular theme. One might have expected then that Dr. Pusey would reply, either to *F. Harper* on the Immaculate Conception, or to *F. Newman* on Marian Devotion: but no one except himself would have written a letter to *F. Newman*, turning almost exclusively on the question which was peculiarly in *F. Harper's* hands. The whole 518

pages, excepting only the first 50, concern the Immaculate Conception; and yet we cannot find the most distant allusion in them to F. Harper's reply. At the end appears an advertisement of some work as "in the press," which is to contain "an appendix in answer to Rev. J. Harper's strictures." But then the very volume before us has been more than two years in the press; and we cannot therefore accept such an advertisement as any proof, that Dr. Pusey has even *begun* his study of F. Harper. We shall not trouble ourselves then to examine Dr. Pusey's argument on this dogma—we shall not even trouble ourselves to find out what that argument *is*—until we receive his promised Appendix.

We will only note therefore, under this head, the author's continued bewilderment on the meaning of the Church's definition. We assure him—as he has been quite fruitlessly assured again and again—that there is literally no second opinion among Catholics as to what has been defined. F. Newman, F. Harper, Mgr. Dupanloup (p. 51) have in vain endeavoured to hammer this into Dr. Pusey's head; and we shall make no further attempt to do so. Undoubtedly many Catholics hold (p. 51) that "the Blessed Virgin did not die in Adam; that she did not come under the penalty of the fall." We ourselves argued for this opinion in October, 1866, pp. 476-489. But none of its advocates ever dreamed that the Church has *defined* any such doctrine; though they may consider that the "Ineffabilis" has, in some respects, given it indirect confirmation. We should imagine there would be no difficulty whatever—if any important object were thereby gained—in obtaining from Rome an authentic declaration, of what it is which the Church has defined *de fide* under the name of the Immaculate Conception.

Dr. Pusey repeats (p. 14) his reference to the condemned writer Oswald. He again declares (p. 15) that the unsound doctrine of that writer had been maintained by Cornelius a Lapide and F. Faber, and that it is implied in an alleged "revelation to S. Ignatius Loyola." We pointed out in October, 1866, (pp. 491-494: see also January, 1867, pp. 219, 220) that Dr. Pusey "confused Oswald's tenet with another, which differs from it in every relevant particular." But we might as well have spoken to the wind. It is Dr. Pusey's peculiar way of controversy (but no one else's) first to make a grossly inaccurate statement; and, secondly, after some time has elapsed, to repeat it with an air of calm and unshaken confidence, which would give all readers the impression that no one in the interval has ventured to contradict it. We have no doubt, in fact, that Dr. Pusey was unaware of any one *having* contradicted it. But surely he has no right to engage in controversy without acquainting himself with what his opponents allege. Nor in this case was any recondite research needed; for our very table of contents mentioned "the error of supposing" Mary "co-present in the Eucharist."

Similarly as to his comment on Marian practical devotion. We devoted a whole article to the subject in July, 1866, with special reference to his objections; and he has so simply ignored our comments, that we might republish the whole without changing a word, as our reply under this head to his present letter.

It will assist indeed perhaps in bringing the matter to a point, if we do reprint a portion of our former article. F. Newman had made the excellent

remark, that there can be no more secure standard to a Catholic of the genuine Marian devotion recommended for all, than the language of those prayers which the Church has indulged. We gave therefore a few extracts from F. St. John's translation of the "Raccolta"; and we here reprint those extracts, italicizing the same words which we italicized before.

"When at length my hour is come, then do thou, Mary, *my hope*, be thyself my aid in those great troubles wherewith my soul will be encompassed. *Strengthen me*, that I may not despair when the enemy sets my sins before my face. Obtain for me at that moment grace *to invoke thee often*, so that I may breathe forth my spirit with *thine own sweet name* and that of thy most holy Son upon my lips" (p. 183).

"*In thee let the Holy Church find safe shelter*; protect it, and be its sweet asylum, its tower of strength, impregnable against every inroad of its enemies. Be thou *the road leading to Jesus*; be thou *the channel whereby we receive all graces needful for our salvation*. Be thou our help in need, our comfort in trouble, our strength in temptation, our refuge in persecution, our aid in all dangers; but especially in the last struggle of our life, at the moment of our death, when all hell shall be unchained against us to snatch away our souls,—in that dread moment, that hour so terrible, whereon our eternity depends, ah, yes, most tender Virgin, do thou, then, make us feel how great is the sweetness of thy Mother's Heart, and the power of thy might with the Heart of Jesus, by opening for us a safe refuge in the very fount of mercy itself, that so one day we too may join with thee in Paradise in praising that same Heart of Jesus for ever and for ever" (p. 179).

"Oh Mary. . . . *I shall assuredly be lost if I abandon thee*. . . . It is impossible for that man to perish who faithfully recommends himself to thee" (p. 184).

"I would I had a greater love, a more tender love: this thou must gain for me, since *to love thee is a great mark of predestination*, and a grace which God grants to those who shall be saved" (p. 185).

"Thou, Mary, art *the stewardess of every grace which God vouchsafes to give us sinners*, and therefore did He make thee so mighty, rich, and kind, that thou mightest succour us. I will that I may be saved: in thy hands I place my eternal salvation, to thee I consign my soul. I will be associated with those who are thy special servants; reject me not. *Thou goest up and down seeking the wretched to console them*. Cast not away, then, a wretched sinner who has recourse to thee. Speak for me, Mary; thy Son grants what thou askest" (pp. 186-7).

"My Queen! my Mother! *I give thee all myself*; and to show my devotion to thee, *I consecrate to thee this day my eyes, ears, mouth, heart, myself wholly, and without reserve*. Wherefore, O loving Mother, as I am thine own, keep me, defend me, as *thy property, and thy own possession*."

"Ejaculation in any Temptation.

"My Queen, my Mother! remember *I am thine own*.

"Keep me, defend me, as *thy property, thy own possession*" (p. 197).

"Accept what we offer, grant us what we ask, *pardon us what we fear*; for *thou art the sole hope of sinners*. Through thee we hope for the forgiveness of our faults; and in thee, most blessed one, is the hope of our reward. Holy Mary, succour the wretched, help the faint-hearted, comfort the sorrowful, pray for the people, shield the clergy, intercede for the devout female sex, let all feel thy help who celebrate thy holy commemoration.

Be thou at hand, ready to aid our prayers, when we pray ; and return to us laden with the answers we desire. Make it thy care, blessed one, to intercede ever for the people of God—thou who didst deserve to bear the Redeemer of the world, who liveth and reigneth for ever and ever” (p. 199).

“O Joseph, help us with thy prayers to be of the number of those who, *by the merits of Jesus and his Virgin Mother, shall be partakers of the resurrection to glory”* (pp. 274-5).

“O Joseph, obtain for us, that, *being entirely devoted to the service of Jesus and Mary, we may live and die for them alone”* (p. 275).

“O Joseph, obtain for us, that, having our hearts freed from idle fears, we may enjoy the peace of a tranquil conscience, *dwelling safely with Jesus and Mary, and dying at last in their arms”* (p. 275).

We argued in our former article—we venture to think incontrovertibly—that the use of such phrases as these is in no respect inconsistent with the most jealously exclusive devotion of heart to God and to Christ. Our purpose in citing them here, is merely to ask Dr. Pusey this simple question. Does he, or does he not, count such devotions as these—and the doctrines therein implied—among those against which he desires protection? If he does not, the whole controversy is at an end; for there is no one Catholic through the length and breadth of Christendom, who would desire to press on him any stronger Marian doctrine or devotion than these.

But let us suppose that Dr. Pusey does object to these devotions, on the grounds which he has given; and let us see what his position would be on such an hypothesis. The Church in communion with Rome has been appointed by God the one exclusive and the infallible guide of Christians to sanctification and salvation. Until Dr. Pusey admits this, he could not be received into the Church by any priest whomsoever. He is requiring then this infallible Church to confess, that she has energetically stimulated devotions, which are out of harmony with Scripture and tradition, and which tend to obscure men's remembrance of their Creator and Redeemer. And he is further requiring her to discountenance authoritatively, in certain portions of her domain, the use of prayers which she has thus earnestly recommended. Such a proposal is truly characteristic of its author: for he always seems unable so much as to apprehend what is *meant*, by Christians learning their religion from a Church, instead of deriving it from their own private examination of Scripture and Antiquity.

In one respect, and one alone, the author seems to us argumentatively successful. We never could ourselves understand the force of F. Newman's argument, that the Catholic authors whom Dr. Pusey principally cited were foreigners and not Englishmen. Except the condemned writer Oswald, Dr. Pusey's two chief authorities were S. Alphonsus and the Venerable Grignon de Montfort. Dr. Pusey warmly objected to the sanction which the writings of these holy men received from the Catholic Church. How were these objections met by the fact that one was an Italian and the other a Frenchman? At all events Dr. Pusey now points out, that English translations of both authors had appeared under grave English Catholic sanction. And we may add indeed, that an Irish translation of Montfort's treatise appeared quite independently, at the very time when F. Faber was

bringing out his own edition in England of that illustrious and saintly writer's work.

A Catholic has recently observed, that the original Eirenicon caused a temporary excitement; but that now it lives not in men's minds at all, except indirectly through the replies to which it gave birth. We augur a still less brilliant fate for the present volume. It is so colourless and feeble, that we cannot imagine there will be the smallest or most temporary excitement caused by its publication.

Some Aspects of the Reformation. By J. G. CAZENOVE, M.A. Oxon.
London: Ridgway.

AS this volume has been sent to us, we suppose we ought to notice it, though we hardly know what to say. It leaves nothing to be desired in the way of temperance and charitableness; but as to its substance, Mr. Cazenove belongs to that school, which we have more difficulty in understanding than any other whatsoever, Protestant, Deistic, or atheistic. Protestant private judgment is most intelligible: every one is to arrive at his own religious or irreligious views, by his own philosophical, historical, and critical investigations. On the other hand, the Catholic doctrine of authority is most intelligible: the Church in communion with Rome is divinely guaranteed as teacher of Truth; and those who desire Truth, must embrace those doctrines which she explicitly or implicitly teaches. But what can we say to persons, who profess to repudiate private judgment, and yet make their own historical investigations as simply the one norm of their belief as does the wildest Protestant or rationalist? We can only rejoice at the amount of orthodox doctrine which they accidentally hold; observe with sympathy and respect the various indications which they present of sincere piety; and hope and pray that they may be brought by divine grace to a more humble and more reasonable way of thinking.

The Corean Martyrs. By Canon SHORTLAND.

The Life of Henry Dorié, Martyr. By the Abbé FERDINAND BAUDRY.
Translated by Lady HERBERT. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is difficult to say which is the more interesting of these two fascinating little narratives, possessing as they do so much of the romance of fiction, while in reality consisting of noble facts. The first is a sketch of the progress of Christianity in Corea, through the labours and deaths of its

martyr-missionaries ; the second is the separate life of one of these heroes, and we must say that, short as it is, we seldom remember a more stirring biography. The accounts of Corea, its natives and language, given in these two volumes are beyond anything curious. The Chinese nation—and we mean to include in it races so near and resembling it so closely as the Japanese and Corean—has always been a singular mystery, uniting as it does the extremes of luxurious civilization and idolatrous barbarism. The Coreans however appear to be decidedly less sophisticated than their neighbours of the Celestial Empire, and in consequence, present a better soil to receive the seed cast in by the missionary. Whether the moving spring was the tractability of the Corean character, the destitution of all spiritual assistance under which the natives suffered, or the martyr's crown ever hovering over that jealously exclusive peninsula, certain it is, that when Corea was in question, the enthusiasm of missionaries knew no bounds. Some waited patiently for years before they could effect an entrance into this longed-for field of labours.

"The Corea!" exclaimed Mgr. Berneux, when appointed its Vicar Apostolic, "that land of martyrs! The very name thrills through the heart of the missionary. Who would not rejoice to enter, now that the door is at last opened?" When Father Dorié had been appointed to this perilous mission, he wrote to his old vicar:—"Rejoice with me at the good news—the great news. My mission has been decided. I go to the Corea with three of my companions. Thank God for me for being allowed to undertake such a glorious work."

Father Dorié's history, with its romantic incidents, and the simple gaiety of heart which he displayed in all circumstances, is singularly captivating. We have to thank Lady Herbert for so natural and flowing a translation, that it is difficult to believe in the French original. We cannot attempt to give our readers any true idea of this novel in real life—they must judge for themselves by its perusal. In a recent sermon for our English Foreign Missionary College, the Archbishop selected some stirring extracts from Father Dorié's life, which will have proved its best advertisement.

One practical hint, before closing this notice. We cannot help being struck by the *date* of these glorious martyrdoms. The year 1866 is no such very distant epoch. We can all remember the little commonplace joys and sorrows with which our minds were occupied in that year as in other previous and succeeding years. Does it not seem marvellous that while we were eating our breakfasts and dinners, taking our walks and our railway journeys, with hardly a thought bestowed out of our own country, these heroic missionaries were undergoing perils, finally tortures and death, which we are too apt to imagine were extinguished with the life of the last Pagan Emperor of Rome? It is certainly not to be expected that the ladies and gentlemen of England should take ship for the Corea in the hope of evangelizing it or dying in the attempt; but even for our own satisfaction, would it not relieve us of a certain painful feeling of selfishness if we took our natural and legitimate part in this great work? Our own personal and bodily labours are not even called for, but our support of the labours of others

by prayers and alms, does seem but the natural result of professing Catholic Christianity.

Life of Sœur Marie, the Workwoman of Liège. By the Author of "Wild Times," "Nellie Netterville," &c. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

SUCH little books as the one before us cannot fail to be of great value in adding to the little collection of ascetical reading which is felt as so great a want amongst Catholics. The life is a peculiarly interesting one, and reminds us in some ways of a little biography put together a few years ago by the able pen of Lady Georgina Fullerton, a life rare from its simple and hidden but deep sanctity,—we mean the life of Elizabeth Twiddy. If we might be allowed to offer a criticism on Sœur Marie's biography, we could wish that this authoress, as well as others of great merit, though we would not include Lady G. Fullerton in our criticism, had copied the beautiful simplicity of some of our earlier writers of the lives of the saints. Who that has read the ancient life of S. Catherine of Sienna, by her confessor the blessed Raymond of Capua, can forget, amidst its quaint language, the exalted piety of the writer, who, entirely carried away by the contemplation of the seraphic beauty of the soul he describes, forgets himself and the style of his own language, until that very self-oblivion and enthusiasm creates a style and language unrivalled in its force, greatness, and simplicity. Did modern writers throw themselves heart and soul into the saintliness of the character they describe, they would need fewer metaphors, ornaments, and italics. But this little book is, as we have already said, so truly good, pious, and valuable in itself, and so really interesting, that we are unwilling to add words of criticism where praise is so well earned.

The Double Sacrifice: a Tale of Castelfidardo. Translated from the Flemish of the Rev. S. Daems. London: John Philp, 7, Orchard Street, Portman Square.

WE cannot well imagine anything better calculated than this effective little book to inspire Catholics with a real enthusiasm for that heroic body, the Pontifical Zouaves, who have been so aptly compared to the Crusaders of former days. Great truth and reality are given to the descriptions of camp life among these true members of the Church militant, by introducing the actual letters of a young Zouave, Henry Woodward, whose family is celebrated among English Catholics for having given the Holy Father two brave soldiers already. The account of the Battle of Castelfidardo is beyond anything stirring. It is given with the spirit and enthusiasm of a true son of the Church; while it is consoling to reflect, when reading it, that

the melancholy issue of that brave struggle has been more than cancelled by the glories of Mentana. The narrative is probably intended chiefly as a vehicle for loyal sentiments, and to enlist the reader's sympathy more warmly in the life of the Pontifical Zouaves than would be possible unless interest were in some degree centred in individual characters. It displays many graceful ideas, but is on the whole decidedly weak. Still, the delineation of the lives of two or three fictitious personages is of little moment compared with the real and deep interest which Catholics will feel in perusing so faithful and loyal a portraiture of the lives led and the dangers risked by these holy Papal volunteers.

Correspondence.

ON A LIBERAL EDUCATION IN ITS BEARING ON MENTAL DISCIPLINE AND CULTURE.

To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

MY DEAR SIR,—The character and conditions of a sound liberal education are questions of such vital importance to our social welfare, and are, moreover, so closely connected with the best interests of Christian and Catholic faith and morality, that I shall make no other apology than such as is indicated by the nature of the subject itself for offering a few remarks in the way of supplement to the able letter of Dr. Gillow in the last number of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

It must be matter of satisfaction to all Catholics to hear, on the testimony of so competent a witness, that in our great colleges an education is imparted to the higher students which, in a mere literary point of view, may challenge advantageous comparison with that of Oxford itself; and imparted, as we all know, in the presence of those safeguards of religion and morality which are fast vanishing even from the theory of Protestant educational discipline. I for one feel no difficulty in believing that the examination of the London University, in which our Catholic students are so often distinguished, may be even a better criterion of a certain kind of information than the corresponding examination at Oxford. As respects that for the ordinary degree, or what is called the pass examination, there are *à priori* reasons, apart from the evidence of facts, why such should be the case. The view which used to prevail, and still I believe prevails at Oxford, assigns a great importance to a three years' residence in college, independently altogether of the examination to which it leads. Hence, whether rightly or wrongly, it is not, or at least used not to be thought desirable to place the B.A. degree beyond the reach of young men of very moderate intellectual capacity, who may avail themselves with average diligence of the opportunities of improvement which every good college supplies. This view of the case had its evil as well as its good tendencies, since it would occasionally give an undue advantage to young men of greater ability who, by dint of natural cleverness and previously acquired scholarship, might succeed in passing the examination after a college life of comparative idleness. It is, however, fair to add, that in every well regulated college young men of this latter class would be urged by all possible inducements to study for honours. Still, on the whole, the case which Dr. Gillow supposes to be common was certainly not rare, of the B.A.

degree being obtained with very little trouble and very moderate acquirements. In London, on the other hand, where no residence is required as a condition of the degree, the examination is not, as at Oxford, a mere feature, however important, in the academical course, but the beginning and end of what the University has to bestow upon those of its members who receive their education at a distance. An Oxford graduate means a man who has passed through Oxford with all those literary and social advantages which public opinion attributes to that University. A graduate of the London University, on the contrary, means a man who has passed the examination with credit and success. This distinction cannot, I think, fail to invest the mere examination with a greater importance than it possesses at Oxford, and to create a corresponding desire on the part of those who determine its character, that success in it shall never be otherwise than a certain badge of literary merit, according to that particular standard of merit which they propose to themselves. I am here all along speaking of the pass examination, for in that which is the qualification for honours, the distinction which I suppose to exist between Oxford and London does not hold good. In the former university, the award of literary honours is determined as strictly by the character of the examination as can possibly be the case in London. Whether, therefore, in this instance also the advantage be on the side of the latter or at any rate there be no clear advantage on the side of Oxford, is a point on which Dr. Gillow is likely to be a better judge than myself. For while I know but little of the present character of the examination for honours at Oxford, and have only a very imperfect idea of that of the corresponding examinations in London, he is at all events fully and experimentally acquainted with the latter, and very probably knows much more than I do of the former. I am quite prepared therefore to accept his testimony on this part of the subject also ; more especially when I remember that the professors and examiners of the London University include in their number some of the most eminent men of the day, while those at Oxford are necessarily selected from a narrower circle.

But there is a far more important question than that of the variety and amount of the knowledge which these examinations presuppose, and that is, the character of the education which they tend to promote. On this part of the subject I own that I have my misgivings. It appears to me that the whole current of public opinion is at present in favour of a style of liberal education materially different from that which we were accustomed to prize in our old Oxford days. I do not by any means intend to apply this remark to the higher class education given in our great Catholic colleges. I know, for instance, that Stonyhurst possesses among its teachers more than one Oxford man of the old school, whose influence cannot fail to infuse somewhat of their own spirit into the classes they instruct. I know too that Ushaw, even in by-gone days, laid the foundation of the education of Cardinal Wiseman who, of all the hereditary Catholics I have happened to meet, seemed to me to come nearest to the old Oxford type in the character of his learning and accomplishments. On the other hand, the connexion which these colleges regard it as important to maintain with the London University must necessarily produce a certain influence on the character of

their higher education, though whether sufficient to assimilate it to the London type, I am unable to say. At any rate, the recent success of an Oscott student in obtaining the highest literary honours at Oxford is a proof that between the present Oxford system and that which prevails at our great colleges there can be no material diversity; and the college in question has the further guarantee of its solidarity with old Oxford in the circumstance of possessing one of the more distinguished of her sons as its president. But it is time for me to indicate my view of the difference in point of character which exists between what I have called the old Oxford type of liberal education and that which is favoured by the public opinion of the present day, which finds its correspondence in the kind of education encouraged by the examinations of the London University and towards which modern Oxford itself is apparently gravitating with great velocity. I shall content myself with calling to your remembrance the theory of a liberal education with which you and I were familiar in our Oxford days, and upon which the education we ourselves received, whatever its faults or flaws, and however, in my own case at least, unworthily represented, was avowedly based.

We were always taught to consider that the great end of a liberal education was not so much to store the mind with a certain amount of knowledge, as to form its character by subjecting it to a certain salutary discipline, and laying the foundation of those habits of accurate thought, adequate expression, discriminative judgment, and cultivated taste, which constitute the true difference between a more and less highly educated man. It was held that the period of academical education was too short to allow of doing more than laying the foundation and furnishing the materials of an edifice which a life is not long enough to construct and adorn; but that at the age when the mind is most pliant, and its energies most vigorous, great advances may be made in this work of preparation and promise. The alternative was considered to lie between teaching much imperfectly, or a little well, and no doubt was felt that the latter side of this alternative was the one which it was best to carry out. Hence the educational reformer strenuously contended that an Oxford education was narrow and illiberal, and was regularly met with the rejoinder that the one for which he pleaded was shallow and latitudinarian. It is quite possible, or rather very probable, that in our day what I have called the Oxford view was carried to excess, and I think that even we remained long enough in the university to witness some useful modifications of it. I began Oxford life some eight or ten years before you, and when I went up for my examination the "curriculum" of study was certainly very limited. A good examination in the Ethics and Rhetoric of Aristotle, with some minor philosophical treatise; in Herodotus, Thucydides, and part of Xenophon for Greek history; in Livy alone for Roman, with a prescribed number of Greek and Latin poets, with Aldrich's Logic, and scholarship enough for rendering a hardish passage of the *Spectator* into classical Latinity, and power of English composition enough to write an ingenious essay on some historical subject, was all that was required for an average first class in *Litteris Humanioribus*. The standard of the mathematical examination for honours was, I believe, equally restricted, but of this I cannot speak from experience. Ten or

fifteen years later such a list of books as the above would have been hardly sufficient for a good second class. The Politics of Aristotle had become almost a *sine qua non* for a first class, in addition to the Ethics and Rhetoric. Bishop Butler's "Analogy" and Sermons were added in the way of commentary on the Ethics. Several treatises of Plato were commonly taken up in addition. Roman history was supplemented by Tacitus. Aristophanes was considered almost essential as a repertory of idiomatic and colloquial Greek, as well as of information on Athenian manners and institutions. Whately's Logic followed on Aldrich, and the Organon of Aristotle on Whately, while the range of poetry was enlarged, and no man had a chance of a first class who could not render English prose into correct Greek as well as elegant Latin. This was undoubtedly a considerable expansion of books, though not of subjects, nor did it in any way affect the characteristic principles of Oxford education. It rendered the highest classical honours of the university difficult of attainment to all but men of a certain intellectual *calibre*, and impossible of attainment to those who did not work steadily during the whole of their undergraduate career, and vigorously towards its close. Still it did not enlarge the basis of the academical studies. It gave no entrance, excepting most incidentally, to modern languages, modern history, modern politics, or modern philosophy, all of which have, since our time, been brought within the reach of Oxford students, and some of them raised into essential conditions of honourable distinction.

It will thus be seen that an Oxford education in former days was confined to four subjects, or, strictly speaking, to three, for the fourth was almost involved in the rest. These were :—1. Ancient philosophy. 2. Ancient history. 3. Ancient poetry ; and, 4. A knowledge of the ancient classical languages not only in their grammatical properties but in their idiomatic peculiarities.

If it be asked why the number of subjects was thus restricted, and why the ancient was preferred to the modern elucidation of them, the first of these questions has been already answered by observing that, according to what I have called the Oxford theory, such limitation was necessary to guard against the evils of a diffuse and superficial knowledge. To the second I will reply by reminding my reader that limitation implies selection, and that it is therefore no argument against the choice of subjects which Oxford actually made to urge that there are many of great value which she discarded as parts of her regular course. The question still remains as to the grounds on which she preferred the ancient to the modern representation of the subjects thus selected ; since, as to those subjects in themselves, all will probably admit that the choice, since choice there must be, could hardly have been improved. One great inducement for preferring the ancient to the modern treatment no doubt was, that the acquisition of the two great languages of classical antiquity would proceed *pari passu* with the acquisition of knowledge on the subjects of which those languages formed the vehicle. It will hardly be contended, I will not say by any scholar, but by any philosopher, that as a discipline of the mind the mastery of any modern language is to be compared with that of the Greek ; while, even as a key to the most popular of modern languages (to say nothing of

the language of the Church) the advantage of a thorough command of Latin can hardly be overrated. Again, if ethical philosophy is to form an important part of a liberal education, undoubtedly I should greatly prefer its being studied on the principles and in conformity with the dogmas of the Catholic religion to any other mode of inculcating it. But here I must remind you once for all that I am not defending the old Oxford theory of education as the best possible, but only as incomparably better than that which is popular in the present day, and, I will even add, as one which I think would rather need to be supplemented than supplanted by the ingredients of a really Catholic education. I mean that its essential character should, I think, be preserved, amid whatever changes in form and circumstance. Supposing then a course of strictly Catholic philosophy to be out of the question, as out of the question it plainly was at Oxford, I think it will be admitted that the university of our time showed its wisdom in preferring that of the Aristotelian School to some of those modern systems which in later times have gone far to take its place. The very fact of the Church having received that school as the best exponent of moral truth as far as it can be ascertained by the light of natural reason and conscience, and having constructed her own great fabric of moral theology upon the basis of its principles, is a sufficient proof in favour of the instinct which led the Oxford of a more religious age to make that philosophy the text of her ethical teaching. In fact, she regarded her philosophical as an auxiliary to her religious education, and would no more have thought of opening the door of youthful speculation to the influence of heretical systems on the one subject than on the other. In principle, though not of course in fact, her teaching was orthodox in both departments alike, and the questions which modern philosophers, in the flood of Christian light, have raised on such matters as human freedom and responsibility would no more have been allowed to enter as debateable ground into the systematic course of her teaching on philosophy, than would the student in divinity have been expected to acquaint himself with the views of infidels and sceptics on the miracles of the Old and New Testaments. It was in strict keeping with those principles of education which I have all along ascribed to the Oxford of twenty or thirty years ago, to teach even secular subjects on a certain system, and to confine speculation upon them as far as possible within a certain groove, though of course it was always impossible, and was never considered necessary, to restrict the range of extra academical reading by any other conditions than such as the conscience of the student, enlightened by the public opinion of the University, might impose. You will, I am sure, bear me out in testifying to the very high moral tone of this public opinion, as well as to the fact of its having been formed to a most material extent by the character of Oxford education. You will remember that this public opinion not merely prevailed among the men of older standing, but even pervaded the most influential classes of the undergraduate community, and this even in their most popular gatherings, and most unrestrained social intercourse.

I may refer especially to the uniformly high tone which distinguished that great Union Society in which so many of our present orators and statesmen

laid the foundation of their future success ; and I think you will also bear me out in saying that among the undergraduates with whom you and I were best acquainted at Balliol conversation of a sceptical or immoral character would have been immediately put down, or pointedly discouraged in any company in which their influence was felt.

The subject of history, like that of philosophy, was also in our time limited to the ancient branch of it. In the examination for open Fellowships questions in modern history were occasionally given, but never, as far as I remember, in the schools. It was of course competent to a candidate for honours to introduce references to modern history in the way of illustration in his paper work. But such reference to it was quite gratuitous, and in no way necessary to the attainment of honours. The reasons for confining the examination to ancient history were very much the same as those which led to the corresponding limitation in ethical and political science, with the exception of such as may have been founded on the dangerous character of free speculation on moral and semi-religious subjects. It was evidently thought undesirable to tempt the student into a field of research which, on account of the very interest belonging to it, might draw off his attention from subjects which the university chose to consider as a more healthful exercise of his intellectual energies. There was also, as you will recollect, a strong prejudice in the minds of many influential persons against encouraging a taste for modern politics, and hence the debates of the Union Society were for a long time connived at rather than openly sanctioned. I am not defending this view of the Oxford authorities, but merely referring to it as some explanation of their unwillingness to encourage as part of the academical course a study so intimately connected with modern politics as that of modern history. The dread of a diffuse and desultory kind of reading, however, was a better reason for the limitation ; especially as modern history, so far as it is a drama in which the principles of an unchanging human nature have their free play, is substantially a reproduction of its ancient counterpart. From the instructive pages of the thoughtful and far-sighted Thucydides the student might derive those maxims of political wisdom, many of which find their recognition in more modern theories of politics, and those exhibitions of human crime or human weakness which are illustrated alike by the history of all times.

In the department of Poetry, the third of those comprised in the Oxford education, there would have been still less excuse than in those of Philosophy and History, for deviating into modern pastures. Every Oxford man of sufficient capacity to try for honours would probably be familiar with the best specimens of English elegant literature, and especially of English poetry, and might fairly be left to himself for all reading of that kind without any other academical encouragement to it than such as was furnished by the Newdegate Prize. Moreover, in all the best colleges the tutors, or at least some of them (as, for instance, my kind friend, Dr. Bull), were men of accomplishment and general reading, and it was the admirable characteristic of the Oxford system, that it established a personal tie between the teacher and the pupil, which gave scope for a great deal of that private intercourse and influence which the mere lectures of a professor do not ordinarily allow.

As far, therefore, as related to the public examination, and to the course of instruction which it helped to form, the ancient poets were the great models upon which the taste of the student, as distinguished from his more exclusively intellectual faculties, was cultivated. The choice was surely a happy one, for there is no province of the sublime and beautiful which those models do not go to fill up. They also conferred the twofold benefit of teaching the ancient languages and forming the taste; and the great majority of them (though of course not without serious exceptions), could be read without the slightest danger to purity of morals.

Here I must throw in a few remarks on the much maligned exercise of Latin verse composition. I cannot but regard the opinions which prevail against it in the minds of many men of the present generation as evidence that between them and those whose view of a liberal education I greatly prefer there exists an essential contrariety which runs through every department of the subject to which it relates. It seems to be thought nowadays that no education is valuable which cannot be tested by direct results in kind.

The whole *instrumental* use, as I may call it, of a liberal education, its use, I mean, in relation to mental character and mental habits of thought and judgment, is apt to be overlooked, or at all events to be made of secondary, whereas I venture to regard it as of primary importance. A well-educated man, in my humble opinion, is one whose education not merely provides him with an abundance of rational resources, but enables him to set forth his knowledge to the best advantage, imparts to him the power of critical discernment and selection, the keen perception of the truly beautiful, and those especial qualities which, whether comprehended under the *αἰσθητικὴ* of the Greeks, *judicium* of the Romans, or our English word "taste," is one of those fruits of education which no amount of mere knowledge can supply or secure. It is at this point that the intellectual province of education touches upon the ethical, and though I am of course as far as possible from saying that the education which tends to the formation of these mental habits, or the improvement of these mental faculties, is to be confounded with what we understand by moral training, yet I do think that the character of mind it goes to create is one which falls in far more readily with a higher kind of discipline than that which regards the intellect alone as that part of our nature with which education, properly so called, is exclusively concerned. I cannot better illustrate my sense of the value of the Oxford education of former times, than by adverting to some of its more prominent specimens among distinguished men of the present day. These specimens shall consist entirely of Oxonians of high academical distinction, but none of whom remained at the university as teachers or students for any length of time after taking their degrees; and I prefer to limit my selection to this number, because it answers an objection made by Dr. Gillow to the Oxford system, that it appears to advantage only or chiefly in those who have remained on as tutors or resident Fellows. My test of the typical Oxford education would be found in such men as the following—a motley class indeed, if judged by any other standard than that by which I here propose to try them, but all of them, though in very various degrees, men of that peculiar educational stamp which distinguishes them,

and, as I am inclined to think, with advantage, from the creations of a more modern school. Here then is my list, and I will arrange it, as far as may be, according to the academical standing of the distinguished men whom it includes : Sir John Taylor Coleridge, Dean Milman, Lord Derby, the late Lord Carlisle, Lord Devon, Mr. Gladstone, Archbishop Manning, Sir Roundell Palmer, the late Lords Elgin and Canning, Mr. Allies, Sir Stafford Northcote. I should of course add Dr. Faber, but that he remained in the university some time after he took his degree. Here then are some dozen Oxford men, chosen as representatives of a far larger class, who, amid whatever great diversities in other respects, agree in that peculiar character of mind which has enabled them to turn their talents, whether in the pulpit, in the senate, at the bar, or in the press, to the greatest practical advantage, and whose scholarship, although in particular instances probably its direct results have evaporated under the pressure of professional occupations, or lost their freshness by mere lapse of time, has left its indelible traces in those perceptive and discriminative faculties by means of which its power is extended to many a subject beyond itself. Many an Oxford man who would find it a hard matter in his later years to extricate the meaning of a crabbed passage in the "Agamemnon" or the eighth book of Thucydides from the meshes of a corrupted text, will yet give unquestionable proofs in his public appearances of the mental discipline which those early processes have contributed to form, as well as of the mental cultivation that has followed upon the academical studies in the retrospect of which those processes do not constitute one of the most attractive features.

And now to return to the subject of Latin verse composition. It is the best possible illustration of my argument, because, as the objectors to it truly remind us, not one man in a hundred, or perhaps a thousand, ever writes a copy of Latin verses after he leaves school or the university. There have no doubt been exceptions to this rule ; I think Mr. Canning and Lord Wellesley were among them, and, for aught I know, there may be many others. Still the exceptions are certainly not numerous enough to affect the rule. Now I will concede thus much to my opponents, that I think it just as great a mistake to persevere in teaching all the boys in a school to write Latin verses, as to make all the girls in a family learn music. I would do in the former case as the wisest parents do in the latter ; that is to say, practise the whole number up to a certain point, and then pick out those for further instruction who exhibit sufficient capacity or inclination for the work. Nothing certainly can be more absurd than trying to hammer uncongenial accomplishments into the minds of those who show no kind of aptitude for them. Still I do not see how, in the scholastic instance any more than in the domestic, you can get at your choice specimens without first trying all round. The question then is, whether the circumstance of Latin verse composition being generally barren of direct results in after life, is any argument against making it an element in a liberal education, and I humbly conceive that it is not. I hold that original composition of some sort is a *sine quâ non* towards acquiring a thorough knowledge of a language. By a thorough knowledge of a language I mean, not merely a correct grammatical acquaintance with it, but an acquaintance with its idiomatic characteristics, and what I may call its

genius. The genius of the Greek is as different from that of the Latin as that of the English from that of the French or Italian, and the mere fact of a person being able to render Greek and Latin into the corresponding English phrase is no necessary proof that he has mastered the spirit of each language. Now the poetry of all languages has a genius of its own as compared with their prose; and if, as I suppose, no one would pretend that a competent knowledge of the Latin language can be acquired without the exercise of original Latin prose composition, then it follows that composition in verse is also necessary towards acquiring a just appreciation of the beauties of Latin poetry. In fact, the habit of this exercise has a twofold advantage; both as it gives an especial interest and a peculiar zest to the study of the Latin poets, and as in turn it reflects a new light upon them, and adds a new charm to that study. I am old enough to remember the fame of Lord Derby's strikingly original Latin prize poem on "Syracuse" which he had recited a year or two before I went into residence at Christ Church. I remember also Lord Carlisle's (then Mr. Howard's) less able but equally classical poem on the Eleusinian Mysteries, and intermediate between them was poor W. Churton's exquisite prize poem on the Newtonian System, in which he describes the theory of gravitation and the mutual action of the centrifugal and centripetal forces in hexameters which are equal to anything in Lucretius. Here are some of them, and I shall be surprised if every scholar do not agree in this opinion. I have noted by italics the phrases which seem to me peculiarly felicitous:—

"Binæ adeo (duplex astris quæ causa movendis),
 Primitus impressæ vires : quarum altera recto ;
 Quò ferat impulsus, perstat propellere motu,
 Altera, qua medium cupide connixa petissunt.
Par ambas vigor, atque æque librata potestas
Inter se tenet oppositas ; ita mutua litem
Componunt adversa, et opus miscetur in unum.
 Stellæ igitur primum dederat quam dextra Moventis
 Cuique viam, æternum tenuisset, et avia longe
 Raptasset sine lege fugam ; at refrænât ab alto
Subtile imperium Solis, reprimitque coercens
 Multa renitentem. Hinc demum media inter utramque
 Curvatis via fit spatiis ; *redit error in orbem,*
Et sua perpetuo relegunt vestigia gyro."

In quite a different style the following lines in the same poem, in which, from the subject of the Georgium Sidus, the poet apostrophizes the poor old blind and benighted king who gave his name to Herschel's discovery, and whose death was then fresh in the memory of the British public, are as beautiful as anything I can conceive in the way of tender and delicate sentiment cast in the mould of classical Latinity. Of course we are not to judge them too rigorously in the light of Catholic theology:—

"Tu nunc, sancta anima, et meritum præmia nactus,
 Morborum ærumnis, *et mentis nocte sepulta*
 Permutas cæli jubar immortale, tuorumque
 Alloquio frueri, et ruptos conjungis amores.

Parta tibi requies : nos portu distinet æquor
 Undosum, et fessos jactant hinc inde procellæ.
 Te vero devincti animis, te, dum tua lucet
 Stella polo, semper grato sub corde foverentes,
 Ingenium moresque aureos, memorande, colemus."

Now your matter-of-fact men will never convince me that it was time thrown away to educate a boy in a practice which enabled him at the age of nineteen or twenty to produce such lines as these, in which are indicated not merely great clearness of thought and great delicacy of feeling, but an extraordinary power of transfusing those qualities into the idiomatic phrase of an ancient language, even under the limitations of metrical composition. It will of course be said that I am here illustrating a rule by a great exception. But I think that such an exception is enough to justify the rule when we remember that it is but one, though a striking one, out of many ; and that the necessity of the rule, under the restrictions I have already put upon it, is implied in every such exception.

But a classical education of the kind here supposed may serve even a higher purpose. Whatever tends to deepen and purify the love of the truly beautiful, may come to minister under proper guidance to the aid even of the religious affections. True religion and the highest kind of beauty are never otherwise than coincident, and work on one another by a power of mutual attraction. Those, for example, whose instincts have been educated according to the standard of the truly beautiful, will study the Holy Scriptures under the advantage of a new sense, akin to that which opens the treasures of music to such as possess a musical ear. I much doubt whether the "Christian Year" could have been written, except by a "typical Oxford man," to use an expression which Dr. Newman, in his "Apologia," applies most kindly, but less correctly, to another. But it is in the Catholic Church, even aliens to her communion being witnesses, that our natural attractions towards the beautiful find their most eloquent response. How many of her hymns, for example, though certainly not framed upon the strictly classical model, appeal by their intrinsic beauty to the cultivated perceptions, even of those who are drawn to them by no special religious prepossessions ! Even her complicated ceremonial, which to uneducated and vulgar minds presents no idea but that of unmeaning confusion, is full of beauty to observers trained by their education to understand the conditions on which true beauty depends. That which to the non-Catholic is often no more than a matter of esthetic pleasure, becomes with a Catholic a powerful aid to devotion. There is not a sentence in the Missal and Breviary, nor a provision, how minute soever in the Rubrics which regulate the outward development of the heaven-taught literature which those volumes comprise, that may not suggest some calming or elevating thought ; and I am convinced that an education such as Oxford once gave, had a tendency to dispose the mind in favour of such impressions. I am far from thinking that the same is true of that which she offers now. Not to speak of the change which a quarter of a century has wrought in the religious and moral tone of that University, the classical scholarship which, even before I ceased to be connected with Oxford, was coming into vogue, and which

I believe is now in the ascendant, tended to give a great preference to the merely critical, over what I may call the esthetical study of ancient literature. This kind of scholarship may, I conceive, be as injurious to the religious instincts of which I am here speaking, as the other is favourable to them, by stiffening the rule upon which our critical perceptions are formed, and thus subjecting what does not come up to the strict requirements of that rule to the squeamish contempt of a dainty and supercilious fastidiousness.

The three respects then in which the old theory of Oxford education seems to me to possess a great advantage over that which is now going far towards superseding it, are—1. That, in as much as a scholastic or academical education is necessarily limited in point of time, and can therefore do no more than start a man on a course of mental improvement, which must be carried to perfection in after life, it is right to make the depth of the teaching an object of greater importance than its breadth, and consequently to aim at teaching a few things well, rather than many things less well. 2. That the end of a liberal education is not merely to store the mind with knowledge, but to give it a certain tone and character by means of that knowledge. 3. That education, if it is to be anything better than a means of worldly distinction and a temptation to individual pride, should be conducted on what we understand, and what I think the Oxford of a former time also understood, by a kind of instinct which served it so far in the place of a more enlightened faith, as the *dogmatic* principle.

Under the two former heads I have little more to say. "Non omnia possumus omnes," is a truth that suggests not only a humbling reflection, but an important rule of action. Nature, or rather its Divine Author, has suggested the fitness of concentrating our energies on those subjects which fall in with our special aptitudes, rather than of attempting to diffuse them over a wider range. The tendency of modern systems of education is in an opposite direction, and appears to presume that every one of a certain capacity and intelligence can do everything in the world, if he do but only make the attempt. A clever man now-a-days seems to think that he loses *caste* in intellectual society, by acknowledging his ignorance on matters to which he has no natural aptitude or attraction. It is a weakness of our nature, long ago noticed by Aristotle, that the qualities or attainments in which we do not shine, are precisely those which we most wish to have ascribed to us. The candid avowal of ignorance is one of the most indisputable tokens of true knowledge; whereas there are people in the world who scarcely like to confess that they could not compose an oratorio or navigate a ship across the Atlantic.

I should almost fear that I had exaggerated the tendencies of certain modern systems of education towards weakening and diluting the mental energies by diffusion, did I not find that my views on this subject are entirely shared by intelligent persons, whom public opinion will readily acquit of those prejudices which are thought to be inherent in the clerical character. On the subject to which I refer, I have said nothing which is not absolute milk and water, in comparison with an article in the "Saturday Review" of a week or two back, on which I have happened to light. This

article is headed, "The London University Matriculation Examination," and occurs in the impression of Saturday, April 3. I shall make use of it only so far as to quote from it the series of questions proposed to candidates for admission to the University in January, 1868. Here then they follow, or at least a sufficient number of them. "1st. Who were the *Ærarii*? What is the action and construction of the common pump? How do you distinguish between a gerund and a gerundive? How do you express 17lb. 10oz. 6dwts. 15grs. as a decimal of 1lb. troy? What is meant by frankpledge, escuage, danelagh, and escheats? How is it that a convex lens of short focal length enables one to see minute objects magnified? What is the Latin for 'He sent ambassadors to seek for peace'? How do you insert a given number of arithmetical means between two given quantities? What is the difference between the logical and the grammatical division of a proposition? How do you decline *bos* in the singular and plural? How do you (on certain data) calculate the percentage composition of ammonia? How do you inscribe a circle in a given triangle? Draw a map of Great Britain. What is the first person present indicative active of *ἰσθῆναι*? How do you write the feminine of *bon*? How much anhydrous phosphoric acid is formed by the combustion of one gramme of phosphorus?"

Now, that any body of men in their sober senses, and far more that such a body of men as those who govern the London University, should suppose that the power of answering questions like these is a test of education in any true sense of the word is one of those exceptional phenomena which baffle all calculation. Of course I do not mean to say that all these questions are equally grotesque, but taking them one with another, and especially taking such an aggregate of them as would be necessary for passing the ordeal of the examination, it is not too much to say of them that, while many a well-educated man in the kingdom could not have answered them, a youth who had been skilfully "coached" for the examination might have succeeded in passing it without anything more than such a smattering of knowledge as does not constitute true education at all. If such questions be taken, as I suppose they fairly may be taken, as a test of the kind of education which the London University wishes to encourage in young men of seventeen or eighteen, I certainly agree with the writer of the "Saturday Review" that the duties for which such a training is most fitted to prepare youth are those of the sub-editor of a second-rate newspaper, who is expected to possess knowledge enough on every conceivable subject to satisfy the inquiries of his various correspondents. One would really think that the highest object of education, so far as we may be allowed to interpret it by the light of such specimens, is not to fit men for the effective use of the talents with which Divine Providence has furnished them, but to erect them into a body of walking encyclopedias. Could I believe that the result of a connection with the London University would be that of assimilating our own liberal education to such a standard, I should deprecate it as one of the greatest calamities of the time. For the reasons, however, that I have given in an earlier part of this letter, I am willing to take a less unfavourable view of it. Still I cannot but think, with the Saturday Reviewer, that the effect of such examinations, even in a mere literary point of view, must be that of warping the education

imparted in all colleges which are affiliated to the London University, or prepare their students for entrance into it.

I come now to the last of the three specified characteristics of the old Oxford system, which I have called its dogmatic principle. In the London University, which avowedly holds itself aloof from all religious preferences, or in the language of the present day from all denominational distinctions, we shall of course look in vain for the recognition of any such principle. But I suppose that it is not yet avowedly set aside in many of those schools, whether of the Established Church or various Dissenting communions, which send up scholars as candidates for the advantages offered by that university, while it is superfluous to add that education on the basis of a definite creed is regarded as a first principle in every Catholic school and college. I cannot therefore help feeling anxious for some such representation of a liberal education among ourselves as may secure its professional and social benefits upon the only terms which Christians, not to say Catholics, can permanently sanction. If students be taught to aim as an object of ambition at success in examinations which are conducted not only without reference to religion but with an avowed exclusion of it, I cannot but fear that even the safeguards of a Catholic college will hardly avail, against the power of this habitual temptation, to impress them with the great truth, that religion is not a mere professional matter, but the informing principle of all conduct, and the ultimate test of all true knowledge. Still and far more do I fear the consequence of subjecting Christian students to examinations on a subject so closely bordering on religion itself as that of moral philosophy, which avowedly encourage, and even make essential to success, the study of that subject under heretical and even atheistical aspects. And here I will say in passing that I am quite at a loss to understand how those who object, and as I think rightly object, to Catholics taking advantage of the Oxford examination, although without the condition of residence, can yet see no corresponding evil in taking a similar advantage of the examinations in philosophy at the London University. I am aware that the language held both at Oxford and in London goes to justify the belief that the examinations in both places are perfectly impartial, and that it is not the preference of one system over another which the student might exhibit in his replies, but merely the evidence that he had studied all with profit, which would determine his success. This profession is I have no doubt sincere, though I feel considerable apprehension that the mind of an examiner would be imperceptibly biased, and in a certain sense even legitimately so, in favour of the system which he espouses, and that he would be apt to regard the opposite view not merely as philosophically untrue, but as intellectually feeble. Even, however, if the fact be quite otherwise, I consider that it does not meet the objection which lies against familiarizing youthful minds, at an age when religious principles are not formed but only in the course of formation, with speculations which are intrinsically false, no matter by what ability supported.

Here, however, I have been led for the moment to deviate from my proper subject, which is that of contrasting two rival systems of education not so much from a religious as from a practical point of view. My present objec-

tion to that which I have recently illustrated by a somewhat extreme instance, is not that it fails as a religious education, to which it does not pretend, but that it fails as tried by the standard of sound education, to which it professes to be conformed. It not only divorces the cultivation of the intellect from that of the moral faculties, and thus omits to deal with human nature in its complex character, but it fails also to cultivate even the intellect in any valuable way. It overloads the mind at a tender age with food beyond its powers of digestion, instead of contenting itself with providing such healthy and invigorating nutriment as may strengthen its powers and fit them for future use.

The same restriction of subject precludes me from entering at any length upon the great problem of our time, which is that of adjusting the conditions of a liberal education, adequate to the demands of the age, with those which are necessary to the paramount interests of Christian faith and morality. Is the study of the ancient languages in their idiomatic perfection still to form the basis of such an education, or is something in this department to be sacrificed, and if something, then how much, to the accurate study of those modern languages which now form the medium of communication between the different nations of Europe, and whose literary resources bear witness to the fruits of modern civilization, and the accretions of many centuries of experience? Is ancient history to be supplemented by modern, and to what, if any, restrictions is the study of all history, but especially of the more modern branch of it, to be subjected? To what extent is the principle of expurgation to be admitted in the reading of classical books injurious to morality, whether by incidental phrases, or in the texture of the subject and its hardly concealed implications? Are the Christian to be substituted for the heathen classics, or to be combined with them, and if so, how is the fine edge of Christian ethics to be preserved from the blunting influences of the heathen admixture, or the fine edge of classical scholarship from those of the patristic Greek or the scholastic Latin? These and many other questions, of which these are but specimens, will have to be confronted by the ablest men among us as time goes on, and they are so full of difficulty that one cannot help feeling selfishly pleased by the thought that their solution will rest with others rather than with oneself. "*Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,*" who may at once vindicate religion from the unhallowed encroachments of science falsely so called, and practically resolve how education may become her handmaid without needless limitation of its own freedom.

The balance has to be struck between two forces which, in the moral and spiritual world, are precisely akin in their several tendencies to those in the world of nature which are so beautifully illustrated in the Latin verses I quoted awhile ago. Of what may be called the centrifugal force of our evil nature, it may be said as truly as of its "physical counterpart,"—

"*avia longe*

*Raptasset sine lege fugam ; at rehrenat ab alto
Subtile imperium Solis, reprimique coercens
Multa renitentem. Hinc demum media inter utramque*

Curvatis via fit spatiis ; rediv error in orbem,
Et sua perpetuo relegunt vestigia gyro."

So is it that the erratic spirit is recalled within its prescribed orbit by the attraction of the Centre of Unity ; that Sun of our ecclesiastical system, which poises the action of the various greater and lesser worlds that own its power, and provides them, as from a fountain alike incapable of failure and impervious to corruption, with perennial supplies of light and heat.

I am ever yours, &c.,

April 16.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.
